JUDGMENT Virendra Kumar, C. - This is a reference made by a Single Member to the Full Bench of the Board regarding its territorial jurisdiction. Simultaneously the same Member has submitted to this Bench the Review petition No. 352 of 1971-72, Allahabad (Baharuddin v. Gaon Sabha). The legal issues involved in this review petition had already been decided by a smaller Full Bench whose decision appears on pages 235 to 246 of R.D. 1975. In view of the decision of the previous Bench it was only a larger Bench which could review the decision of the previous Bench dated May 31, 1975. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the instant reference and the review petition may be succinctly set forth. In Revision No. 352 of 1971-72 Allahabad (Baharuddin v. Gaon Sabha), Sri M. Samiuddin, an erstwhile Member of the Board referred the matter to a Full Bench. The relevant portions from his referring order dated June 9, 1972 are given below:- "The main contention is that since an application in revision lies to the Board of Revenue, the Board alone has the power to dispose it of, and the parties should be heard before this can be done. Non-hearing of the parties goes against the principles of natural justice. Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act has been referred to . 3. The learned counsel for the applicant has emphasised that the provisions of the Revenue Courts Manual as such do not apply and paragraph 189 of the Revenue Court Manual has been challenged. 4. The main point which emerges out is that where the rights of a party are affected, the Board has to give a hearing before any orders could be passed, and failure to do so would amount to violation of the principles of natural justice. Since this involves some fundamental points of law, it would be in the interest of justice if the matter is thrashed out in detail. It would, therefore, be necessary to refer this matter to a Full Bench which may be constituted by the Chairman of the Board at an early date to go into the matter." 3. Since this involves some fundamental points of law, it would be in the interest of justice if the matter is thrashed out in detail. It would, therefore, be necessary to refer this matter to a Full Bench which may be constituted by the Chairman of the Board at an early date to go into the matter." 3. There were several other petitions for review or applications for restoration treated as review in which similar points were involved and, therefore, a Bench was constituted consisting of S|Sri Prakash Krishen, M. Samiuddin and A.K. Sharma, Members to answer the questions referred to the Bench. Before the hearing could start Sri A.K. Sharma and hence the Bench was reconstituted to consist of S\Sri Prakash Krishen, M. Samiuddin and N.B. Lal, Members to give answers to the questions referred by the various Members in the following review and restoration applications:- Restoration application No. 32 of 1971-72, District Agra against Board's order dated January 16, 1971. Restoration treated as review application No.8 of 1964-650, Lucknow against order dated April 30, 1965. Review-cum-restoration application No. 352 of 1971-72, Allahabad against order dated November 12, 1971. Review application No. 26 and 27 of 1972-73|Azamgarh against order dated February 7, 1972. Review No. 49 of 1972-73, Allahabad against order dated July 26, 1973. Review No. 19 of 1972-73, Basti against order dated September 5, 1972. Review Applications Nos. 78 to 82 of 1970-71, District Azamgarh against order dated December 28, 1970. Review No. 675-S of 1970-71, Moradabad against order dated June 26, 1971. Review No. 231(z) of 1970-1971, Pratapgarh against order dated November 26, 1970. 4. The Bench reduced the points of law involved to two questions which are to the following effect:- (1) Is it open to the Board to dismiss an application for revision without giving a hearing to the parties? (2) Are the provisions contained in Rules 186 to 189 of the Revenue Court Manual valid and legal? 5. Before answering these two questions the Bench also heard the counsels regarding the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue and held that the Board had jurisdiction all over the State. Thereafter the Bench went on to give its answer to it. After answering the two issues the order was signed by Sri N.B. Lal one of the Members of the Bench. Thereafter the Bench went on to give its answer to it. After answering the two issues the order was signed by Sri N.B. Lal one of the Members of the Bench. Thereafter Sri M. Samiuddin another Member of the same Bench observed that he generally agreed with the conclusions arrived at but went on to add a para of his own regarding the jurisdiction of the Board. Lastly, Sri Prakash Krishen, Member, concluded by observing 'I concur'. The result is that the petition is dismissed. 6. On publication of this judgment in R.D. 1975 at page 235 showing that the judgment was a majority judgment of S|Sri M. Samiuddin and Prakash Krishen, Members and that Sri. N.B. Lal had differed from the other two Members, quite a lot of confusion was created in the minds of the other Members of the Board, the learned counsels both at Allahabad and Lucknow as well as the litigant public and shortly thereafter a petition for review was presented on July 24, 1975 (Review No. 71 of 1975) and since only a larger Bench could review the order of the previous full bench the Single Member who made the reference expressed the view that this review petition could only be heard by a larger Bench. Further, because it was not clear from the Full Bench decision of May 31, 1975 that the observations made in his judgment regarding the jurisdiction of the Board were in the nature of obiter dicta or ratio decidendi, the Single Member referred the matter to a larger Full Bench. His referring order is to the following effect:- "In this review petition a reference was made by the erstwhile Member Sri M. Samiuddin, I.A.S., to the Full Bench for a reply on one point which, according to him, involved some fundamental points of law. The Full Bench consisting of the referring Member Sri M. Samiuddin, I.A.S., along with Sri Prakash Krishen, I.A.S. and Sri N.B. Lal, I.A.S. met at Lucknow and on May 31, 1975 gave its replies on the points which had been referred to it. 2. A copy of the judgment of this Full Bench has now been received. A perusal of this judgment shows that the Full Bench also considered and decided the point of jurisdiction although no reference had been made to the Bench on this point. 2. A copy of the judgment of this Full Bench has now been received. A perusal of this judgment shows that the Full Bench also considered and decided the point of jurisdiction although no reference had been made to the Bench on this point. Hence, the following issue will also need to be referred to larger Bench for determining the question of jurisdiction. This issue is: "Can Members of the Board sitting Single or in Bench entertain, hear adn decide appeals and revisions under the Land Revenue Act and under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act at any district headquarters in the State or at Lucknow and Allahabad only." 7. Thus this larger Full Bench has before it three questions which have to be answered afresh in view of the ambiguities arising out of the preview Full Bench's findings given in its judgment on May 31,1975. 8. The foregoing facts would show that these three questions referred to the present Full Bench are: (1) Can Members of the Board sitting Singly or in Bench entertain, hear and decide appeals and revisions under the U.P. Zanmindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act at any district headquarters in the State or at Lucknow or Allahabad only (2) Is it open to the Board to dismiss an application for revision without giving a hearing to the parties? and (3) Are the provisions contained in Rules 186 to 189 of the Revenue Court Manual valid and legal. 9. This Full Bench heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in Review application No. 71 of 1974-75 at Allahabad on November 17, 1975. Some advocates representing the Revenue Bar Association, Lucknow were also present in the hearing. In the subsequent two hearing held at Lucknow on November 21 and 22, 1975 the arguments continued and we heard both the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri S.N. Misra, Advocate, representing the Revenue Bar Association, Lucknow and the District Government Counsel (Revenue) Lucknow who also argued on behalf of the Lucknow Bar Association. 10. Taking the question of Board's jurisdiction first we find that it can be considered under the two broad heads - (a) territorial jurisdiction , and (b) Act wise jurisdiction. For the purposes of territorial jurisdiction we will have to go back, as pointed out by the learned counsel for petitioner, to the early nineteenth century. 10. Taking the question of Board's jurisdiction first we find that it can be considered under the two broad heads - (a) territorial jurisdiction , and (b) Act wise jurisdiction. For the purposes of territorial jurisdiction we will have to go back, as pointed out by the learned counsel for petitioner, to the early nineteenth century. He has argued that according to Para III of Bengal Regulation of 1831 the Board was to be ordinarily stationed at Allahabad' and thereafter through successive regulations ans Acts the Board's office, principal seat and headquarter continued to be at Allahabad, with the result that the cases under all Acts triable by the Board of Revenue should be entertained, heard and decided at Allahabad only and that all judicial work of the Board of Revenue being done at Lucknow is irregular, illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the Board. 11. The learned counsels representing the Lucknow Bar have argued that this contention of the learned counsel is thoroughly unsound and based on a very narrow view of the territorial jurisdiction of the Board. They have traced the history of the Board from the very inception of this organization and have pointed out that the jurisdiction of the 'Board' first finds place in Regulation II of 1973. The relevant part of this para reads as follows:- "From May 1, 1793 the Courts of Maal Adawlut or Revenue Courts shall be abolished and the trial of the suits which were cognizable in those courts as well as judicial powers whatsoever heretofore vested in the collectors of the revenue or in the Board of Revenue collectively as a court of appeal or in any Member of the Board individually shall be transferred to the courts of Dwwanny Adawlut." 12. Subsequently three Board's of Revenue were established for the lower, central and western provinces. Regulation III of 1822, however, laid down very clearly the composition, powers functions and duties of these Boards. These have been given in Sections 4 and 5 of Regulation III of 1822 and are being reproduced verbatim for facility of ready reference:- "IV. First - The said Boards shall each of them consist of such number of members as the Governor-General in council may from time to time appoint. Second - The said Boards shall ordinarily sit daily (Sundays and holidays excepted) for the transaction of public business. First - The said Boards shall each of them consist of such number of members as the Governor-General in council may from time to time appoint. Second - The said Boards shall ordinarily sit daily (Sundays and holidays excepted) for the transaction of public business. Third - (Forms of proceedings, Sudder station) - Superseded by Clause Second IV and Section VI. Regulation I, 1829). V. First - It shall be competent to the Government-General in Council, by an order in Council, to authorise a Single Member of any of the said Boards to exercise, either generally or locally, all the duties, powers an authority, which are vested in the Board collectively, whenever circumstances may render such an arrangement desirable. It shall further be competent to the Governor-General in Council similarly to authorize the several members of the said Board separately to exercise at the same time, and within the same limits, such part of the said duties powers and authority, as it may from time to time be judged proper to assign to each respectively, whenever, for the greater dispatch of business or other cause, it may appear advisable to divide the business of the Board or to assign any special duty to any member separately: provided, however that if a member exercising singly , as above, the duties powers, and authority of the Board or any part thereof, shall in any case be of opinion that any decision or order of a collector ought to be reversed or altered he shall not pass any final order on the case without the concurrence of one or more of the other members, unless otherwise specially directed and authorised by Government: provided, further, that it shall not be competent to a single member of a Board to reverse or alter a decree or order passed by any other member, provided also, that no settlement of the land revenue , whether in perpetuity or for a term of years, shall be or be held final and binding upon Government unless the same shall have been formally confirmed by the Governor-General in Council. Second - Whenever two members of a Board shall jointly or separately have considered any question, if a difference of opinion shall arise between them, the decision of the question shall be postponed, and the case shall be referred to a third member, permanent or provisional, in such mode as may from time to time be directed by Government, and shall be determined according to the majority of voices. Third - In regard of the appointment , removal or punishment of the native officers of collectors of land revenue, or other functionaries subordinate to the Boards, a single member vested as above with authority separately to exercise the powers of the Board or any part thereof, shall within the limits of his authority, be competent to proceed in the same manner as the Board collectively are authorised to proceed: provided that, in any such case, if a member of the Board acting singly shall differ in opinion from a collector or other functionary immediately subordinate to them, he shall not unless otherwise specially authorised by Government, pass any final order without the concurrence of one or more members of the Board. Fourth - No final orders regarding the appointment, removal, or punishment of officers belonging or immediately subordinate to the Board, shall (unless otherwise specially directed by the Government-General in Council) be issued without the concurrent judgment of two or more members. Fifth - Single members exercising separate authority as above shall be competent to suspend any officer under their authority, in like manner as the Board collectively may do, but all orders regarding the suspension of any such officer, passed by a single member, unless in confirmation of an order of recommendation of a collector, or other intermediate authority, or unless specially, authorised by the Governor General in Council, shall be reported without loss of time to some other member, and shall be liable to be set aside by the decision of a majority of the Board. Sixth - The Boards are authorised to review, rescind, alter, or confirm, any order and decision passed by them collectively, or by any member exercising, as above, separate authority, if an application to that effect be made to them by any party interested in the case, within the period of three months from the date on which the order or decision may have been passed, or good and sufficient cause shown for a further delay, and if, from the documents exhibited, the case shall appear to merit further investigation. But no order or decision passed by a single member exercising separate authority shall be reversed, altered or stayed , excepting on the concurrent judgment of two or more members. Seventh - To provide for cases wherein the members of the Board shall not agree in opinion as to the decision or order to be passed in any case, and wherein the voices on each side may be equal, it shall be competent to the Governor-General in council to appoint one or more temporary or provisional member, who shall, in regard to the investigation and determination of the questions so in dispute, have and exercise the same powers and authority as if they ordinarily belonged to the Board, and if a difference of opinion as aforesaid shall arise between two members of the Board holding joint sittings, at any place where a temporary or provisional member may be stationed, the other permanent member or members of the Board being absent, it shall and may be lawful for them, without reference to such absent member, to submit the question in dispute to the provisional member, and to issue orders in conformity with the opinion which he may support." 