Mahanth Girija Nandan Bhagat v. Principal, Teachers Training College, Turki
1976-10-29
B.P.SINHA
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Birendra Prasad Sinha, J. This application is directed against a final order passed in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, West Muzaffarpur, declaring the possession of the first party (opposite party before this court) over the lands in dispute. The lands involved in the proceeding bear cadastral survey plot Nos. 1424 to 1432 of Khata No. 153, having an area of 3.41 acres, situate in village Turki, P. S. Turki, district Muzaffarpur, and form part of the lands which were donated to the Government of Bihar by the late Narsingh Bhagat, the Guru of the second party, under a registered deed dated the 16th October, 1949. The proceeding came to be started in the following manner. 2. On the 27th of March, 1970, the principal of the Teachers' Training College, Turki (First party), wrote to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kurhani. Stating, inter alia, that the Government Janta College, Turki, was situated on a portion of the land belonging to the Turki Teachers' Training College and the Janta College had since been abolished in 1967. It was further stated that the building and the of her assets of the Janta College had been made over to the Teachers' Training College. On the 26th March, 1970, Mahanth Girija Nandan Bhagat (Petitioner before this court) took forcible possession of the office and also harvested the standing crops growing on the and had rut his own locks in the building. On receipt of the said information, the Sub-Inspector of Police is said to have made an enquiry and on the 21st April, 1970, sent a report to the sub-divisional Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, recommending for action under section 144/145 of the Code. It was stated in the report that the Janta College which had been started on the 2nd October, 1953. had been closed on the 17th November, 1967, and the building vacated by it was occupied by the trainees of the Teachers' Training College, Turki, for the purposes of office library, stores and hostel etc. The report further mentioned that on the 26th March, 1970, the petitioner had spaded the field and cut away the standing wheat crop. The Sub-Inspector found the servants of the petitioner present near the building and the field having been spaded.
The report further mentioned that on the 26th March, 1970, the petitioner had spaded the field and cut away the standing wheat crop. The Sub-Inspector found the servants of the petitioner present near the building and the field having been spaded. The Sub-divisional Magistrate started a proceeding under section 144 of t he Code on the 30th April, 1970, which was converted into a proceeding under section 145 of the Code on the 22nd of June. 3. The first party (Opposite party) in his written statement stated that the Guru of the second party (Petitioner) executed a deed of gift in favour of the Government for establishing a basic training school and, on the abolition of the .Tanta College, the land and building were being used for the teachers' training College. It was admitted that there was a stipulation in the deed that if the land ever ceased to be used for the purpose of basic training College, it would revert to the donor and his successors-in-interest, but the donee and his successors-in-interest in office would be at liberty to remove and sell the building on the land and other materials. It was asserted that even though the land was not being used for the purpose of the institution the second party-petitioner had no right to take forcible possession, but be should have negotiated the matter. A prayer was made to declare the possession of the first party and an order for delivery of the possession of the portion of land in question which has been forcibly possessed by the second party" The second party-petitioner stated in his written statement that his Guru had made a gift with the clear stipulation that the land would remain in possession of the doner or to the successors-in-interest only till the educational institution would run and in the event of its abolition, it would revert back to the doner and his successors. Possession was claimed immediately after the abolition of Janta College. The claim of the first party was denied. The first party filed affidavits of five persons and the second party filed affidavits of nine persons. Both parties tiled the deed of gift made by the late Narsingh Bhagat. 4.
