JUDGMENT K.K. Narendran, J. 1. In this original petition the petitioner-Panchayat represented by its Vice-President, questions Ext. P-2 notifications issued by the 3rd respondent-State bifurcating the Kodiyathur Panchayat into the Kodiyathur Panchayat and Karassery Panchayat. By Notification No. 1 the 3rd respondent cancelled the Notification dated 28th December 1961 constituting the Kodiyathur Panchayat under section 3(1) (d) of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 32 of 1960, for short the Act. By Notification No. 2, the 3rd respondent constituted the Kodiyathur and Karassery Panchayat specifying the areas comprised therein under section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. By Notification No. 3, the 3rd respondent appointed the Administrative Committees for the two newly constituted Panchayats under section 13 (1) (a) of the Act. The questions that arise for consideration in this original petition are: (1) whether before bifurcating a Panchayat under section 3 (1) of the Act, the State Government is bound to give an opportunity to the Panchayat for showing cause against the proposal even in a case where the Panchayat has, by a resolution, requested the State to bifurcate the Panchayat and (2) whether Ext. P-3 resolution adopted by the Panchayat questioning the bifurcation and authorising the Vice-President to challenge the same before the High Court is valid as the same was not included in the notice and the agenda for the meeting given to the members in view of rules 4 and 5 of the Kerala Panchayats (Proceedings of Panchayat Meetings and Committees) Rules, 1962. A question whether Ext. P-3 resolution is hit by rule 3 (c) of the Kerala Panchayats Moving of Resolutions at Panchayat Meetings) Rules, 1962 also arises for consideration. 2. The Kodiyathur Panchayat, which comprised of three villages, by resolution dated 5th February 1972 requested the 3rd respondent to bifurcate the same in the interests of the general public. On receipt of the resolution, the 3rd respondent forwarded the same to the 2nd respondent-Director of Panchayats who submitted a report on 10th May 1972 recommending bifurcation. Thereafter also, the 3rd respondent received representations for the bifurcation of the Panchayat. The Panchayat Committee on 6th December 1972 adopted another resolution requesting the 3rd respondent for bifurcation. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent by order dated 12th December 1972 gave a direction to complete the further steps for effecting the bifurcation on the basis of the recommendations of the 2nd respondent. The Panchayat Committee on 6th December 1972 adopted another resolution requesting the 3rd respondent for bifurcation. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent by order dated 12th December 1972 gave a direction to complete the further steps for effecting the bifurcation on the basis of the recommendations of the 2nd respondent. But, due to the delimitation of the Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies, the matter could not be proceeded with. On 20th August 1974 the President of the Kodiyathur Panchayat again made a request to the 3rd respondent for finalising the steps for bifurcation. Thereupon, the 2nd respondent submitted drafts of the Notifications to be issued in this regard. The drafts were accepted by the 3rd respondent and Ext. P-2 notifications were accordingly published in the Kerala Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 4th June 1975. 3. A member of the Panchayat questioned Ext. P-2 Notification in O. P. No. 2842 of 1975 before this Court. But the Original Petition was dismissed by a Bench of this Court holding the same as not maintainable since the petitioner therein, a member of the Panchayat, has no locus standi to challenge Ext. P-2 Notifications. When O.P. No. 2842 of 1975 was pending, the petitioner- Panchayat adopted Ext. P-3 resolution at its meeting held on 6th November 1975 authorising the Vice-President to question Ext. P-2 notifications in appropriate proceedings before this Court. Accordingly, this original petition was filed on 10th November 1975. Over and above the prayer for quashing Ext. P-2 notifications, the petitioner also has prayed for a writ of mandamus or other appropriate, order or direction commanding the third respondent to issue notice to the Panchayat under section 3 of the Act before any steps are taken for bifurcating the Panchayat. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 3rd respondent and along with the counter-affidavit Exts. R-1 to R-4 are also produced. Exts. R-1 and R-2 are the two resolutions adopted by the Panchayat in 1972 requesting for a bifurcation. The circumstances under which Ext. P-2 Notifications happened to be issued are narrated in detail in the counter-affidavit. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit controverting the averments and answering the contentions raised in the counter-affidavit. Along with the reply affidavit, the resolution adopted by the Panchayat at its meeting held on 6th November 1975 has been produced as Ext. P-3. On behalf of the 3rd respondent, an additional counter-affidavit has also been filed. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit controverting the averments and answering the contentions raised in the counter-affidavit. Along with the reply affidavit, the resolution adopted by the Panchayat at its meeting held on 6th November 1975 has been produced as Ext. P-3. On behalf of the 3rd respondent, an additional counter-affidavit has also been filed. Along with the additional counter-affidavit a copy of the notice of the meeting held on 6th November 1975 has been produced as Ext. R-5. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder affidavit also. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even if the Panchayat wanted bifurcation, the Panchayat has a voice regarding the matters to be included in the notifications to be issued in connection with the bifurcation. According to the learned counsel, section 3 (1) proviso gives a clear indication that the details regarding the bifurcation have to be put to the Panchayat and its opinions and objections obtained and considered before the details of the bifurcation are finalised. Learned counsel then took me through various passages in Administrative Law by J. F. Garner, 4th Edn. On page 459 Garner has given the following conclusions: "This survey ˜in little, as it were, of the functions of local authorities has perhaps given some indication of the extent of their range. The adage that it is the function of local Government to care for the citizen from the cradle (or earlier) to the grave may not be as true as it was a few years ago before many services had been ˜nationalised, but local Government in this country remains a major industry employing very many individuals and calling on the spare time and voluntary effort of many elected and, co-opted representatives. The list of functions can never be complete, for they are varied from time to time by general and local Acts of Parliament and a complete compendium of local Government law would fill many volumes. The independence of local authorities in this country leads to variety in the range of functions exercised, due to their initiative in obtaining local Acts, or in exercising ˜permissive functions (i.e. those which are not made duties by statute), as well as to variety in the standards observed by particular local authorities in exercising those functions. The independence of local authorities in this country leads to variety in the range of functions exercised, due to their initiative in obtaining local Acts, or in exercising ˜permissive functions (i.e. those which are not made duties by statute), as well as to variety in the standards observed by particular local authorities in exercising those functions. Geography also may add variety, for a seaside resort or an ancient market town will wish to conduct their local Government in a manner different from that adopted by a large industrial city. The essential feature of a modern local authority is that it should possess a wide range of functions. That range should be as wide, as practicable, having regard to the authority area and resources, so that the interest of members may be retained and the authority may be able to recruit to their staff able and efficient officers. The extent to which discretionary powers may be exercised, and the standard of services provided, depend of course on an authority resources."� Reference was then made to Harji Chaku v. Mamlatdar Lalpur, A.I.R, 1973 Gujarat 233 wherein construing section 20 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1962 it is said: "The Act really brings democracy to the doors of the village people. As pointed out in the preamble a large measure of democratic decentralisation of power had been sought to be achieved in favour of these Panchayats so that the Panchayat administration serves as a primary school of democracy by training people in a democratic way of life and giving them an opportunity to participate effectively in the local self-Government."� In the above case, it is further said: "As for the Nava Dhunia village, however, it was the question of its identity being completely lost unless it was given some weightage so that its representation would be effective."� Learned counsel also referred to Ramachandra v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1965 A.P. 40 wherein construing section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithis and Zillia Parishads Act, 35 of 1959, a provision similar to section 3 (1) of the Act in question, the court said: "The powers in clauses (a) to (d) are subject to the proviso that before issuing a notification under that sub-section, the Commissioner shall give the gram panchayat which will be affected by the issue of such notification an opportunity of showing cause against the proposal and consider the objections, if any, of such gram panchayat."� Learned counsel then pointed out that in the case of the initial constitution, no consultation is necessary and possible, but, thereafter, before excluding any area from a Panchayat or including an area in a Panchayat and before the cancellation of a Notification constituting a Panchayat, the Panchayat has to be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the same. Relying on Koruthu v. Kerala State Electricity Board, 1971 K.L.T. 780 learned counsel contended that provisions are there in section 3 (1) for consulting the Panchayat before the Notifications in question are issued and if those provisions are not complied with, then, the Notifications cannot be sustained. Learned counsel then contended that the provisions for consultation contained in section 3(1) are mandatory and they cannot be ignored. In support of this contention, learned counsel referred to Ramachandra v. Govind, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 915. Learned counsel also pointed out that in the absence of any mention regarding the area in the resolutions for bifurcation it was incumbent; on the part of the 3rd respondent to consult the Panchayat before a decision was taken regarding the village or villages which should form the two new Panchayats. Learned counsel also pointed out that in the absence of any mention regarding the area in the resolutions for bifurcation it was incumbent; on the part of the 3rd respondent to consult the Panchayat before a decision was taken regarding the village or villages which should form the two new Panchayats. In this connection, reference was made to The President, Omassery Panchayat v. Government of Kerala, (O. P. No. 116 of 1973) wherein Mr. Justice Balakrishna Eradi has said: "It is manifest that under the proviso to section 3(1) of the Act it was incumbent on the State Government to have afforded an opportunity to the petitioner to make its representations in regard to the said proposal. The fact that a resolution had been sent by the Panchayat agreeing to the exclusion of much lesser area would not operate to dispense with the mandatory requirements of the above section."