JUDGMENT P.C. Saxena, Member. - The Additional Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi, had made this reference dated 23-11-1973 in a case under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. The facts are briefly that a suit under section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act had been filed. A stage was reached when the lekhpal was ordered to propose lots for the preparation of the final decree. At this point the present revisionist filed an objection containing several points including one that the land in suit is abadi and, therefore not agricultural land Proceedings were alleged to be without jurisdiction. 3. Other parties also filed objections which were finally disposed of by an order of the trial court which was to the effect that the land was less than 318 acres in area and, therefore, its auction had earlier been ordered rightly and also that since the preliminary decree had been passed it could not be decided at this stage whether the land was abadi or not. In revision, the Additional Commissioner has expressed the opinion the no interference should be made with the orders of the trail court. 4. Learned counsel for the revisionists has referred to section 331 A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, which provides that if in any suit relating to land held by a Bhumidhar, the question arises or is raised whether the land in question is or not used for purposes connected with agriculture etc. and a declaration has not been made in respect of such land under Section 143 or 144 the court shall frame an issue on the question and send the record to the Assistant Collector incharge of the Sub-Divisional for the decision of that issue. Learned counsel has claimed that his specific question arose in the suit as a result of the objection filed by the revisionist on 29-6-73 and since the suit under section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act would be deemed to be pending until the final decree had been given, the entire proceedings were vitiated by the failure of the trail court of comply with this mandatory provision of the law. 5. The above contention has to be examined in relation to the stage at which the question mentioned in section 331-A can be deemed to have legally arisen. 5. The above contention has to be examined in relation to the stage at which the question mentioned in section 331-A can be deemed to have legally arisen. According to learned counsel this question can arise at any state before the final judgment in a suit. As to this, the framing of issues by a court must be deemed to be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XVI of the Code lays down specifically that issued arise when a material proposition of fact and law is affirmed by one party and denied by another. Material propositions are defined as those which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. Order XVI Rule 5 C.P.C. goes on to specify that at the firs herein for the suit the court shall after reading the plaintiff and the written statement, if any, ascertain the material propositions on which the parties are at variance and shall thereupon proceed to frame and record the issued on which the right decision of the case appears to depend. 6. It is noticeable that the Code provides that issued should be framed at the first hearing of the suit. This emphasis is re-enforced by the last rule of the order which clearly states that noting in the rule requires the court to frame and record issues where the defendant at the first hearing of the suit makes no defence. 7. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner as summarised above would, therefore, be valid if section 331-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act could be read independently of the Code of Civil Procedure. In may opinion, this was not the intention of the Legislature. If the section is read in terms of the Code, it is clear that the question raised by the revisionist at a stage subsequent to the initial framing of the issues by the court had become entirely irrelevant to the proceedings at the point of time that he chose to raise the question. 8. If the section is read in terms of the Code, it is clear that the question raised by the revisionist at a stage subsequent to the initial framing of the issues by the court had become entirely irrelevant to the proceedings at the point of time that he chose to raise the question. 8. On the practical grounds also it is clear that much harassment would be caused to the litigant parties if the question envisaged by section 331-A of the Act was allowed to be raised by any party at a point of time of its chose subsequent to the framing of the issues and before the passing of the judgment. It would, of course, be open to any party to apply to a court for amendment of its original pleadings but the procedure prescribed in section 331-A would have to followed by the court only if such amendment was allowed and this resulted in re-framing of the set of issued so as to include the one prescribed by the section. 9. In view of the above discussion, the revision application stands dismissed.