JUDGMENT : A.P. Sen, J. 1. This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against a judgment of the District Judge, East Nimar, Khandwa dated 15th April 1968, reversing the judgment and decree of the IInd Civil Judge, Class II, Burhanpur, dated 21st March 1967, and dismissing the plaintiff's suit for recovery of Rs. 4,173.78 P. by way of reimbursement for land revenue paid by him on behalf of the Defendant for the years 1962-63, 1963-64 and 1964-65. 2. The relevant facts, in brief, are as follows: The plaintiff, Kantilal, had taken a lease of an open plot bearing khasra No. 168, measuring 7 52 acres, situate in village Chinchala, from the defendant, Barrister Ramchandrarao Deshmukh, who was the bhumiswami thereof, for a period of 10 years by a registered lease-deed dated 28-4-1953, Ex-p-3, on an annual rent of Rs. 600. The lease was for non-agricultural purposes as the plaintiff has his Ginning factory thereon. By clause 1 of the deed, it was specified that the duration of the lease was to be for 10 years, w. e. f. 1-1-1953 to 31-12-1962. Clause 2 thereof was the renewal clause, and it stipulated that the plaintiff, i. e. the lessee, would have the option of renewal of the lease for a period of 20 years and upon the expiry of the lease, also the right of selling the super-structure of the Ginning Factory to the defendant or of removing the same before giving vacant possession thereof. Under clause 6, the land revenue of Rs. 19 assessed on the land was payable by the defendant, i.e., the lessor. 3. The lease has not been renewed after the expiry of its original term of 10 years w. e. f. 1-1-1963, though the plaintiff remained in possession of the plot thereafter. Meanwhile, the land revenue of the plot leased was reassessed at Rs. 1,360.60 p. per year due to its diversion for non-agricultural purposes under section 59 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The plaintiff paid the land revenue so assessed for the years 1961-62 to 1964-65. He brought the suit claiming recovery of Rs. 4,173.78 p., by way of reimbursement of Rs. 4,081.80 p. towards the land revenue for the years 1962-63, 1963-64 and 1964-65 at the rate of Rs. 1,360 60 p. together with Rs. 91.98 p. as interest thereon. The plaintiff paid the land revenue so assessed for the years 1961-62 to 1964-65. He brought the suit claiming recovery of Rs. 4,173.78 p., by way of reimbursement of Rs. 4,081.80 p. towards the land revenue for the years 1962-63, 1963-64 and 1964-65 at the rate of Rs. 1,360 60 p. together with Rs. 91.98 p. as interest thereon. The plaintiff's suit was based on the ground that the defendant was bound by law to pay the land revenue under section 138 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 and inasmuch as he failed to pay the same, the plaintiff was "interested in making the payment", within the meaning of section 69 of the Contract Act. According to the plaintiff, he was compelled to make the payment with a view to save the land on which his Ginning factory was located, from being auctioned towards realisation of arrears of land revenue due. The defendant contested the plaintiff's claim, alleging that the lease having been determined by his notice dated 29-3-1961 and also having expired by efflux of time, the plaintiff was a trespasser and therefore, not a person interested in "making the payment'" within the meaning of section 69 of the Contract Act, and that the payment was a voluntary one. The learned trial Judge upheld the plaintiff's claim and decreed the suit. In appeal, the learned District Judge has reversed the decree and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of section 69 of the Contract Act, as the payment of land revenue made by him was one entirely gratuitous. That view of his proceeds on the basis that the lease of the plaintiff had been determined by his notice dated 29-3-1962, Ex-D-1, and there being no evidence in proof of the fact that the plaintiff had invoked the renewal clause of the lease, his possession after the expiry of the lease on 31-12-1962 was that of a trespasser. 4. That view of his proceeds on the basis that the lease of the plaintiff had been determined by his notice dated 29-3-1962, Ex-D-1, and there being no evidence in proof of the fact that the plaintiff had invoked the renewal clause of the lease, his possession after the expiry of the lease on 31-12-1962 was that of a trespasser. 