� 6. Learned Advocate-General appearing for 3rd respondent-State contended that Ext. P-2 notifications are perfectly legal and valid. He referred to section 3 (1) of the Act and contended that in the circumstances of this case it was not mandatory that the 3rd respondent should consult the Panchayat before finalising the proposals for bifurcation. In support of this contention reference was made to Ramachandra v. Govind, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 915. It is further contended that at any rate since the demand for bifurcation came from the Panchayat there was no necessity to send the proposals to the Panchayat and to give it an opportunity to raise objections. Learned Advocate-General then contended that the executive power of a local body has to be exercised through its executive authority and hence this original petition filed by the Panchayat represented by the Vice-President is not maintainable. In this connection reference was made to sections 2 (12), 34, 36, 37, 119, 120 and 122 of the Act. The next contention of the learned Advocate-General was that Ext. P-3 resolution on the strength of which this original petition has been filed is invalid. In this connection reference was made to rules 4 and 5 of the Kerala Panchayats (Proceedings of Panchayat Meetings and Committees) Rules, 1962 and rules, 2 and 3 (c) of the Kerala Panchayats (Moving of Resolutions at Panchayat Meetings) Rules, 1962. P-3 resolution on the strength of which this original petition has been filed is invalid. In this connection reference was made to rules 4 and 5 of the Kerala Panchayats (Proceedings of Panchayat Meetings and Committees) Rules, 1962 and rules, 2 and 3 (c) of the Kerala Panchayats (Moving of Resolutions at Panchayat Meetings) Rules, 1962. According to the learned Advocate-General under rules 4 and 5 of the Kerala Panchayats (Proceedings of Panchayat Meetings and Committees) Rules, 1962, all items proposed by the President and the Executive Authority must be included in the agenda to be forwarded to the members along with the notice of the meeting but in the notice of the meeting held on 6th November 1975 which adopted Ext. P-3 resolution, produced as Ext. R-5 along with the additional counter-affidavit the same was not included as an item of the agenda. Learned Advocate-General also pointed out that since Ext. P-3 resolution was not included in the agenda in Ext. R-5 it could not have been moved in the meeting dated 6th November 1975 as per rule 2 of the Kerala Panchayats (Moving of Resolutions at Panchayat Meetings) Rules, 1962. Learned Advocate-General then read extensively from the Conduct of Meetings by T.P.E. Curry and J.Richard Sykes and the Law and Practice of Meetings by Frank Shackleton. In the Conduct of Meetings by T.P.E. Curry and J. Richard Sykes 12th Edn. on page 8 it is said: "The notice convening the meeting should, in most cases, contain sufficient description of the nature of the business which the meeting is to transact, and the meeting cannot in ordinary cases go outside the business mentioned in that notice [ Longfield Parish Council v. Wright (1918), 88 L.J. (Ch. 119.)] In some cases the practice is not to give any indication of the nature of the business, unless there is something unusual to be considered. For example, notices of meetings of directors in many companies contain no agenda. 119.)] In some cases the practice is not to give any indication of the nature of the business, unless there is something unusual to be considered. For example, notices of meetings of directors in many companies contain no agenda. In other cases statute may specify what information should be given: thus in Smith v. Deighton and Billington, (1852), 8 Noore P. C. 187), the following passage occurs: "˜Undoubtedly it was the intention of the Legislature in framing this Statute to provide that due information should be given to all the parishioners of the special purpose for which their attendance is required" At page 9 it is said: "The object of requiring a proper notice of the purposes for which the meeting is to be held, is to enable a member to exercise his own judgment as to whether he will attend or not. A notice may be good in part and bad in part, and it is not wholly invalid because it extends to something which cannot be done at the meeting [Cleve v. Financial Corporation, (1873), L.R. 16. Eq. 363]. The heading in a notice of ˜Any other business will generally authorise the transaction of business of a purely formal nature but not business of any substantial importance."� On page 189 it is further said: "Notices of all Council Meetings must specify the business to he transacted. In addition, in the case of a meeting of a County Council (or the Greater London Council) where a resolution is to be proposed for the payment of a sum out of the county fund (otherwise than for ordinary periodical payments) or for incurring any liability exceeding 50, the notice must state the amount of the sum of the liability and the purpose."