JUDGMENT 1. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the order of respondent No. 1 the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur dated 15.5.76 granting one temporary permit in favour of respondents 2 to 3 on Udaipur-Bhudar via Palodara route. 2. The petitioner is no an existing operator on Udaipur Rikhabdeo route via Palodara and his permit is said to the valid upto 7.6.77. Respondent 3 moved an application on 13.4.76 under section 62(1)(c) and 68F(1)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter to be called "the Act") for a temporary permit and the purpose for which permit is required was mentioned (to meet a particular temporary need) as non-temporary permit cannot be granted and need persists). Similarly respondent 2 also applied in the same manner on the same day for the grant of a temporary permit. The said applications were circulated by the Secretary Regional Transport Authority and ultimately it was ordered on 15.5.76 that temporary permits be issued. The reasons for issue of this mentioned in the said resolution are that it is necessary considering the requirement of the public and the convenience on this route that a temporary permit should be issued and further that the temporary permit can be issued for four months till the State Transport Corporation operates on this route and after the portion of Udaipur Palodara is nationalised the buses will operate only from Palodara to Bhudar. On 19.3.76 a scheme known as Udaipur Kushalgarh via Jaisamand. Salumbar, Banswara has been notified under section 68D(3) of the Act. The said scheme is a scheme of total exclusion which means that no private operator can operate on a notified route. It may be mentioned that the draft scheme with regard to this notified route had been earlier published under section 68D(3) of the Act in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 24.4.73. 3. There is also a notified route known as Udaipur-Dungarpur under section 68D(3) of the Act. The said route is an operational route and the Rajasthan State Transport Corporation is operating on this. It is common ground that the notified route of Udaipur to Kushalgarh is common ground from Udaipur to Palodara of the temporary route. Udaipur to Bhudar which has been given to the respondents 2 and 3. The said route is an operational route and the Rajasthan State Transport Corporation is operating on this. It is common ground that the notified route of Udaipur to Kushalgarh is common ground from Udaipur to Palodara of the temporary route. Udaipur to Bhudar which has been given to the respondents 2 and 3. It may be mentioned that respondents 2 and 3 had previously applied on 18.12.75 and 28.10.75 respectively with regard to Udaipur Bhudar route which had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority by its order of 23rd January, 1976. The said grant was challenged in the writ petition S.B. Civil Writ No. 253/76 which was finally heard and decided on 1.3.76 and the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur dated 23.1.76 granting permits to the respondents 2 and 3 had been quashed. The counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vyas challenges the present grant of temporary permits in favour of respondents 2 and 3 on the following grounds:- (a) That part of the portion of the route of respondents 2 and 3 Udaipur to Bhudar overlaps Udaipur Dungarpur notified route duly notified under section 68D(3) of the Act from Rikhabdeo to bifurcation point towards Bhudar for a distance of nearly 2 Kilometers. (b) As the permit for the route Udaipur-Bhudar given to the petitioner will overlap part of the notified route of Udaipur Kushalgarh upto Palodara the Regional Transport Authority has no jurisdiction to give such a temporary permit. (c) That no temporary need as contemplated by section 62(1)(c) is shown in the application of respondents 2 and 3 and therefore the grant to them by the Regional Transport Authority is without jurisdiction. Re:(a): I may straight away say that so far as the overlapping of a portion of Udaipur-Dungarpur notified route from Rikhabdeo to Bhudar by the temporary permit of respondents 2 and 3 is concerned the material is insufficient on record to permit any finding to be given. Though in the reply by respondents 2 and 3 it was mentioned that the bifurcation towards Bhudar is only 1 or 2 miles, the counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 explained that in fact from Rikhabdeo to the intersection there is only a circle from which the notified route goes to Dungarpur while the petitioner's buses go to Bhudar. The suggestion is that it is not a case of overlapping but more a case of intersection. The suggestion is that it is not a case of overlapping but more a case of intersection. It is now well settled that if there is a prohibition to operate on a notified route no licence can be granted to a private operator whose route traverses or overlaps in part or whole of that notified route. The intersection of notified route however may not amount to