4. The appellant filed an application under Order 11, Rule 14 read with sections 151 and 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for directing the defendant to produce the originals of two documents seeking leave, at the same time, to file the aforesaid two documents as additional evidence, under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code, in proof of the fact that the plaintiff had exercised his option of renewal, namely, (i) copy of the plaintiff's solicitor's letter dated 26-4-1962, and (ii) copy of the plaintiff's letters dated 1-10-1962. The application was strenuously opposed at the hearing. Learned counsel for the appellant did not press the application, and, in fact, expressly abandoned the plea that the plaintiff had exercised his option of renewal of the lease for another term of 20 years under Clause 6 of the lease-deed. The appellant has instead confined his submissions on the basis that the plot in question being an open plot was an "accommodation" within the meaning of section 2(a)(i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961; and, the plaintiff, therefore, became a statutory tenant thereof as held in Shyamlal Lachman v. Umacharan Tiwari, 1960 MPLJ 1002 (FB). 5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant has put forward a two-fold contention, namely, (i) there was a mis-trial of the suit due to the failure of the learned trial judge to frame material issues, and (ii) the plaintiff being a statutory tenant of the plot, he was interested in "making the payment" of the land revenue assessed thereon within the meaning of section 69 of the Contract Act, and he was entitled to have the same adjusted under the proviso to section 139 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. There is no substance in any of these contentions. 6. There is no substance in any of these contentions. 6. As to the first, the learned District Judge has undoubtedly observed that the learned trial judge failed in his duty to frame proper issues; but, he held that this did not vitiate the trial as the parties went to trial with full knowledge of their respective cases and led all their evidence not only in support of their contentions but also in refutations of the rival contentions, following the decision of their Lordships in Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao AIR 1963 SC 884 . He, accordingly, held that it cannot be said that the absence of an issue was fatal to the case, or that there was that mis-trial which vitiates the proceedings in suit. The objection as to the framing of proper issues so also the prayer for a consequent remand, was strenuously opposed by the plaintiff who was the respondent. 7. To meet the contention, it will suffice to quote from the judgment of the learned District Judge: On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that, though no issues were framed on the various points in dispute between the parties, they went to trial with full knowledge of the points in dispute between them and have adduced evidence. The trial Court has considered all the questions and has given a decision on all points in dispute. The failure therefore to frame issues, as contended by the appellant, is of no material consequence. It was also not stated before me by either of the parties that they want to lead any additional evidence or have any further evidence to offer''. In view of this, the contention that there was a mis-trial due to the failure of the learned trial judge to frame material issues must be rejected as the appellant cannot be permitted to take up inconsistent position. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, vehemently argues that the case squarely falls within section 69 of the Contract Act. It is pointed out that though the primary liability to pay the land revenue was on the defendant who was the bhumiswami of the land, under section 138 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, the plaintiff being an occupier of the same had the secondary liability under section 139 of the Code to clear off the arrears. It is pointed out that though the primary liability to pay the land revenue was on the defendant who was the bhumiswami of the land, under section 138 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, the plaintiff being an occupier of the same had the secondary liability under section 139 of the Code to clear off the arrears. It is urged that in view of the definition of the term "accommodation", as contained in section 2(a)(i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the plaintiff with the expiry of the lease by efflux of time on 31-12-1962, became a statutory tenant of the land, and thus he could not be evicted there from except in the manner provided by sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, as laid down by the Full Bench in Shyamlal Lachman v. Umacharan Tiwari (supra). 9. It is, therefore, urged that the plaintiff was not a trespasser as wrongly assumed by the learned District Judge, and he was clearly "interested in making the payment" of the land revenue for the years in question within the meaning of section 69 of the Contract Act. It was further urged that the plaintiff is entitled to the reimbursement of the amount paid on behalf of the defendant, who was bound by law, to pay the same, and the remedy of the defendant, if any, lay by way of sections 8, 9 and 10 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, to have the standard rent fixed, or to have the enhanced tax recovered, by instituting proper proceedings in that behalf. There is some difficulty in accepting these contentions. 