Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the Principal and Professor of Zoology in the Sir Theyagaraya College, Madras, which is under the control and management of a committee represented by respondents 3 to 10 herein. On 26th, May 1975, the Committee of management of the College passed a resolution framing certain charges against the petitioner and he was asked to give his explanation for the said charges. The petitioner filed his explanation on 1st, July 1975. Thereafter, the committee of management proposed to convene a meeting for 25th August 1975 to consider the charges framed against the petitioner. The petitioner immediately filed O.S. 6051 of 1975 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras and obtained an interim injunction in I.A. No. 16649 of 1975 restraining the committee from homing the meeting on the ground that the committee is not competent to function and as such they have no jurisdiction to pass any orders against the petitioner. The said interim order was, however, dissolved on 24th September 1975. The petitioner then preferred an appeal in C.M.A. No. 158 of 1975 against the said order which is said to be pending. However, at a meeting alleged to have been held on 26th, September 1975 at 4 PM at which 5 members attended, a resolution to place the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect pending enquiry into the charges and appointing the 11th respondent herein who was the Vice-Principal as the Principal in charge and one Augustine Chellappa as Professor in charge of the Zoology department was passed. The petitioner has filed this writ petition on 19th December, 1975 seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to implement the provisions of S. 19(3) of Ordinance 17 of 9975, which came into force in the mean-while on 21st, November 1975, by restoring him to office. 2. The petitioner has filed this writ petition on 19th December, 1975 seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to implement the provisions of S. 19(3) of Ordinance 17 of 9975, which came into force in the mean-while on 21st, November 1975, by restoring him to office. 2. The petitioners case is that the order alleged to have been passed by the Committee against the petitioner suspending him from the office of Principal having been passed on 26th, September 1974 it comes to an end automatically as a result of S. 19(3)(b) of Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975, hereinafter called the Ordinance, that on the expiry of 27th, November 1975 the petitioner is restored to his office statutorily, that after the coming into force of the said Ordinance no order of suspension can remain in force for a period of more than 2 months from the date of suspension unless it is extended by a competent authority and that as the enquiry contemplated against the petitioner has not been completed within the period of two months, he should, without prejudice to the enquiry be deemed to have been restored to his office. 3. The stand taken by the second respondent, the Committee of Management of the College in its counter affidavit is that S. 19(3)(b) of the Ordinance refers to an order of suspension made with the prior approval of the Competent Authority under S. 19(2), that therefore S. 19(3) cannot be invoked by the petitioner against the order of suspension passed before coming into force of the said Ordinance, and that in any event Ss. 19, 20 and 21 of the Ordinance should be deemed not to have come into force having regard to the scheme and object of the Ordinance unless and until the Code of Conduct is prescribed in S. 18(1) has been formulated. 19, 20 and 21 of the Ordinance should be deemed not to have come into force having regard to the scheme and object of the Ordinance unless and until the Code of Conduct is prescribed in S. 18(1) has been formulated. It is also contended that S. 22 of the Ordinance itself shows that it has no application to prior orders of suspension, that unless the entire scheme contemplated by the Ordinance is brought into force, S. 19(3) cannot be taken to invalidate any suspension orders passed earlier, and that, in any event, the writ itself is not maintainable in law as the right and liabilities are defined by an agreement entered into between the petitioner and the Committee and as the writ petition is directed against the Managing Committee of a private college. 4. Though a contention was raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petition in the counter affidavit, it has not been argued at the time of the hearing and therefore I have to proceed on the basis that the same has been given up. Even otherwise, the Committee of Management functioning under a trust deed and running an Educational Institution getting aid from the Government is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution—especially in its exercise of disciplinary j urisdiction. Besides, the writ is also for a direction to the State Government to implement and enforce the provisions of S. 19 of the Ordinance and hence the writ cannot be dismissed as not maintainable. Therefore, I proceed to deal with the merits of the main controversy based on the scope of S. 19(3) of the Ordinance. 