traversing or overlapping the route because the prohibition imposed applies to a whole or part of the route on the highway on the same line of the route and that intersection cannot be said to be traversing the same line as it goes over it vide Mysore S.R.T. Corpn. v. Mysore S.T.A. Tribunal AIR 1974 SC 1940 . This ground against the grant of a permit to the respondents 2 and 3 therefore cannot be satisfactorily decided in the present proceedings as no foundation was laid before the Regional Transport Authority and none of the authorities have had occasion to deal with it. It is in this context that the preliminary objection of the respondents 2 and 3 that the petitioner having not availed of the alternative remedy of revision under section 64A of the Act should not be allowed to maintain the petition assumes force. This plea of the petitioner therefore fails. Re:(b): The next argument is that as Udaipur Kushalgarh notified route will be traversed by the respondents 2 and 3 by operating on Udaipur Bhudar route as Udaipur to Palodara is common to both the routes the said permit could not have been issued. This argument is based on the assertion that under law a temporary permit which can be granted under proviso to section 68FF cannot be for a portion of the notified Udaipur Kushalgarh route but must be for the whole of the notified route, and therefore the permit issued to respondents No. 2 and 3 for Udaipur Bhudar which includes only a portion of notified route of Udaipur Kushalgarh cannot be considered to have been issued under proviso to section 68FF. Further argument is made that the provisions of section 62(1)(c) for the issue of the temporary permit cannot be invoked as there is no provision to issue a permit by invoking power both under Chapter IV (which contains section 62) and chapter IV A which comprises section 68FF and argument is further strengthened by making reference to section 68B which lays down that provisions of chapter IV A shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV of the Act. Mr. Vyas was so bold as to say that section 68B clearly means that a case covered by Chapter IV A must totally exclude applicability of any provisions of Chapter IV and therefore combining the power under proviso to section 68FF and 62 is not permissible. This extreme argument of Mr. Vyas has not been accepted by the Supreme Court in Abdul Gafoor v. State of Mysore AIR 1961 SC 1586 in which it has been held that all that section 68B presupposes is that there are some provisions in Chapter IV which can apply to some matters under Chapter IV A and all that it means is that if there is a matter to which both the provisions of Chapter IV and Chapter IV A are applicable then the latter Chapter will prevail to the extent of its inconsistency with corresponding provision in Chapter IV. The Supreme Court has actually held in Shrinivasa v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1960 SC 350 that the provisions of section 57(2) of Chapter IV are applicable when an application is made for the grant of a permit under section 68F of Chapter IV A. It is not therefore possible to accept the extreme argument that though undoubtedly the power be there with the Regional Transport Authority under Chapter IV A or Chapter IV the same cannot be exercised at the same time and must be exercised separately. Mr. Vyas however urges that proviso to 68FF when it permits a temporary permit to be given for such notified route can only contemplate an issue of a temporary permit for the whole of the notified route and not of a portion combined with the other portion which is not so notified. He seeks to rely on a Division Bench of this Court in support of this assertion viz, Special Appeal No. 539/72 decided on 13.11.72. He seeks to rely on a Division Bench of this Court in support of this assertion viz, Special Appeal No. 539/72 decided on 13.11.72. In that case after a draft scheme under section 68C was published in respect of Bhilwara Ajmer route the Regional Transport Authority issued a permit for Bhilwara to Bahera via Maudal Chauraya. The portion between Bhilwara to Mandal Chauraya was a part of the draft scheme route of Bhilwara Ajmer. The Regional Transport Authority had therefore issued the permit with the remarks that it would be a temporary permit from Bhilwara to Mandal Chauraya and a non temporary one from Mandel Chauraya to Bihera and the permit was made valid for three years. The Regional Transport Authority having refused the objection of the petitioner a writ petition was filed in this Court challenging the grant which was allowed by the Single Judge and the matter was affirmed in appeal. The Division Bench took the view that the Motor Vehicles Act contemplates only two categories of permits: (1) non temporary permits and (2) temporary permits & there is no third category of permit which can be granted under the Act. The Division Bench consequently took the view that there was no scope for granting a hybrid or composite permit temporary for a portion of the published route and non temporary for the rest. The obvious distinction between that case and the present case is that the permits granted to respondents 2 and 3 are temporary, i.e. one kind of permit contemplated under the Act. Proviso to section 68FF does contemplate issue of a temporary permit in respect of a notified route where no application for permit has been made by the State Transport Undertaking. Prima facie therefore it does not appear as if there is any such total ban on issue of a temporary permit when the conditions both of proviso to section 68FF and 62(1)(c) are attracted. 