JUDGMENT P. N. Bakshi, J. 1. THE petitioner is a Corporation established under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The petitioner has its Central Office at Bombay and five zonal offices. The Central Zonal Office at Kanpur governs the territories of U. P. and Madhya Pradesh. A group of properties known as Free India Estate was owned by the Free India Insurance Company Ltd. at Kanpur. The tenements of this property had been let out to various tenants. This property vested in the Life Insurance Corporation on 1-9-1956. 2. THE petitioner's case is that the Zonal Manager wrote to the District Magistrate, Kanpur on 16-10-1956 for the allotment of the various tenements of the Free India Estate to the employees of the Corporation who have been transferred to Kanpur from time to time and were faced with the difficulties of a suitable residential accommodation. The then Collector, Kanpur is alleged to have given assurance to the petitioner that in the event of the premises falling vacant, he shall be consulted before making allotment. Srimati Raj Kumari Varma was a tenant of house No. 42 Free India Estate. She died on 16-8-1972. On 22-8-1972 an application was filed by the petitioner under Section 16 (I) (b) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for release of this accommodation in favour of the Corporation vide annexure 5 attached to the writ petition. Along with this application annexure A was attached which disclosed the names of 29 officers of Class I of the Corporation, 120 employees of class 3 and 28 employees of class 4 who were on the waiting list and were in pressing need of the accommodation. In other words the case of the corporation was that it bona fide needed the premises in question for accommodating one of its employees mentioned in annexure A. On 27-8-1972 objections were filed to this application by Smt. Sneh Srivastava and Smt. Prakash Wati respondents 5 and 6 to this writ petition who claim to be in possession of the premises after the death of Smt. Raj Kumari Varma. These respondents claimed to be the daughters of the deceased. The said objections have been attached as annexure 6 to this writ petition. A reply thereto was filed by the Life Insurance Corporation on 20-9-1972 vide annexure 7. These respondents claimed to be the daughters of the deceased. The said objections have been attached as annexure 6 to this writ petition. A reply thereto was filed by the Life Insurance Corporation on 20-9-1972 vide annexure 7. On 23-10-1972 the Rent Control Eviction Officer, Kanpur rejected the release application filed by the petitioner vide annexure 8. The Rent Control Eviction Officer also found that premises No. 42 had legally fallen vacant. He further held that the need of the petitioner was not genuine. A copy of the said order is attached as annexure 8 to this writ petition. Thereafter, the petitioner as well as the heirs of the deceased filed appeals before the District Judge which were dismissed by him on 7-4-1973 vide annexure II filed along with this petition. It appears that house No. 42 was allotted on 30-10-1972 to Sri Beni Singh Awasthi, respondent No. 4 a true copy of this allotment order is attached as annexure 9 to this writ petition. Writ No. 2262 of 1973 was filed in this Court by Smt. Sneh Srivastava and others aggrieved by the order of the District Judge mentioned above. This writ petition was dismissed on 23-10-1975. The Life Insurance Corporation also filed the present writ petition challenging the impugned order of the District Judge. 3. I have heard counsel for both the parties. The main question which has been convassed before me by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the view of law taken by the District Judge in interpreting the question whether in the case of a Corporation, the need of the employees is also to be taken into consideration has been erroneously decided. Learned counsel has submitted that the Corporation being juristic entity can only act through its offices under the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act. The Corporation is fully competent to apply for a release of premises belonging to it for the purpose of accommodating its employees. I shall now consider the force of this submission. 4. The Corporation is fully competent to apply for a release of premises belonging to it for the purpose of accommodating its employees. I shall now consider the force of this submission. 4. SECTION 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 runs as under :- "16 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the District Magistrate may by order :- (a) require the landlord to let any building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant, or a part of such building but not appurtenant land alone, to any person specified in the order (to be called an allotment order) or (b) release the whole or any part of such building, or any land appurtenant thereto in favour of the landlord (to be called a release order). (2) No release order under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be made unless the District Magistrate is satisfied that the building or any part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction, by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family,, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him either for residential purpose or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling.........." In the instant case, an application has been made by the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The ground on which the application is made is that there is a large list of its employees who have not been provided with residential accommodation and who are in urgent need of the said accommodation. On this ground the landlord i.e., the Life Insurance Corporation claims release of the property in its favour. The District Judge while considering this question was of the view that since the Life Insurance Corporation does not come within the definition of the word 'Family' as defined under the Act, it is not entitled to apply for a release of the property belonging to it after it is vacated by the tenant. Learned counsel for the petitioner has quoted Salmond on Jurisprudence' 12th Edition Article 68 in support of his contention that :- "A corporation, having neither soul nor body, cannot act save through the agency of some representative in the world of real men. Learned counsel for the petitioner has quoted Salmond on Jurisprudence' 12th Edition Article 68 in support of his contention that :- "A corporation, having neither soul nor body, cannot act save through the agency of some representative in the world of real men. For the same reason it can have no interests, save those which are attributed to it as a trustee for or otherwise on behalf of actual human beings." 