Judgment :- 1. Petitioners who were applicants for an order of purchase of the Landlord's right under S.72F, Land Reforms Act challenge the judgment of the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Kozhikode reversing on appeal, the decision of the Land Tribunal allowing their application. The challenge is rested primarily on the ground that in the appeal which was taken from the final order on their application the Appellate Authority had no jurisdiction to reverse the preliminary order finding the petitioners to be tenants, owing to the failure of respondents 1 and 2 to appeal from the preliminary order and secondarily on the merits of the findings. 2. The petitioners filed the application in 1971 and on 7 81972 the Land Tribunal gave a preliminary "decision", under R.9 (1) of the Land Reforms (Vesting and Assignment) Rules holding that the petitioners are cultivating tenants under respondents 1 and 2. Subsequently on 25 91972, the Land Tribunal passed the final order under R.10, read with S.72F (5) of the Act. It was from this order that respondents 1 and 2 preferred their appeal to the Appellate Authority, though they challenged the preliminary decision also in the memorandum of appeal. The Appellate Authority reversed the decision of the Land Tribunal holding that the petitioners are cultivating tenants and dismissed their application. The more important of the two questions raised in the revision, as indicated earlier, relates to the power of the Appellate Authority in an appeal from the final order, to reverse a preliminary decision from which no appeal had been filed. 3. To view of Chellappan v. Kalyani, 1975 KLT. 187, which has been approved by another Division Bench in Abraham v. Joseph, 1975 KLT. 658, which was concerned with the analogous preliminary order under R.81 of Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules on the status of the applicant as a kudi-kidappukaran), it is now settled that a preliminary decision under R.9 (1) of the Assignment Rules is an appealable order. From this counsel for the petitioners argued that as no appeal had been filed from the preliminary decision within the time allowed by law, it was not liable to be challenged or interfered with in the appeal taken from the final order. It was said that the preliminary decision is, as was observed in Abraham's case, 1975 KLT. From this counsel for the petitioners argued that as no appeal had been filed from the preliminary decision within the time allowed by law, it was not liable to be challenged or interfered with in the appeal taken from the final order. It was said that the preliminary decision is, as was observed in Abraham's case, 1975 KLT. 658, just like a preliminary decree in a civil suit and that accordingly on the principle underlying S.97, CPC. the omission to appeal from the preliminary decision will preclude the aggrieved party from disputing its correctness in the appeal which may be preferred from the final order. 4. I find myself unable to accept this contention. The preliminary decision is but a step in the process of adjudicating the dispute; it does not dispose of the case except where it is adverse to the applicant and leads to the consequential order under R.9 (2) rejecting the application; in other cases it forms the substratum of the final order. The final order depends upon the preliminary decision and there is no principle nor any provision in the Act or Rules which precludes the challenge of the latter in the appeal from the former. S.97.C.P.C has by itself no application; nor does it lay down any general juridical principle; it is as I shall point out a special provision framed in the interests of expediency. When an appeal lies from the final order the aggrieved party has a right to appeal from the entire case, because it is that order that disposes of the case and in that appeal he can, unless prohibited by any provision of law, challenge every antecedent order notwithstanding that he might have appealed from such an order dealing only with a part of the case. There is nothing in the nature of things that compel acceptance of the view for which the petitioners are contending. 5. In order to appreciate the (rue object of S.97, it is necessary to recall the antecedent law. That provision was introduced for the first time in the Civil Procedure Code of 1908. The earlier law was that objections "to the preliminary decree could be raised in the appeal from the final decree. This was laid down by the Full Bench decision in Khadem Hossein v. Emdad Hossein, I. L. R.29 Calcutta 758, overruling 23 Calcutta 279 and affirming 23 Calcutta 406. The earlier law was that objections "to the preliminary decree could be raised in the appeal from the final decree. This was laid down by the Full Bench decision in Khadem Hossein v. Emdad Hossein, I. L. R.29 Calcutta 758, overruling 23 Calcutta 279 and affirming 23 Calcutta 406. In 29 Calcutta 758 reliance was placed upon three decisions of the Privy Council, Mohoshur Singh v. The Bengal Government, 7 M.I A. 283, Farbes v. Ameeroonnissa Begum,10 MIA. 340 and Shah Mukhun