Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by an employer against the judgment in O. P. No. 4685 of 1974 dismissing his petition to set aside an order of reference made under S.10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for short, the Act. That order has been produced along with the Original Petition as Ext. P.17 and is dated 10 919'4. Earlier the Government in relation to the same alleged industrial dispute had passed an order Ext. P 14 under S.12(5) of the Act which was in these terms: "I am directed to inform you that from the report of the conciliation officer submitted under S.12(4) of Industrial Disputes Act neither the employer nor the Trade Union attended the conciliation conferences. As such the Government feel that this is a dispute in which neither party is interested and as such the dispute per se does not exist. Therefore Government do not consider it necessary to take further action". Ext. P14 is dated 18101972 and soon after the receipt of Ext. P14, the Union concerned represented by its Secretary, the 1st respondent, sent a communication to the Government dated 1111-1972.On receipt of the above communication, the Government directed the Deputy Labour Officer to convene further conferences and ascertain whether there was really an industrial dispute between the parties concerned. It appears that the Deputy Labour Officer took some time to convene the conference. But it is clear from the averments in the Original Petition itself that he did convene a conference on 31 1974 and it is admitted by the appellant that he received notice regarding this conference on the previous day, on 21 1974. He has not stated in the petition as to what he did on receipt of this notice nor does he say whether he attended the conference. He further admits that there was a further conference convened on 7 2-1974. According to him he then pointed out that the Government had already refused to refer the dispute by Ext. PI4 order. But it is denied by the Government that he attended the conference that day. The Deputy Labour Officer assuming that the appellant did not attend the conferences-we will so presume sent a further report to the Government after the conferences on 3 174 and 7 21974 as enjoined by the Act. Apparently thereafter, Ext. P17 order was passed. PI4 order. But it is denied by the Government that he attended the conference that day. The Deputy Labour Officer assuming that the appellant did not attend the conferences-we will so presume sent a further report to the Government after the conferences on 3 174 and 7 21974 as enjoined by the Act. Apparently thereafter, Ext. P17 order was passed. The petitioner is right in his contention that the order Ext. P17 only refers to the report dated 191972 which was the report that was referred to in Ext. P14. It is apparently a drafting mistake and we do not think that we should rest our decision on the basis of this and assume that the very same reason that prompted the Government to pass Ext. P14 order persuaded them to pass Ext P17 order. It is extremely unlikely particularly in view of the letter of the Union already referred to and the fact that farther conferences were convened. We must therefore take it that the Government was prompted to change the view it took at the time of passing Ext. P14 because of additional material. 2. It is now well-established that the function of the Government while passing orders under S.10 (1) referring a dispute to the Industrial Tribunal is administrative or executive in nature, not Certainly judicial or quasi judicial. It is equally well-established that there can be no question of the principles of res judicata being applied, nor can it be said that after having refused to refer a dispute the Government cannot thereafter make an order of reference. It is open to them to reconsider. It is only necessary to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Western India Watch Co. Ltd. v. The Western India Watch Co. Workers Union and others AIR. 1970 S C. 1205, Para.9, in support of what we have stated here and counsel for the appellant did not dispute the position. He however invited our attention to Para.13 of the same judgment and contended that what is stated in Para.13 of the same judgment is identical with the view taken by the Madras High Courts in two decisions, one by a single judge which is said to have been approved by a Division Bench. He however invited our attention to Para.13 of the same judgment and contended that what is stated in Para.13 of the same judgment is identical with the view taken by the Madras High Courts in two decisions, one by a single judge which is said to have been approved by a Division Bench. So it was argued that the Government can after refusing to refer a dispute pass an order referring the dispute only after hearing the person apparently the employer who is said to have been benefitted by the earlier orders of refusal to refer. Before we deal with this aspect, we would like to emphasise that it is not obligatory on the part of the Government to give reasons while referring a dispute under S.10 (1). They are of course obliged to consider the relevant material; they cannot act arbitrarily, cannot take extraneous factors into consideration and if their order is challenged as being violative of these principles, before a court of law they may have to satisfy the court that there was material to reach the conclusion that "in the opinion" of the Government an industrial dispute did exist or atleast in the opinion of the Government such a dispute was apprehended. This Court cannot consider the sufficiency of the material in such cases