JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal by the defendants against the judgement and decree of the Senior Civil Judge, Jhalawar, dated August 21, 1967, by which the judgement and decree of the Munsiff, Jhalawar were set aside, and the suit of the plaintiff respondents for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction was decreed. 2. The dispute relates to a shop situate at village Pidawa, fully described in paragraph No. 3 of the plaint. This shop, according to the plaintiffs, was owned by Balchand, who let it out to Pannalal on the monthly rent of Rs.150/-. The plaintiff respondents, who are the heirs of Nathulal, after terminating the tenancy by notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, instituted the suit against the defendant-appellants, who are the heirs of Pannalal, for eviction and arrears of rent on the ground that Nathulal was adopted son of the landlord and namely, Balchand. The defendants contested the suit. They denied that Balchand was the owner of the shop and that he let out the shop to Pannalal. They also denied that Nathulal was the adopted son of Balchand. The defendants pleaded that they had perfected their title by adverse possession by remaining in occupation of the shop for more than 100 years. The defendants further alleged that one Lal Singh had earlier filed a suit for eviction against Pannalal and Nathulal. Nathulal, in that suit, admitted having mortgaged the suit shop in favour of Lal Singh, but that suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove that Pannalal was in occupation of the suit shop as tenant of Nathulal. According to the defendants, this finding in the previous suit is binding on the plaintiffs and it constitutes res judicata between the3 parties in the present suit. According to the defendants, this finding in the previous suit is binding on the plaintiffs and it constitutes res judicata between the3 parties in the present suit. Several other pleas were raised by the defendants, which would be clear from the following issues framed by the trial court:- " fuEufyf[kr rUnhgkr dk;e dh xbZA 1- vk;k oknhx.k ds vykok ukFkqyky e`rd dk dksbZ vU; okfjl ugha gSa\ oknhx.k 2- vk;k ukFkqyky ckypUn ds ;gka xksn vk;k Fkk vkSj og ckypUn dk okfjl ,oa dk;e eqdke Fkk\ 3- vk;k ukFkqyky dh nks yM+fd;ka lqjth okbZ olek ckbZ ekStwn gS vkSj ,slk gS rks bl dk nkos ij D;k vlj gS\ izfroknhx.k 4- vk;k izfroknh nqdku eqrukt esa 111 ) ekgckj esa fdjk;s ij gS\ oknhx.k 5- vk;k uksfVl dkuwuh gSA oknhx.k 6- vk;k nkos ij res judicata vkfjt gSa\ izfroknh 7- vk;k izfroknh dk dCtk nqdku eqruktk ij eqtkyiuk tk;n vt ckjg lky gS\ izfroknhx.k 8- vk;k izfroknhx.k us nqdku eqrukt ij 700 :0 vpZ fd;k gS vkSj os 700 :0 vpZ fd;k gS vkSj os 700:0 oknhxq.k ls ikus ds gdnkj gSa%& izfroknhx.k 9- vk;k izfroknhx.k [kjpk [kkl 100 ikus ds vf/kdkjh gSa%& izfroknhx.k 10- nknjlhA " 3. The trial court on the consideration of the evidence led by the parties, recorded findings in favour of the plaintiffs on issues Nos. 1, 3 and 9 and against the plaintiffs on issues Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 7. Issues Nos. 5 and 8 were deleted. On the findings arrived abide the trial court, the suit was dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiffs he learned Civil Judge, after elaborate discussion of the entire evidence on the record, recorded the following findings:- (1) That Nathu Lal (ancestor of the plaintiffs) was adopted by Rakhi Bai, widow of Balchand for her husband; (2) That Pannalal occupied the suit premises as tenant of Bal Chand; (3) That the suit was not barred by res judicata as the final decision of the High Court of Tonk in Lal Singh's suit on the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between Pannalal and Nathulal, was in favour of Nathulal. (4) That the defendants were estopped from claiming adverse possession during the continuance of her tenancy. In the result, the appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. The defendant's have now preferred this second appeal in this court. 4. (4) That the defendants were estopped from claiming adverse possession during the continuance of her tenancy. In the result, the appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. The defendant's have now preferred this second appeal in this court. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants has challenged the correctness of the aforesaid four findings arrived at by the appellate occurred. 6. I first take up the question whether Rakhibai adopted Nathulal as son of her deceased husband Balchand. PW.4 aged 689 years has deposed that Nathulal was the adopted son of Balchand and that after the death of Balchand, all his properties came under the control of Nathulal. He has further deposed that at the time of adoption, his own age was 18 years and that all the ceremonies of adoption were performed in his presence. According to him, Ghasilal natural father of Nathulal, gave Nathulal in adoption and Rakhibai took Nathulal in adoption for her husband. DW.2 Govind Ram has admitted in his cross examination that on the death of Balchand, the house owned by Balchand was possessed by Nathulal. The oral evidence of the above witnesses clearly goes to show that after the death of Balchand, Nathulal came into possession of all the properties belonging to Balchand. The lower appellate court has relied upon this evidence and I see no good ground to take a contrary view. The lower appellate court has also relied upon certain documentary evidence wherein Nathulal described himself to be the son of Balchand. A perusal of Ex.1, which is a mortgage deed, executed in Samwat Year 1978 shows that Nathulal therein acted as an attesting witness and described himself to be the son of Balchand. Similarly, in Ex. A4, which is a mortgage deed executed by Nathulal in favour of Lal Singh, Nathulal described himself to be the son of Balchand, It may be mentioned here that Ex. A4 is not on the record, but its reference is found in the statement of plaintiff Lal Chand. The lower appellate court has placed reliance on the above documentary evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any ground worth the name which may shake the3 genuineness of any of the above documents. A4 is not on the record, but its reference is found in the statement of plaintiff Lal Chand. The lower appellate court has placed reliance on the above documentary evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any ground worth the name which may shake the3 genuineness