10. In my judgment, the question of the applicability of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, to the facts of the present case, does not arise at all. The plaintiff laid no foundation for that case in the pleadings. The point that the provisions of the Act apply to the lease in question was not taken at any time. The question whether the lease falls within the purview of the Act or not, is a mixed question of fact and law. The determination of the question must depend on whether the provisions of the Act apply to village Chinchala where the leased plot is situate. The extent clause contained in sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act extends the Act to the areas specified in the Schedule. The determination of the question must depend on whether the provisions of the Act apply to village Chinchala where the leased plot is situate. The extent clause contained in sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act extends the Act to the areas specified in the Schedule. In the Schedule, item 32 specifies the Burhanpur municipal area, i. e., the area within the limits of the Municipal Council, Burhanpur as covered by the provisions of the Act. There is nothing on record to establish that village Chinchala is within the municipal limits. My attention is, however, drawn to Municipal tax receipt, Ex. P-12. But there is nothing to show that this relates to the Ginning Factory. In the state of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record, it cannot be held that the lease is governed by the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The question being a mixed question of fact and law, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the second appellate stage. That being so, the question of the plaintiff being a statutory tenant or the lease being governed by the decision in Shyamlal Lachman v. Umacharan Tiwari (supra), does not also arise. 11. It has already been stated that learned counsel for the appellant abandoned the plea that the plaintiff had exercised his option of renewal under clause 6 of the lease and he also did not rely on the two documents sought to be filed under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code. He based his entire submissions on the ground of the plaintiff being a statutory tenant, relying on the decision in Shyamlal Lachman v. Umacharan Tiwari (supra). Upon that basis, he contends that the plaintiff was "interested in making payment" within the meaning of section 69 of the Contract Act. There is a fallacy in the argument. If the lease is not governed by the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the plaintiff cannot be regarded as a statutory tenant. His position is only that of a person in possession whose lease has determined by efflux of time. I pointedly asked learned counsel for the appellant to enlighten me on the subject, but he pressed into service the theory of the plaintiff being a statutory tenant. The plaintiff is not entitled to relief upon that basis. His position is only that of a person in possession whose lease has determined by efflux of time. I pointedly asked learned counsel for the appellant to enlighten me on the subject, but he pressed into service the theory of the plaintiff being a statutory tenant. The plaintiff is not entitled to relief upon that basis. The question then is what is the position of a person in possession whose lease has determined by efflux of time, i.e., whether such a person is "interested in making the payment" within the meaning of section 69 of the Contract Act. The answer must clearly be in the negative. 12. The expression "interested in making the payment" occurring in section 69 of the Contract Act has a definite legal connotation. The section only applies to payments made bona fide for the protection of one's own interest. In Ram Tuhul Singh v. Biseswar Lal LR (1875) 2 IA 131. the Privy Council, in dealing with the rights of parties making payments, observed: It is not in every case in which a man has benefited by the money of another that an obligation to repay that money arises. The question is not to be concluded by nice considerations of what may be fair and proper according to the highest morality. To support such a suit there must be an obligation in the case of a voluntary payment by A of B's debt. See also Banwarilal v. Rajkishore 1945 NLJ 563 : AIR 1946 Nag. 21 : ILR 1945 Nag 820. 13. It is true that "a person interested in making the payment" in section 69 of the Contract Act does not mean that the interest should be such as would stand the test of a judicial trial; it is sufficient if the person who makes the payment honestly believes that his own interest requires that it should be made. It, therefore, suffices if there are reasonable grounds for the belief, even though the belief itself may be unfounded. That this is the correct view of section 69 of the Contract Act is clear from the decision of the Privy Council in Govindram Gordhandas Seksaria and Another. v. State of Gondal by His Highness the Maharaja of Gondal and Ors. AIR 1950 PC 99 . That this is the correct view of section 69 of the Contract Act is clear from the decision of the Privy Council in Govindram Gordhandas Seksaria and Another. v. State of Gondal by His Highness the Maharaja of Gondal and Ors. AIR 1950 PC 99 . There, the plaintiffs had agreed to purchase certain mills and to save the mills from sale, they paid arrears of municipal dues. In allowing them to recover the same from the vendors, their Lordships observed:-- To their Lordships it seems to have been very unlike a voluntary payment. The company had contracted to buy these mills, and they were imminently threatened "with a forced sale which would, of course, defeat its purpose. Money had to be found for the taxes if the Mills were to be saved. Neither the Maharaja nor the trustees showed any sign of paying the Municipality. So the appellant company paid. But to describe it in those circumstances as having made a voluntary payment appears to their Lordships to involve some misuse of language. Not do they appreciate why it should not properly be described as interested in the payment. In any ordinary use of language the company was interested in the taxes being paid at the time when they were paid since only through the payment could it realize the fruit of the contract that it had entered into. The words themselves do not require that a person to be interested in a payment should at the same time have a legal proprietary interest in the property in respect of which the payment is made. It is no doubt true that there have been decisions which have tested whether a person was interested in payment by ascertaining whether he had such a proprietary interest. It may be a good test in appropriate circumstances. But it would be a sad fallacy to deduce from the circumstance that a person may be interested in a payment because be has an interest in the property to which it relates the conclusion that no one who has not an interest in a property can be interested in a payment made in respect of that property. In truth, section 69 invites no such judicial limitation. 14. The general purport of the section is, therefore, clear. In truth, section 69 invites no such judicial limitation. 14. The general purport of the section is, therefore, clear. It is meant to afford to a person who pays money in furtherance of some existing interest and indemnity in respect of the payment against any other person who rather than he, could have been made liable by law to make the payment. That test is not fulfilled in the instant case. In the instant case, there can be no doubt that the payments of land revenue made by the plaintiff were entirely gratuitous, and not in good faith for protection of one's own interest. The argument before me proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff had not exercised his option of renewal. Even if it were so, and renewal was wrongly refused, that would amount to a breach. The remedy of the plaintiff in that event, would be to sue for specific performance of the contract. No such suit has admittedly been filed. The right to have a renewed lease, therefore, does not exist. The defendant bad acquired a right to turn the plaintiff out of possession at the expiration of the term granted by the lease. See, Messrs. Jardine, Skinner & Co. v. Rani Surat Soondari Debi LR 1878 5 IA 164. Thus the possession of the plaintiff was, therefore nothing but unlawful. As a matter of fact, after the expiry of the lease by efflux of time, the plaintiff had no interest left and, therefore, was not "a person interested in making the payment" within the meaning of section 69 of the Contract Act. 15. The fact that the payments made the plaintiff were not in good faith, or made to protect one's own interest, is an inescapable conclusion. While it is true that the primary liability under section 138(1)(a) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 for payment of land revenue in case of a bhumiswami holding is on the bhumiswami, the secondary liability of an occupier of such holding under section 139 of the Code does not arise except in case of default by the bhumiswami. That is a result which flows from the opening words "In case of default by any person who is primarily liable under section 138", occurring in section 139 of the Code, which control the operative part of the section. 16. That is a result which flows from the opening words "In case of default by any person who is primarily liable under section 138", occurring in section 139 of the Code, which control the operative part of the section. 