JUDGMENT - M.N. CHANDURKAR, J.:---This is landlords petition challenging the dismissal of his suit for eviction against the respondent filed by him on the ground that the bona fide required the suit premises for occupation. The suit premises consist of municipal house No. 147 which are admittedly in the possession of the defendant and the defendant, which as it now appears is a partnership firm is running a shop in these premises. The plaintiff came to Court with a case that he has two sons Rajmal and Sharad and these two sons had to be settled in life. He wanted to start a medicine shop to be run by Rajmal who, according to him, was already working as an employee of a pharmaceutical firm. The other son Sharad according to the petitioner, wanted to start a dispensary. Further according to the petitioner, Bhagwandas who was looking after the dispensary of the defendant firm had already taken possession of house No. 149 in Polan Peth which was originally in the occupation of his tenant. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the defendant would not be in any way prejudiced if a decree for eviction was passed. The defendant denied the case of a bona fide need put up by the petitioner plaintiff. The main plea of the defendant was that the petitioner had his own threestoried building in Balaji Peth where he originally used to run a shop and where he was now staying and he also owned three other plots in Jalgaon where the property in dispute is situated. It was the positive case of the defendant in the written statement that in front of the house of the plaintiff, there is a market place and shops and there were dispensaries and medicine shops also. Further it was stated that the plaintiff had initially started a shop, but he closed it down and got his son employed. It was specifically denied that Rajmal had any knowledge about business in medicine and, according to the defendant, the other son Sharad was taking his education and if at all the plaintiff wanted to start a shop, he could do it in his own premises. Therefore, according to the defendant, the need was neither genuine nor reasonable. It was specifically denied that Rajmal had any knowledge about business in medicine and, according to the defendant, the other son Sharad was taking his education and if at all the plaintiff wanted to start a shop, he could do it in his own premises. Therefore, according to the defendant, the need was neither genuine nor reasonable. Further it was pleaded that house No. 149 was the personal property of Bhagwandas and the business in the suit premises was a partnership business carried on by Manakchand, Nandlal and Bhagwandas, all sons of Jivanram and the two partners Manakchand and Bhagwan had nothing to do with house No. 149. Bhagwandas is admittedly a step-brother of Manakchand and Nandlal. On these pleadings the parties went to trial and apart from the petitioner his son Sharad gave evidence and on behalf of the defendant Bhagwandas gave evidence before the trial Court the petitioner filed a notice dated 14th October, 1967 issued under the provisions of the Town Planning Act to the effect that while making a town plain, the plaintiff was to be given plot No. 96 in lieu of his present plot No. 116. Now, it is not in dispute that this notice was in fact not for allotment of any other plot, but, according to the plaintiff, half of his house No. 110 was intended to be taken over by the Town Planing Authority. It is, however, not in dispute that inspite of this notice issued as far back as on 14th October, 1967, the plaintiff even now continues to be in possession of the entire house No. 110. The trial Court while considering the issue whether the plaintiff required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for starting a medical shop for this sons came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had established satisfactorily that he required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for the use of his sons for their respective professions, that is, for the medicine shop to be started by Rajmal and for dispensary to be started by Sharad. The observations made by the trial Court show that his decision with regard to the need in respect of the rented premises was largely influenced by the fact that even the residential accommodation, that is, house No. 110 was going to be reduced to one-half as a result of the town planning scheme. The observations made by the trial Court show that his decision with regard to the need in respect of the rented premises was largely influenced by the fact that even the residential accommodation, that is, house No. 110 was going to be reduced to one-half as a result of the town planning scheme. The learned Judge of the trial Court negatived the argument that the proceedings were initiated out of an ulterior motive to oust the defendants. Further, the trial Court, considering the issue of hardship, took the view that if the accommodation is not made for the shop and the dispensary, the plaintiff will not be in a position to settle his sons into the respective business and profession. Further while considering the hardship of the defendant, the trial Court took the view that house No. 149, which Bhagwandas claimed to be his own, in which two step-brothers, according to him, had no interest, was the property of the joint family and that the shop Jivanram Bhagwandas was also the property of the joint Hindu family consisting of the three sons of Jivanram Harkaran. He reached this conclusion on the footing that Jivanram purchased this house