JUDGMENT The present petitioner has applied under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act in the court of Small causes, Calcutta, for recovery of possession of a room in the third floor of premises No. 7 Burtalla Street, Calcutta from the opposite party. His case is that the said premises belong to a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakashara school of Hindu Law of which he was the Karta and the manager. The opposite party has been alleged to be a near relation of the petitioner. It has been claimed that the opposite party was granted leave and license to use and occupy on room on the third floor of the said premises No. 7 Burtolla Street and that the said license had been revoked and/or withdrawn by a letter dated 11th February 1975. The defendant had failed to vacate the room. Hence the plaintiff has prayed for recovery of possession. 2. The opposite party in his written statement has denied the above allegations. He has inter alia stated that he is a tenant in respect of the said room under Mahanands Ramju Rameswar Joshi at a rent of Rs. 10-per month payable according to Hindi calender. The opposite party's case is that the petitioner is not entitled to recover possession. 3. The opposite party filed an application purported to be under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Chapter XXXVII Rules 1 and 2 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Manual praying for mandatory injunction directing the petitioner to restore the supply of electricity of one light and one fan to the disputed room which was disconnected on June 2, 1975. The petitioner opposed the said prayer for mandatory injunction made by the. opposite party. The petitioner however, did not dispute that during the pendency of the above proceeding, he had disconnected supply of electricity to the disputed room. He claimed that the opposite party was a licensee and the said license had already been revoked. The use of the electricity by the opposite party was permissive and the said permission had been already withdrawn after due warning to the opposite party, who had been using electricity for the purpose of operating iron, heater etc. The petitioner contended that the opposite party had no right or locus standi to enforce in the Small Causes Court his right to use electricity. The petitioner contended that the opposite party had no right or locus standi to enforce in the Small Causes Court his right to use electricity. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the said application for mandatory injunction was also questioned. 4. The learned judge, 3rd Bench. Court of Small Causes Calcutta by his order dated 1st September, 1975 has passed an order of mandatory injunction, commanding the petitioner to restore the electric supply to the opposite party with immediate effect. The opposite party has been ordered to deposit in the trial Court a sum of Rs. 16/- per month commencing from September, 1975. The plaintiff has been given liberty to withdraw the amount, if so deposited irrespective of the result of the suit. Therefore, the petitioner obtained the present rule. Admittedly the opposite party had been enjoying electricity in the disputed room until the petitioner had disconnected the same. The only point in this rule is whether the court of Small Causes has any jurisdiction to pass mandatory temporary injunction for restoration of electric supply to the room in dispute. 5. Mr. Ghosh, learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that even according to the Court below the order of temporary injunction passed by it was not governed by the provisions of order 39 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil procedure or Chapter XXXVII of the Rules of Practice of the Court below. According to Mr. Ghosh the court in a proceeding under section 41 has no jurisdiction to pass mandatory temporary injunction for restoration of electric supply affecting substantive rights to an immovable property. In this connection, Mr. Ghosh relied upon the decisions in (1) Ramashwar Dubey v. Jogendralal Saha and others, AIR 1968 Calcutta 234, 53 CWN 474. 6. Mr. Aurora, who appeared on behalf of the opposite party on the other hand has contended that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made applicable to suits to be tried by the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. A proceeding under section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to be disposed of according to procedure applicable to such suits. Among other provisions, Section 151 of the court has been made applicable to Small Causes Court suits. Therefore, in the instant case the Court below did not exceed its jurisdiction by issuing mandatory temporary injunction in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. 7. Among other provisions, Section 151 of the court has been made applicable to Small Causes Court suits. Therefore, in the instant case the Court below did not exceed its jurisdiction by issuing mandatory temporary injunction in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. 7. In the instant case, the order of temporary injunction was not plainly covered by Rule 1 of order 39 but was issued in the exercise of the inherent powers of the court of Small Causes. 8. The Code of Civil procedure is not exhaustive. The Court has therefore, in cases, where the circumstances require it, acted upon the assumption of the possession of an inherent power to act exdebito justitial and to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists (Vide Mulla on Code of Civil Procedure, 13th Edition) Vol. I page 576. Also, see, (2) Hukumchand v. Kamalanand ILR (1906) 33 Calcutta 972. The Supreme Court in (3) Monoharlal v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 527, set at rest differences in judicial opinion on the question whether the Court could issue a temporary injunction under Section 151 when the case does not fall within the terms of either Rule 1 or Rule 2 of order 39. It is well-settled that inherent powers of the Court cannot be exercised when prohibited by the Code of Civil Procedure. Inherent powers are also not to be ordinarily exercised if the Code does not contain any specific provision which would meet the necessity. Further, inherent power is to be exercised only for ends of justice. The Supreme Court in (4) Padam Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1961 Supreme Court 218 held that an order appointing a Commissioner for seizing Account Books of the plaintiff was invalid because