16. Now, the liability of the bhumiswami does not arise except in the manner provided. Under section 140(1), land revenue payable on account of a revenue year falls due on the 1st day of that year. The expression "revenue year", as defined in section 2(1)(v), means the year commencing on such date as the State Government may, by notification, appoint. The State Government have, accordingly, appointed 1st October as the date on which the revenue year shall commence, also framed rules under section 258(2)(xxxi) read with section 140(2) prescribing the dates on which, and the instalments in which, land revenue shall be payable. The leased plot fell within the Indore Division, and the land revenue was payable in two instalments, the 2nd on 15th May. Section 141 then provides that (i) any land revenue due and not paid on or before the prescribed date becomes there from an "arrear", and (ii) the persons responsible for it, whether under the provisions of sections 138 or 139, become "defaulters". [See, Dvivedi's M.P. Land Revenue Code, 8th Ed, pp. 409-11]. 17. It is quite clear on the evidence that the land revenue for the years in question had not become due and payable and were, therefore, not in "arrears", nor was the defendant a "defaulter" in respect thereof. The notice of demand dated 4-3-1963, Ex. P-8, is addressed to the plaintiff's father Jadhavji, i. e. a dead person. The year of demand is not mentioned in the notice. It required payment of Rs. 1360.60 p. towards land revenue with penalty within one day. The receipt dated 30-3-1963, Ex-P-9, shows payment for the year 1962-63, i. e., before the due date. These two documents appear to have been maneuvered. The demand notices for the years 1963-64 and 1964-65 are not forthcoming. The receipt dated 17-3-1964, Ex-P-10, shows payment under protest of Rs. 1360.60 p. for the year 1963-64, while the receipt dated 12-2-1965, Ex-P-13, shows such payment to the village Patel for the year 1964-65. These two documents appear to have been maneuvered. The demand notices for the years 1963-64 and 1964-65 are not forthcoming. The receipt dated 17-3-1964, Ex-P-10, shows payment under protest of Rs. 1360.60 p. for the year 1963-64, while the receipt dated 12-2-1965, Ex-P-13, shows such payment to the village Patel for the year 1964-65. There was no occasion for the plaintiff to have made these payments on behalf of the defendant, when the land revenue for these years had not fallen due, nor was he served with any notices of demand. There was, indeed, no "default in payment" on the part of the defendant within the meaning of section 139 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 to attract the secondary liability of the plaintiff. 18. The plaintiff could not be regarded as "a person interested in making the payment thereof", within the meaning of section 69 of the Contract Act. The payments were, in fact, not honest payments made in good faith but were made with an ulterior motive. The plaintiff's lease having expired, and he having failed to exercise his option for renewal, and there being no renewed lease in his favour, he was in unlawful possession of the plot. Despite the expiry of the lease by efflux of time, the plaintiff has continued to be in unlawful possession. The payments were, therefore, made by the plaintiff with the object of creating some kind of right in him, when he had none. 19. There can be no doubt that all the payments by the plaintiff were voluntarily made. In view of the settled law, the plaintiff is not entitled to any reimbursement for such voluntary payments. 20. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs, counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified. Postscript: 1. After the judgment was laid on the table, learned counsel applied that the delivery of the judgment be deferred along with certified copies of two documents, namely-(i) Khasra panchsala for the years 1963-64 and 1964-65; and (ii) building sanction plan. Both these documents no doubt show that the leased area falls within the Burhanpur Municipal area and is, therefore, covered by Item 32 of the Schedule of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Both these documents no doubt show that the leased area falls within the Burhanpur Municipal area and is, therefore, covered by Item 32 of the Schedule of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. That being so, the leased area is "accommodation" within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Act and consequently the plaintiff on the determination of the lease by efflux of time and also by notice, dated 29-3-1962 (Ex-D-1), served by the defendant became a "Statutory tenant" thereof. 1. These documents are, however, of no avail to the plaintiff. That is because I have also examined the alternative position and held that even if the plaintiff was treated to be a statutory tenant, he was not entitled to the benefit of section 69 of the Contract Act, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the view I have taken, namely that the payments in question made by the plaintiff were voluntary and not in good faith for the protection of one's own interest, he was not 'a person interested in making the payment', within the meaning of section 69 of the Contract Act. The two documents sought to be filed under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, do not affect the result of the appeal.