in the name of Bhagwandas as the property of the joint family and that it was not the separate property given to Bhagwandas at the time of the separation of the family because no separation was proved. The trial Court also held that the shop Jivanram Bhagwandas belonged to the joint family because a reply to the notice served by the plaintiff was given by Bhagwandas showing himself as Vahivatdar of the shop. Jivanram Bhagwandas along with his father Jivanram Harkaran and that the contention that Bhagwandas had no interest in the shop was taken only after the death of Jivanram Harkaran in April 1964. The trial Court further took the view that if house No. 129 was the property of the joint family, its nature cannot be changed by Bhagwandas and his step-brothers becoming partners in the Kirana and grain business. The learned trial Judge further held that the partnership was actually formed the intention that it should be possible if and when a suit was instituted to contend that the municipal house No. 149 was the individual property of Bhagwandas and the shop Jivanram Bhagwandas was a partnership business in which Bhagwandas was only one of the partners. The learned trial Judge further held that the partnership was actually formed the intention that it should be possible if and when a suit was instituted to contend that the municipal house No. 149 was the individual property of Bhagwandas and the shop Jivanram Bhagwandas was a partnership business in which Bhagwandas was only one of the partners. Thus having taken this view, it reached the conclusion that already accommodation was available to the defendant and, therefore, no hardship would result if a decree for eviction would be passed against him. The trial Court had also framed an issue as to whether running the business as a partnership concern would amount to not using the suit premises for which they were let out, but that issue was answered in the negative. Finally, the trial Court passed a decree for possession in respect of the suit premises. The defendant filed an appeal against this decree of the trial Court. The learned Assistant Judge, Jalgaon, who decided the appeal took the view that the trial Court had been wholly influenced by the notice (Ex. 30) from the Town Planning Authority. On merits, the learned Assistant Judge took the view that there is no material on record to show that Rajmal wanted to leave service and start a medical shop and Sharad wanted to start a dispensary, they had sufficient accommodation in house No. 110. The Appellate Court further took the view that there was no evidence that half the area of house No. 110 has been acquired by the Town Planning Department. The Appellate Court referred to the evidence on record and held that 9 rooms in house No. 110 were in possession of the plaintiff and the plaintiff could very well start a dispensary and a medical shop for his own sons is municipal house No. 110. It further took into consideration the fact that a Kirana and grain shop were already started in house No. 110. It further took into consideration the fact that a Kirana and grain shop were already started in house No. 110. The learned Judge further observed that if at all the plaintiff really wanted to start a medical shop and dispensary, he could also start it in house No. 110, and it further took the view that the series of notices issued by the plaintiff, the first one in 1963, the second on in 1964 and then the last one in 1969, showed that the plaintiff was making out new grounds every time for claiming possession of the suit premises against the defendant. The learned Assistant Judge, therefore, set aside the finding of the trial Court that the suit premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiff. On the question of hardship, the Appellate Court took the view that there was no material to show that house No. 149 belonged to the defendant shop or was available for occupation of the defendant incase of eviction. Therefore he took the view that house No. 129 was separate property of Bhagwandas and the defendant shop had no concern with it. Thus, according to the learned Assistant Judge, house No. 149 was not available to the defendant shop for occupation and that greater hardship would be caused to the defendant by passing a decree for eviction, as the defendant is carrying on Kirana business in the suit premises since the last 38 years and has acquired a good-will of its own as held by the trial Court. The Appellate Court, therefore, set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The petitioner has now filed this petition challenging the decision of the Appellate Court. It is vehemently contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Appellate Court should have been slow to interfere with the finding given by the trial Court on the issue of bona fide and reasonable requirement and that the evidence of the landlord and his son Sharad had sufficiently proved that the petitioner needed the premises bona fide and reasonably for the purpose of starting a medical shop and the dispensary for his son. It was sought to be contended that the lower Appellate Court had taken into account irrelevant considerations and various material factors were left out of consideration while setting aside the decision of the trial Court. It was sought to be contended that the lower Appellate Court had taken into account irrelevant considerations and various material factors were left out of consideration while setting aside the decision of the trial Court. It was urged that the evidence given by the father that Rajmal was in service and that Sharad was a doctor who was already running his dispensary in a village has not been challenged and, therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the Appellate Court should not have interfered with the finding given by the trial Court. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, but I am not satisfied that there is may errors in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court or that judgment of the lower Appellate Court is vitiated for any of the reasons referred to by the learned Counsel. There can be no dispute that the Appellate Court normally should be slow to interfere with the decision on evidence on a question of fact recorded by the trial Court. But that is not to say that an Appellate Court is totally incompetent to reverse a decision on a question of fact. If, as in the instant case, the decision of the trial Court with regard to the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord was largely affected by a very irrelevant circumstance, namely the assumption that the landlord was being deprived of half of the premises in house No. 110, then the entire decision of the trial Court must stand vitiated and the Appellate Court had, therefore, full jurisdiction to re-appreciate the entire evidence afresh. It has not been disputed before me that in spite of the notice (Ex. 30) which was issued as far back as on 14th October, 1967, the petitioner still continues in occupation of his entire premises in house No. 110. One of the very important factors which has weighed with the trial Court in holding that the petitioner needed the premises in dispute for the purposes of starting of the medicine shop and the dispensary was that a large part of the premises in house No. 110 is not available to the plaintiff. Now, the present is not a case where the landlord is staying in rented premises and he is claiming premises owned by him on the ground that he reasonably and bona fide needs the tenanted premises. Now, the present is not a case where the landlord is staying in rented premises and he is claiming premises owned by him on the ground that he reasonably and bona fide needs the tenanted premises. In the instant case the landlord has in his personal occupation a three storied building. The present case is a case, therefore, were unless the landlord satisfactorily establishes his need for additional accommodation, he will not be entitled to a decree for eviction. It is really this approach which was rightly adopted by the trial Court, but in proceeding ahead with the case, he has allowed himself to be influenced by the assumption that the plaintiff is not in a position to use half of the premises in house No. 110. Even the judgment of the trial Court shows that he might have taken a different view of the matter if it was shown that the plaintiff was able to utilise the entire premises in house No. 110. The trial Court had rightly considered the objection of the defendant that the landlord had his own premises in house No. 110. While referring to the objection of the tenant in paragraph 13 he has observed that the main objection to the requirement of the landlord is that the plaintiff owns municipal house No. 110 in Balaji Peth locality of Jalgaon. It was suggested before the trial Court that Balaji Peth was a suitable locality which had also medicine shops and dispensaries. But while considering this question, he took the view that "The real difficulty for the plaintiff is that almost one-half of the plot of land on which his house stands is earmarked to go into the town planning scheme." How, the trial Court had understood the plaintiffs case to be clearly that it was not that the accommodation in house No. 110 was insufficient, but he had understood the case that he needed additional accommodation because he was being deprived of half the house. This is clear from the following observations in the judgment in paragraph 13 : "The explanation which is offered by the plaintiff as regards his inability to start the medicine shop or dispensary in his own house is this; it is not that the accommodation as is presently available would be insufficient for the two purposes of the two sons. This is clear from the following observations in the judgment in paragraph 13 : "The explanation which is offered by the plaintiff as regards his inability to start the medicine shop or dispensary in his own house is this; it is not that the accommodation as is presently available would be insufficient for the two purposes of the two sons. The real difficulty for the plot of land on which his house stands is earmarked to go into the town planning scheme." Therefore, even before the trial Court it was not the case of the plaintiff that accommodation in house No. 110 was insufficient if he wanted to start the medicine shop in that house, but he wanted to provide for the possibility of being deprived of half of the house No. 110. Even on the plaintiffs own showing, therefore, this is not a case in which he on the date on which he gave the notice accommodation was not available to him. Indeed neither the petitioner nor his son Sharad had deposed as to why they did not think it feasible to start the medicine shop or dispensary in house No. 110. It is not the plaintiffs case in the plaint also that house No. 110 does not have sufficient accommodation or is not in any way suitable for the purpose of a medicine shop or a dispensary. Indeed there is a treat infirmity in the plaintiffs case inasmuch as the nature of the need disclosed