5. As already stated, the order of suspension in this case pending enquiry was made on 26th, September 1975 and 60 days period referred to in S. 19(3) came to an end on 25th, November 1975. The question is whether the order of suspension had ceased to have any effect by virtue of the said provision. There is no dispute that the College in question is a private College as defined in S. 2(8) and the petitioner comes within the definition of “teacher” as defined in S. 2(10). Therefore, the parties are admittedly governed by the provisions of the Ordinance as and from its commencement. The Ordinance came into force on 21st, November 1975. There is no dispute that the College in question is a private College as defined in S. 2(8) and the petitioner comes within the definition of “teacher” as defined in S. 2(10). Therefore, the parties are admittedly governed by the provisions of the Ordinance as and from its commencement. The Ordinance came into force on 21st, November 1975. In this case the order of suspension has been passed by the Committee of Management of the College prior to coming into force of the said Ordinance. One of the questions to be considered is whether the provisions of the Ordinance affected the orders of suspension passed earlier. 6. S. 2(2) defines a College Committee in relation to a Private College, as a committee constituted under S. 11. S. 2(3) defines “competent authority” as an authority, officer or person authorised by the Government by a notification to perform the functions of the competent authority under the Ordinance. The disciplinary jurisdiction to be exercised by a College Committee against a teacher in a private college is dealt with in Ss. 18 to 22. S. 18(1) provides that every teacher employed in any private college shall be governed by the Code of Conduct as may be prescribed arm if any such teacher violates any such Code of Conduct he shall be liable to such disciplinary action as may be prescribed. S. 18(2) enables the College as constituted under S. 11 to define the standards of conduct to be observed by teachers employed in the College. S. 19(1) provides that no teacher employed in any private college shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor his services terminated except with the prior approva1 of the competent authority. Sub-Sec. (2) of S. 19 directs the Competent Authority to satisfy itself before giving such approval that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such action. Sub-Sec. (3) with which we are directly concerned is as follows: “19(3)(a) No teacher employed in any private college shall be placed under suspension except when an enquiry into the gross misconduct within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under sub-S. (1) of S. 18 of each teacher is contemplated. Sub-Sec. (3) with which we are directly concerned is as follows: “19(3)(a) No teacher employed in any private college shall be placed under suspension except when an enquiry into the gross misconduct within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under sub-S. (1) of S. 18 of each teacher is contemplated. (b) No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such enquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher; Provided that the Competent Authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period of two months, for a further period of not exceeding two months, if, in the opinion of such Competent Authority, the inquiry could not be completed within Unsaid period of two months for reasons directly attributable to such teacher.” Sec. 20 provides for an appeal to such authority or officers as may be prescribed against an order of punishment imposed on teachers. S. 21 provides for a second appeal against the appellate order. S. 20 to an Appellate Tribunal, constituted under S. 38 in cases of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination of service. S. 22 directs that all appeals pending against the orders of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of service filed either by the teacher or by the College be transferred to the Appellate Authority constituted under S. 20 or the Tribunal constituted under S. 38 as the case may be. S. 24 gives an over-riding effect to the provisions in Chapter IV which deals with the terms and conditions of service and the disciplinary jurisdiction, over any law for the time being in force or any award, agreement or contract of service or judgment, decree, order of Court, Tribunal or Authority to the contrary. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner rests his whole case on S. 19(3)(b) and says that the order of suspension, eventhough passed earlier to the coming into force of the Ordinance cannot remain in force for more than two months unless the proviso therein is invoked. Mr. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner rests his whole case on S. 19(3)(b) and says that the order of suspension, eventhough passed earlier to the coming into force of the Ordinance cannot remain in force for more than two months unless the proviso therein is invoked. Mr. V.K.T. Chari, the learned counsel for the respondents, however, places much emphasis on the expression “such suspension” occurring in clause (b) of that Sub-section and contends that the two months limit will apply to an order of suspension passed by a College Committee under clause (a) for violation of any of the provisions prescribed in the Code of Conduct that there being no Code of Conduct prescribed as yet, there is no question of suspension for violation of the provision of the Code of Conduct by the teacher and that unless there is a specific provision in the Ordinance itself to treat the suspension order passed earlier as an order passed under its provisions, it is not possible to treat the impugned order of suspension as on e passed under S. 19(3)(a) so as to attract the limitation of two months contained in Cl. (b). Mr. V.K.T. Chari also contends that the terms and conditions of service of the petitioner with the second respondent management are based on an agreement, and as such, their relationship is governed by the law of ‘Master and servant’ which is purely contractual, that the purpose and object of the Ordinance being to replace that scheme and to provide, on its stead, a statutory scheme governing the relationship between teacher and the College and giving a statutory status to the teachers, who were till now having a contractual status, such an object cannot be achieved unless the entire field till now covered by the terms and conditions of service regulated by a contract is fully replaced or superseded by the new scheme contemplated by the Ordinance and that necessary steps not having been taken so far for giving effect to all the provisions of the Ordinance, the contractual status of teachers should be taken to continue. In this connection the learned counsel refers to the explanatory statement to the Ordinance the relevant portion of which is as follows: “It has been decided to regulate the condition of service of teachers in the private colleges and it has also been decided that the rules relating to managing bodies and payment of grants to private Colleges should be statutory.” and contends that if a new scheme is substituted for an existing scheme, the substitution must be complete in all aspects, that, therefore, the entire body of law necessary for constituting the new scheme should be there before the old scheme is taken to have been replaced, but that in this case the Ordinance has not been followed up by the necessary rules to give effect to its provision. Thus according to the learned counsel unless there is a prescription of Code of Conduct, the constitution of the College Committee, and the appointment of competent authority, S. 19 cannot come into play at all. 8. It is true, unless there is a prescription of the Code of Conduct as per S. 18, there cannot be a violation of that Code of Conduct for which an order of suspension pending enquiry could be passed under S. 19(3)(a). If the expression “such suspension” occurring in S. 19(3)(b) is strictly and literally construed, it will refer only to an order of suspension passed under clause (a) of sub-section (3) for a violation of the Code of Conduct prescribed under S. 18(1), which means clause (b) will refer to only orders of suspension passed in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance and not earlier. But having regard to the other provisions of the Ordinance which are categoric, the order of suspension passed earlier, in my view, cannot be said to survive the Ordinance, unless the Ordinance itself saves such orders. As already stated, the Ordinance came into force on 21st November 1975 and disciplinary jurisdiction has been conferred by S. 14 on College Committee constituted under S. 11 which will include the Principal and two Senior Professors of the College. As already stated, the Ordinance came into force on 21st November 1975 and disciplinary jurisdiction has been conferred by S. 14 on College Committee constituted under S. 11 which will include the Principal and two Senior Professors of the College. Therefore, after the coming into force of the Ordinance the existing committee which is not a College Committee defined in S. 2(2) cannot have any disciplinary jurisdiction over the teachers of the College, except in respect of disciplinary proceedings initiated earlier which appears to have been saved by the Explanation to S. 20. Therefore, while the disciplinary jurisdiction itself is taken away from one committee and given to another committee, the order of suspension pending enquiry passed earlier by the former committee cannot be said to survive. It cannot be disputed that after the coming into force of the Ordinance no order of suspension pending enquiry passed by the new committee can be in force for more than two months, unless it is extended for a further period of two months by the competent authority if the enquiry could not be completed within the said period of 2 months. The question is whether the limitation of two months applies only to orders of suspension passed after the Ordinance came into force or whether it applies to orders of suspension passed earlier. Having regard to the fact that the order of suspension passed earlier to the coming into force of the Ordinance has not been continued by any specific provision, such orders should be deemed to be subject to S. 19(3)(b) and its duration curtailed by the rule of limitation prescribed therein. As already pointed out S. 24 gives the provisions in Chapter IV an overriding effect, and, therefore, any agreement or contract of service should give way to Chapter IV. The result is the contract of service in so far as it is contrary to or in conflict with the provisions of Chapter IV will cease to operate and, therefore, any order of suspension pending enquiry passed before the coming into force of the Ordinance to avoid its conflict with S. 19(3)(b) should be taken to and after the period of two months from the coming into force of the Ordinance. Even if under the terms and conditions of service the petitioner can be suspended pending enquiry for any duration, the Ordinance having overriding effect on the contract of service, the power to suspend should be taken to have been limited by the provisions of the Ordinance for a period of two months. 