Order: The writ petition is one for the issue of a certiorari to quash the order of the second respondent in Cr.M.P. No. 995 of 1974 dated 15th February, 1975. The criminal miscellaneous petition filed under sections 397 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is for the same relief. Therefore, both can be dealt with together. 2. The short facts are as follows: The petitioner is the owner of ‘Midland Annexe’ at Door No. 36, Dr. Subbarayan Road, Salem-1, which is a Boarding and Lodging House. It is owned by a firm of partners consisting of (1) Thangaraj, (2) S. Arumugham and (3) the petitioner. The firm is a registered partnership. A notice was issued on 30th December, 1974, calling upon the writ petitioner to show cause as to why the premises should not be attached for the improper use thereof. The instances of improper use were listed out in the show cause notice, which was to the effect that the lodge was being run or used as a brothel by allowing the rooms of the lodge to be used by prostitutes for carrying on prostitution during the year 1973-74. On the basis of this show-cause notice, a prosecution was launched against the petitioner under section 18(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (herinafter referred as the Act) which was taken up in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 995 of 1974. The Chief judicial Magistrate, Salem, passed an order dated 15th February, 1975 (which is the subject-matter of the writ petition as well as the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition before this Court), holding that the offenee complained of had been made out and directed the eviction of the petitioner under section 18(1)(a) and further gave a direction under section 18(1)(b). 3. Though initially the writ petitioner challenged the vires of section 18(1) of the Act, when the matter was taken up for hearing, Mr. Nainar Sundaram, learned Counsel for the writ petitioner, conceded that his client was no longer interested in challenging the vires of the Act. This obviated the necessity to the first respondent filing a counter affidavit. 3. Though initially the writ petitioner challenged the vires of section 18(1) of the Act, when the matter was taken up for hearing, Mr. Nainar Sundaram, learned Counsel for the writ petitioner, conceded that his client was no longer interested in challenging the vires of the Act. This obviated the necessity to the first respondent filing a counter affidavit. Consequent upon this stand arguments were addressed on behalf the petitioner as follows: (1) Having regard to the ruling reported in Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi v. Ram Kali1, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to have resorted to section 7 of the Act before proceeding to take action under section 18(1), since section 7 would have enabled the petitioner to prove his innocence, and in the event of he being found guilty under section 7, he would have had an opportunity to come up in appeal, of which he has now been deprived by the prosecution having resorted to section 18. (2) Some instances listed out in the show-cause notice of December, 19/4, did not relate to ‘Midland Annexe’ of which alone the petitioner is the owner and therefore the show cause notice was not proper. (3) The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has not taken into consideration the proviso to section 18 (1) (6) notwithstanding his further direction under section 18 (1) (b). 4. The learned Government Pleader, in countering these arguments, would submit that it was open to the prosecution to have recourse either to section 7 or to section 18, that these are distinct in nature, the former relating to an offence against the person, under which the prosecution would be required to establish the mens rea of the accused, and the latter concerning the premises in question, and that, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that resort must have been had to section 7 is not correct. Nextly, all the instances quoted in the show cause notice of December, 1974, did relate to the petitioner, notwithstanding the misdescription of the property as merely ‘Midland Lodge’ and therefore no exception could be taken to the same. Lastly it is urged that the applicability of the proviso to section 18(1)(b) is not available to an owner of the premises at all; in this case, it is the owner who was running the lodge and therefore there was no scope for applying this proviso. Lastly it is urged that the applicability of the proviso to section 18(1)(b) is not available to an owner of the premises at all; in this case, it is the owner who was running the lodge and therefore there was no scope for applying this proviso. This was perhaps the reason why no such argument was advanced in this regard either before the Criminal Court nor even a ground taken in the writ petition. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor, while supporting the arguments of the learned Government Pleader, would also draw my attention to the decision in C.J. Vaswani v. State of W.B.1, and submit that section 7 and section 18 contemplate different situations, the latter being preventive in nature and concerning the premises. 6. On a careful consideration of the above arguments I find no substance either in the writ petition or in the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition. Certainly, there is no warrant for the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that only after resorting to section 7, section 18 could be invoked. As has been pointed out in Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi v. Ram Kali2, and C.J. Vaswani v. State of West Bengal3, section 7 and section 18 contemplate different offfences, section 7, as against the person, where under a regular prosecution would have to prove the mens rea or the knowledge of the accused, and no such thing arising under section 18. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, section 18 is purely preventive in nature. On a reading of the decision in Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi v. Ram Kali2, I sec no warrant for the extreme submission. Therefore, this argument fails. 7. May be, in some or the instances listed out in the show cause notice of 30th December, 1974, the desctiption of the property is only ‘Midland Lodge’ It is not the case of the petitioner that the ‘Midland’ belongs to somebody else. Even otherwise, there were certainly instances which directly related to ‘Midland Annexe’, which is admittedly owned by the petitioner. It is not by the numerality of the instances by which the offence under the section is made out; but even a single instance is enough, provided the Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction under section 18 (1) properly. In this case, I have little hesitation in holding that the discretion has been exercised properly. 8. It is not by the numerality of the instances by which the offence under the section is made out; but even a single instance is enough, provided the Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction under section 18 (1) properly. In this case, I have little hesitation in holding that the discretion has been exercised properly. 8. Regarding the applicability of the proviso to section 18 (1) (b), first of all that stage has not arisen, since, under that section, the writ petitioner, viz., owner, will have to obtain the previous approval of the Magistrate and then it will be time enough for the Magistrate to consider the applicability of the proviso, whether it is applicable to ‘owner’, I say nothing at present. Therefore, this argument also fails. 9. Consequently, the writ petition will stand dismissed. I make no order as to costs. 10. In view of my order in the writ petition, the criminal miscellaneous petition will also stand dismissed.