13. We have considered it necessary to quote, in extenso, from Regulation III of 1822 to show that the basic structure of the Board and the scheme of things envisaged at that time have remained, more or less, unchanged excepting such alterations which became absolutely necessary due to socio-political or economic reasons. 14. A major change took place when Bengal Regulation I of 1829 was passed. 14. A major change took place when Bengal Regulation I of 1829 was passed. The preamble of this Regulation need to be reproduced in order to explain the changed which were brought into effect by this Regulation and the reasons which made these changes necessary: "I. The system in operation for superintending the magistracy and the police, and for controlling and directing the executive revenue officers, who in several cases are also magistrates, has been found to be defective. The Provincial Courts of appeal and Circuit, as now constituted, partly from the extent of country placed under their authority, and partly from their having to discharge the duties of both civil and criminal tribunals, have, in many cases failed to afford that prompt administration of justice which it is the duty of Government to secure for the people. The goal deliveries have been, in some instances, delayed beyond the term prescribed by law, especially in the division of Bareilly, which comprises thirteen stations, at which gaol deliveries have to be held, besides the joint magistrates of Belah and Sirpoorah, and a great arrear of cases under appeal has accrued in all the courts, to the manifest injury of many individuals ans to the encouragement or litigation and crime. The judges of circuit, when employed singly in the district under their authority, do not possess sufficient powers, nor have they the opportunity of acquiring sufficient local knowledge to enable them adequately to control the police, or protect the people. The great extent of company under each of the Boards of Revenue has similarly operated to impede them in the execution of the duties which belong to them as tribunals, for the determination of all questions relative to the assessment of lands under settlement, and for the judicial decision of many other important cases, as the general guardians of the fiscal interests of the state, as directors and superintendents over the executive officers, and as the confidential advisers of Government. For the correction of the above defects, it has appeared to be expedient and necessary to place the magistracy and police, and the collectors and other executive revenue officers, under the superintendence and control of commissioners of revenue and circuit, each vested with the charge of such a moderate tract of country as may enable them to be easy of access to the people, and frequently to visit the different parts of their respective jurisdictions, to confide to the said Commissioners the powers now vested in the courts of Circuit together with those that belong to the Boards of Revenue, to be exercised, with the modifications hereinafter provided, the former under the authority of the Nazamut Adawlut, and the latter under the instructions and control of a Sudder of Chief Board of Revenue, and altogether to disjoin the functions of the Courts of Circuit from those of the Judges of appeal. It has, at the same time appeared to be necessary, with a view to the more speedy and effectual redress of the wrongs which the people have suffered in several of the districts of the Western Provinces, under the circumstances detailed in the preamble of Regulation I, 1821, to transfer to the said commissioner of revenue and circuit, the powers and authority now exercised by the Mofussil special commissioners acting under the provisions of that law, with certain modifications hereinafter specified. It has likewise been deemed expedient to extend the system of administration, which has been for some years followed in Chuttack, to the adjoining district of Midnapore, and to certain other districts in the vicinity of tracts of which the affairs are conducted on similar principles and further, with a view to public economy, it has been deemed proper to abolish the office of Superintendent of Police, the necessity for which is superseded by the appointment of Commissioners. With the above views and purposes the Governor-General in Council has enacted the following rules, to be in force from the March 1, 1829, throughout the provinces immediately subject to the presidency of Fort William." 15. With the above views and purposes the Governor-General in Council has enacted the following rules, to be in force from the March 1, 1829, throughout the provinces immediately subject to the presidency of Fort William." 15. Para 2 of this regulation laid down that the Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit shall be appointed for each of the 20 divisions mentioned in the para and para 4 provided that the said Commissioners shall possess and exercise within the several districts comprised in the respective divisions the powers and authority now vested in the Boards of Revenue and Courts of Wards subject to the control and direction of a Sudder or the Head Board to be ordinarily stationed at the presidency, unless otherwise directed by the Governor-General in Council or the said Sudder Board, with his authority or sanction, may prescribe. This para of Regulation I of 1829 spells out that the Sudder or Head Board will be ordinarily stationed at the Presidency, namely the Fort William at Calcutta. However, the powers of the Board were to be exercised by the Commissioners within the several districts comprised in their respective divisions. 16. According to Section 3 of Regulation X of 1831 the Governor-General in Council was empowered to depute one or more members of the Sudder Board to be ordinarily stationed at Allahabad and to exercise exclusive control and direction over the revenue affairs of the tracts hereinafter mentioned in the said regulation, in like manner as was then exercised by the Sudder Board at the Presidency. Thereafter the station of Board was, by proclamation , shifted from Allahabad to Agra and the Board was styled as a Board of Revenue for the North Western Provinces. 17. In 1833 when Regulation I was passed the Sudder Board was stationed at Agra and not at Allahabad. Later on under Section 3 of Act IV of 1850 the Sudder Board of Revenue at the Presidency was denominated as the Board of Revenue for the lower provinces of Bengal. 18. The Recovery of Rents (Bengal Act) 1859 which can be said to be the precursor of the Land Revenue Act, 1901 did not define the word 'Board of Revenue'. By Section CLI this Act only provided that Collectors and Deputy Collectors were to be subject to the general direction and control of the Commissioners and the Board of Revenue. 18. The Recovery of Rents (Bengal Act) 1859 which can be said to be the precursor of the Land Revenue Act, 1901 did not define the word 'Board of Revenue'. By Section CLI this Act only provided that Collectors and Deputy Collectors were to be subject to the general direction and control of the Commissioners and the Board of Revenue. However, the North Western Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1873 defined the Board of Revenue more clearly. Under Section 3(vii) Board was defined as the Board of Revenue for the North Western Provinces. Under Section 151 of this Act it was laid down that every officer invested with power under this Act may hold a court of hearing and determining suits under this Act in any place within the limits of the district to which he is appointed. Every hearing shall be in open court and the parties to the suit or their agents shall have due notice to attend in such place. Under the North Western Provinces Act of 1881 the Board continued to have the same definition and the power to hold court in any place and the jurisdiction of the court was contained in Section 152 of this Act. According to this Act also the permanent seat of the Board of Revenue was not indicated and there was a general assumption that the Board will continue to ordinarily stationed at Allahabad. 19. In 1890 after the formal amalgamation of the territory of Oudh the Board for the North Western Provinces also became the Board for Oudh territory. 20. In 1901 the North Western Provinces and Oudh Land Revenue Act and North Western Provinces Tenancy Act were enacted which defined Board and the Board of Revenue which has continued since then. During the period the various tenancy legislation's like the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 and the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 remained in force, although the Board of Revenue was stationed at Allahabad it used to hold its Courts in Circuits in all the headquarters of the divisions of the Province. It was only in 1949 that the practice of holding courts in Circuits was stopped and the administrative wing of the Board of Revenue was shifted to Lucknow. It was only in 1949 that the practice of holding courts in Circuits was stopped and the administrative wing of the Board of Revenue was shifted to Lucknow. The United Provinces Board of Revenue Act, 1922 which provided that the jurisdiction of the Board will extend over the entire State of U.P. remained, however, silent as to what will be the seat or what will be the principal head-quarters of the Board. 21. With this historical background it would be easier to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsels of Lucknow Bar. They have maintained that the Board of Revenue is a statutory body dating back to the period when the authority of the East India Company was established in the province of Bengal and, later as and when the territories of the Company grew in size the jurisdiction of the Board, originally confined to the province of Bengal was extended to the province of Bihar, the districts of eastern U.P. which were ceded to Company in 1801 by the Nawab Wazir of Oudh and finally by the complete annexation of the twelve districts of Oudh in 1809. According to them, the Board was first established at Murshidabad and then shifted to Fort William at Calcutta. While exercising complete territorial jurisdiction over the entire North Western Provinces which later came to be known as the Provinces of Agra and Oudh, it remained without any permanent seat or headquarters and stationed some of its members for sometime at Agra but had nothing or the sort which could be regarded as its permanent seat or headquarters. Till 1901 the board had exercised supervision and control over the two aspects of revenue administration, namely the realisation of revenue, rent on the one hand and the rights and interests of the cultivators on the other. From 1901 onwards however, there was a bifurcation and while the collection of rent and land revenue was governed by the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, the tenancy legislation's continued separately resulting in the North Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901, the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926, the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951. On the rent and revenue side the enactments which need any mention are the A.I.T. Act, 1948, the L.L.H.T. Act 1957 and the U.P. Land Development Act, 1972. On the rent and revenue side the enactments which need any mention are the A.I.T. Act, 1948, the L.L.H.T. Act 1957 and the U.P. Land Development Act, 1972. This bifurcation of legislation had, however, very little impact on the powers and functions of the Board which remained unimpaired so far as its territorial jurisdiction was concerned. They have thus maintained that this jurisdiction of the Board has remained unaffected and while it extended, firstly to the earliest British territories, was later on confined to the North Western Provinces and now extends to the whole of the Provinces of Agra and Oudh presently known as the State of U.P. The Board never has had any permanent seat or headquarters and has ordinarily been stationed first at Murshidabad, then at Fort William in Bengal, then at Allahabad, then at Agra and again at Allahabad as well as Lucknow. However, the stationing of Boards headquarters at either of these two places has not restricted or confined the Board's jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the revenue cases of various classes under various Acts at either of the places in its jurisdiction and that it continued to hold the Circuit Courts at the various divisional headquarters right upto 1948. Hence, to say that the principal seat and headquarters of the Board is at Allahabad where alone it can entertain, hear and decide the cases under various Acts triable by the Board is absolutely untenable. 22. The learned counsels of the Lucknow Bar have also pointed out that the above conclusions are borne out fully by Rule 163 of the Revenue Court Manual, on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied, and which provides that every appeal or application to the Board or Revenue shall be presented to the Registrar of the Boards Office at Allahabad or to a Member at National (since deleted) or to the District Officer of the district concerned and if, the said application or appeal is presented to a Member of the Board at any other district headquarters other than the Boards Office at Allahabad, it shall be sent forthwith to the Registrar of the Board Office at Allahabad. This view finds further support from the latter portion of Rule 173 of the Revenue Court Manual which reads as follows:- The results of appeals decided by the Board shall be affixed on the notice board in their office. When the appeal has been heard in any district other than Allahabad, the result shall be affixed on the notice board of the Commissioners Court if the headquarters of the district in which the appeal had been heard is also the headquarters of a Division, and in other cases, on the notice board of the Collector's court. 23. In support of these conclusions it would not be out of place to mention what eminent jurists have to say on "The Interpretation of Statutes", Maxwell has stated that there is a presumption against ousting established jurisdiction. 'A strong leaning exists', according to him, 'against construing a statute so as to oust or restrict the jurisdiction of the superior courts, Although this feeling may owe its origin to the contests for jurisdiction between between the various courts in former times, when the judges' emoluments depended mainly upon fees, 'the well-known rule that a statute should not be constructed as taking away the jurisdiction of the courts in the absence of clear and unambiguous language to that effect' now rests on a reluctance to disturb the established state of the law or to deny to the subjects access to the seat of justice. "The proper tribunals for the determination of legal disputes in this country are the courts and they are the only tribunals which, by training and experience, and assisted by properly qualified advocates, are fitted for the task'. 