Lall v. Sree Kishen Singh, 12 MIA. 157 In 7 MIA. 283. after a final decree, the Privy Council considered whether the Sudder Court properly granted a review of judgment under which the trial was held and the final decree was passed and they set aside the final decree on the ground that the review was not properly granted, although the order of review was appealable and no appeal had been made against it before the final decree. In the course of the judgment Dr. Lushington observed: "We are not aware of any law or Regulation prevailing in India which renders it imperative upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory Order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting for ever the benefit of the consideration of the appellate Court. No authority or precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we cannot conceive that anything would be more detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule which would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing; whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar calamities. We believe there have been very many cases before this Tribunal in which their Lordships have deemed it to be their duty to correct erroneous interlocutory Orders, though not brought under their consideration until the whole cause had been decided, and brought hither by appeal for adjudication." 6. In 10 MIA. We believe there have been very many cases before this Tribunal in which their Lordships have deemed it to be their duty to correct erroneous interlocutory Orders, though not brought under their consideration until the whole cause had been decided, and brought hither by appeal for adjudication." 6. In 10 MIA. 340 notwithstanding the objection raised, the Privy Council considered in the appeal from the final decree, the propriety of an order of remand on which the proceedings were continued and the final decree was passed, despite the fact that the finding on which the order of remand was passed related to the merits of the case and decided the character of the transactions between the parties. The Privy Council followed 7 MIA. 283. Both these cases were followed in the later case 12 MIA. 157 where the rate of interest payable by the mortgagor which was fixed by an order of remand, was allowed to be questioned in the appeal from the final decree, the Privy Council observing "the question as to the interest is open on this appeal, though the Plaintiffs might have appealed, and did not, from the Interlocutory decree on the point." The attempt of Mr. Venkatakrishnan to distinguish these cases as inapplicable on the reasoning that they were concerned with'interlocutory orders', has no force as the orders were called interlocutory orders or decrees only "in the sense", as pointed out by Banerjee, J. in 29 Calcutta 758, 770 "that they did not dispose of the cases; but so is the preliminary decree in a partition suit an interlocutory decree, as it does not completely dispose of the case." It is also to be noted that the 'interlocutory orders' were orders from which appeals lay but from which no appeals had been filed. 7. In Satydhvan v. Doorajin, AIR. 1960 SC. 941, the question was whether the Supreme Court could in an appeal from the final decision of a case interfere with an earlier order of remand made by the High Court deciding a question at issue between the parties. Their Lordships discussed and followed, among others, 7 M. I. A. 283,10 M. I. A. 340 and 431 and held that as S.105 (2) C.P. C. did not apply to appeals to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court could set aside the decision in the order of remand. Their Lordships discussed and followed, among others, 7 M. I. A. 283,10 M. I. A. 340 and 431 and held that as S.105 (2) C.P. C. did not apply to appeals to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court could set aside the decision in the order of remand. In the course of the judgment it was pointed out (page 946) that under S.591 of the C. P C. of 1877 a party aggrieved by an order of remand could object to its validity in an appeal against the final decree, though he might have appealed against the order and had not done so and that a special provision (S. 105 (2)) was made in the CPC. of 1908 providing that if an appeal lay from an order of remand and still no appeal was taken, its correctness could not be disputed in the appeal from the final decision. 8. From the above review it is clear that an interlocutory order or decree which is appealable but which has not been appealed from can be questioned in the appeal from the final decree. That was the position under the former Code of Civil Procedure even where the interlocutory decree or order decided the rights of parties as is illustrated by the decisions in 10 M.I. A. 340 and 12 M. I. A. 157.29 Calcutta 758 F. B. shows that the position was the same with respect to preliminary decrees strictly so called. Then came S.97 and 105 (2) in the CPC. of 1908 the former precluding in the appeal from the final decree dispute about preliminary decree which has not been appealed from, and the latter likewise precluding challenge to appealable orders of remand which has not been appealed from. In the absence of such restrictive provisions, orders of remand or preliminary decrees could be challenged in appeals from the final decrees. 