� In the Law and Practice of Meetings by Frank Shackleton” 5th Edition on page 27 it is said: "As to the essentials of a notice, it must state clearly the nature of any special business to be transacted, as no other business can be transacted in addition or otherwise, unless the notice refers to ordinary business which it is competent for the meeting to transaction. As to what is special business, the answer depends upon the regulations and the kind of body concerned. As to what is special business, the answer depends upon the regulations and the kind of body concerned. The true test would appear to be the construction an absent member would put upon the notice, for the nature of the business may largely determine whether such member shall absent himself from the meeting or not. It is, however, always desirable to state clearly the nature of any special business to be transacted, and if the regulations provide for notice of such special business, any resolutions passed without due notice will be invalid."� On page 28 it is said: "In the case of meetings of members, care must be taken to see that no business of an important nature is omitted from the notice."� On page 36 it is said: "If members are summoned to appear for a particular purpose they cannot proceed to any other matter without the unanimous consent of the whole body, but if they are all present and waive the formality of notice, a resolution passed at such meeting would be good, even though the meeting were not assembled for that particular purpose. [Machell v. Nevinson, (1809) 11 East 84n.]"� On page 310 dealing with the meetings of Borough Councils it is said: "Except in the case of business required by the Act to be transacted at the annual meeting of the council, no business can be transacted at a meeting other than that specified in the summons relating thereto” R. V. Grimshaw (See, ante)."� In this connection learned Advocate-General also referred to Shyabuddin Sab v. Municipality of Gadag-Betgeri, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 314 and contended that this decision is distinguishable on facts since the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 does not contain a provision similar to the one contained in the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 extracted in para 11 of the judgment. Learned Advocate-General then referred to rule 3 (c) of the Kerala Panchayats (Moving of Resolutions at Panchayat Meetings) Rules, 1962 and contended that Ext. P-3 resolution is hit by rule 3 (c) as O.P. No. 2842 of 1975 challenging Ext. P-2 notifications was pending on 6th November 1975 when the resolution was adopted by the Panchayat. It was also pointed out that though Ext. P-2 notifications on bifurcation were issued as early as 4th June 1975 the Panchayat passed Ext. P-3 resolution is hit by rule 3 (c) as O.P. No. 2842 of 1975 challenging Ext. P-2 notifications was pending on 6th November 1975 when the resolution was adopted by the Panchayat. It was also pointed out that though Ext. P-2 notifications on bifurcation were issued as early as 4th June 1975 the Panchayat passed Ext. P-3 resolution only on 6th November 1975 and questioned the bifurcation before this court only on 10th November 1975. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner in his reply referred to section 4 (2) of the Act and contended that as the administration of the Panchayats vests in the Panchayat. The Panchayat can by a resolution authorise the Vice-President or anybody else to file an Original Petition before this court. It was also contended that Ext. P-3 resolution will not be hit by section 34 of the Act and that under the Kerala Panchayats (Restriction on Litigation) Rules, 1966 the Panchayat can authorise by a resolution the filing of a suit or a petition. Learned counsel also contended that a resolution admitted by the President must form part of the agenda for the meeting. Learned counsel then pointed out that the provisions of section 3 (1) of tire Act being mandatory Ext. P-2 notifications issued without complying with the mandatory requirements of the section are invalid and ineffective. In support of this contention learned counsel also relied on Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 714. 8. Learned counsel then pointed out that the provisions of section 3 (1) of tire Act being mandatory Ext. P-2 notifications issued without complying with the mandatory requirements of the section are invalid and ineffective. In support of this contention learned counsel also relied on Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 714. 8. Section 3 (1) of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 reads: "(1) The Government may by notification in the gazette" (a) declare any village or group of adjacent villages or portions thereof to be a Panchayat area for the purpose of this Act and specify the name and headquarters of the Panchayat; or (b) exclude from a Panchayat area any village or portion thereof comprised in it; or (c) include in a Panchayat area any village or portion thereof; or (d) cancel a notification issued under clause (a) or alter the name and headquarters of the Panchayat as notified under the said clause: Provided that before issuing a notification under clause (b), clause (c) or clause (d) the Government shall give the Panchayat or Panchayats which will be affected by the issue of such notification a reasonable opportunity for showing cause against the proposal and shall consider the explanations and objections, if any, of such Panchayat or Panchayats.� Section 4 (2) of the Act reads: "(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the administration of the Panchayat area shall vest in the Panchayat but the Panchayat shall not be entitled to exercise functions expressly assigned by or under this Act or any other law to its President or executive authority or any other authority."