5. THE principle which has been laid down above cannot be disputed. The same principle has been followed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in its decision reported in All India Rent Control Journal, 1969, page 761, H. C. Sharma v. Life Insurance Corporation of India. This decision of learned Single Judge has been based upon the view expressed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC 175 , B. M. Lall v. Dunlop Rubber Co. The learned single Judge has observed as follows :- "A corporation is only a legal person. It can occupy premises only through its employees. Unless, therefore, a corporation wishes to make a distinction between occupation by itself through its employees and occupation by employees on their own behalf, mere permissive occupation of the employees would not ordinarily be construed as occupation on account of employees themselves." 6. IT may be observed here that in the Supreme Court decision which has been relied upon here by the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court the terms and conditions on which the Company would allot the premises to their officers for residence have been reduced to a contract between the Company and the employees. These terms were very similar to the terms on which the corporation allotted premises to Sri Chakrwarti in the Delhi case. In the instant case, however, no such contract was filed before the District Magistrate where the application for release of the premises in question was made. Annexure 12 however, has been filed along with this writ petition which indicates the terms and conditions on which a license to occupy the premises belonging to the Life Insurance Corporation is incorporated. In the instant case, however, no such contract was filed before the District Magistrate where the application for release of the premises in question was made. Annexure 12 however, has been filed along with this writ petition which indicates the terms and conditions on which a license to occupy the premises belonging to the Life Insurance Corporation is incorporated. IT must however, be observed in this very connection that in annexure A which has been filed along with these applications even though the names of several employees have been mentioned as requiring accommodation yet the application for release does not indicate in whose favour the premises would be allotted by the Life Insurance Corporation after its release in its favour by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The District Judge has observed in his impugned order that the Life Insurance Corporation has not shown as to which of the employees would benefit and for whom the accommodation in question wag being asked for. It has also not been mentioned in the order whether the employee to whom the allotment was to be given was possessed of any accommodation in the town or not. In my view, these are certainly matters which have to be taken into consideration by the District Magistrate while releasing the property in favour of the Life Insurance Corporation. The Life Insurance Corporation is certainly the owner of the entire property in question. It is the landlord of the property in question. Its employees are merely the licensees of the Corporation who are granted permission by the Corporation to occupy the premises in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract which may be entered into between the Corporation and the employees. As such, the impugned orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the District Judge clearly suffer from an illegality in holding the Life Insurance Corporation was not entitled to file an application for release of the premises In question. In this very connection I would like to mention that the District Judge was of the view that if the premises have been required for the purpose of having an office by the Life Insurance Corporation, such an application would be covered by Section 16 (1) of the Act. In my view this is a very narrow interpretation of Section 16 of the Act. In my view this is a very narrow interpretation of Section 16 of the Act. Requirement of the Life Insurance Corporation for the purpose of extension of its office as also for the purpose of providing accommodation to its needy officers must be treated at par as a bonafide need of the corporation. 7. HAVING regard to all the facts and circumstances mentioned by me above, I am of the view that this writ petition must be allowed but in order to legally decide the rights of the parties, it is necessary that the case be remanded to the District Judge so that he may consider the question whether the Life Insurance Corporation bonafide requires the accommodation in question for any particular employee mentioned in list A. The petitioners will be entitled to lead evidence on this question and the respondents will also be entitled to rebut the allegations to show that the premises is not required bona fide by the petitioners. 8. WITH the above observations this writ petition is allowed. A writ of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order of the District Judge dated 7-4-1973 and the Rent Control Eviction Officer dated 23-10-1972. The case is remanded to the District Judge for disposal in accordance with law in the light of the observations made by me above. Cost shall abide the result. Petition allowed.