and if there has been an application of the mind to the question and the matter had been dealt with honestly and in a bona fide manner the order of reference would be final and cannot be subject to scrutiny. If on the other hand, the Government refuse to make an order of reference, it is obliged to state reasons because the statute itself provides that the Government shall so state the reasons. An industrial dispute is to be resolved by a special procedure provided for that purpose. If that procedure is the only remedy available to the workmen and if a recourse to that procedure is denied by refusing to make an order of reference the Government will have to state reasons There must be what is called, a speaking order, which on the face of it would indicate why a special remedy had been denied to the workmen. If on the other hand a referencehad been made, merely by the passing of such an order of reference, it cannot be said that any rights of the parties have been affected. If on the other hand a referencehad been made, merely by the passing of such an order of reference, it cannot be said that any rights of the parties have been affected. We said recently in relation to the power under S.92 of the C. P. C., where the Advocate General has to give permission to institute a suit the grant of permission cannot be said to affect adversely the rights of the defendants in the suit so as to sustain an action under Art.226 of the Constitution. We also dealt with fairly elaborately the ambit of review of administrative action. We further held that if there was a refusal to give permission we would like to know why the Advocate General refused permission to institute a suit. A refusal, we held, would affect the rights of parties. We think that the same would be the position in regard to the action under S.10 (1). No employer can be beard to say that an order of reference has prejudicially affected his rights so as to enable him to seek the setting aside of the order of the Government in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. This aspect is important because counsel has contended or proceeded on the basis that by the order Ext P14 refusing to refer the dispute some vested rights had accrued to the appellant and that by passing the order of refusal Ext. P17, that vested right has been taken away and this according to him should not have been done without giving an opportunity to the appellant to satisfy the Government that there was no necessity, need or justification for any change of opinion. 3. The passage relied on from the Supreme Court decision in M/s. Western India Watch Co. Ltd. The Western India Watch Co. Workers Union and Others AIR. 1970 S.C.1205 reads as follows: "13. It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make the reference, such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen. It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make the reference, such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen. Such a consideration would, we should think, be taken into account by the Government whenever, in exercise of its discretion, it decides to reopen its previous decision as also the time which has lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it. These are matters which the Government would have to take into account while deciding whether it should reopen its former decision in the interest of justice and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its jurisdiction under S.4-K of the Act. Whether the intervening period may be short or long would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and therefore, in construing the expression "at any time" in S.4-K it would be impossible to lay down any limits to it." 4. We do not understand this as imposing any obligation on the part of the State Government to conform to any particular procedure or of imposing an obligation on the part of the Government to hear an employer before taking a view different from the one taken earlier by the Government in refusing to refer a dispute. The court has merely pointed out what are the relevant aspects that the Government have to take into account before deciding whether a dispute which they refused to refer earlier should be referred. It may also be borne in mind that in the particular case a reference ordered four years after an earlier refusal was upheld by the Supreme Court. But counsel relied on a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Tiruchy Steel Rolling Mills Ltd v. S. Chanasambandan and others (1974) 46 F.J.R. 158. The question that was considered by the court arose before the Division Bench in view of the difference of opinion between Rajagopalan, J., in Radhakrishna Mills (Pollachi) Ltd. v. State of Madras, (1955) 9 F J.R. 125 and Ramaprasada Rao, J. in K. Abdul Salam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972)43 F.J.R. 180. The question that was considered by the court arose before the Division Bench in view of the difference of opinion between Rajagopalan, J., in Radhakrishna Mills (Pollachi) Ltd. v. State of Madras, (1955) 9 F J.R. 125 and Ramaprasada Rao, J. in K. Abdul Salam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972)43 F.J.R. 180. Ramaprasada Rao J., proceeded on the basis that the Government is only performing a judicial act in reconsidering the question and later deciding to make the order of reference. On the other hand, justice Rajagopalan has categorically said that the action of the Government is purely administrative in nature and it is not quasi-judicial or judicial and there is no impediment in the change of view being adopted Justice Ramaprasada Rao, as we