the said power under Section 151 was exercised with respect to a matter affecting the substantive rights of the plaintiff. It was observed that specific powers have to be conferred on the Courts for passing orders affecting substantive rights of parties, such powers can not come within the scope of inherent powers of the Court in matter of procedure which powers have source in the Court possessing all the essential powers to regulate its practice and procedure. It was observed that specific powers have to be conferred on the Courts for passing orders affecting substantive rights of parties, such powers can not come within the scope of inherent powers of the Court in matter of procedure which powers have source in the Court possessing all the essential powers to regulate its practice and procedure. Raghubar Dayal J. who delivered the majority opinion in (3) Monohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal (Supra) at page 533 of the reports quoted with approval of these observations. Chatterjee J. in (1) Ramashwar Dubey v. Jogindra Lal Saha and others AIR 1968 Calcutta 234 (Supra) followed these decisions regarding scope of inherent powers of the Court to grant injunction affecting substantive rights. Chatterjee J. in Rameshwar Dubey v. Jogindra Lal Saha and others AIR 1968 Calcutta 234 (Supra) held that an injunction can not be granted under Chapter XXXVI part 3 of the Rules framed by the High Court under Section 9 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act or under the inherent powers of the Small Causes Court to restrain a person from functioning as a Councillor, Calcutta Corporation pending disposal of an election petition under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. Chatterjee J. was of the view that Rule 1 Chapter XXXVII part 3 empowers the Small Causes Court to grant injunction when (1) any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by a party to the suit or wrongfully sold in execution of the decree and (2) when the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors. In the absence of any other prescribed rule, the Court of Small Causes cannot grant injunction in other circumstances, it was held that the Chief Judge had no power to grant temporary injunction to restrain an elected Councillor from assuming office. Chatterjee J. further held that a temporary injunction in the exercise of the Court's inherent power can be granted in a matter which does not affect substantive rights of a party, unlike Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 which empower the Courts to grant injunction even in case of substantive rights. Chatterjee J. further held that a temporary injunction in the exercise of the Court's inherent power can be granted in a matter which does not affect substantive rights of a party, unlike Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 which empower the Courts to grant injunction even in case of substantive rights. Chatterjee J. further held that although Section 151 has been extended the Small Causes Court has no power to grant any injunction affecting substantive rights to any party in cases other that those which come under Chapter XXXVII. 9. These decisions are binding upon me. Therefore, I am to hold that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes in proceeding under Section 151 is confined to granting temporary injunction in matters of procedure and does not extend to substantive rights of-the parties, The question whether an occupier or the tenant is entitled to enjoy electricity in the premises in his occupation is not a matter of procedure only. But the same pertains to question of substantive rights, The opposite party has to establish that such rights to electricity invested in him and there is corresponding duty on the part of the petitioner to give uninterrupted electric supply to him. The question of this entitlement and corresponding obligation and content of the said right to get electric connection are all matters of substantive law. The Court below unless can form even a prima facie opinion that the opposite party has a right vested in him to enjoy electricity it cannot issue any mandatory temporary injunction directing restoration of electric supply. In case of a tenant perhaps a right to enjoy electricity may be a part of covenant of quiet possession. The Civil Court in an appropriate case may under Rule 2 of order 39 issue temporary injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach of such covenant of quiet possession between the landlord and the tenant. But Chapter XXXVII of Rules and Practice does not embody any rule corresponding to Rule 2 of order 39 and therefore, the Court of Smell Causes in the exercise of its inherent powers cannot affect questions of substantive right to possession and enjoyment of immovable property. 10. Mr. But Chapter XXXVII of Rules and Practice does not embody any rule corresponding to Rule 2 of order 39 and therefore, the Court of Smell Causes in the exercise of its inherent powers cannot affect questions of substantive right to possession and enjoyment of immovable property. 10. Mr. Aurora appearing on behalf of the opposite party emphasised that the opposite party had been so long enjoying electricity in his room and the same was disconnected during the pendency of the proceeding under Section 41. But the said facts cannot empower the Court in a proceeding under Section 41 to pass interlocutory orders in excess of its powers. 11. For the aforesaid reason, I reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Court of Small Causes had exceeded its jurisdiction by passing mandatory order for restoration of electric connection to the rooms in occupation of the opposite party. This order, however, would be without prejudice to the right of the opposite party to take recourse to any other proceeding according to law to get restoration of electric supply to his room. I express no opinion as to whether the opposite party is a tenant or a licensee and whether he is entitled to make any application in this connection before the learned Rent Controller or to file a separate suit. 12, I accordingly make the rule absolute and set aside the order complained of. The application for injunction for restoration of electric supply filed by the opposite party be dismissed as not maintainable but without prejudice to his right to take recourse to any other proceeding according to law. Let the proceeding under Section 41 be disposed of as quickly as possible. The records he sent down immediately.