'Any one bred in the tradition of the law', said Viscount Simonds, 'is likely to regard with little sympathy legislative provisions for ousting the jurisdiction of the court, whether in order that the subject may be deprived altogether of remedy or in order that his grievance may be remitted to some other tribunal. 'It is', he said in another case, 'a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject's recourse to Her Majesty's courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words. That is, as Mc. 'It is', he said in another case, 'a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject's recourse to Her Majesty's courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words. That is, as Mc. Nair, J. called it in Francis v. Viewsley and West Drayton Urban District Council, a 'fundamental rule' from which I would not for my part sanction any departure. (1) The observations of Jagdish Swarup are also significant on this subject. Jurisdiction of a court, according to him, 'may be defined to be he power of a court to hear and determine a cause, to adjudicate and exercise any judicial power in relation to it, in other words, by jurisdiction is mean the authority under which a court has to decide cases that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. An examination of the cases numerous attempts to define the term 'jurisdiction, which has been stated to be 'the power to hear and determine issues of the law and fact', the authority by which the judicial officers take cognizance of and decide local controversy 'the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them', 'the power to hear, determine and pronounce judgmets on the issues before the court', 'the power of authority which is conferred upon a court by the legislature to hear and determine causes between parties and to carry the judgments into effect', 'the power to require into the facts, to apply the law, to pronounce the judgment and to carry it into execution.' (1) Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Ch. 7, 12th Edn., Langan, P. St. J., p. 153. 'Thus jurisdiction of the courts may be qualified or restricted by a variety of circumstances, that is, a jurisdiction may have to be considered with reference to place, value and nature of the subject-matter. The power of a tribunal may be exercised within defined territorial limits. Its cognizance may be restricted to subject-matter of the prescribed value. It may be competent to deal with controversies of a specified character, for instance, testamentary or matrimonial cases acquisition of land and for purpose of record of rights between landlords and tenants. The power of a tribunal may be exercised within defined territorial limits. Its cognizance may be restricted to subject-matter of the prescribed value. It may be competent to deal with controversies of a specified character, for instance, testamentary or matrimonial cases acquisition of land and for purpose of record of rights between landlords and tenants. This classification into territorial jurisdiction, pecuniary jurisdiction, and jurisdiction of the subject-matter is obviously of a fundamental character. 'Given such jurisdiction, we must be careful', said Mukherjee, J.: 'to distinguish exercise of jurisdiction from the existence of jurisdiction, for fundamentally different are the consequences of failure to comply with the statutory requirements in the assumption and in the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all and the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. The extent to which the conditions essential for creating and raising the jurisdiction of the courts or the restraints attaching to the mode of exercise of that jurisdiction itself, is sometimes a question of great, nicety. But the distinction between existence of jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction has not always been borne in mind and this has sometimes led to confusion (2) . Thus, the territorial jurisdiction of the Board is and has continued to be over the whole of Uttar Pradesh irrespective of the fact where its principal seat, office, or headquarters may be. (2) Swarup J., Legislation and Interpretation, 2nd Edn., p. 412-413. 24. The view that the Board's jurisdiction extends to the entire State of U.P. and that it can hold its courts anywhere in U.P. is further borne out by a very recent pronouncement of Supreme Court (3). The leaned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently emphasized that the observations of the Supreme Court have no bearing on the point at issue in the present case, but we are of the view that this is not the case. The following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court are completely analogous to the instant reference. 'In spite of the fact that the Allahabad High Court is known as the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad yet, according to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, 'there is no permanence attached to Allahabad. The following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court are completely analogous to the instant reference. 'In spite of the fact that the Allahabad High Court is known as the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad yet, according to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, 'there is no permanence attached to Allahabad. The seat can be at Allahabad or at such other authority places may be determined by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Governor. 'It is left to the prudence of the authorities mentioned as to what other places should be determined. In the normal understanding of the matters, it is left to the discretion of the authority as to whether the seats at Allahabad ad well a at Lucknow will be changed. Both places may continue. Both places may be changed Lucknow is the seat of the Govt. Allahabad has also the history that the High Court was there before the order. Lucknow has been the principal place of Oudh.....It is difficult to foresee the future whether the authorities will change the location at other places but no idea of a permanent seat can be read in the order. One can only say that it is the wish and hope that both Allahabad and Lucknow will be the important seats so that history is not wiped out and policy is not changed'. (3) 1975 SCC, Part IX, p. 671. 25. This is precisely the position in the instant case. Although Board of Revenue, U.P. has never been designated as the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad yet it has functioned from its two offices namely Allahabad and Lucknow. Both offices have been used for the transaction of its business and like their Lordships of the Supreme Court we can also wish and hope that both Allahabad and Lucknow will continue to be the important seats were the Board's business will continue to be transacted. 26. Having considered the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue as a whole we may pass on to the examination of the next important aspect of the reference made to us. 26. Having considered the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue as a whole we may pass on to the examination of the next important aspect of the reference made to us. It is whether there can be any distribution of any territorial jurisdiction between the Members and whether this division can be only in terms of territory or whether it can also be in terms of the Acts which the Board is required to administer, and finally as to what is the authority to make such distribution ? According to the learned counsel for the petitioner by Act XXXII of 1966 (Regulation of Procedure Act, 1966) the previous Sections 7 and 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 were deleted and in its place new Sections 7 and 8 were incorporated. He pointed out that, placing reliance on Section 7 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, the Members of the Board of Revenue distributed their business as follows: (a) the cases pertaining to the proceedings under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would be entertained, heard and decided at Allahabad, and (b) the cases pertaining to the U.P. Land Revenue Act will be heard and decided at Lucknow. This distribution of work was challenged in a case but the Chairman|Senior-most Member of the Board vide his order dated November 26, 1974 upheld the existing orders relating to the distribution of work. He, however did not enter into the principal seat and the headquarters of the Board of Revenue. 27. The old Section 7 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act read as follows:- "7. Power to distribute business - (1) Subject to such rules or order as the State Government may prescribe or issue, the Board may distribute its business and make such territorial division of its jurisdiction amongst its members as to the Board may deem fit. (2) All orders made or decrees passed by a member of the Board in accordance with such distribution or division shall be held to be the orders or decrees (as the case may be) of the Board." 28. The new Section 7 is to the following effect:- 7. Power to distribute business. (1) Subject to the provisions of any rules made under this Act and of Section 8, the Board may so distribute its business and make such territorial division of its jurisdiction amongst its members as it thinks fit. The new Section 7 is to the following effect:- 7. Power to distribute business. (1) Subject to the provisions of any rules made under this Act and of Section 8, the Board may so distribute its business and make such territorial division of its jurisdiction amongst its members as it thinks fit. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the Board may in particular and subject as aforesaid regulate the disposal of its judicial business by its Members sitting alone or in Division Benches." 29. Here it would also be necessary to reproduce the old Section 8- " 8. Alteration or reversal of a judicial order. - No decree or order in judicial proceeding coming under the consideration of the Board on appeal, on a reference under Section 218, or in revision under Section 219 shall be altered or reversed without the concurrent judgment of two members of the Board." Concurrence - Section 8 does not preclude a member incharge of a particular division from expressing his opinion for purposes of concurrence with regard to an appeal pertaining to that division which has been by another member. The new Section 8 is to the following effect:- "8. Decision when case heard by Division Bench - (1) Where a judicial proceeding coming under the consideration of the Board on appeal or reference or in revision is heard by Division Bench composed of two or more members, the case shall be decided in accordance with the opinion, of such members or of the majority, if any, of such members. (2) Where the members constituting the Bench are equally divided in opinion as to the decision to be given on any point, the case shall be heard upon such point by one or more of other members and the point be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members who have heard the case including those who first heard it." 30. These Sections cannot be properly appreciated unless the rules pertaining to them are also read along with them. In this connection two rules mentioned in the Revenue Court Manual are of a great significance. These Sections cannot be properly appreciated unless the rules pertaining to them are also read along with them. In this connection two rules mentioned in the Revenue Court Manual are of a great significance. According to old Rule 170 of the Revenue Court Manual 'When the Board has distributed its appellate business among the Members, the order coming under the consideration of the Board in appeal shall be modified or reversed without the concurrent judgment of two Members of the Board.' 31. To this important rule two other rules were added by way of amendment. Rule 170-A, as amended by Government Notification dated July 16, 1971 reads as follows:- "Rule 170-A. A Bench of two or more members of the Board doing judicial work may be constituted to decide intricate and controversial questions of law. The procedure for the formation of the Bench shall be as below:- (a) Any member doing judicial work may move the senior most Member proposing the formation of a Bench, giving reasons therefor. (b) The senior most Member may accept the proposal, reject it or modify the same. (c) The senior most Member may also form a Bench on his own motion." (d) The senior most Member will name the members who shall constitute the bench if there are more than three members doing judicial work and will also formulate specific points of reference to the Bench so formed." 32. Rule 170 of the Revenue Court Manual, referred to in para 30, was also modified by notification dated February 7, 1973 by insertion of two sub-rules. These rules are reproduced below:- "170(i) The senior most member of the Board shall distribute business and make necessary territorial division of Board's jurisdiction amongst members. (ii) When the Board has distributed it judicial business among the members, the order of a single member shall be the order of the Board." 33. The learned counsels of the Lucknow Bar have pointed out that for the correct interpretation of these two sections and the relevant rules with which these two sections are to be read, one has to go back to Regulation III of 1822 and specially its Sections 4 and 5 which have been quoted, in extenso, in para 12 of this order. The salient features of this regulation can certainly bear repetition. The salient features of this regulation can certainly bear repetition. According to Section 5 of this Regulation the Governor-General in Council, to authorise a single member of any of the three Boards to exercise either generally or locally all the duties, powers and authority which are vested in the Board collectively. This section further provided that it would be competent to the Governor-General in Council to authorise the several members of the said Board separately to exercise at the same time and within the same limits such part of the said duties, powers and authority as it may from time to time be judged proper to assign to each respectively, whenever, for the greater dispatch of business or other cause, it may appear advisable to divide the business of the Board or to assign any special duty to any member separately provided that if a member exercising singly, as above, the duties, powers, and authority of the Board, or any part thereof, shall in any case be of opinion that any decision or order of a Collector ought to be reversed or altered, he shall not pass any final order on the case without the concurrence of one or more of the other members unless otherwise specially directed and authorised by Government. This Section 5 of Regulation III of 1882 provides the basis on which Sections 7 and 8 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 were framed, the difference being that the powers which had been formerly,vested in the Governor-General in Council came to vest in the State Government. By Act XXXII of 1966 as a result of the passing of the U.P. Board of (Revenue Regulation of Procedure Act, 1966) these sections were amended and the powers of the State Government came to be vested in the Board itself. The word Board as used in this section means full Board sitting at Lucknow or Allahabad jointly. By Act XXXII of 1966 as a result of the passing of the U.P. Board of (Revenue Regulation of Procedure Act, 1966) these sections were amended and the powers of the State Government came to be vested in the Board itself. The word Board as used in this section means full Board sitting at Lucknow or Allahabad jointly. On the basis of this amendment a meeting of the full Board was held on March 4, 1967 in which the following decisions were taken :- "I. The distribution of judicial business ans territorial jurisdiction among Members of the Board under the amended Section 7(1) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act was decided to be as mentioned below:- (i) All cases under the U.P. Land Revenue Act will be dispose of at Lucknow by Members on the Administrative side who will have concurrent jurisdiction in respect of such cases. (ii) All cases other than those mentioned against (i) above, will be disposed of by Judicial Members at Allahabad as below - Sri J.B. Tandon, I.A.S., Judicial Member, I - Allahabad, Lucknow, Rohilkhand, Kumaon, Uttarakhand, Jhansi Divisions and districts of Ballia, Mirzapur and Ghazipur. Sri Ratnakar Singh, I.A.S., Judicial Member, II - Gorakhpur, Agra Divisions and district of Varanasi. Sri Ashwini Kumar, I.A.S., Judicial Member, III - Faizabad, Meerut Divisions and district of Jaunpur. (iii) During the absence of any of the Judicial Member due to illness, leave, transfer or any other cause, urgent work e.g. applications for stay, applications for transfer of proceedings etc. relating to his court, shall be laid before the linked court which is indicated below:- In case of J.M. I to J.M. II. In case of J.M. II to J.M. III. In case of J.M. III to J.M. I. If the linked court of Judicial Member is also not in session for a similar cause, urgent work of the absentee's circle shall be laid before the Judicial Member present, or if more than one Judicial Member is in session, as may be arranged between the Judicial Members present. In case of J.M. III to J.M. I. If the linked court of Judicial Member is also not in session for a similar cause, urgent work of the absentee's circle shall be laid before the Judicial Member present, or if more than one Judicial Member is in session, as may be arranged between the Judicial Members present. The territorial division of jurisdiction of Judicial Members given in para above, is subject to the proviso that a Member on the Administrative side or a Division Bench comprising of Members on the Administrative side may take over any case or matter falling within the jurisdiction of any of the Judicial Members or Division Bench of Judicial Members may exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Judicial Members or a Division Bench of Judicial Members in respect of the case or matter so taken away. Further, any case under the U.P. Land Revenue Act on the file of the Members on the Administrative side or on the lle of the Bench of Members on the Administrative side may be transferred to any of the Judicial Members or a Division Bench of Judicial Members for disposal. "II. In accordance with the amended Section 7(2) of the U.P.L.R. Act the disposal of judicial business by the Members of the Board sitting alone or in Division Bench shall be regulated as below:- (i) All cases falling within the territorial jurisdiction as indicated in para 1 above shall be heard and decided by Members sitting alone. Provided a single Member may for good and sufficient reasons direct that any case falling within his territorial jurisdiction be fixed for hearing before a Division Bench and thereupon it shall be so fixed. (ii) Members shall sit alone or in such Division Benches as may be constituted from time to time, consisting of Judicial Members at Allahabad and or Members on the Administrative side at Lucknow. S.N. Misra, I.C.S., March 4, 1967; H.C. Gupta, I.C.S.; M. Lal, I.C.S. and J.B. Tandon, I.A.S., March 4, 1967; Ratnakar Singh, I.A.S. and Ashwani Kumar, I.A.S." 34. (ii) Members shall sit alone or in such Division Benches as may be constituted from time to time, consisting of Judicial Members at Allahabad and or Members on the Administrative side at Lucknow. S.N. Misra, I.C.S., March 4, 1967; H.C. Gupta, I.C.S.; M. Lal, I.C.S. and J.B. Tandon, I.A.S., March 4, 1967; Ratnakar Singh, I.A.S. and Ashwani Kumar, I.A.S." 34. In other words, the powers of distribution of business between the Members of the Board both in terms of territorial jurisdiction and Act-wise distribution which had originally vested in the Governor-General in council came, in due course, to be developed upon the State Government till 1966 when the State Government divested itself of these powers and entrusted them to the Board of Revenue. In exercise of these powers the Board distributed its business in the order referred to above and it has been argued that there was noting illegal or irregular in this distribution and the State Government had not imposed any restrictions on the Board in dividing is business. It appears that the earlier Full Bench which decided this issue did not consider the full implications of the amendment of Sections 7 and 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act or of the amended Rule 170 and the insertion of a new Rule 170-A of the Revenue Court Manual while passing the judgment which is now sought to be reviewed. In spite of this fact, however, the decisions to which the Bench arrived are in no way incorrect or erroneous. The learned District Government counsel (Revenue) Lucknow has submitted that the jurisdiction is of three types: (i) statutory jurisdiction, (ii) territorial jurisdiction and (iii) pecuniary jurisdiction (or the jurisdiction exercised by the civil courts). In instant case, it has been fully and conclusively established in the foregoing paragraphs that the Board enjoyed both statutory and territorial jurisdiction over the entire State. The question now was that once the Board was entrusted with powers to distribute its business what was it supposed to do. The Boards business can be broadly categorised under two heads: (a) Administrative and (b) Judicial. The administrative part consisted of the work like settlement, maintenance of land records, realisation of land revenue and other dues, land acquisition, etc. The question now was that once the Board was entrusted with powers to distribute its business what was it supposed to do. The Boards business can be broadly categorised under two heads: (a) Administrative and (b) Judicial. The administrative part consisted of the work like settlement, maintenance of land records, realisation of land revenue and other dues, land acquisition, etc. This business was supposed to be exercised by the Members of the Board posted at Lucknow and the powers in this regard still vested in the State in accordance with Section 10 of U.P. Land Revenue Act. So far as he judicial business was concerned it can be classified under three heads: (a) appellate, (b) revisional, and (c) pertaining to reviews. While Rules 170 and 170-A of the Revenue Court Manual pertained to the Appellate business of the Board, the revisional business was to be conducted in accordance with Rule 190 of the Revenue Court Manual. As regards the work of review, the procedure to be adopted was mutatis mutandis, as in the case of reviews. The learned District Government Counsel (Revenue) Lucknow, therefore, pointed out that whatever orders had been passed by the Board so far regarding the distribution of its judicial business were perfectly in consonance with the relevant laws and in exercise of the powers vested in Board by the amended Section 7 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. 35. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the word 'and' used in Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act has been used in its conjunctive sense. He, therefore, maintained that 'subject to the provisions of any rules made under this Act and of Section 8' means that the rules should have been made under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 as well as of Section 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. There is no doubt that the word 'and' cab be used both in a conjunctive and disjunctive sense but his emphasis on the fact that in Sub-section (1) Section 7 the use of the word 'and' is conjunctive does not appear to us to be much significance. There is no doubt that the word 'and' cab be used both in a conjunctive and disjunctive sense but his emphasis on the fact that in Sub-section (1) Section 7 the use of the word 'and' is conjunctive does not appear to us to be much significance. Our reason for holding that the controversy whether the use of the word 'and' in this Sub-section is conjunctive or disjunctive is of merely academic interest is that the intent of the legislature has been made amply clear by Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. For the sake of ready reference this Sub-section may be reproduced once again : 7 (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the Board may in particular and subject as aforesaid, regulate the disposal of its judicial business by its Members sitting alone or in Division Benches'. The provision of sub-section (2) makes it very clear that whether the word 'and' used in its conjunctive or disjunctive sense, the fact remains that the Board will continue to enjoy the powers to regulate the disposal of its judicial business by its Members sitting alone or in Division Benches. Otherwise, too, the exact connotation of the word 'and' as used in sub-section (1) is not very material. Rules 170 and 170-A which are directly related to these sections have been framed by the Government under its rule making authority and it is no where laid down that the rules are for the purposes of Section 7 or of Section 8 of the Act. Besides, according to sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Rules are to be made under this Act', and not under this section. If the wording of sub-section (1) of Section 7 had been, 'Subject to the provisions of any rules made under this section and of Section 8', there might have been some scope of ambiguity as the result of conjunctive and disjunctive interpretation of the word 'and', but sub-section (1) of Section 7 as worded in the enactment, hardly leaves any doubt as to what is really meant. We, therefore, hold that the decisions taken by the Board on March 4, 1967 and reproduced in para 31 of this order were perfectly regular and cannot be called in question simply because sub-section (1) of Section 7 was supposed to be read along with Section 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. 36. Before we proceed to answer the issue of jurisdiction referred to us, we consider it necessary to remove the confusion, which may possibly arise, because of the subtle distinction made by one of the Members of the previous Bench (Sri M. Samiuddin), in the separate not recorded by him, between entertainment of appeals ans revisions on the one hand, and their hearing ans decision on the other. We regret that we cannot subscribe to this view of the learned Member. Entertainment and hearing cannot be compartmentalised. In fact they are the various stages of the disposal of appeals, revisions, reviews, etc. In this view we are fortified by the observations made by their Lordships of Allahabad High Court in the case Ram Sahai v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1972 R.D. 105 where it has been clearly held that filing and presentation ought to be understood in the extended sense of hearing and decision and that any narrow and literal interpretation would defeat the purpose of the orders. Here, too, the question was whether a case falling within jurisdiction of Judges at Lucknow should be presented at Lucknow and not at Allahabad. Similarly, it could be argued whether a case falling within the jurisdiction of the Judges at Allahabad could be heard and entertained at Lucknow? Their Lordships expressed the view that the filing and presentation were to be done in accordance with the directions issued by the Chief Justice. According to the Uttar Pradesh High Court (Amalgamation) order, 1948 certain classes of writs were to be entertained at Allahabad and once they had been filed an entertained at Allahabad, their hearing and decision will also have to be at Allahabad. This analogy fully applies to the appeals, revisions, etc., to be filed and presented at Lucknow or Allahabad and their final hearing and decision at one of these two places. This analogy fully applies to the appeals, revisions, etc., to be filed and presented at Lucknow or Allahabad and their final hearing and decision at one of these two places. We, therefore, hold that entertainment, hearing and decision will be done at the same place as may be fixed by the Full Board in the exercise of its powers under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. 37. In the light of the above discussions we would like to answer the issue referred to us in the following words: "The members of the board sitting singly or in Bench can entertain, hear and decide appeals and revisions under the U.P. Land Revenue Act and under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act at any district headquarters in the State or at Lucknow and Allahabad. However, the jurisdiction of the Members-both territorial and Act-wise has to be governed by the decisions of the full Board taken in exercise of the powers vested in it by Sections 7 and 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, and Rules 170 and 170-A of the Revenue Court Manual." 38. We may now pass on to answer the two questions which were referred to the earlier Bench whose judgment dated May 31, 1975 is now sought to be answered. The answers to these two issues will necessarily involve discussions of several points which may be categorised as follows:- (1) Scope of review petition and hearing of reviews by a Full Bench. (2) Fundamental principles of natural justice and their applicability to Rule 181 as well as Rules 186 to 190 of the Revenue Court Manual. (3) Power of the Board to hold any rule void or ultra vires. (4) The doctrine of delegated legislation as applicable to the rules mentioned above, and (5) The difference between judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative functions of an authority as also the judicial or quasi-judicial nature of proceedings contemplated by Rules 181 to 190 of the Revenue Court Manual. 39. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner reviews are provided by Rule 339(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. This rule derives its authority from Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act which reads as follows:- "273. 39. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner reviews are provided by Rule 339(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. This rule derives its authority from Section 273 of the U.P. Tenancy Act which reads as follows:- "273. The Board on its own motion or on the application of the parties to the case may review and may rescind, alter or confirm any decree or order made by itself or by a Single Member." However, Section 114 of the C.P.C. which provides for reviews has been expressly excluded from the provisions of C.P.C which do not apply to suits or proceedings under this Act in accordance with the Second Schedule of the U.P. Tenancy Act and once the applicability of Section 114 of the C.P.C.is ruled out, Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. will also not be considered as being applicable to the applications for review filed under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Thus, according to the powers of the Board to review its own orders are neither governed by Rule 339 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act or Section 114 of C.P.C. or Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. but these powers are enjoyed by the Board in accordance with the settled principles of law that every Court has inherent jurisdiction in law that every Court has inherent jurisdiction apart from Statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. This power is based on a legal maxim which is to the effect that no party shall suffer because of any fault of the court. Relying on a large number of cases, especially Sriniwasa Prasad Singh v. Sub-Divisional Officer, 1968 ALJ 1257 and the case of Lachmana v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P., 1966 R.D. 419 the learned counsel has argued that the Board enjoyed vested powers which were not in any way confined or restricted by the provisions either of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act or the U.P. Tenancy Act or even the C.P.C. According to him this view of the Allahabad High Court has been confirmed in a large number of cases like the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mirzapur v. Raja Sriniwasa Prasad Singh A.I.R. 1966, S.C., 1164. and several other cases reported in A.I.R. 1970, S.C., 540; A.I.R. 1963, S.C., p. 1909 and 1963 A.L.J., p. 601. 40. and several other cases reported in A.I.R. 1970, S.C., 540; A.I.R. 1963, S.C., p. 1909 and 1963 A.L.J., p. 601. 40. Accepting this proposition of the learned counsel for the petitioner we would like to proceed ahead with the examination of several points raised by him regarding the validity of correctness of Rule 181 as well as Rules 186 to 190 of the Revenue Court Manual. The learned counsel for the petitioner has thereafter taken up the principles of natural justice and after citing various authorities he has summed up by saying that there are four principles of natural justice which are well settled under the English and Indian laws. These principles are; (a) 'Nemo judex in causa sua', which means that no one should be a judge in his own cause; (b) The second principle is contained in the maxim 'audi alteram partem' which literally means 'hear the other party'. This principle has two aspects : No party ought to be condemned unheard, and, if his right to be heard is to be a reality he must know in good time the case which he has to meet, (c) it is from the second principle that the third principle of natural justice is directly related, viz., every person whose civil rights are affected must have a reasonable notice of the case which he has to meet, and (d) The authority deciding the cause must act in good faith reasonably and not arbitrarily. 41. The learned counsel has quoted extensively from various works like Wilson's Constitutional Law, 'Natural Justice' by M.H. Marshall and 'Natural Justice or Fundamental Principles of Procedure' by Suranjan Chakravarti. He has also given a large number of rulings in support of his proposition and we can do no better than to cite these cases Tribhuban Prakash v. The Union of India, AIR 1970 (S.C), 540, Shivdeo Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1963 S.C., p 1909, Mohd. Azmat Azim Khan v. Raja Shatraunji and others, ALJ 1963, p. 601, Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai Conciliation Officer, AIR 1970 (Guj.), p. 1: Gullapalli Nageshwararao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959, SC, 1376; Rodrick Jenkines v. Jhon Julien Mc. Azmat Azim Khan v. Raja Shatraunji and others, ALJ 1963, p. 601, Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai Conciliation Officer, AIR 1970 (Guj.), p. 1: Gullapalli Nageshwararao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959, SC, 1376; Rodrick Jenkines v. Jhon Julien Mc. Keithen, AIR 1970 (USSC), 32; Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 S.C., p. 1606, State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav, AIR 1969 S.C., 1297; The State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram Patanga, AIR 1970 (Punj.), p. 9. Haji Manzoor Ahmed v. State of U.P., AIR 1970, Allahabad, p. 467; All India Punjab National Bank Employees Federation v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., 1960 SC, p. 160; Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. v. Ghanshyam Deo Gupta, AIR 1962 S.C., p. 1110, Province of Bombay v. Khushal Das, AIR 1950 S.C., p. 222; Board of Revenue, U.P. v. Sardarni Vidyawati, AIR 1962 S.C., p. 1217; M.G. Abral, Addl. Collector of Customs, Bombay v. M/s. Shanti Lal Chottey Lal and Co., AIR 1966 S.C., p. 197; Jaswant Sugar Mills Ldy. v. Laxmi Chand, AIR 1963 (SC), p. 677; Gullapalli Nageshwarrao v. Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corpn., AIR 1959 S.C., 308, Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter, AIR 1971 S.C. 1093 . Keeping in mind the various pronouncements on natural justice Suranjan Chakravarti in his work on the subject has deduced as many as eight rules of natural justice from the various authorities, viz., (1) Substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated, (2) the tribunal must give both the parties an opportunity of being heard and stating their case and view, (3) notice when the judge will proceed must be given to the parties, (4) tribunal must act honestly and impartially, (5) and not at the dictation of others to whom authority is not given by law. (6) there must not be malversation of any kind, (7) a person cannot be Judge in his own cause, and (8) the least bias on the part of the person deciding the cause will vitiate the matter. To this, ninth may also be added, i.e., the authority deciding the particular cause must give reasons in support of the order he makes. 42. To this, ninth may also be added, i.e., the authority deciding the particular cause must give reasons in support of the order he makes. 42. While we have absolutely no hesitation in accepting these cardinal principles, we would examine, in subsequent paragraphs, as to which, if any, of these principles is violated or is likely to be violated while interpreting and administering Rules 181 and 186 to 189 of Revenue Court Manual. 43. The next point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Board had full powers to hold any sections or rules made thereunder void or ultra vires if the Board was of the view of the view that they ocended the fundamental principles of natural justice or their vires could b e successfully challenged on any other ground. In support of this proposition he has referred to the cases Aman Singh v. Shiv Dhari, 1966 R.D., 367.; Bishweshwar v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1956 (Raj.) p. 101.; M.L. Bagga v. C. Murha Rao AIR 1956 (Hyd.), p.35., and also pages 619, 632 and 635 of Jagdish Swarup's Book 'Interpretation of Statutes'. He has also referred to the cases Municipal Corporation of city of Rangoon v. Saw Wallace, AIR 1942 (Rang.), p. 70.; D.K. Kaunise v. Debi Chand, AIR 1924 (Mad.), p.46.; Baridal Co. operative Central Bank Lt. Benoy Bhushan Gupta, AIR 1934 (Cal.), p. 537.; V.M. Raghavalu Naidu and Sons v. Corporation of Madras , AIR 1930 (Mad),. p 648; Muddi Narayanam and Co. v. Kaanumuri Subha Raju, AIr 1957 (AP) p, 837; Provincial Government v. Nemi Chand Behari Lal Jain, AIR 1941 (Nag), p 203, Gala Singh v. Hokam Rai, AIR 1921 (Lah), p 130. We will be considering some of the important cases on this point when we take up the point as to which of the rules of the Revenue Court Manual, if any, can be held to be ultra vires or void in the light of the observations made in these rulings. 44. The fourth point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the doctrine of delegated legislation as applicable to the various rule of the Revenue Court Manual which are the subject matter of review in the present case. 44. The fourth point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the doctrine of delegated legislation as applicable to the various rule of the Revenue Court Manual which are the subject matter of review in the present case. Contending that several rules have exceeded the limits of the scop envisaged by the doctrine of delegated legislation, he has referred to an number of cases most important of which is The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Satyaanarayan, AIR 1968 S.C., p. 825. Beside, he has also referred to rules laid down in Maxwell's 'Interpretation of Statutes' (135); Jain's Administrative Law (p.303) and Jagdish Swarup's Interpretation of Statutes (pp. 721, 722 and 723). Whether the doctrine of delegated legislation is applicable to the validity of these rules and, if so, to what extent will be examined by us in detail when we come to interpretation of the relevant rules of the Revenue Court Manual. 45. Finally, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the difference between judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative functions of an authority should be appreciated and it should be examined whether the proceedings contemplated by Rules 181 and 186 to 190 of the Revenue Court Manual are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature and whether the principles applying to proceedings of a purely judicial nature are also applicable to proceedings which are of a quasi-judicial nature. For this, again, he has referred to a longer number of cases including the under noted cases Testeels Ltd. v. N. M. Desai, Conciliation Officer, A.I.R. 1970 (Guj.), p. 1; A. K. Karipak v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 (S.C.), p. 150, Smt. Guru-wara Prabandhak Committee Amritsar v. Lachhman Singh Gill, A.I.R. 1970 (Punj.), p. 40; State of Gujrat v. Patel Raghav Natha, A.I.R. 1969 (S.C.), p. 1297, Dehri Rohtas Light Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 (Patna), p. 109; Union of India v. T. R. Varma. A.I.R. 1957 (S.C.), p. 882: The New Prakash Transport Co. v. The New Suwarna Transport Co., A.I.R. 1957 (S.C.), p. 232. Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab. A.I.R 1959 (S.C.), p. 375; Gullapalli Nageswarrao and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 (S.C.), p. 1367; M|s. Komarbatty Co. A.I.R. 1957 (S.C.), p. 882: The New Prakash Transport Co. v. The New Suwarna Transport Co., A.I.R. 1957 (S.C.), p. 232. Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab. A.I.R 1959 (S.C.), p. 375; Gullapalli Nageswarrao and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 (S.C.), p. 1367; M|s. Komarbatty Co. Ltd. v, Ush-nath Pakrashi, A.I.R. 1959 (S.C.), p. 1399: Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees Federation and others, A.I.R. 1960 (S. C.), p. 160; Board of High School and-Intermediate Education, TJ. P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta and others, A.I.R. 1962 (S.C.), p. 1110; Board of Revenue v. Sardarni Vidvawati, A.I.R. 19C2 (S.C.). p. 121; Board of High School and Intermediate Education. U.P. v. Bagleshwar Prasad, A.I.R. 1966 (S.C.), p. 875 and Jaswant Suaar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. Laxmi Chand & others, A.I.R. 1963 (S.C.), p. 677. 46. With these basic objections to the various rules of the Revenue Court Manual being summed up in the foregoing paragraphs it would be more convenient for us to take the various rules one by one and examine their property, legality or validity which has been challenged by the leaned counsel for the petitioner. 47. The first rule to be assailed is Rule 181 according to which it was not necessary for the Board to date, sign and pronounce its orders in open court. This rule has been amended by Board's Notification No. G-968/129.10-B, dated July 14, 1975 published in the Official Gazette of August 2, 1975. This amendment takes away from the Board the discretion not to date, sign and pronounce its orders in open courts. Thus a major ground for challenging the validity of this rule has been taken away and henceforth all orders of the Board will have to comply with the requirements of Rule 31 Order XLI of the C.P.C. Even then, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the powers of the Board to pass its orders in chamber have been retained. In order to appreciate this it will be necessary to reproduce this it will be necessary to reproduce the amended rule: "It shall not be necessary for the Board when confirming an order or decree appealed against to do more than record an order dismissing the appeal and confirming the order or decree of the court against whose order or decree the Appeal is made. In all other cases, the Appellate Court shall record a judgment in compliance with the requirements of rule 31 Order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code. The judgment shall be dated signed and pronounced in open Court." Even the amended rule 181 suffers according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, from two serious defects. Firstly, it does not clarify whether the amendment rule will have retrospective effect and secondly the Board's power to decide the revisions in chamber in cases in which the order has to be varied or reversed still continues. So far as the first objection is concerned we do not think it has any force in it. In its classix work on the 'Interpretation of Statues' Maxwell has observed 'upon the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation. They are construed as operating only in cases or facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. It is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall bee construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct operation'. Unless a rule or its amendments clearly specifies that it will have retrospective effect, that particular rule or its amendment will be deemed to have come into force from the date when it is published in the official Gazatte. Thus, any contention to the effect that the amendment should be deemed to be with retrospective effect cannot be said to have any force in it. As regards the second defect, this would be considered in greater detail when we come shortly to the examination of Rules 186 to 190 regarding revisions. 48. Before passing on to the consideration of these provisions it will be necessary to take into account the amendment Section 333-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The original section which provided for revisions was Section 333. It reads as follows:- "333. 48. Before passing on to the consideration of these provisions it will be necessary to take into account the amendment Section 333-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The original section which provided for revisions was Section 333. It reads as follows:- "333. Power of Board to call for cases-The Board may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any subordinate court in which no appeal lies, or where an appeals lies but has not been preferred and if such subordinate court appear- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested ; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity: the Board may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit." Accordingly the U.P.Land Laws Amendment Act, 1975(U.P.Act XXX of 1975) a new section as Section 333-A has been inserted after Section 333 of the principle Act. The new section is to the following effect:- "333-A. The Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any suit or proceedings referred to in Section 333 decided by any Court subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceedings and if he is of opinion that such order should be varied cancelled or reversed, he shall refer the case with the opinion thereof for the orders of the Board and the Board shall thereupon pass such orders as it thinks fit." 49. A plain reading of the original section and the new section shows that the power to call for the record of any suit or proceedings decided by subordinate court which had so far vested exclusively in the Board, has also been delegated to the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner in one very important respect. It is that while the Commissioner had to refer each and every revision filed under Section 333 to the Board, this is no longer necessary. It is that while the Commissioner had to refer each and every revision filed under Section 333 to the Board, this is no longer necessary. Hence forward the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner will have full powers of affirming or confirming the order passed by the subordinate court and that it will no longer be necessary for the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner to refer such cases to the Board, meaning thereby that the reference by the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner is no linger required in respect of the decisions of the subordinate courts which have to be confirmed, but a reference is needed only in those cases in which the order of the subordinate courts is sought to be varied, cancelled or reversed. Here, we may consider rule 189 of the Revenue Court Manual which lays down the procedure to be followed by the Board when a reference is made by the Commissioner. Such reference can be of the following categories:- (a) Those in which recommendation is made for dismissing the petition in revision but no objection has been filed; (b) Those in which the recommendation is for dismissal but objections has been filed; (c) Those in which the recommendation is for allowing an application but no objection has been field, and (d) Those in which recommendation is for allowing the application but objection has been filed. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner it will no longer be necessary to move the Board in cases in which the revision petition is to be dismissed or in which the Commissioner decides to confirm the trial courts judgments i.e. category(a) As regards category (b) the revisionist will have to come up before the Board through another revisions against the order of the Commissioner and the question of filing any objection will not arise. As regards category (c) the question would be whether such a revision can be decided in chamber in accordance with rule 181 of the Revenue Court Manual or not. The main objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Board cannot decide anything in chamber because the principles of natural justice would be violated by the fact that one of the parties has not been heard. 50. The main objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Board cannot decide anything in chamber because the principles of natural justice would be violated by the fact that one of the parties has not been heard. 50. The learned counsels of the Lucknow Bar who, though not directly involved in this case, were good enough to give us the benefit of their views, have rightly pointed out that the principles of natural justice as contained in the maxim 'audi alteram partem' only supplement a statutory provision but do not supplant any act or rule which has the force of a statute behind it. Every court or tribunal has to follow certain set of rules and as long those rules have the power of a statute behind them such rules have to be observed very carefully and cautiously. If the principles of natural justice that the other party must be heard is taken to its extreme conclusion we would find that it results in what is known in logic as 'reduliio ad absurdum'. We might cite one or two instances which would indicate that there are several eventualities in which the other party has to be heard but not at the preliminary stage when the order has to be, in nature of the things based on the allegations or averments of a single party supported by an affidavit or not. Thus when an appeal is presented for admission under Order XLI, rule 11 the only material before the Court is the judgment of the trial court, the judgment of the first appellate court and the grounds of appeal. On the basis of these three documents and on the basis of the arguments put forward at the time of admission an appeal is considered fit for admission and then alone notices are issued to the other party. In other words, the right of hearing to the opposite party is not completely ruled out but it comes at a later stage. Similarly, when a court is approached with a prayer for interim injunction the only material on which the court can grant the injunction is an affidavit and it is only after the interim injunction has been granted that a notice is issued to the other party and then the merits of a stay or injunction application are heard in open court before both the parties. A further and more extreme case might perhaps be when a person commits a criminal cognizable offence and the police apprehends him on the basis of First Information Report alone which far from being accompanied by an affidavit is merely in the nature of an allegation to the police officer who is not even empowered to examine the complainant on oath. On the basis such a report the police apprehends a person and it is only at a much later stage when the accused gets a chance of being produced before the Magistrate that he is able to on bail or of proving that the proceedings against his should be withdrawn. All these instances will go to show that while the right of the other party to be heard is contemplated by law because it is fundamental principle of natural justice yet the occasions when the other party has to be heard and the opportunities which are to be afforded to the other party would vary from Act to Act, Rule to Rule and enactment to enactment. 51. Again, it has to be borne in mind that while the fundamental principles of natural justice undoubtedly envisage that the other party should be heard, such a right cannot be claimed at very stage of the proceeding. If a particular party has been heard at one stage and it is found that its objection or plea is so flimsy or frivolous that it deserves to be summarily rejected, the question of a second hearing should not normally arise. Thus, when a revision is decided by the Additional Commissioner under Section 333-A and the revision is dismissed by the Additional Commissioner the aggrieved person will have the right to come to the Board in revision again and this time it will not be necessary for him that the procedure laid down in paras 186 to 190 should be followed. These paras are meant to provide an occasion for hearing only in those cases in which a chance is given to the aggrieved party file an objections but it fails to do so. Failure to file objection does not mean that his case will go by default. These paras are meant to provide an occasion for hearing only in those cases in which a chance is given to the aggrieved party file an objections but it fails to do so. Failure to file objection does not mean that his case will go by default. It only means that he has acquiesced in the order of Commissioner or Additional Commissioner and has not considered it necessary or worthwhile to file an objection so that he may have a chance of being heard again. In such cases it should not be necessary for the Board to call for the objector who could have objected but has not done so. This power of getting a second hearing will be admissible to the aggrieved party only if it files an objection; otherwise the Board will be fully within its power pass an order in chamber. Here we would also like to quoto with approval the observation of the previous Full Bench given below:- "The sprit underlying Rule 189 is that whenever there is a question of varying or reversing the order sought to be revised the parties should invariable be heard by the Board but the aggrieved party should file an objection. Where full hearing has been given to the parties before the Commissioner a discretion has been given that the parties may be heard only if considered necessary. This discretion has no doubt to be judicially exercised. Wherever discretion has been provided by Statutes or rules in such matters as are to be decided by the courts, the exercise of such a discretion cannot be questioned afterwards, for it would be within the scope of discretion allowed by the statute or rules. It is not only in case of revision under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act that the courts exercise the judicial discretion. Such discretion is quite often exercised by the courts in matters like issue of ad interim injunctions or orders staying the operation of the orders by the Judicial and executive bodies without affording any opportunity to the party likely to be adversely affected by orders of courts. Such discretion is quite often exercised by the courts in matters like issue of ad interim injunctions or orders staying the operation of the orders by the Judicial and executive bodies without affording any opportunity to the party likely to be adversely affected by orders of courts. If the contention that before exercise of every judicial discretion it is necessary to hear the parties before any orders adversely affecting the interest of any one is passed is carried to its logical end, when no order in such cases could ever be passed by any court. The discretion given in this rule to hear or not to hear the parties has been given with a well-defined purpose that superfluous and non-maintainable revisions do not continue to impede the course of justice. This object is in conformity with the intention and aims of the legislation for speedy abolition of intermediaries of land reforms. If the contentions of the applicants are accepted, the process of implementing land reforms and determination of tenant dispute could be considerably delayed by bringing frivolous revisions against every conceivable order of the lower courts. The aim of the rules of natural justice, which have not been defined anywhere is to prevent miscarriage of justice. They operate where no specific provisions of law or procedure have been prescribed. In the instant case, the law prescribes an exhaustive procedure in which parties have ample opportunity of placing their case before the Commissioner had later if considered can, therefore, not be said to be violative of the principles of natural justice. The rules of procedure are intended to facilitate the day to day working and to assist in achieving a fair and smooth course of justice. They have to be followed so long as they exist in the form in which they have been drawn up. They have to be strictly adhered to in order to obtain expeditious disposal of cases and an interpretation based on natural justice can only be sought when there is any ambiguity. Here there is none and the statute confers powers to make rules and such rules have been validity framed. They have to be strictly adhered to in order to obtain expeditious disposal of cases and an interpretation based on natural justice can only be sought when there is any ambiguity. Here there is none and the statute confers powers to make rules and such rules have been validity framed. The judicial discretion to the court to hear or not to hear the parties in those cases where a variation of the order sought to be revised is not be made, therefore, rests on a reasonable basis and is in accordance with the statute and rules. It cannot, therefore, be said to be offending the principles of natural justice." 52. We would like to add that use of the words 'if any' and 'if necessary' in Rule 189 gives the Board wide discretionary powers and in conferring such discretion the legislature was fully conscious of the fact that it was conferring this discretion on the apex court of revenue justice which, it envisaged, would comprise of persons having the necessary knowledge, maturity and experience to be able to exercise to be able to exercise that discretion judiciously and in good faith. 53. It may also be observed that in laying down rules 186 to 190 the Legislature did have fully in its mind the distinction between 'subjective satisfaction' and 'objective satisfaction is necessary the order need not be so detailed and comprehensive because it is based on the recommendation of another senior officer, namely the Commissioner who has gone through the subject-matter of dispute in considerable detail. It is only when 'objective satisfaction' is required and when any order is to be passed as a result of this objective satisfaction and is liable judicial scrutiny that both parties have to be heard and a proper judgment is to be written as contemplated by Order XLI, Rule 31. 54. We may next take up whether the Board has any powers to hold any rules void or ultra vires. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the case Aman Singh v. Shiv Adhar, 1966 RD 367 in which their Lordship of the High Court have held that it is the duty of the civil court to scrutinise the validity of each law challenged before it and if the law does not appear to be validity framed to declare it ultra vires and not to give effect to it. Their Lordships went on to observe that the court below also held that the rule appeared to be beyond the power but unfortunately it remarked that it had no jurisdiction to declare the rule invalid. AS against this pronouncement of the Allahabad High Court we have before us two cases - One of the Supreme Court and the other of the Allahabad High Court which have dealt with this issue. The first is the case of Venkararamana and Co. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC, p. 1089 in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows: If a statute imposes a liability and creates an effective machinery for deciding question of law and fact arising in regard to that liability, it may, by necessary implication, bar the maintainability of a civil suit in respect of the said liability. A statute may also confer exclusive jurisdiction on the authorities constituting the said machinery to decide finally a jurisdiction fact thereby excluding by necessary implication the jurisdiction of a civil court in that regard. But an authority created by a statue cannot question the vires of that statue or any of the provisions thereof which were under its function. It must act under the Act and not outside it'. The case decided by the Allahabad High Court R.B. Narain singh Suger Mills Ltd. Lhaksar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow, 1968 ALJ, p. 1046 subsequent to the case of Aman Singh v. Shiv Adhari, referred to above clearly lays down that it is not open to an authority created under the statue to pronounce upon the vires of that statute. The views of Judges of the Allahabad High Court appears to be in conflict and, therefore, we have no hesitation in following the Supreme Court case in which it has been clearly stated that an authority created by a statute has to work within that a statute and cannot challenge or question the vires of the statute itself. 55. We have shown that the Board of Revenue is a statutory body and the rules framed either under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or under the U.P. Land Revenue Act have the same force of law as the statutes themselves. 55. We have shown that the Board of Revenue is a statutory body and the rules framed either under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or under the U.P. Land Revenue Act have the same force of law as the statutes themselves. Hence the statutory body namely the Board does not have the jurisdiction to pronounce judgment on the vires of the statues by which it has been created and under which it is required to function. Besides, this matter is not of much importance for the instant case, because as shown in paragraph 51 of this order Rules 181 to 190 of the Revenue Court Manual are neither void nor ultra vires. 