understand the decision insisted on principles of natural justice being followed on the ground that the Government was acting judicially or quasi judicially. The Division Bench was not prepared to go to that extent. In fact, it stated specifically that "it is not necessary for us to decide the wider question whether principles of natural 'justice will apply to every administrative order". They however rested their conclusion on the following reasoning: "The contention of the petitioner is that, in the particular circumstances principles of natural justice require that notice should have been given to the management. We accept this contention as correct. Principles of natural justice, in the present context, mean fairness, and the rule of law, which is envisaged, includes fairness in administrative orders as well. When the Government relied on the reasoning of the Industrial Tribunal in its order in the complaint under S.33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, we think they acted rightly. But, when they desired to reconsider, it is but proper and fair that, before they did so, notice was given to the management, so that it might have its say to the contrary. That fairness was not extended in this case." The view of the Madras High Court has not been accepted by the Karnataka High Court in the decision in Kirloskar Electric Company Limited and Workmen of Kirloskar Electric Company Limited (1974) 2 LLJ. 537. The Madras High Court decision was referred to by Mr. That fairness was not extended in this case." The view of the Madras High Court has not been accepted by the Karnataka High Court in the decision in Kirloskar Electric Company Limited and Workmen of Kirloskar Electric Company Limited (1974) 2 LLJ. 537. The Madras High Court decision was referred to by Mr. Justice E. S. Venkitaramiah but was dissented from The learned judge observed: "When once the State Government is satisfied about the said question, it acquires jurisdiction to refer dispute for adjudication The fact (hat at one stage, the Government was of the view that there was no need to refer the matter for adjudication, does not preclude it from re-considering it and making a reference at a late stage. The power to refer cannot be said to have been exhausted when the Government has declined to make a reference at an earlier stage. There is considerable body of judicial opinion that so long as an industrial dispute exists or apprehended and the Government is of the opinion that it is so, the fact it has earlier refused to exercise the power does not preclude it from exercising that power at a later stage. The argument that the Government has violated the principle of natural justice when it referred the dispute without notice to parties is untenable. Where an action is likely to lead to civil consequences which are prejudicial to any person, there is an implied obligation on the part of the authority taking such a decision to give an opportunity to the persons likely to be affected to show cause against the proposed action. By a reference to Labour Court, certain unfettered rights which the management had in relation to workmen would would get restricted is not a matter of any civil consequences." 5. It is true that the Supreme Court has stated that the line of demarcation between the exercise of quasi judicial authority and administrative action is getting gradually but steadily thinner and it is not possible any longer to state that no administrative action is liable to be impugned in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. This is a well-known development of the law as is evident from the decision in A. K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others AIR. 1970 S. C.150. This is a well-known development of the law as is evident from the decision in A. K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others AIR. 1970 S. C.150. This development of the law cannot however be understood as wiping out the distinction between administrative action and or quasi-judicial action. The distinction still remains. The fact that in given cases the court will be persuaded to interfere with an administrative order or direction does not mean the difference between the two has ceased to exist. We venture to think that the scope for exercise of jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution in interfering with the executive or administrative action is still much narrower than in cases of quasi-judicial proceedings. When the administrative action is such as is contemplated by the provisions of the statute in S.10(1) the interference must be even more limited and we do not think that the development of the law has in any way whittled down the well-established principles in regard to the scope of interference in such matters. We do not think that this Court would be justified in interfering with an order of reference under S.10(1) on the mere ground that the order has been passed after an earlier order refusing to refer without being given an opportunity to the employer to state his case why the earlier view taken by the Government should not be altered. 6. Before concluding this judgment we would like to mention that we have referred to those decisions not because we are convinced that the appellant had not been given any opportunity to state his case before the order of reference was made. We are fully satisfied that he had been given ample opportunity to state his case before the Deputy Labour Officer who convened the conferences on 311974 and 7 2 1974. If he did not avail himself of those opportunities, he will have to thank himself. We dismiss this appeal. Dismissed.