JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - This is defendant's revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and order dated 30th July, 1975 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bareilly, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Small Cause Court Judge. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that the plaintiff opposite party filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant revisionist from a shop and for the recovery of Rs. 80/- as arrears of rent and damages from 20th December, 1973 to 19th February, 1974. According to the plaintiff, the shop was constructed in 1968 and the provisions of U.P. Act. No. 13 of 1972 were not applicable to it. 3. The defendant filed a lengthy written statement. In substance, he contested the suit mainly on the grounds that the shop was an old construction and the provisions of the Act No. 13 of 1972 applied to it and as no grounds for ejectment was made out, the suit was liable to be dismissed. It was also alleged that the notice to quit was invalid. 4. The learned Judge Small Cause Court, Bareilly arrived at the conclusion that the shop was constructed in 1968 and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were not applicable to it. He further held that the notice to quit was valid. The suit was accordingly decreed for possession over the shop as well as for the recovery of rent and damages from 10-12-1973 at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month upto the date of delivery of possession. 5. The defendant filed a revision application under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. Only one point viz., when the shop was constructed appears to have been pressed before that court and he agreed with the finding given by the learned Small Cause Court. The revision was accordingly dismissed and the defendant has now come up in revision against it under section 115 C.P.C. 6. The crucial point for consideration is when the shop in suit was completed. Both the learned lower courts held on the basis of the plaintiff's statement and Amin's report that it was constructed in 1968. The revision was accordingly dismissed and the defendant has now come up in revision against it under section 115 C.P.C. 6. The crucial point for consideration is when the shop in suit was completed. Both the learned lower courts held on the basis of the plaintiff's statement and Amin's report that it was constructed in 1968. It appears that the Amin had inspected the shop in the presence of the parties and submitted his report on 21-2-1975 to the effect that the northern wall contains bricks of 1959 and 1962. The southern wall contains bricks of 1960 and the western and eastern walls contain bricks of 1967. 7. The learned counsel for the revisionist has vehemently contended that the lower courts should have recorded its finding about completion of the construction in the light of Explanation added to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. It will he convenient at this stage to read the relevant section 2 of the new Act in so far as it is material for the purpose of this case. It read :- Exemption from operation of Act : "2. (1) Nothing in this Act apply to:- (2) Except as provided in sub-section (2) of section 24 or sub-section (3) of section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. Explanation :-for the purposes of this sub-section,- (a) The construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or, assessment the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time : Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants ; (b) ..................... (c) ..................... (c) ..................... " There can be no manner of doubt that the burden of proving that the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 do not apply to this building lay on the plaintiff. I am fortified in this view by the case of Noor Mohammad v. Smt. Insha Allah Jahan Begam, 1971 A.W.R. 41. The plaintiff opposite party had to discharge this burden in the light of section 2(2) and the Explanation appended to it. The provision makes it clear that the construction of the building shall be deemed to have been completed on either of the three dates viz., either on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to, or otherwise recorded by the local authority and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment was made and in the case of difference, the earliest of the said dates in the absence of any such report, record or assessment the date on which it was actually occupied for the first time. Therefore, the term "completed" used in section 2(2) of the new Act will have to be construed in the light of the Explanation. Both the learned lower courts should have recorded a finding about completion of the building in the light of this Explanation. This view is in accord with the view expressed in S.A. Alvi v. A.R. Khan, 1974 A.L.J. 597. By completely ignoring this Explanation, they have recorded a finding on the basis of Amin's report and statement of the plaintiff that the building was constructed in 1962. The learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party has vehemently contended that there was no serious dispute about the date on which the building was first occupied and the completion could be determined on its basis. I am reluctant to subscribe to this contention because neither there is any word in the plaint to show when the building was first occupied nor the plaintiff adduced any evidence on this point nor the learned lower courts have recorded any finding on it. Besides it, he could bank on the date of occupation only in the absence of date on which the completion of the building was reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority or the date on which the first assessment was made. Besides it, he could bank on the date of occupation only in the absence of date on which the completion of the building was reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority or the date on which the first assessment was made. In the instant case no evidence was adduced by the plaintiff to show on which date the completion of the building was reported to or was otherwise recorded or when the first assessment became effective. Unless absence of these three was proved, the plaintiff opposite party could not fall back upon the date of occupation. The result is that the trial court acted illegally and with material irregularity by not deciding the question of completion in the manner prescribed but by deciding it in a fanciful manner. He failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and the case deserves to he sent back to the trial court for retrial. 8. The revision application is accordingly allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower courts are set aside. The case is sent back to the learned trial court for re-trial. He will give fresh opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence and decide the question of completion of this building in the light of section 2(2) and the Explanation of the new Act. The record may be sent back to the trial court who will dispose of the suit expeditiously. The parties shall bear their own costs of this revision.