being need for additional accommodation, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to make out a clear case in the plaint itself as to why the present accommodation in his possession was insufficient. Probably this fact was not referred to in the plaint as it appears from the judgment of the trial Court and the evidence on record that such was never the plaintiffs case. Thus assuming that the plaintiff had proved that he wanted to establish his son by starting a medicine shop for him and the other son by having a dispensary, the need in respect of the suit premises cannot be said to be established. In a case like the instant one, the plaintiff cannot remain satisfied by merely establishing that the plaintiff is desirous of having a shop or a dispensary for his son. What has to be established is the need in respect of the tenanted premises. In a case like the instant one, the plaintiff cannot remain satisfied by merely establishing that the plaintiff is desirous of having a shop or a dispensary for his son. What has to be established is the need in respect of the tenanted premises. Unless the plaintiff established the need viz-a-viz tenanted premises, a decree for eviction could not be passed against the tenant because so far as the defendant is concerned, the mere need to have a shop or a dispensary was not very relevant. What had, therefore, to be established by the plaintiff was that he needed the suit premises as such to satisfy his need. In a case of additional accommodation, such need for additional accommodation can be said to be established only where the plaintiff proved to the satisfaction of the Court that his present accommodation is either insufficient or unsuitable having regard to the nature of the purpose for which additional accommodation is sought. It is not disputed before me that the reference to (Ex. 30) which was a notice from the Town Planning Authority was wholly irrelevant. If that was so and there can be no dispute that it was that notice which weighed with the trial Court, it is clear that the decision of the trial Court was vitiated. The lower Appellate Court was, therefore, entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence and having found that there is no explanation as to why the premises in house No. 110 could not have been sued, it was open to the Appellate Court to come to a contrary finding on the issue of reasonableness and bona fides of the landlords requirement. It is also clear that the circumstance that the plaintiff had been issuing notices since 1964 with an attempt to get the suit premises vacated was not an entirely irrelevant circumstances. That would indicate the frame of the mind of the landlord. If deposed to by the landlord, he wanted the shop to be started about three years earlier, nothing prevented him from starting a shop in any of the 8 or 9 rooms which were in his possession in house No. 110. That house is also situated in a business locality and there is clear admission of the plaintiff that near about there is a medicine shop and there is also a dispensary. That house is also situated in a business locality and there is clear admission of the plaintiff that near about there is a medicine shop and there is also a dispensary. In my view, no error could be found with the decision of the lower Appellate Court on the issue of bona fides of the need. Since the need itself has not been found to be bona fide or reasonable, it is not necessary to go into the correctness or otherwise of the finding recorded by the Appellate Court on the issue of hardship. It is also not necessary to go into the correctness or otherwise of the finding as to whether house No. 149 belongs exclusively to Bhagwandas or whether it is joint family property of Bhagwandas and his two steps-brothers. Mr. Morje, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court in (Smt. Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra)1, 1970 R.C.J. 34 and (Mattulal v. Radha Lal)2, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1596. The first case was under section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, where the Supreme Court held that whether on facts proved the requirement of the landlord is bona fide within the meaning of section 14(1)(e) is a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. In the other case, the Supreme Court was dealing with bona fide requirement of landlord under section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and it was held that the question whether the landlord does not bona fide require the premises in question for the purpose of starting business as a dealer in iron and steel material was a finding of fact and not finding of mixed law and fact. The learned Counsel has also referred to a decision in (Madan Lal Puri v. Sain Dass Berry)3, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 585 in which the Supreme Court was also dealing with section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and it was held that the finding as to bona fide requirement of landlord within the meaning of section 14(1)(e) was a mixed question of law and fact. There is really no occasion to refer to these decisions in detail because the entire arguments of the learned Counsel have been heard and he was not prevented from arguing any question as to the bona fide requirement on the ground that the finding given by the lower Appellate Court was a finding of fact. In the view which I have taken, this petition must fail and is rejected. Rule discharge. However, there will be no order as to costs. -----