( 1 ) THE Court made the following : in this revision petition by the tenant the correctness and legality of the order dated 11-9-1974 in HRCA. No. 100 of 1973 of the District Judge, mangalore, South Kanara, confirming the order dated 25-8-1973 of the principal Munsiff, Mangalore, SK in HRC No. 68 of 1971 on his file granting an order for possession in favour of Respondent-landlord under clause (h) of the proviso to sub-sec (1) of S. 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, is challenged. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT has his residence at No. 5-742 situate in Mannagudde, mangalore Town. In the open space in front of his residence and abutting the road he has a row of shops leaving in between them a passage of about 31/2 feet, providing the only access from the road to his residence Petitioner is in occupation as a tenant of a small shop which abuts this passage on the south. The portion to the North of the passage is stated to have been let out by respondent to a restaurateur. Respondent has sought and the Courts below have granted an order of eviction against petitioner to enable the respondent to demolish the shop premises occupied by the petitioner to provide for a passage of more width from the road to the said residence so that respondent may be able to take his car inside his compound. Petitioner's defences which assumed the familiar pattern that the petition was actuated by oblique motives to coerce an enhancement of rent and that the order of eviction would occasion greater hardship to him were not found acceptable to the Courts below. They found respondent's request both bonafide and reasonable. ( 3 ) SRI Krishna Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner, is not able to make good his attack on these findings with reference either to any fallacies of reasoning or infirmities in the inferences. The Commissioner appointed in the case has stated in his report Ext.-Cl that the portion in the occupation of petitioner is the only appropriate location for widening of the passage. This report has been accepted by the Courts below. The Commissioner appointed in the case has stated in his report Ext.-Cl that the portion in the occupation of petitioner is the only appropriate location for widening of the passage. This report has been accepted by the Courts below. These are findings of fact and in the absence of any demonstrable errors in the approach of the Courts below to the matter, vitiating the findings, the same do not admit of interference, this Court not being a second court of first appeal. However, two other contentions advanced by Sri Krishna Bhat bear examination. He contends that a landlord cannot, consistently with the scheme of the provisions of S. 21 (1) (h) read with S. 25 of the Act, be permitted to seek eviction of a tenant in occupation of an accommodation so as to enable the landlord to put the premises to a use which involves, as it does in the present case, an avowed demolition of the structure. According to him, such a relief to the landlord which renders the evicted tenant's right of reentry envisaged in S. 25 of the Act nugatory is opposed to and outside the pale of the said scheme. His further contention is that respondent's proposed use of the land as a mere passage after the demolition of the super structure which is now in petitioner's use is not 'occupation' within the meaning of S. 21 (1) (h) of the Act and that therefore relief to the landlord stands barred. There is nothing in the language of S. 21 (1) (h) which supports the construction Sri Krishna Bhat seeks; but his contention is that such a restriction shall have to be read into that sub-section in view of the provisions of S. 25 of the Act. ( 4 ) IN Ramaniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1676 , explaining the scope of analogous provisions of the Bombay Rents, hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947), it was observed :"the Act has provided sufficient protection to the tenants Against being harassed by threat of ejectment in case they are unable to satisfy landlord's demands. Various restrictions have been placed on the right of the landlord to eject the tenant. Various restrictions have been placed on the right of the landlord to eject the tenant. S. 12 (1) provides that the landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession 01 any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Act. S. 13 provides exceptional cases in which the landlord can eject the tenant even though he had been paying rent regularly or be ready and willing to pay rent. The provisions of S. 13 are for the advantage of the landlord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in that section are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the exercise of the landlord's general right to eject his tenant. There is therefore no reason why restrictions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. We do not therefore agree with the contention that cl. (g) will apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the premises without making any alteration in them i. e. , to occupy the identical building which the tenant occupies. There is no justification to give such a narrow construction either to the word 'premises' or to the word 'occupies' which have been construed by this Court in Krishnanlal Ishwarlal Desai v. Bai Vijkor, referred to later. In Krishanlal Ishwarlal Desai's case, Civil Appeal No. 804 of 1962 dated 18-1-1963 (SC) this Court said in connection with the provisions of S. 17 (1) of the Act :"what is, however, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf. . . "'occupation' of the premises in Cl (g) does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their occupation. "in Kiishanlal Ishwarlal Desai v. Bai Vijkor, AIR. 1967 SC. In a case like the present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their occupation. "in Kiishanlal Ishwarlal Desai v. Bai Vijkor, AIR. 1967 SC. 375, it was observed :"what is, however, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf and this overt act was, on the finding of the District Court, done by the appellant on October 24, 1957". The proposition that emerges from the above enunciations is that a landlord who seeks the premises for his own occupation is at liberty to demolish the super-structure and reconstruct the same or may "occupy the place by making use of it in any manner" admits as its corollary the liberty on the part of a landlord, in appropriate cases, to demolish the super-structure and make use of the land for his purposes in terms of the case made out by him under S. 21 (1) (h) and held proved at the trial. Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the manner of use which respondent seeks to put the premises to, in my opinion, does amount to 'occupation' of the premises by him within the meaning of S. 21 (1) (h) of the Act. The expression 'occupy' cannot be given a lestricted meaning. ( 5 ) WHAT remains to be considered is the contention as to comparitive hardship. Sri Krishna Bhat says that Court below held against petitioner on this point on the ground that petitioner was also in occupation of an adjacent shop belonging to the same landlord; and that that ground has now disappeared in view of the circumstance that petitioner has since lost possession of that premises also in proceedings for eviction instituted against him on the ground of sub-letting. If petitioner has unlawfully sublet that shop and thereby rendered himself liable to eviction, he cannot be heard to complain against the consequences of his own act. If petitioner has unlawfully sublet that shop and thereby rendered himself liable to eviction, he cannot be heard to complain against the consequences of his own act. As found by the Courts below, new buildings are coming up in Mangalore and the inconvenience caused to petitioner owing to his being compelled to pay higher rents for such new premises cannot be trated as such hardship as would override the need of the respondent who admittedly is finding himself compelled to park his car in the premises of a relation for want of a proper access to his own property. ( 6 ) NO other point was urged. ( 7 ) IN the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, petitioner is granted time to yield up and deliver vacant possession till 31-7-1976. No costs. --- *** --- .sw