( 1 ) BECAUSE common questions of law and facts arise for consideration, these appeals are disposed of by this common judgment. They arise out of two suits OS. No. 96 of 1970 and OS. No. 98 of 1970 on the file of the Munaiff, kgf. OS. No. 96 of 1970 was filed by Parthasarathy, an employee of the Kolar Gold Mines Undertakings (hereinafter referred to as the Undertakings, and OS. No. 98 of 1970 was filed by A. Theodore who was also an employee of the Undertakings. It is not necessary for the purpose of these cases to refer to certain proceedings which had taken place prior to 1-12-65. By its order dated 1-12-65, the Undertakings passed an order dismissing the plaintiffs from service at the conclusion of a departmental enquiry into certain alleged acts of misconduct committed by them As there was a reference made under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act pending adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal constituted by the Govt of india, applications were made by the Undertakings before the Tribunal under Clause (b) of sub-sec (2) of S. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act for approval of the action of dismissal taken by the Undertakings. By its order dated 30-10-68, the Industrial Tribunal accorded its approval to the action of the Undertakings. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the suits out of which these appeals arise, on 13-4-1970 for a declaration that the orders of dismissal passed on 1-12-1965 were void and for a decree declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to be treated as the employees of the Undertakings holding the posts which they were holding immediately prior to the orders of dismissal and for other consequential reliefs. ( 2 ) THE suits were contested by the Undertakings on various grounds. One of the contentions urged by the Undertakings was that the suits were barred by time. The trial Court decreed the suits. Aggrieved by the decrees of the trial Court the Undertakings filed two appeals in RA. Nos. 55 and 56 of 1972 on the file of the Civil Judge, Kolar. The learned Civil Judge dismissed the appeals holding that the suits were not barred by time. He did not express any opinion on the other grounds urged in the memoranda of appeal. These two appeals are filed by the Undertakings against the decrees passed by the lower appellate Court. The learned Civil Judge dismissed the appeals holding that the suits were not barred by time. He did not express any opinion on the other grounds urged in the memoranda of appeal. These two appeals are filed by the Undertakings against the decrees passed by the lower appellate Court. ( 3 ) TWO points are urged by Sri K. J. Shetty, learned counsel for the undertakings in these appeals- (1) the finding of the lower appellate Court that the suits were in time was erroneous and (2) that the lower appellate court had committed an error in not recording its findings on other questions which were argued before it. ( 4 ) THE trial court found that the suits were governed by Art. 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The lower appellate Court found that they were governed by Art. 58. Both of them found that the right to institute the suits, arose in these cases on 30-10-1968, on which date the Industrial Tribunal accorded its approval to the action taken by the Undertakings under s. 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Pisputes Act. ( 5 ) IT is not disputed by Sri. K. J. Shetty, learned counsel for the undertakings that the suits would be in time if it is held that the right to due in these cases accrued on 30-10-1968 whether "art. 58 is held applicable or Art. 113 is held applicable to the cases. His main contention is that the right to sue in these cases arose on 1-12-65 on which date the Undertakings passed the orders opf dismissal. ( 6 ) SRI R. N. Byra Reddy. appearing for the plaintiffs argued that in these cases the appropriate date on which the cause of action should be deemed to hate accrued would be the date on which the Industrial Tribunal accorded its approval to the action taken by the Undertakings since it was open to the Industrial Tribunal to restore the plaintiffs to their original posts by declining to accord approval prayed for under S. 33 (2) {b) of the industrial Disputes Act. ( 7 ) I am of the view that the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the time would begin to run from the date on which the Industrial tribunal passed the order even though it may have the effect of approving the action taken on 1-12-1965, since the orders of dismissal passed by the undertakings were liable to be made ineffective by the Tribunal" declining to accord the approval. If the interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the Undertakings on the expression 'when the right to sue first accrues' appearing in Art. 58 or on the exprestion 'when the right to sue accrues' appearing in Art. 113 is accepted, then employees in the position of the plaintiffs would have to resort to a suit even before the Industrial Tribunal accords its approval under S. 33 (2) (b) in cases where the proceedings under S. 33 (2) (b) take more than three years. Delays of this nature are not unknown. I am of the opinion that the true principle applicable to cases of this nature has been enunciated by the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (AIR 1932 PC 165 ). In that case, the question for consideration was whether during the pendency o an appeal against a decree, it was obligatory on the part of the decree holder to file an execution within 3 years from the date of the decree. While construing the provisions of Art. 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the Privy Council observed :"the fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result, is hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there- is any question sub judiee between any of the parties those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage. Not in such a case as this is the judgment-debtor prejudiced. He may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which is so dear to debtors, and if he is virtuously inclined there is nothing to prevent his paying what he owes into Court". Not in such a case as this is the judgment-debtor prejudiced. He may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which is so dear to debtors, and if he is virtuously inclined there is nothing to prevent his paying what he owes into Court". ( 8 ) IN this case, as mentioned earlier, if the Tribunal had rejected the applications made under 9. 33 (2) (b), there would have been no need for the institution of the suits out of which these appeals arise. I hold that the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the time began to run in these cases from the date of the order of the Tribunal i. e. , 30-10-1968. The suits filed within 3 years from that day would be in time whether Art. 58 applies or Art. 113 applies. In view of the above, it is not necessary for me to hold which of these two articles would be applicable to these cases. The finding recorded by the lower appellate court on the question of limitation is, therefore, affirmed. ( 9 ) SRI K. J. Shelty, learned Counsel for the Undertakings however ursed that the lower appellate Court was in error in thinking that he had oot urged any other contentions before it. It would appear that these cases were disposed of along with four other cases. While deciding all of them amultaneously, the lower appellate Court omitted to notice that in these two cases there were some other contentions raised and they required to be decided by it. Sri R. N. Byra Reddy, learned counsel for the plaintiffs does not contradict the statement made on behalf of the Undertakings that; some other contentions which had been raised in the appeal memo were actually urged and the lower appellate Court has failed to pronounce its opinion on those contentions. ( 10 ) IN these circumstances, while affirming, the finding of the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation, the decrees passed by it have got to be set aside and the cases have to be remanded to the lower appellate court to dispose of the appeals after hearing the parties on other issues. The decrees passed by the Courts below are therefore set aside. The findings recorded by the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation are, however, affirmed. The decrees passed by the Courts below are therefore set aside. The findings recorded by the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation are, however, affirmed. The matter is remitted to the lower appellate court with a direction to dispose of the appeals afresh after hearing the parties on other issues within a period of 4 months from the date of the receipt of the copy of this judgment. --- *** --- .