Possession was claimed immediately after the abolition of Janta College. The claim of the first party was denied. The first party filed affidavits of five persons and the second party filed affidavits of nine persons. Both parties tiled the deed of gift made by the late Narsingh Bhagat. 4. As regards the affidavits, the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate stated in paragraph four of his order: "The preponderance of evidence appears to weigh in favour of the 2nd party in as much as almost all the deponents have stated to own land on the either sides of the boundary of the disputed land". He further stated- "Independent witnesses as regards factum of possession has not been produced by the 1st party. But a little later, the learned Magistrate stated- It therefore, leads me to believe that the deponents were never sure of the time when the second party came in possession over the land in dispute Which is very much relevant for deciding the issue of factum of possession. I am, therefore, at a Joss to put reliance on the affidavits filed on behalf of the second party. But affidavits filled on behalf of the 1st party are also equally insufficient to place reliance on the factum of possession" "It is very difficult to appreciate the contradictory position taken up by the learned Magistrate In. regard to the affidavits of the second party the learned Magistrate first stated that so far as the oral evidence Was concerned, it weighed more in favour of the second party, but later on he rejected the affidavits of the second party also. On the question of taking forcible possession by the second party petitioner, the learned Magistrate has stated that the case of the second party is supported by various circumstances and appears to be true as it has been admitted by the 2nd party that few rooms of the building still contain furniture’s and papers of Teachers Training College. The learned Magistrate ultimately came to the finding that the land in dispute belonged to Government in the Education Department and that the second party forcibly took possession of some portion of the disputed :and building within two months (26.3.7(1) prier to the date of the proceeding (30.4.70)." 5.
The learned Magistrate ultimately came to the finding that the land in dispute belonged to Government in the Education Department and that the second party forcibly took possession of some portion of the disputed :and building within two months (26.3.7(1) prier to the date of the proceeding (30.4.70)." 5. Shri Umesh Chandra Prasad Sinha, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the dispossession of the first parts having admittedly been on the 26th of March. 1970, and the proceeding under section] 45 of the Code having been initiated on the 22nd June, 1970, the learned Magistrate should have declared the second party-petitioner to be in possession over the disputed land. Shri Sinha appears to be correct- 6. The first proviso to section 145 (4) of the Code (1898) reads as follows : " provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has within two months next before the date of such order been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, he may treat the party so dispossessed as if he had been in possession at such date." It is obvious that the words "the date of such order" refer to the order passed under subsection (1) of section 145 of the Code, i.e. when a proceeding under section 145 of Code is initiated. The order under section 145 of the Code, in the present case, was passed on the 22nd June, 1970. The period of two months, therefore, must be calculated from that date and not from the date on which the proceeding under section 144 of the Code was started. The learned Magistrate has calculated the period of two months from the date on which the proceeding under section 144 of the Code was started, i.e. 30th of April, 1970. He has clearly, therefore, fallen into an error, because he could not calculate the period of two months from the 30th of April, 1970. On his own finding that the second party-petitioner took possession of some portion of the disputed land and building on the 26th March 1970, the learned Magistrate should have declared the second party to be in possession.
On his own finding that the second party-petitioner took possession of some portion of the disputed land and building on the 26th March 1970, the learned Magistrate should have declared the second party to be in possession. In Lakshami Narain Singh V. Jugeshwar Jha a Division Bench of this court overruling an earlier single judge decision of this court in Gobordhan Das V. Suresh Chandra held that "the plain words" of the proviso compel the decision to be that two months 'must be calculated from the date of the order passed under" section 145 (1) of the-Code and no other date." In the case of Lakshmi Narain Singh (supra) their Lordships further he ld that even in a case of forcible and wrongful dispossession, it would by beyond the functions of a Court to be missed by sentiments and give a construction to the provisions of the statute which entirely alters it and gives to it a meaning which is contrary to the plain words of the statute. A similar view was expressed by Sahay, J. in Re: Harihar Singh that the period of two months must be computed from the date on which the proceeding Under section 145 is drawn up and not from the date on which the proceeding under section 144 is drawn up. It is needless to multiply the various other authorities of this Court on this point. 7. In view of the admission of the first party that they were dispossessed two months prior to the date of the initiation of the proceeding under section 145 (I) of the Code and the finding of the learned Magistrate in that regard, I am of the opinion that the learned Magistrate should have declared the second party-petitioner to be in possession over the disputed land and building. His decision to the contrary is wrong and must be set aside. 8. In the result, this application is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate is set aside and the possession of the second party petitioner is declared over the land and the building in dispute. Application allowed.