JUDGMENT P.N. Bakshi, J. - The petitioner company is a sales organisation and the sale selling agent of the products of M/s. Jay Engineering Works Ltd. for the whole of India with the exception of West Bengal. On 14th January, 1972, the respondent No. 2 filed a suit against the petitioner and the Bench sales Manager of Bareilly Branch in the Court of Munsif City, Bareilly for the eviction of the petitioner from the premises in dispute. The suit was filed purely on the allegations that the tenancy of the petitioner has been terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. No other ground for eviction was mentioned in the plaint. On 12th May, 1972 the petitioner filed a written statement considering the respondent's suit. On 16th July, 1972, the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came into force. In view of Section 39 of the said Act, the petitioner deposited the entire rent due along with interest in the trial Court on 10th of August, 1972. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 filed an application for the amendment of the plaint. The petitioner's contention is that this amendment application was moved beyond the period of 60 days prescribed thereof. By virtue of this amendment application, the respondent No. 2 sought ejectment of the petitioner on the ground that he has sublet the premises in question to Sri S.K. Gupta, respondent No. 3. This application was allowed by the Judge, Small Causes, Bareilly vide his judgment and order dated 22nd February, 1973. Aggrieved thereby, a revision was filed in the Court of District Judge, Bareilly by the petitioner, which was dismissed on 21st April, 1974. No further steps were taken by the petitioner to challenge this revisional order. Thereafter, additional written statement was filed to the amended plaint. Evidence was led in the case. On 3rd September, 1973, the Judge, Small Causes Court, Bareilly, dismissed the suit of respondent No. 2. The ground on which the suit was that on the date when the suit had been filed, the premises in question had not been sublet to Sri S.K. Gupta and that the cause of action had arisen subsequent to the institution of the suit, and as such was not maintainable. The ground on which the suit was that on the date when the suit had been filed, the premises in question had not been sublet to Sri S.K. Gupta and that the cause of action had arisen subsequent to the institution of the suit, and as such was not maintainable. It was further held by the Judge, Small Causes Court that the petitioner company not being a natural person, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act were not attracted to the facts of the present case. On these findings, it was finally held that no case of subletting had been proved. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, a revision was filed before the District Judge, Bareilly which has been allowed on 9th October, 1974. The Revisional Court was of the opinion that the plaint could be amended by the plaintiff even though the cause of action had arisen after the institution of the suit and after the deposit of the money under Section 39 of the Act. The Additional District Judge further held that on the basis of the agreement between the company and respondent and respondent No. 3 the case of subletting had been proved within the meaning of Section 12(1)(b) of the aforesaid Act. The plaintiff's suit was, therefore, decreed. Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition has been filed. 2. It appears that subsequent to the amendment of this writ petition, the petitioner, by way of abundant caution, also filed Civil Revision No. 336 of 1975 against the impugned order of the Additional District Judge dated 9th October, 1974. This Revision was admitted and connected with the present writ petition No. 2318 of 1974 by the order of this Court dated 30th July, 1975. As such this writ petition as well as the Civil Revision are being disposed of by this Common judgment. 3. I have heard the counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents on the record. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that under Section 43(2)(h), an application for amendment has to be made within 60 days from the commencement of the U.P. Urban Building Regulation of Letting of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. In the instant case, the application has been made beyond that period. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that under Section 43(2)(h), an application for amendment has to be made within 60 days from the commencement of the U.P. Urban Building Regulation of Letting of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. In the instant case, the application has been made beyond that period. The petitioner's counsel has also submitted that the agreement in question which is Annexure 5 on the record was entered into between the parties on 30th August, 1972. This could not be made the basis of the cause of action as accrued to the plaintiff on the date of the institution of the suit. In other words, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that only those causes of action can be considered which have accrued on the day when the original suit was instituted in the Court of Munsif. On these two grounds, it is argued that the petitioner should be non-suited. As I have mentioned above, this question was agitated before the Judge, Small Causes Court. These contentions were repelled by him. A revision was filed by the petitioner before District Judge. That revision was dismissed. No other steps were taken by the petitioner to challenge the order by the District Judge in revision. The petitioner acquired to this order. This order has now become final between the parties in so far as the above noted questions are concerned, it has been held by the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 941, that : "The principle of res-judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court, whether the trial Court or a higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings." 4. In view of this decision the contention of the respondents' counsel has great force and must be accepted. 5. With regard to the question that subsequent events should not be taken into consideration and should not have been allowed to form the basis of the amended plaint, it would be enough to refer to another decision of the Supreme Court reported in Pasupuleti Venkat Swarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1409. 5. With regard to the question that subsequent events should not be taken into consideration and should not have been allowed to form the basis of the amended plaint, it would be enough to refer to another decision of the Supreme Court reported in Pasupuleti Venkat Swarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1409. In this decision, it was held that : Where, a during the pendency of a proceeding under Rent Control legislation by the landlord for permission to evict the tenants, a subsequent event in the facts of the case takes place which has a material bearing on the landlord's right to evict, the approach of the Act in revision, in taking cognizance of the new development cannot be said to be wrong or illegal." 6. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, I am in agreement with the submission made by the respondents' counsel that the above two objections which have been raised by the petitioner's counsel as to maintainability of the suit are without force and must be rejected outright. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent has brought to my notice a case of the Supreme Court reported in Bhagwan Das v. R. Rajdeo Singh, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 986. This is a case in which Bhagwan Das was the tenant in chief of the premises. He is alleged to have sublet the premises to Usha Sales. The Rent Controller held that subletting of the premises had been proved and made an order evicting him from the premises. This order was confirmed in appeal. The Supreme Court refused to interfere with this order on the ground that there did not arise any question of law much less a substantial question of law. In this connection, it may be mentioned that Bhagwan Das was not an employee of Usha Sales on the date when he had let out the premises to Usha Sales and got himself appointed as the agent for displaying and selling the products of Usha Sales. In the instant case, the respondent No. 3, Sri S.K. Gupta was already an employee of Usha Sales. He was working as the Manager of the concern and as the Manager of the said concern he was in possession of the said premises on behalf of Usha Sales. His possession continued to remain the same. In the instant case, the respondent No. 3, Sri S.K. Gupta was already an employee of Usha Sales. He was working as the Manager of the concern and as the Manager of the said concern he was in possession of the said premises on behalf of Usha Sales. His possession continued to remain the same. Only the modus operandi of his work was altered. Instead of looking after the business as Manager of the concern, he was made a commission agent and entitled to commission of the amount of business secured by him. The facts of the Supreme Court case, therefore, are not applicable to the present case. 8. The other question which has to be determined and which is of a more crucial nature is whether on the facts of the present case, the petitioner is guilt of having sublet the premises in question to respondent No. 3. Both sides have referred to the agreement Annexure 5 on the record in support of their respective contentions. According to the case of the petitioner the respondent No. 3 was its employee. Since the company was desirous of promoting sales to the customers at the selling point, it decided to nominate experienced individuals for the purpose of improving the sales. As such the respondent No. 3 was nominated as dealer by the petitioner on the basis of the agreement dated 20th August, 1972. I find from a perusal of the judgment on the record that Sir S.P. Agrawal, Advocate, Mukhitar-a-am of the plaintiff in the suit has admitted that respondent No. 3 who was defendant No. 2 in that suit used to occupy the shop in question as an employee of the petitioner. He has admitted that respondent No. 3 was the Branch Manager of Usha Sales in Bareilly in 1971 and he used to get salary from the petitioner. Formerly, he used to sit as the servant of the company and now he sits as a nominated sales dealer. In cross-examination, he further admitted that Usha Sales defendant No. 1 in the suit, as in the legal possession of the shop in suit and the respondent No. 3 is a licensee thereto. Formerly, he used to sit as the servant of the company and now he sits as a nominated sales dealer. In cross-examination, he further admitted that Usha Sales defendant No. 1 in the suit, as in the legal possession of the shop in suit and the respondent No. 3 is a licensee thereto. He further admitted that Usha Sales has a right to remove and to dispossess respondent No. 3 at any time from the shop in suit and that the Broad of Usha Sales is still hanging on the shop in question. I also find from the statement of Ved Ratan (D.W.1), Divisional Manager, that Sri S.K. Gupta used to sell the goods which were manufactured by Usha Sales and that he is still doing the same. Usha Sales is still in possession of the shop in suit. Formerly, Sir S.K. Gupta was an employee as a Manager and now he is a nominated dealer. Previously, he earned a salary and now he was paid commission. His statement is further to the effect that Shri Gupta had been allowed to occupy the shop in suit as a licensee. This so far as the oral evidence on the record is concerned to which reference has been made on the orders of the Courts below. In the agreement dated 20th August, 1972, Annexure 5, the same position as has been deposed in the oral testimony of the witnesses have been reiterated. It has been specifically laid down in clause 2 of the agreement that the agreement in question relates to the sale of the products directly supplied to the nominated dealer by the company and that if the nominated dealer desired to keep any other products, it has to be done with the permission of the company. Clause 3(d) of the agreement is to the effect that the rent of the premises shall be paid by the company directly to the landlord. Clause 3(a) is to the effect that the use of the premises will neither prejudice the lease rights of the company in any way, nor confer any rights on the nominated dealer of a tenant or of a sub-tenant in the aforesaid premises. It is true that by virtue of clauses 4 and 5 of this agreement, the dealer is allowed to furnish and equip counters and racks at his own costs in accordance with the companies standards. It is true that by virtue of clauses 4 and 5 of this agreement, the dealer is allowed to furnish and equip counters and racks at his own costs in accordance with the companies standards. He has also been allowed to provide his own staff at his own expense. But this does not mean that the possession and the tenancy of the company qua the premises in question ceased to exist merely because it had decided to conduct its business not through the agency of the Manager but through the nominated dealer constituted under the agreement. Having considered these facts enumerated above, I am of the opinion that the company was and still continues to be the tenant of the premises in question and the respondent No. 3 who was conducting the business of the company in his capacity as Manager prior to the agreement has now become as nominated dealer. He has no independent rights of possession to the property. He is merely a licensee of the petitioner. This change in the status has been necessitated due to business considerations Obviously, as Manager of the concern, he would not have so much interest for boosting up the sales as he would have if he were nominated dealer in which case he would be entitled to the payment of commission on the extent of sales effected by him. This was purely an internal business arrangement between the company and the respondent No. 3. It could not amount to subletting under the provisions of the Act. The Additional District Judge his tried to apply Section 12(1)(b) of Act XIII of 1972 in coming to the conclusion that the premises in question has been sublet. A plain reading of this section shows that it is wholly in-applicable to the facts of the present case. The only relevant section which may have some bearing on this question may be Section 12(2) which applies to non-residential buildings between that would not apply because that envisages a situation when a person who is not a member of the family is introduced in the building as a partner or a new partner is admitted in the premises in question. The instant case is not covered even by Section 12(2) of the Act. The District Judge, in my view was in error when he held that the petitioner has sublet the premises to the respondent No. 3. The instant case is not covered even by Section 12(2) of the Act. The District Judge, in my view was in error when he held that the petitioner has sublet the premises to the respondent No. 3. 9. In the result, therefore, this writ petition is allowed. A writ of certiorari is issued quashing the order of the Additional District Judge, Bareilly dated 9th October, 1974. The petitioner would be entitled to his costs. Since this writ petition is being allowed, Civil Revision No. 336 of 1975 is dismissed as infructuous.