� Rules 4 and 5 of the Kerala Panchayats (Proceedings of Panchayat Meetings and Committees) Rules, 1962 read: "4(1) No meeting shall be held unless notice of the day and time when the meeting is to be held and of the business to be transacted there at has been given at least three clear days before the day of the meeting. (2) In cases of urgency, the President may convene a meeting on giving shorter notice than that specified in sub-rule (1). 5. The agenda for the meeting shall be prepared by the Executive Authority in consultation with the President. (2) In cases of urgency, the President may convene a meeting on giving shorter notice than that specified in sub-rule (1). 5. The agenda for the meeting shall be prepared by the Executive Authority in consultation with the President. All items proposed by the President and the Executive Authority shall be included in the agenda."� Rules 2 and 3 (c) of the Kerala Panchayats (Moving of Resolutions at Panchayat Meetings) Rules, 1962 read: "2. A member who wishes to move a resolution shall give ten clear days notice of his intention in writing to the President and shall forward with such notice a copy of the resolution which he wishes to move: Provided that the President may allow a resolution to be included on the list of business with shorter notice than ten days. 3. No resolution shall however be admissible which does not comply with the following conditions, namely:- (a) x x x x x (b) x x x x x (c) It shall not relate to a matter which is under adjudication by a Court of Law:"� The Panchayat is the primary unit in the democratic set up in this country. It has an important role to play. The reconstitution of a Panchayat cannot be made without ascertaining the popular opinion. That is why the proviso is there in section 3 (1). Under section 3 (1) the State Government can issue notifications in respect of four matters and in all those matters before taking a final decision the Panchayat or Panchayats which will be affected shall be given a reasonable opportunity for showing cause against what the State Government are going to do. Only after considering the objections if any of the Panchayat or Panchayats the State Government can take a final decision and issue the notifications. A mere request for bifurcation made by a Panchayat cannot be taken as a blank cheque by the State Government. The matters mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 3 (1) are certainly involved in the bifurcation of a Panchayat. So it is imperative that the State Government should formulate proposals and forward the same to the Panchayat for its objection if any. Only after affording a reasonable opportunity to the Panchayat and after considering its objections if any the State Government can take a decision in the matter and issue the necessary notifications constituting the Panchayats. So it is imperative that the State Government should formulate proposals and forward the same to the Panchayat for its objection if any. Only after affording a reasonable opportunity to the Panchayat and after considering its objections if any the State Government can take a decision in the matter and issue the necessary notifications constituting the Panchayats. Admittedly this has not been done in this case. It cannot be said that section 3 (1) is not mandatory. The administration of a Panchayat vests in the Panchayat under section 4 (2) of the Act. Initiating a legal action on behalf of the Panchayat is not a function of the executive authority under section 34 or any other provision of the Act. The indication in section 119 is also that the Panchayat can authorise any person to initiate legal action on its behalf. In this case the Panchayat has by Ext. P-3 resolution authorised the Vice-President to approach this court. If the resolution has been validly passed then it cannot be said that the original petition is not maintainable. Admittedly the resolution was not in Ext. R-5 notice and agenda for the meeting held on 6th November 1975 which took Ext. P-3 decision. As per rules 4 and 5 of the Kerala Panchayats (Proceedings of Panchayat Meetings and Committees) Rules, 1962 the notice of the meeting with the agenda should be given to the members in advance. Under rule 2 of the Kerala Panchayats (Moving of Resolutions at Panchayat Meetings) Rules, 1962 a member should give ten days notice for moving a resolution. As per the proviso to the above rule the President can include a resolution with shorter notice also in the agenda. But a resolution which is not included in the agenda cannot be taken up for discussion. As the resolution in Ext. P-3 was not either in the original agenda issued or was not later included in the agenda by the President the consideration of the same by the meeting dated 6th November 1975 was not only irregular but illegal. This is a defect which cannot be cured under section 47 of the Act also. Even if it is assumed that the President of the meeting has the power to admit an adjournment motion under the general law and procedure of meetings, a resolution moved on 6th November 1975 questioning Ext. This is a defect which cannot be cured under section 47 of the Act also. Even if it is assumed that the President of the meeting has the power to admit an adjournment motion under the general law and procedure of meetings, a resolution moved on 6th November 1975 questioning Ext. P-2 notifications dated 4th June 1975 cannot be treated as an adjournment motion. Not only that as the matter covered by the resolution was pending adjudication before this court in O. P. No. 2842 of 1975 the resolution is hit by rule 3 (c) of the Kerala Panchayats (Moving of Resolutions at Panchayat Meetings) Rules, 1962 also. In the absence of a valid resolution of the Panchayat it goes without saying that the Vice-President cannot bring this Original Petition on behalf of the Panchayat. In the result the Original Petition is dismissed as not maintainable. No costs.