9. I am not inclined to agree with Mr. V.K.T. Chari that S. 24 of the Ordinance should be taken to have been suspended until after the framing of the rules, the prescription of the Code of Conduct, constitution of the competent authority and the constitution of the Tribunal. S. 24 takes effect on the date when the Ordinance was promulgated which means that as and from the relevant date an order of suspension can be passed only for violation of the Code of Conduct and even then it can be in force only for two months. Therefore, if no order of suspension can be passed against a teacher beyond a period of two months under the Ordinance which overrides the provisions of the agreement of service any order of suspension based on the power traceable to the agreement of service cannot survive for more than two months after the coming into force of the Ordinance. In this case the Ordinance having come into force on 21st November 1975, the period of two months expired on 21st January 1976. While testing the validity of the order of suspension in this case with reference to the provisions of the Ordinance, the object and purpose of the Ordinance cannot be overlooked. The object of the provisions contained in Chapter IV is to set that all disciplinary enquiries against teachers should be completed within a period of 2 months and if there is a suspension pending enquiry, the suspension cannot be continued beyond the said period of 2 months unless the competent authority extends the period of suspension for another period of two months if the enquiry could not be completed within first two months. 10. Mr. V.K.T. Chad refers to the legal maxim “ lex non cogit ad impossibilia” and points out that unless the rules are framed, the Code of Conduct prescribed, the competent authority and the Tribunal constituted, no disciplinary proceedings could be continued by the College management and no suspension could be made. 10. Mr. V.K.T. Chad refers to the legal maxim “ lex non cogit ad impossibilia” and points out that unless the rules are framed, the Code of Conduct prescribed, the competent authority and the Tribunal constituted, no disciplinary proceedings could be continued by the College management and no suspension could be made. It is true before disciplinary proceedings are initiated by the College Committee under the Ordinance, all the above things have to be done and it will be impossible to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a teacher as at present under the provisions of the Ordinance. Impossibility of taking disciplinary proceedings under the Ordinance in the absenee of the above things being done, will not lead to the inference that the disciplinary jurisdiction based on the agreement of service still continues. It that was the intention, then the operation of S. 24 giving an overriding effect to Chapter IV could have been suspended till such time the rules and other things are made. The object of giving an overriding effect for Chapter IV is to confer immediately certain additional benefits to the teachers which were not available to them under the agreement of service and such benefits will accrue to the teachers from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance. The immunity from suspension pending enquiry except for a gross misconduct or limited duration of an order of suspension even if one is passed are all benefits available to the teachers under the Ordinance and they are entitled to claim those benefits from the commencement of the Ordinance. It is not possible for me to agree that all the additional benefits given under the Ordinance can be claimed only after the framing of the rules etc., and that there being a substitution of one scheme for another, the entire scheme should be available for substitution as otherwise the existing scheme should continue until such time as the full scheme is ready for substitution. In this case the terms and conditions of service are not sought to be replaced by the Ordinance but the Ordinance makes certain additional provisions for the benefit of the teachers and such additional benefits they will be entitled to claim even from the date of commencement of the Ordinance. In this case the terms and conditions of service are not sought to be replaced by the Ordinance but the Ordinance makes certain additional provisions for the benefit of the teachers and such additional benefits they will be entitled to claim even from the date of commencement of the Ordinance. In this view the order of suspension dated 26th September 1975 should be taken to have ceased to be of any effect after 21st January 1976, i.e., 60 days after the commencement of the Ordinance. 11. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the rule nisi is made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs.