Abdul Sathar Haji Moosa Sait Dharmasthapanam Ernakulam v. The Kerala Wakf Board
1976-01-01
V.P.GOPALAN NAMBIYAR
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT V.P. Gopalan Nambiar, J. 1. The petitioners are the joint trustees of the Abdul Sathar Haji Moosa Sait Dharmasthapanam, Pullepady, Ernakulam. They pray for a writ of certiorari to quash the direction or order of the Wakf Board, dated 10th November, 1973 and evidenced by Ext P-8; and for a writ of mandamus directing the Wakf Board not to insist that they should appoint a Manager for the Dharmasthapanam. 2. The Wakf in question was constituted under a document (will), a copy of which has been filed as Ext. P-1. The provisions of the same are rather detailed and elaborate. For the purpose of this writ petition, it would be enough to note clauses (16) and (17) of the deed. These run as follows: xxx xxx xxx The document is of the year 1924 (1099 M.E.). By Ext. P-2 dated 20th July 1963 the Wakf Board after its constitution by the Wakf Act, 1954, invited the attention of the petitioners to a series of complaints received in regard to the mismanagement of the affairs of the trust and to the misappropriation of its funds, and proceeded to issue certain directions to the Mutawallis under the provisions of section 15, clause (2) (c) of the Wakf Act. Among the directions thus sought to be issued, it would be enough for the purpose of this writ petition to extract directions (a) and (b) of Ext. P-2: "(a) They should appoint a competent Manager for the Trust, preferably a person approved by the Wakf Board; (b) All items of expenditure of Rs. 1,000 and above should be incurred only after calling for open tenders.� It would be convenient next to refer to section 15(1) and (2) (c) and (d) of the Act: "15.
P-2: "(a) They should appoint a competent Manager for the Trust, preferably a person approved by the Wakf Board; (b) All items of expenditure of Rs. 1,000 and above should be incurred only after calling for open tenders.� It would be convenient next to refer to section 15(1) and (2) (c) and (d) of the Act: "15. (1) Subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the general superintendence of all Wakfs in a State shall vest in the Board established for the State; and it shall be the duty of the so to exercise its powers under this Act as to ensure that the Wakfs under its superintendence are properly maintained, controlled and administered and the income thereof is duly applied to the objects and fur the purposes for which such Wakfs were created or intended: Provided that in exercising its powers under this Act in respect of any Wakf, the Board shall act in conformity with the directions of the Wakf, the purposes of the Wakf and any usage or custom of the Wakf sanctioned by the Muslim law. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the functions of the Board shall be” (a) * * and (b) * * (c) to give directions for the administration of Wakfs; (d) to settle schemes of management for a Wakf. Provided that no such settlement shall be made without giving the parties aflected an opportunity of being heard: * * * *� The petitioners moved O.P, No, 3036 of 1964 complaining against direction (b) in Ext. P-2. That writ petition was disposed of by a learned Judge of this court by judgment dated 10th December 1965. The learned Judge, after noticing the provisions of section 15 of the Act, pointed out that under the provisions of clause (b) of section 15 (2), no interference with the administration and management of the Wakf could be had, and only directions in the nature of guidance or indicative of policies could be issued. In that view, the learned Judge quashed direction (b) in Ext. P-2. There was an appeal”Writ Appeal No. 85 of 1966 ”against that judgment. The learned Judges on appeal did not express themselves on the scope and ambit of section 15 (2) of the Act; but, as admitted, found that the impugned direction was too wide.
In that view, the learned Judge quashed direction (b) in Ext. P-2. There was an appeal”Writ Appeal No. 85 of 1966 ”against that judgment. The learned Judges on appeal did not express themselves on the scope and ambit of section 15 (2) of the Act; but, as admitted, found that the impugned direction was too wide. It was agreed before the learned Judges that fresh directions would be issued by the Board. Recording this, the appeal was disposed of in terms of the submissions made. Even after the disposal of the appeal, the Wakf Board would appear to have gone on pressing for appointment of a manager. Ext. P-6 dated 19th May 1973 is a copy of the representation made by the petitioners against the Board demand for appointment of a manager. Ext. P-7 is a copy of the petition No, 6/1973 dated 19th May 1973, filed before the Wakf Board under section 15 of the Act. These amply set out the case of the petitioners in regard to the appointment of a manager which was demanded from them. Their objections to the said course were overruled by Ext. P-8 order dated 10th November, 1973. By this order the Board again repeated its demand for the appointment of a manager for the Trust. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners have filed the above writ petition. 3. Counsel for the petitioners challenge the impugned order on two principal grounds: (1) that the direction to appoint a manager was outside the scope of the limited powers of the Board conferred on it under section 15 of the Act; and (2) that in any event, the Board functions could, by reason of the proviso to section 15 (1), be exercised only in conformity with the directions of the Wakf; and, in the instant case, the Board direction had contravened the expressed intention of the Wakf. 4. I shall examine the second of these contentions first. I have already extracted clauses 16 end 17 of Ext. P-1. There can be little doubt that clause 17 gives complete freedom and discretion to appoint a manager, if necessary, to the Managing Trustees of the Wakf. It was fairly conceded that this complete freedom to appoint a manager would involve a freedom or discretion not to appoint where circumstances do not warrant such appointment.
P-1. There can be little doubt that clause 17 gives complete freedom and discretion to appoint a manager, if necessary, to the Managing Trustees of the Wakf. It was fairly conceded that this complete freedom to appoint a manager would involve a freedom or discretion not to appoint where circumstances do not warrant such appointment. Under such circumstances, here the Wakf deed confers an absolute power or discretion upon the Managing Trustee to appoint or not to appoint a manager, for a statutory body like the Wakf Board to force hands by calling upon the Trustee to appoint a manager, cannot be said to be in conformity with the provisions of the Wakf deed; and the proviso to section 15 (1) of the Act is dear that the right of issuing directions is to be exercised only in conformity with the directions of the Wakf. For that reason, the direction cannot be said to be within the purview of section 15 of the Act. I have little hesitation, therefore, to hold that the Wakf Board has exceeded its power in issuing the direction complained of in Ext. P-1 to appoint a manager. 5. Petitioners counsel seems also to be well-founded in the contention that the right of issuing directions conferred under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act comprehends within its scope only functions of a supervisory character and cannot include ministerial or managerial functions such as the appointment of a manager or matters relating to the day-to-day administration of the Wakf. It may well be that this power may be comprehended under sub-clause (d) which allows the Board to settle a scheme for management of a Wakf. But clause (b), I am afraid, does not comprehend this power. As, however, the impugned direction seems clearly to contravene the provisions of the proviso to section 15(1) of the Act, it would be enough to rest my conclusion that it is unsustainable on the said provision, and there is no need to pray in aid the further circumstance that it is also beyond the supervisory power of the Board. 6. For the reasons indicated above, I allow this writ petition and quash Ext. P-8 order. There will be no order as to costs.