9. Neither in the Land Reforms Act nor in the relevant rules is there any provision corresponding to S.97 of the CPC. restricting the mode of challenging the preliminary decision or order under R.9 (1) of the Assignment Rules. It must follow that the preliminary decision can be made the subject of attack while appealing from the consequential final order. 9. Neither in the Land Reforms Act nor in the relevant rules is there any provision corresponding to S.97 of the CPC. restricting the mode of challenging the preliminary decision or order under R.9 (1) of the Assignment Rules. It must follow that the preliminary decision can be made the subject of attack while appealing from the consequential final order. This result is not altered by the attempt of counsel for the petitioner to equate a preliminary order with a preliminary decree on the strength of the observation in 1975 K. L. T. 658 that the order (there under R.81 of the Tenancy Rules) "is only a preliminary order just like a preliminary decree in a civil suit" for even if it can be so equated, in the absence of a statutory bar like S.97, failure to appeal will not render it immune from attack in the appeal from the final order. 10. Akbaralli Abedalli v. Godha Lahanu, A. I. R 1957 Bombay 105, it was held that the failure to file an appeal from a preliminary order (which was appealable) under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947 finding that the relative transaction was a mortgage will not debar the creditor from challenging that finding in an appeal from the final award in the case. Reversing the contrary view taken by the lower appellate court on considerations flowing from S.97, C.P.C. Gajendragadkar J (as he then was) held: "This view overlooks the fact that the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act makes no provision corresponding to the provisions contained in S.97 of the Code, and so far as this Court is concerned, it may be taken to be fairly well settled that the failure of a party to make an appeal against an order passed under S.24 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors, Relief Act, like his failure to appeal against an order passed under S.17 does not preclude him from challenging the correctness of such finding in an appeal against the award." 11. This decision, which fully supports the view taken above was, with commendable fairness brought to my notice by Mr. Venkatakrishnan. 12. 1 am not discussing Kesavan Nair v. Padmanabhan Nair, 1958 K.L.T. 211, Arshad Ali v. Tahir Ali, AIR 1954 Assam 33, Kami Lal v. Shyam Kishore, A.I.R. 1959 Calcutta 76, and Kaushalya Devi v. Baijanath, AIR. 1961 S. C. 790, quoted by Mr. Venkatakrishnan. 12. 1 am not discussing Kesavan Nair v. Padmanabhan Nair, 1958 K.L.T. 211, Arshad Ali v. Tahir Ali, AIR 1954 Assam 33, Kami Lal v. Shyam Kishore, A.I.R. 1959 Calcutta 76, and Kaushalya Devi v. Baijanath, AIR. 1961 S. C. 790, quoted by Mr. Venkatakrishnan as they have no application being based upon S.97, C.P.C. for which, as I explained, no parallel exists in the Land Reforms Act and Rules 13. I hold that in the appeal from the final order it was open to respondents to challenge the preliminary order and the. Appellate Authority had jurisdiction to entertain the challenge. 14. Turning to the merits of the petitioner's claim as cultivating tenants. it can be shortly dealt with. The respondents who are the owners took delivery of the properties on 1110 1957 in execution of the decree in O.S. 789 of 1953 which was for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage of 1940. After the mortgagees took the harvest for which a reservation had been made in the order of delivery, when the respondents attempted to cultivate the properties, the petitioners obstructed. Thereupon they brought O.S. 86 of 1958 against the mortgagees (as defendants 1 and 2) and the petitioners (as defendants 3 and 4), original for injunction and later by an amendment for possession on the allegation that the latter had committed trespass in June 1958. The petitioners resisted the suit denying the trespass and setting up an oral lease from the mortgagees. Overruling this defence the suit was decreed finding them to be trespassers. Pursuant to the decree the respondents filed E. P. 123 of 1969 and the first respondent took delivery of the properties under the delivery account Ext. R8. The petitioners' father was not idle either, for he filed a suit O. S.232 of 1969 for a declaration that he was a tenant but this suit was dismissed. In the meanwhile the petitioners filed the present application in 1971 claiming themselves to be tenants. This narrative is enough to hold that the Appellate Authority was right in finding against the lease which after all is a finding of fact. 15. I confirm the appellate judgment and dismiss the revision but without costs. Dismissed.