4. On Nikarth Prasao v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 1135 it was held in connection with the notified route that the portions of a route could not be said to be different routes over which the private operators stood excluded under section 68 of the Act. If Mr. 4. On Nikarth Prasao v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 1135 it was held in connection with the notified route that the portions of a route could not be said to be different routes over which the private operators stood excluded under section 68 of the Act. If Mr. Vyas's argument is accepted proviso to section 68FF can only be utilised for issue of a temporary permit for the whole of the notified route and not for the issue of a temporary permit on a portion of the notified route. Prima facie it does not seem why it should be so. No doubt if the notified route is a route of total exclusion then according to the Supreme Court case Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mysore S.T.A. Tribunal AIR 1974 SC 1940 no non temporary permit can be issued to private operator on the route on which it is overlapping a portion of notified route for the simple reason that there is no provision for the issue of such a permit and as the scheme forbids it even a permit for part of the route cannot be issued. But once proviso to section 68FF is attracted then if the temporary permit can be issued to a private operator so long as an application for permit has not been made by the State Transport Undertaking prima facie what logic is there in restricting the power of the Regional Transport Authority to issue a temporary permit only for the whole of the notified route but not for a portion of it. Apparently it would seem a paradox that when the Regional Transport Authority can issue a temporary permit for whole of the notified route it should be prohibited from doing so far a part of such notified route. 5. I may also refer to M/s. Rajendra Singh Bros. v. Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur 1972 WLN 585 where apparently the view taken was that as the route is between two termini and if therefore the two termini do not fall on the notified route issue of a permit is not prohibited. I must however note that this view was taken earlier to the decision of Mysore State Road Transport Corporations' case and would prima facie run counter to the Supreme Court decision. I must however note that this view was taken earlier to the decision of Mysore State Road Transport Corporations' case and would prima facie run counter to the Supreme Court decision. Moreover Joshi J. has in Kulwant Singh v. STA S.B.C. Writ Petition No. 1947 of 73 decided on 10.2.75 not accepted this view. I do not however consider it necessary to decide finally this point in view of another objection raised by the respondents to the conduct of the petitioner to maintain the present writ petition. It is pointed out that according to the petitioner's own allegation in the Writ Petition his renewal of permit is valid upto 7.5.75 which means that his present permit on the Udaipur Rakhabdeo route was renewed on 7.5.74. As already notified draft scheme for Udaipur Kushalgarh route was notified under section 68C on 24.4.73. Section 68F(1)(d) provides that no permit shall be granted or renewed during the period intervening between the date of publication under section 68Cof any scheme and the date of publication of the approval of modified scheme in favour of any person for any class of a road transport service in relation of an area of route or portion thereof covered by such scheme Proviso further lays down that where the period of operation of a permit in relation to any area, route or portion thereof specified in a scheme published under section 68C expires after such publication, such permit may be renewed for a limited period, but the permit so renewed shall cease to be effective on the publication of the scheme under sub section (3) of section 68D. Now according to the respondents as the permit of the petitioner expired in May, 1974 i.e. after the publication on 24.4.73 under section 68C of the draft scheme of Udaipur Kushalgarh route the same could only have been renewed for a limited period and the permit so renewed should have ceased to be effective on the publication of the scheme under sub section (3) of section 68D. Admittedly Udaipur Kushalgarh route has been notified under section 68D(3), on 19.3.76. The petitioner's permit it is urged which