56. We may next take up the doctrine of delegated legislation as applicable to those rules. In his commendable book (Legislation and Interpretation) Jagdish Swarup has devoted a whole chapter (Chapter XXVII) to it. Defining delegated legislation he has distinguished it from subordinate legislation. According to him legislation is either supreme or subordinate. The former is that which proceeds with the sovereign or supreme power in the State and which is, therefore, incapable of being repealed annulled or controlled by any other legislative authority. Subordinate legislation is that which proceeds form any authority other then the sovereign power and is, therefore, dependent for its continued existence and validity on some superior or supreme authority. He has further proceeded to categories delegate legislation under two main heads. Firstly, rules, regulations and bye-laws under the statute which provided that they shall have the same effect as if enacted thereunder and; secondly, rules regulations and bye-laws made under the statue which do not in terms provide that they shall have the same effect as if enacted there-under. These guidelines laid down by the eminent author make it quite clear that the rules which find place in the Revenue Court Manual fall within the category of 'rules under the Act' as mentioned on page 680 of Jagdish Swarup's book. Rules framed under are Act, according to the author, are ancillary and subserve the purpose of the enactment. They cannot go against the provisions of the enactment and cannot in any manner make nay change therein. They are merely for the purpose of carrying out the essential policy which the legislature has laid down in the enactment itself. Rules framed under are Act, according to the author, are ancillary and subserve the purpose of the enactment. They cannot go against the provisions of the enactment and cannot in any manner make nay change therein. They are merely for the purpose of carrying out the essential policy which the legislature has laid down in the enactment itself. So far as Rules 181 and 186 to 190 of Revenue Court Manual are concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not given any reasons by which it can be inferred that they go against the provisions of enactment itself or have the effect of making any change therein. We are, therefore, fully convinced that theory of delegated legislation and the authority of the enacting legislature regarding the power make rules, had been correctly and properly exercised. 57. Coming, lastly, to the point of judicial and quasi-judicial nature of the pronouncements under Rules 181 and 186 to 190 there is a mass of case law show that all these proceedings are of judicial nature and that accounts for the reasons why they are supposed to be governed by a 'speaking order'. The term 'speaking order' does not find a place either in Maxwell's 'Interpretation of Statutes' or in Jagdish Swarup's book 'Legislation and Interpretation' G.P.Singh or even in Crawford's 'Statutory Construction-Interpretation of laws. However, it finds place both in Venkataramaiya's 'Law Lexicon and the 'Law Lexicon of Mukherji and Singh. 'Speaking order', according to Venkatarmaiya, 'has been explained by Lord Cairns, L.C., speaks of an un-speaking or unintelligible order he obviously means an order which gives no reasons, or does not explain in any way why the court made the order but simply states that the court made such and such a conviction, order for removal or for quashing the poor rate, or other order of that sort, giving no reasons for doing so. It may not be unintelligible in that it does not tell the superior court why the inferior court made that order'. Quoting another case Venkataramaiya has expressed the opinion that the need for a speaking order arises 'when from that order an appeal or revision is provided for, the appellate or the revisional authority may know upon what grounds judgment impugned was rendered. Brevity of the order does not mean that it is necessarily bad any more than prolixity makes for soundness'. Brevity of the order does not mean that it is necessarily bad any more than prolixity makes for soundness'. From the observation we can deduce the main ingredients of a speaking order. In our opinion these are: (a) It should not be so cryptic that it does not convey the sense as to why it was passed. (b) It should be a well-reasoned and well argued order; and (c) It should be an order by whose perusal the parties as well as the superior courts should be able to appreciate that the officer passing the order has really applied his mind to the matter and they should be able to understand as to why it was passed and on what material it rests. 58. In view of the fact that we have held that the proceedings under paras 186 to 190 of the Revenue Court Manual are Judicial in nature, the necessary corollary follows that the orders passed during the courts of these proceedings should necessary be 'speaking orders'. 59. Having dealt with the general grounds on which paras 151 and 186 to 190 have been assailed, it will be necessary for us to trace the history of the interpretation of these rules. Before doing so, we would like to reproduce with our fullest approval, paras 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the Full Bench order in Babu Lal. v. Saheb Singh, 1975 R.D. 235. 16. Under the U.P.Tenancy Act, 1939 the provisions for revisions was under Section 275. By SEction 243 of the U.P.Tenancy Act provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 were made applicable to suits and proceedings under that Act except those provisions of Civil Procedure Code as are contained in List I of the Second Schedule made Section 115 C.P.C. relating to revision inapplicable to proceedings under the U.P.Tenancy Act. Rules for disposal of revisions under the Act were framed by the State Government by virtue of powers conferred upon it by Section 193 clause (g) of this Act in Revenue Court Manual, Rules 186 to 190. Like the provisions for revision in the Land Revenue Act here also there is an intermediate stage at which the Commissioner hears and refers to the Board with his recommendation. This provision has also stood test of time and law. 17. Like the provisions for revision in the Land Revenue Act here also there is an intermediate stage at which the Commissioner hears and refers to the Board with his recommendation. This provision has also stood test of time and law. 17. Under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act Provisions of Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable under Section 341 and no exceptions have been provided. The question is whether it was competent for the State Government to frame a rule to provide for a procedure for disposal of revisions other than that in the Civil Procedure Code. The learned counsel for the applicants has argued that a specific provision has been under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for application of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code to all proceedings and, therefore, the State Government could not by making a rule circumvent and negative the intention of the Legislature by making a rule not in consonance with the statute. Referring to Vasan Lal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. ,p. 4) he stated that the power of delegation is a constitutes element of the legislating power as a whole and in modern times when the legislature enact laws to meet the challenge of the complex socio-economic problems they often find it convenient and necessary to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by their acts, but the extent to which such delegation is permissible is that they must lay down the legislative policy and principle and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers in that behalf. It was further argued that it is for the courts to hold on a fair, generous and liberal construction of any impugned statue whether the legislature exceeded permissible limits in delegating its legislative authority. Relying on Bishweshar v. Board of Revenue Rajasthan, (A.I.R. 1956 Raj., p.101) it was stated that rules to be framed under any provisions of the Act cannot be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and, therefore, any mode of hearing provided by the rules which may be inconsistent with clauses of the Act cannot be a valid one. Relying on Bishweshar v. Board of Revenue Rajasthan, (A.I.R. 1956 Raj., p.101) it was stated that rules to be framed under any provisions of the Act cannot be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and, therefore, any mode of hearing provided by the rules which may be inconsistent with clauses of the Act cannot be a valid one. On the basis of A.I.R. 1941 Nagpur, p. 203 it was argued that rules and bye-laws made under statutory powers enforceable by penalties imposed must on pain of invalidity be not unreasonable nor in excess of the statutory power authorising them nor repugnant to that statute or to the general principles of law. Citing A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 48 it was submitted that even the rules and bye-laws made by statutory bodies should be reasonable otherwise they would be ultra vires and void and that in the case of rules framed for the guidance of courts greater reasonableness and fairness if expected. Learned counsel urged that all delegated legislation has to be in consonance with letter and spirit of the enactment and should not give powers to subordinate authorities more than envisaged or intended. The question here is whether in face of Section 341 the State Government could frame rule 182 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules to prescribe a procedure for disposal of revision and other proceedings. Under Civil Procedure Code for decision of revision under Section 115 no specific procedure for hearing and disposal of revision has been laid down. It follows, therefore, that in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act also no specific provisions has been made of disposal of suits, applications, appeals and other proceedings including proceedings for review or revision. Section 344, sub-section (1), clause (b) quoted elsewhere shows that every power to make rules shall be deemed to include the powers to provide for the procedure to be followed in suits appeals and other proceedings including proceedings for review or revision under this Act in cases for which no specific provisions being the case, the State Government was perfectly within its rule-making powers in framing rule 182. There is always a presumption that rules which have been framed by the State Government under the powers vested in them by the Statute are valid and legal. There is always a presumption that rules which have been framed by the State Government under the powers vested in them by the Statute are valid and legal. Moreover, Section 344 sub-Clause (4) provides that all rules made under this Act shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before the State Legislature as soon as they are made and shall be subject to such modifications as the Legislature may make during the session in which they are so, laid. In the instant case there would be the presumption. Which has not been challenged, that all the necessary formalities required under Section 344 in framing the Rule under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act including the relevant rule 182 were followed and completed. That being so, the intention of Legislature in framing this rule is now not open to challenge. "18. Having come to the conclusion that Rule 182 framed under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is valid, it is to be determined if the provisions of any or of all the rules 185 to 189 of the Revenue Court Manual which lay down a procedure for disposal of revisions are violative of the Article 14 being unreasonable, impractical, unfair and against the principles of natural justice. Rule 185 merely provides fro the manner in which applications for revisions shall be presented and documents which shall accompany and if presented through a counsel a Vakalatnama would be necessary. None of the provisions of this rule can and has been challenged. Rule 186 provides for the forum where applications are to be presented, namely the Board where order sought to be revised has been passed by the Commissioner, and to the Commissioner if such an order has been passed by a court subordinate to the commissioner. In the latter eventuality the application has to be with a request that it may be forwarded to the Board with the recommendation for orders. Rule 187 enables the Commissioner to forward the application to the Board with recommendation that it may be summarily rejected if (i) an appeal lies to the District Judge or the Board, within any other clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 275 of the U.P.Tenancy Act corresponding to Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Rule 187 enables the Commissioner to forward the application to the Board with recommendation that it may be summarily rejected if (i) an appeal lies to the District Judge or the Board, within any other clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 275 of the U.P.Tenancy Act corresponding to Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Rule 188 provides for the when recommendation for summary rejection under rule 187 has not been made and to hear the applicant or the parties and, thereafter make a proper recommendation to the Board but it is qualified by the proviso that no recommendation for varying the order sought to be revised can be made unless both parties to the case have been heard. Under sub-rule (2) of the rule 188 the Commissioner is duty bound to inform the parties of the recommendation that it made to the Board and within one month of the date on which he is so informed the aggrieved party may file an objection. In would be clear from the scheme of things that not only the Commissioner has to bear the applicant and the parties of the recommendation made in every case whether it be for summary rejection under rule 187 or after hearing the parties under rule 188. It is also mandatory that he shall make no recommendation for varying the order sought to be revised unless both parties to the case have been heard. Rule 189 deals with the procedure for disposal of revision directly presented to the Board under Rule 186 or on reference by the Commissioner under Rule 187 or 188. It provides that after considering the objection, if any mad upon the recommendation of the Commissioner under sub-rule (2) of rule 188 and hearing the parties, if necessary, the Board would pass such order as deemed proper. The proviso to Rule 189 further makes it incumbent on the Board that save where an aggrieved party has failed to file objection in accordance with sub-rule (2) of Rule 188 the impugned order cannot be varied on reversed unless both the parties to the case have been heard. The proviso to Rule 189 further makes it incumbent on the Board that save where an aggrieved party has failed to file objection in accordance with sub-rule (2) of Rule 188 the impugned order cannot be varied on reversed unless both the parties to the case have been heard. It would be seen that where the Board decides to vary or reverse the order sought to be revised and an objection has been filed in accordance with sub-rule (2) of rule 188 the Board has to necessary give a hearing to the Parties. In other cases the Board has a discretion to hear or not there the parties. "19. Challenging the provisions of Rule 186, 187 and 188 the learned counsel for the applicants urged that under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the Commissioner could have no place in the procedure for disposal of revision applications and such a provisions in rule was against statutory provisions in this regard. It has already been held above that relevant rule 182 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules which lays down a procedure for disposal of suits, proceedings, etc., including revisions in accordance with Parts 1 and IV of the Revenue Cour Manual was within legislative competent of the State Government and valid. It being so, the legal validity of the relevant rules of the Revenue Court Manual also follows. It has been said elsewhere that under the land Revenue Act and the U.P.Tenancy Act, Commissioner has been an important link in the procedure for disposal of revisions and this provision has withstood the test of law and time for the last three quarters of a century in the case of former and thirty five years in case of latter. To say that identical provisions under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are invalid on any ground does not appeal. The Commissioner has except in the contingencies enumerated in Rule 187 necessary to hear the applicant or parties to the case and can make no recommendation for varying the order sought to be revised unless both parties to the case have heard. Thereafter also he is duty bound to inform the parties to the recommendation made and the aggrieved person may file objection for consideration of the Board. Thereafter also he is duty bound to inform the parties to the recommendation made and the aggrieved person may file objection for consideration of the Board. Intervention by the Commissioner, therefore, cannot be said to be against the principles of natural justice or in any way violative of the statue. Further the intervention of the Commissioner at intermediate stage between the revisionist and the Board also has practical benefits. If all the revisions are to be directly presented to the Board only, the business of the Board will become unmanageable. The Commissioner provides invaluable assistance to the Board by hearing the parties in detail and giving his considered recommendation. Moreover, the procedure has the advantage of bringing the process of law nearer to the litigant. Approach to the Board only if mandatory in every case would make the process cumbersome, dilatory and costly. These provisions, therefore, can also not be said to be retarding the course of justice or impractical." 