JUDGMENT SHMBHU PRASAD SINGH, J. 1. The petitioner, proprietor of M/s Laxmijee Mills, which carries on business in foodgrains and is a licensee under the Bihar Foodgrains Dealer's Licensing Order 1967 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Order') issued under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') at Biharsharif in the district of Nalanda, has made this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing orders contained in annexure 2 and 6 of the Collector of district, respondent no. 3, confiscating 128 bags of maize, 6 bags of Masur Chhati and 6 bags of Masur in a proceeding under section 6A of the Act. 2. It appears that on 12th of August, 1975, at about 5 P.M. there was an inspection of the business premises of the petitioner by a Magistrate. He made the inspection under order of the Sub-divisional Officer, Biharsharif, on the basis of the information received from officers of the Commercial Taxes Department. He seized in presence of other Government officers who were present there the entire stock of foodgrains of the petitioner and submitted a written report to the Officer-in-charge Biharsharif, Police station on the basis of which a first Information report (annexure 1) was drawn up. The report of the Magistrate is a part of the said first information report. The report shows that the Magistrate examined the signboard, the stock register and also verified the entire stock by getting it weighed. As mentioned in the report, he found the following discrepancies (i) There was excess of 15 quintals 4 Kilograms of maize in 18 bags and also of 4 quintals 24 kilograms 600 grams of Khesari Dal than the quantities thereof as entered in the stock register. (ii) The quantity of Masur was 800 grams less than its quantity as entered in the stock register. The actual verification by weighing the foodgrains was done in the morning of 13th of August, 1975 and not on 12th of August, 1975. An explanation was offered on behalf of the petitioner on 13th of August, 1975 that the excess in maize was on account of the fact that it was received on 12th of August, 1975 which was entered in the Amdani (income) register but not in the stock register as the inspection was made before the closing of business and the stock register itself was seized. The magistrate in his report has referred to this explanation and also observed that the officer of the Commercial Taxes Department stated that the entry in the Amdani register was wrong as it was made therein after he had signed the register. In the opinion of the Magistrate, therefore, the entry in the Amdani register about maize was doubtful. 3. The Police, however, after completing the investigation in the case submitted final report (Annexure 4) which was accepted by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate of the place, by the order dated 13th of February, 1976 vide annexure 3. In the meantime on 20th of January, 1976, the Collector had passed the order as contained in annexure 2 confiscating the grains as aforesaid. He did not pass any order for confiscation of Khesari and Khesari Dal as they were not covered in any of the foodgrains mentioned in the Order which may lead to a proceeding under section 6A of the Act. While passing the order the Collector considered the show cause filed by the petitioner stating that excess maize which was found was received on 12th of August, 1975 itself and the shortage in the Masur was negligible and, therefore, it should be ignored, and observed that he did not accept the contention of the opposite party, i.e. the petitioner that the maize was received on the said date, the 12th of August; 1975 and was, therefore, properly accounted for. 4. Against the aforesaid order of the Collector, the petitioner appealed to the Commissioner, Patna Division respondent no. 2. The appeal was taken up for admission on 9th of March, 1976. Before that the police had already submitted final report (Annexure 4) and the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had accepted it by his order dated 13th of February, 1976 (vide annexure 3). It was urged on behalf of the petitioner before respondent no. 2 that in accordance with provisions of section 6C (2) of the Act, in view of the fact that the petitioner had been discharged, the seized commodities should be returned to the petitioner. No other point was urged before him. Respondent no. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner before respondent no. 2 that in accordance with provisions of section 6C (2) of the Act, in view of the fact that the petitioner had been discharged, the seized commodities should be returned to the petitioner. No other point was urged before him. Respondent no. 2 did not admit the appeal with the observation that the appellant before him, i.e., the petitioner had to approach the authority who passed the order of confiscation, namely, the Collector for such release and an appeal could lie to him only if the petitioner was aggrieved by the order of the Collector on such a prayer. The aforesaid order of respondent no. 2 has been made annexure 5 to the writ petition. The petitioner then moved the Collector against for release of the grains and the Collector refused the prayer by his order dated 27th of April, 1976 (annexure 6) observing that section 6C (2) of the Act, could apply only if there was an acquittal after trial and not in a case of discharge. The petitioner thereafter did not go in appeal to the Commissioner and moved this Court by this writ application. It was admitted on 6th of May, 1976. While admitting the case the following order was also passed:– "Pending hearing of this application, the seized grains may be released to the petitioner on his depositing in cash price of maize at the rate of Rs. 137/- per quintal, Masur Chhanti @ Rs. 197/- per quintal and Masur @ Rs. 150/- per quintal. It will be open to the petitioner to sell the grains after they are released to him. We have been informed that the petitioner could not deposit the money and the grains are still there. 