was renewed upto 7.5.77 should have ceased to be effective with effect from 19.3.76. Admittedly Udaipur Kushalgarh route has been notified under section 68D(3), on 19.3.76. The petitioner's permit it is urged which was renewed upto 7.5.77 should have ceased to be effective with effect from 19.3.76. The argument is that if the petitioner's plea that no temporary permit can be issued to the respondents 2 and 3 on Udaipur Bhudar route because it overlaps a part of notified route of Udaipur Kushalgarh, the same reasoning and process would mean that the petitioner's own renewed permit on Udaipur Rikhabdeo route which also overlaps the notified route of Udaipur Kushalgarh would cease to be effect from March, 1976 with the consequent result that the petitioner who is now seeking to challenge the grant of temporary permit to respondents 2 and 3 would have no locus standi to challenge it, because the only ground on which the petitioner claims to be aggrieved is that he has a permit on Udaipur Rikhebdeo route which has quite a common portion with Udaipur Bhudar route issued to respondents 2 and 3. It is well settled that petitioner in order to have a locus standi to file a petition must show a personal injury and the counsel for the respondent therefore says that if the petitioner's permit on Udaipur Rikhabdeo route be treated as non existent since March, 1976, there is no injury which the petitioner can complain of and the Writ Petition is therefore liable to be dismissed on that account. I am not of course in this petition determining the rights of the petitioner nor am I going into the matter whether the petitioner's permit which is apparently valid upto 7.5.77 has ceased to be effective with the issue of a notified route of Udaipur Kushalgarh on 19.3.76. The reason is that I do not have sufficient material on record; nor has the challenge to the petitioner's permit been made in the present petition directly and it would not be correct to give a decision on this point by way of collateral proceedings. Even though therefore the3 question about the existence or otherwise of the permit of the petitioner is not being decided by me, yet the petitioner cannot be allowed to urge this argument against the respondents 2 and 3 for the grant of a temporary permit on grounds which if applicable would make his own position shaky and doubtful. Even though therefore the3 question about the existence or otherwise of the permit of the petitioner is not being decided by me, yet the petitioner cannot be allowed to urge this argument against the respondents 2 and 3 for the grant of a temporary permit on grounds which if applicable would make his own position shaky and doubtful. It is well settled that the petitioner who comes to this Court must come with clean hands and a person who seeks equity must do equity himself. As the grievance of the petitioner is sought to be founded on the existence of a notified route and the respondents 2 and 3's permit contravening the mandate of total exclusion in the notified route, he cannot at the same time by any logic or equity escape from the rigour of the same consequences being made applicable to him. The petitioner cannot be allowed to urge a ground to demolish the case of respondents 2 and 3 at the time to plead that the same ground should not be applicable to him. The petitioner has himself got his permit renewed by this very Regional Transport Authority after the draft scheme of Udaipur Kushalgarh route had been published and it does not lie in this mouth to object that respondents 2 and 3 cannot be given the temporary permit by the Regional Transport authority because of the existence of the notified route. The petitioner cannot obviously approbate and reprobate and if the objects to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport authority to issue permit in favour of respondents 2 and 3 the same infirmity of jurisdiction will then prima facie attach to the issue of a permit by the Regional Transport Authority in the petitioner's favour too Samarathmal v. Jugaldas AIR 1974 Rajasthan 104 lays down that party is not entitled to any writ for failure to avail the alternative remedy and also for his inconsistent conduct in approbating and reprobating the jurisdiction. This is another reason why I feel that it would be better if the petitioner was left to seek his remedy in revision where all these various contentions and disputed matters can be taken up by the authority which would obviously be a better position to deal with these facts and matters of detail. 6. This is another reason why I feel that it would be better if the petitioner was left to seek his remedy in revision where all these various contentions and disputed matters can be taken up by the authority which would obviously be a better position to deal with these facts and matters of detail. 