60. In spite of the Correct position of law being as has been shown in the above paras the interpretation of rules 186 to 190 continued t be the subject matter of ruling which were at times contradictory in nature. In Harbans Lal and Others v. Board of Revenue C.M.W. No. 1372 of 1970, decided by Lokur, J., on December 15, 1971 propose to vary or reverse the recommendation made by the Additional Commissioner, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Lokur of the Allahabad High Court analysed the various rules in which his Lordship observed: "Proviso to Rule 189 requires the Board of Revenue to hear both parties when an objection is filed before disposing of the reference. It is not denied that the petitioner were not heard by the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue has thus violated the mandatory provision under the proviso to Rule 189 in passing orders on the recommendation made by the Additional Commissioner. The learned counsel for the opposite party contended that the proviso to Rule 189 requires that the parties should be heard only when Board of Revenue, This is not the correct reading of the proviso. The orders sought to be revised is the order of the trial court and if that order is to be varied or reversed according to the recommendation of the Additional Commissioner, the Board of Revenue was bound to hear the party. The orders sought to be revised is the order of the trial court and if that order is to be varied or reversed according to the recommendation of the Additional Commissioner, the Board of Revenue was bound to hear the party. The suggestion that the order to be revised relates to the recommendation of the Commissioner is untenable." The same view was held by a Division Bench of this Board in Karan Singh v. Gaon Sabaha (Review No. 316 of 1970/71/Aligarh). In para 2 of the order passed in this case it has been observed ' We have heard the parties at length. The learned counsel for the opposite parties referred to some decision taken by the High Court which had a bearing on the Point, but despite several adjournment allowed on this account, the learned counsel for the opposite party was unable to show any such ruling.' It is Justice Lokur's Judgment which is contemplated and it is unfortunate that the observation of his Lordship of the High Court could not be shown to the Division Bench and even though this Bench followed the ruling of Justice Lokur, there is no mention of it. 61. The fact of the case decided by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Lokur have a very important bearing on the interpretation of Rules 186 to 190 of the Revenue Court Manual. In the earlier part of his judgment it has been observed 'The Additional Commissioner.... made a recommendation to the Board of Revenue that the revision be allowed and the orders of the trial court be set aside and the restoration application dismissed. The Board of Revenue accepted the recommendation of the Additional Commissioner. The petitioners have challenged the order of the Board of Revenue in this petition on the ground that no notice of hearing of the reference was given to the petitioners although the petitioners had appeared before the Board of Revenue through a counsel. The contesting opposite parties contend that the Board of Revenue was not bound to hear the petitioners as they had filed no objection. The petitioners, however, have produced along with the rejoinder-affidavit an objection filed by them thus negativing the contention of the contesting opposite parties that no objection was filed by them. This would show that an objection was filed. The petitioners, however, have produced along with the rejoinder-affidavit an objection filed by them thus negativing the contention of the contesting opposite parties that no objection was filed by them. This would show that an objection was filed. That particular case fell under category (d) of the case categorised in the case of Karan Singh v. Gaon Sabha Review No. 316 of 1970/71/Alogarh., i.e. 'those in which recommendation have been made for allowing the petition in revision but an objection has been filed.' This clearly comes within the proviso to Rule 189 in which it has been clearly laid down 'provided that, save where an aggrieved party has failed to file an objection in accordance with sub-rule (2) of Rule 188, the order sought to be revised shall not be varied or reversed unless both the parties to the case have been heard'. The case of Harbans Lal Board of Revenue (supra) decided by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Lokpur clearly indicates that the order sought to be revised was to be varied or reversed and in spite of the fact that an objection had been filed the Board of Revenue endorsed the recommendation of the Additional Commissioner without hearing both parties. Clearly therefore, the Board transgressed its jurisdiction as laid down in Rule 189 and its order was correctly struck down by the High Court. 62. Even otherwise, Rule 189 has be worded in such a manner that it gives the Board a lot of discretion. The earlier part of this rule reads that on receiving an application under Rule 189 and after considering the objection, if any made under sub-rule (2) of Rule 188 and hearing the parties, if necessary, the Board shall pass such orders as they may consider proper.' The use of the phrases of 'if any' 'if necessary' makes it amply clear that the Board is expected to apply its mind to the merits of the recommendation made by the Additional Commissioner and to exercise the discretion vested in it in a judicious manner. Hence, even if no objection has been filed but the Board after going through the relevant records and the recommendation of the Additional Commissioner comes to the conclusion that the parties to the case should be heard before the revision is decided, the Board has full powers to issue notice to the parties and to hear them before passing final orders in the revision. 63. The foregoing discussion will clearly show that whatever the phraseology used in the rules it is not to be interpreted absolutely literally and that the discretion vested in the Board in its capacity as the apex Court of revenue justice is to be exercised carefully, judiciously and with considerable care and restraint. Besides, the Board is also expected to pass orders which can be called 'speaking orders' which have been defined in para 57 above. Failure of the Board either to exercise its powers judicially or to pass any order which is not a well-considered, well-reasoned and well argued order will certainly make it vulnerable to adverse criticism by the public and strictures by the High Court. 64. In view of what has been discussed above and after considering all aspects of the matter we are firmly of the view that the provisions of Rules 186 to 190 are not only relevant and necessary but also serve a very useful purpose without in any way offending either principles of natural justice or violating the principles of judicial discretion embodies in the Act itself under which these rules have been framed. 65. Our answers to the two issues referred to the Bench would, therefore, be as follows- (2) Is it open to the Board to dismiss an application in revision without giving a hearing to the parties? As a result of the insertion of new Section 333-A by virtue of the U.P. Land Laws Amendment Act, 1975 an answer to this issue has become, more or less, redundant. By virtue of the new section the Board will not be receiving any revisions from the Additional Commissioner in which the Additional Commissioner can pass an order rejecting the revision himself. So far, however, those revision are concerned which will be filed directly before the Board, a hearing to the parties will have to be given. By virtue of the new section the Board will not be receiving any revisions from the Additional Commissioner in which the Additional Commissioner can pass an order rejecting the revision himself. So far, however, those revision are concerned which will be filed directly before the Board, a hearing to the parties will have to be given. In case in which the revisions are referred to the Board by the Additional Commissioner that the Order of the trial court should be varied, cancelled or reversed, two eventualities would arise; whether and objection has been filed or the reference by the Additional Commissioner has not been contested in the sense that no objection has been filed. In the case of those revisions in which an objection has been filed a hearing to the parties is absolutely necessary. In the case of those revisions which have been referred by the Commissioner and in which no objection has been filed the powers of the Board are discretionary-it may or may not hear the parties. However this discretion with the Board is to be exercised very judiciously and with great care and caution in order to ensure that the ends of justice are not defeated. Also, when in the absence of an objection the Board decides to dispose of the revision in which no objection has been field the Board should pass a speaking order i.e. an order which is not only well reasoned and well argued but which also shows why it has not been considered necessary to hear the other party once again(because it has been heard by the Additional Commissioner once earlier) and why the matter is considered to be one in which it has been considered just and proper to pass an order on the basis of the commissioner's referred order. (3) Are the provisions contained in rules 186 to 189 of the Revenue Court Manual valid and legal? It is our considered view that these rules are perfectly valid and legal and although a little change may be considered necessary by virtue of the insertion of the new Section 333-A yet these changes should be considered to be mutantis mutandis without having any bearing whatsoever on the validity and legality of these rules. 66. It is our considered view that these rules are perfectly valid and legal and although a little change may be considered necessary by virtue of the insertion of the new Section 333-A yet these changes should be considered to be mutantis mutandis without having any bearing whatsoever on the validity and legality of these rules. 66. Before concluding there are one or two other observation which we would like to make lest there be any confusion in the minds of the litigant public, the learned counsel and the parties. Firstly, the previous judgment of the Full Bench (1970 R.D., p. 235) was a unanimous judgment insofar as the two points referred to it were concerned. This judgment was initially signed by Sri. N.B. Lal and Sri M. Samiuddin added 'I generally agree with the conclusion arrived at' while Sri Prakhash Krishen concluded by saying that he 'concurred'. Secondly, the observations of Sri M. Samiuddin in para 2 of this are in the nature of obiter dicta because these had nothing to do with the issue referred to the Bench and he had expressed his personal views only so far as the jurisdiction of the Boar was concerned. In the light of a separate issue having been framed on this point and answered by this Bench these observations of the learned erstwhile Member cannot be said to have any significance. Thirdly, the observation of the earlier Bench that 'various application for review or restoration were being heard and disposed of together' was a little ambiguous. What the learned Members constituting that Bench must have had in their minds was that those issues and those points which were common to all these petitions were being heard and answered together. It is not the duty of Bench constituted to hear and answer any specific issues referred to it do decide the original petitions form which those points arose. The Bench only answers the issue referred to it and thereafter it is the duty of the courts concerned to decide the petition in the light of issue thus answered. And, fourthly and finally, it has to be made clear that Section 333-A inserted by the U.P.Land Laws Amendment Act, 1975 does came into force on the day it was published in the Gazette, namely August 19, 1975. We are fortified in making this remark by Section 25 of the Amendment Act of 1975. And, fourthly and finally, it has to be made clear that Section 333-A inserted by the U.P.Land Laws Amendment Act, 1975 does came into force on the day it was published in the Gazette, namely August 19, 1975. We are fortified in making this remark by Section 25 of the Amendment Act of 1975. It reads: ' In Section 331 of the principle Act for sub-section (3) the following sub-section shall be substituted and be deemed always to have been substituted'. Had it been the intent of the Legislature to give Section 333-A any retrospective effect like that given in the proceeding section, Section 26 of the Amendment Act of 1975 should have read: 'After Section 333 of the principal Act the following subs-section shall be inserted and be deemed always to have been inserted'. This view finds further support from the Full Bench case of Allahabad High Court Har Pradad v. Ram Swarup (A.I.R. 1973, Alld,. p. 390) which pertains to the amendment in Section 115, C.P.C., by Section 6 of U.P. Act XXXVII of 1972. This case has no direct bearing on the instant reference but it is completely analogous so far as the retrospective operation of sections affecting jurisdiction of courts are concerned. In this case, their Lordship of Allahabad High Court have clearly held that Section 6 of Act XXXVII of 1972 has no retrospective operation because no such intention can be clearly spelled out from the amendment Act nor is there any provision mad in the Act to the effect that all pending revisions shall stand transferred to the district courts concerned nor is it provided therein that the High Court shall transfer all such revisions to the direct courts concerned. The mere fact that the enactment in question does not contain any saving clause is not decisive of the question as to whether the Act is to operate retrospectively so as to affect pending cases as well. Thus all those references made by the Additional Commissioner prior to August 19, 1975 will continue to be disposed of by the Board as required by rules 186 to 190 of the Revenue Court Manual. It is only regarding the revisions preferred after August 19, 1975 that the provisions of Section 333-a shall be deemed to apply. 67. Thus all those references made by the Additional Commissioner prior to August 19, 1975 will continue to be disposed of by the Board as required by rules 186 to 190 of the Revenue Court Manual. It is only regarding the revisions preferred after August 19, 1975 that the provisions of Section 333-a shall be deemed to apply. 67. Let a copy of this order be sent to all those Courts which made the references in the petitions referred to in the order of the present Bench and let those applications petitions be decided by the respective Courts in the light of answers given in this reference.