5. The order of confiscation passed by respondent no. 3 has been challenged in the writ petition on various grounds, but Mr. 150/- per quintal. It will be open to the petitioner to sell the grains after they are released to him. We have been informed that the petitioner could not deposit the money and the grains are still there. 5. The order of confiscation passed by respondent no. 3 has been challenged in the writ petition on various grounds, but Mr. Bharuka appearing on behalf of the petitioner urged only three of them at the there of the hearing:– (i) That the petitioner was not expected to enter in the stock register the grains as soon as they arrived: he was entitled to enter them at the close of the business of the day and in the instant case as 18 bags of maize were fresh arrivals of 12th of August, 1975 itself and the difference in the case of Masur being negligible, there was no contravention of any order passed under section 3 of the Act, and as such the orders of confiscation are illegal. (ii) That respondent no. 3 having failed to record an unambiguous finding that the petitioner has contravened any Order passed under section 3 of the Act, and having not assigned any reason for disbelieving the explanation of the petitioner, the orders of confiscation were bad. (iii) That after the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has accepted the final report submitted by the police holding that there was no contravention of any order passed under section 3 of the Act, the order passed by the Collector as contained in annexure 6 refusing to release the goods to the petitioner was against law and without Jurisdiction. 6. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. It denies that the excess stock of maize was entered in the Amdani (income) register at or before the time of inspection and states that Respondent no. 3 rightly refused to accept the explanation of the petitioner. It is further alleged that the petitioner would have been entitled to get the confiscated foodgrains released only if there had been an order of acquittal in his favour and not only on account of an order of discharge passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate accepting final report submitted by the Police in the case. 7. So far as the first point urged by Mr. Bharuka is concerned, respondent no. 7. So far as the first point urged by Mr. Bharuka is concerned, respondent no. 3 has not any where in his orders doubted the explanation offered by the petitioner that difference so far Masur was concerned was negligible, but he was not prepared to accept the explanation of the petitioner that 18 bags of maize arrived in the shop on 12th of August, 1975 itself and, therefore, they were not found entered in the stock register. In this connection he has also referred to the assertion of the officer of the Commercial Taxes Department that there was no entry to that effect in the Amdani (income) register at the time that officer inspected the shop of the petitioner. This question is a disputed question of fact. Sufficient materials are not on the record on the basis of which a definite finding may be arrived at by this Court as to whether the said quantity of maize actually arrived on 12th of August, 1975 itself. Further the petitioner did not urge this point before the Commissioner when the appeal was taken up for admission on 9th of March 1967. In the circumstances I do not think it will be proper for this Court to go into this question in exercise of writ jurisdiction and to hold that the explanation offered by the petitioner in this regard is correct and as such there was no contravention of any order passed under the Act, by the petitioner. 8. There is also no substance in the second point urged on behalf of the petitioner. True it is that respondent no. 3 has rot stated in so many words that there was contravention of an order passed under the Act, by the petitioner, but if the two words passed by him as contained in annexure 3 and 6 are read, it is manifest that he was of the opinion that the petitioner had contravened an order passed under the Act. Respondent no. 3 has also assigned reasons, be they good or bad, for not accepting the explanation of the petitioner. The orders of confiscation, therefore, cannot be quashed on this ground either. 9. The decision of the third point raised by Mr. Respondent no. 3 has also assigned reasons, be they good or bad, for not accepting the explanation of the petitioner. The orders of confiscation, therefore, cannot be quashed on this ground either. 9. The decision of the third point raised by Mr. Bharuka rests on the decision of the question whether the expression "acquitted" in section 6C (2) of the Act, is comprehensive enough to include an order of the nature passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13th of February, 1976 accepting the final report submitted by the Police. The expression "acquitted" or "acquittal" has not been defined in the Act, nor the word "discharge" has been defined in the Act. Neither of these two words "acquittal" and "discharge" has been defined in the Central General Clauses Act, (Act 10 of 1897) or the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, (Act 1 of 1917). According to dictionaries, the two words are almost synonyms. "Acquit" means to Free: to release: to release from an accusation and "acquittal" means a judicial discharge from an accusation. "Discharge" means to set free: to acquit. Prima facie, therefore, the expression "acquitted" in section 6C (2) of the Act, should be construed to be comprehensive enough to include any judicial order passed at any stage of the proceeding setting free the accused of the accusation. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, however, submitted that the words "discharge" and "acquittal" "have been used in two different senses in the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the expression "acquitted" in section 6C (2) of the Act, ought not to include an order of discharge. Learned counsel for the State drew our attention to section 227, 239 and 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") where the expression "discharge" has been used and sections 232, 248 and 255 where the expression "acquittal" has been used. From a perusal of these sections it will appear that in the procedure prescribed for trial of summons cases only the word acquittal has been used for there is no express provision for framing of charges in summons cases. So far as session trials and trials in warrant cases are concerned, both the expression "discharge" and "acquittal" have been used. From a perusal of these sections it will appear that in the procedure prescribed for trial of summons cases only the word acquittal has been used for there is no express provision for framing of charges in summons cases. So far as session trials and trials in warrant cases are concerned, both the expression "discharge" and "acquittal" have been used. When on perusal of the materials on the record or examination of the evidence led by the prosecution in warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report, the court of sessions or the Magistrate considers that no case against the accused has been made out, he would discharge the accused, but if he frames charges and thereafter on taking further evidence finds the accused not guilty he is required to record an order of "acquittal". It would thus appear that for the purposes of the Code "acquittal" means an Order setting free the accused of accusation after full-dress trial, whereas "discharge" means setting free the accused of accusation without a full–dress trial. In my opinion, however, this distinction between the meaning of the two words as used in the Code cannot be relevant for the purposes of construing the meaning of the term "acquitted" in section 6C (2) of the Act. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that where some expression is used in it and it is not defined there in the dictionary meaning of the expression has to be given to it while construing it. Further if the word "acquitted" in section 6C (2) of the Act, is to be given a meaning setting free the accused from accusation after full–dress trial, that will lead to results which may not be good for the ends of justice. A closer examination of the Code will show that in sessions cases or warrant cases an order of discharge is to be recorded when the Sessions Judge or the Magistrate finds that the prosecution case is wholly worthless and no charge need be framed, whereas in cases where there is some substance in the prosecution case charge is framed and after trial if the accused is not found guilty he is acquitted. It will be against principle of justice to hold that an order of discharge is disadvantageous to him than an order of acquittal. It will be against principle of justice to hold that an order of discharge is disadvantageous to him than an order of acquittal. Of course, in some cases where an accused is discharged on some technical grounds such as want of sanction etc., the case stands on different footing. But that in itself cannot be a ground for holding that in all cases orders of discharge should be disadvantageous to the accused than the order of acquittal. That will amount to giving some advantage to the prosecution in cases which are wholly worthless than in cases which Prima facie appear to have some substance. In the instant case, if the State was dissatisfied with the final report of the police, it should have filed a protest petition before the Magistrate or if it was dissatisfied with the order passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate accepting the final report it should have moved the superior courts for setting aside that order. But having not done so, the State or the respondent no. 3 cannot be allowed to urge that the word "acquitted" in section 6C (2) of the Act, should be given a limited meaning as not to include order dated 13th of February, 1976 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate accepting the final report. Undoubtedly the order amounted to an order of judicial discharge of the accused from an accusation which is the dictionary meaning of the term "acquittal". In my opinion, therefore, there is substance in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Bharuka and the application must succeed on that ground. 10. It may be stated here that section 6A and 6C of the Act, have been amended by the Essential Commodities (Bihar Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1976–Bihar Ordinance No. 123 of 1976. They were also amended by an earlier Ordinance, such as Bihar Ordinance No. 41 of 1976, but these amendments have got no bearing on the interpretation of the term "acquitted" in section 6C (2) of the Act. 11. In the result, the application is allowed and the orders of respondent no. 3 as contained in annexure 2 and 6 are quashed. Respondent no. 3 is directed to return to the petitioner the maize, Masur Chhanti and Masur seized. I agree. Application allowed.