6. Re:(c): Point No. 3 objects to the issue of a temporary permit on the ground that there is no temporary need in existence. Mr. Vyas refers me to the application submitted by respondents 2 and 3 to show that all that was mentioned as a purpose for which permit was required to the application was to meet a particular temporary need and urges that this is not in compliance with section 62(1)(c) and therefore there was no jurisdiction in the Regional Transport Authority to issue the permit. In this connection reference was made to A.V. Venkateswaren v. R.S. Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1606 and 1975 WLN 700 Gafoor v. RTA Jaipur . The counsel for the respondent however argued that the earlier writ petition No. 253/76 had been allowed because the Regional Transport authority is granting the permit had not given any reasons to show that a temporary need existed. He refers me to the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority is which the circulation note after noticing that the writ petition No. 263/76 had been allowed by this Court with the remarks that at the time of issue of temporary permit it should be clearly specified whether a need to issue a temporary permit existed or not, goes on to give details of the route under section 68D but the STate Transport Undertaking had not yet stated its operation, and no non temporary permit can be issued for Udaipur Bhudar But keeping in view the requirement of the public for travelling, issue of a temporary permit seems essential so that the villages falling on this route can have advantage of a bus service and concludes with a recommendation that keeping in view the forts and facilities of public it was a fit case in which respondents 2 and 3 be issued a temporary permit. He also referred me to the further recital in which it was pointed out that on this route there is no passenger bus service and that there was a scope for two permits and it was necessary to issue the temporary permit keeping in view the needs of the public. He also stressed that the Regional Transport Authority has clearly stated that when the3 notified portion Udaipur to Palodara is operated the permit will cease to be operative upto Palodara and thereafter respondents 2 and 3's permit will be valid from Palodara to Bhudar. He referred me to T.H.N. Ahmed v. Commissioner AIR 1972 All. 146 to stress that when the Regional Transport Authority had issued a temporary permit to meet the requirements of the travelling public it was a good reason for exercise of powers under section 62(1)(c) of the Act. He also stressed that the finding whether a temporary need exists or not is primarily a question of fact for the Regional Transport Authority to consider and this Court should not interfere with finding of fact. No doubt, as Mr. Vyas counsel for the petitioner urged it has been stated in a number of decisions of this Court that if the condition precedent of the existence of a temporary need is absent and is not indicated by the Regional Transport Authority the jurisdiction to exercise power under section 62(1)(c) is missing and this Court has therefore at number of times quashed such a decision as being without jurisdiction. This is however an exception to the normal rule laid down by this Court also that in presence of an alternative remedy resort to this Court under Article 226 will be discouraged. This Court has held in Girdhari v. RTA 1970 RLW 465 that the revision under section 64A is a proper remedy. Mr. This is however an exception to the normal rule laid down by this Court also that in presence of an alternative remedy resort to this Court under Article 226 will be discouraged. This Court has held in Girdhari v. RTA 1970 RLW 465 that the revision under section 64A is a proper remedy. Mr. Vyas had also urged that the finding of the Regional Transport Authority that need for the villages will be satisfied by the issue of a permit was merely a make believe as petitioner and other operators who ply on Udaipur Rikhabdeo route cover most of the villages on Udaipur Bhudar route and that Bhudar village was only a couple of miles beyond Rikhabdeo and did not justify the issue of temporary permit from Udaipur to Bhudar and referred to the earlier decision of the Regional Transport Authority of 30th January, 1975, wherein it had declined to issue a permit for Udaipur Bhudar route. It is apparent that the parties are making rival contentions which need examination by reference to facts which obviously cannot be examined satisfactorily in these proceedings. I therefore do not feel that it is a case which can satisfactorily be decided in this Court as the necessary material in all its aspects is not on the record. I am therefore of the opinion that it will be a proper exercise of discretion in this case if I refuse to entertain this writ petition and leave the petitioner to seek his remedy by alternative mode of revision provided under the Motor Vehicles Act where all the points urged by the petitioner and the respondents can be gone into more satisfactorily. 7. The result is that I would decline to exercise my discretion under Article 226 on the ground that alternative remedy exists and would dismiss the petition with no order as to costs. *******