of any of the above documents. The main argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, in this connection is that Ex.1 and Ex. A4 are both unregistered documents and therefore they are in admissible in evidence. So far as Ex.1 is concerned, it is a mortgage deed for Rs. 100/-. It was executed on Bhadwa Bud 1, Samwat Year 1978 in respect of the property situated in the erstwhile State of Tonk. The learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to lay his hands on any law prevailing in the farmer State of Tonk, which required registration of such a document. That apart, under proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, a document which is compulsorily register-able but is not so registered is admissible in evidence for "collateral purposes". That is to say for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring as signing, limiting, or extinguishing a right to immovable property. In the present case Ex.1 and Ex. A4 are being used to prove that Nathulal in these documents, described himself to be the son of Balchand. That is certainly a collateral purpose within the meaning of proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. In my opinion, for this limited purpose, the documents Ex.1 and Ex. A4 are admissible in evidence. 7. It is next contended that the fact that Nathulal gave out his parentage as Balchand, cannot be considered sufficient, to prove his adoption. Similarly, it is contended that the fact that after the death of Balchand, all his property was possessed by Nathulal, is also insufficient to prove his adoption to Balchand. It is further contended that although PW.4 says that he was present when the ceremony of adoption were performed, he does not go further to show that the essential ceremony of giving and taking adoption took place in his presence. To my mind, none of these contentions has any substance. PW.4 aged 68 years has stated that the adoption of Nathulal took place when his (witness) age was 18 years. To my mind, none of these contentions has any substance. PW.4 aged 68 years has stated that the adoption of Nathulal took place when his (witness) age was 18 years. Thus, according to PW.4, the adoption took place some 50 years ago. PW.4 has further deposed that all ceremonies of adoption took place in his presence and Nathulal's natural father Ghasilal gave Nathulal in adoption and Rakhi Bai took him in adoption to Balchand. It is further clear from the evidence of this witness that after the death of Balchand and entire property left by him came into possession of Nathulal. Again in mortgaging the suit shop Nathulal described himself to be the sone of Balchand. Even Pannalal in the suit filed by Lal Singh, has described Nathulal as the son of Balchand in the title of his written statement. In the present case, the heirs of Pannalal are disputing the validity of Nathulal's adoption after lapse of 50 years. It is true that under the Hindu Law, the onus of proving adoption is on the party, who alleges it. In the present case, the onus therefore lay on the plaintiff to prove the fact of Nathulal's adoption to Balchand, but as held by a Division Bench of this Court, in Nandkishore and others v. Brijbehari and another, AIR 1955 Raj 65 that after the lapse of long years, some evidence to the fact of adoption may be regarded as sufficient to shift the burden on the other side to prove want of adoption, the reason being that it is natural that after a lapse of long years, the evidence of adoption may disappear and it may become very difficult to find witnesses of the ceremony of actually giving and taking in adoption. After a review of various authorities, it was laid down in Nandkishore's case (1) that in cases of adoption, a presumption of validity of adoption may be gathered from the status of the adopted son in the adopted family and its recognition by the members of the family for a number of years. In the present case, as already stated above. Nathulal remained in possession of Balchand's property throughout his life. He mortgaged a part of the property belonging to Balchand, namely, the suit shop, describing himself to be the son of Balchand. In the present case, as already stated above. Nathulal remained in possession of Balchand's property throughout his life. He mortgaged a part of the property belonging to Balchand, namely, the suit shop, describing himself to be the son of Balchand. In the suit filed against him by Lal Singh, he was described as the son of Balchand. PW.4 has deposed that Ghasilal, the natural father of Nathulal gave Nathulal in adoption and Rakshi Bai, widow of Balchand, took him in adoption for her husband in his presence. Not only that Balchand (PW.4) has also deposed that all the ceremonies of adoption took place in his presence. Having regard to all these circumstances, I find no good reason for interfering with the finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court regarding the fact of adoption of Nathulal to Balchand. I may also mention here, that there is no evidence on the other side in defence to rebut the presumption in favour of the validity of Nathulal's adoption, which is being challenged after a lapse of about 50 years. 8. I now take up the next finding arrived at by the lower appellate court, namely, that Balchand let out the suit shop to Pannalal. The lower appellate court has, in this connection relied upon the admission of Pannalal contained in sale deed. Ex.2, executed by Pannalal on December 8, 1933. By this sale deed Ex.2,Pannalal sold movable property lying in the suit shop to one Motisingh for Rs. 175/-. The genuineness of this document is not disputed before me. Pannalal's son Kewal Chand, in his statement as DW 1, admitted his father's signature on Ex.2. Besides PW.3 Puralal proves his attestation on Ex.2. In this document, Pannalal, in clear terms admitted that the suit shop belonged to Balchand and he was in occupation of it as a tenant. Singh Pannalal was in occupation of the suit shop, he was in the best position to know in what manner, he came into possession of the shop. That being the case, Pannalal's admission has great evidentiary value. It is well settled that an admission made by the predecessor-in-title, who is in the best position to know all about the property in his possession, is not only evidence against him, but also an evidence against those who claim through him. That being the case, Pannalal's admission has great evidentiary value. It is well settled that an admission made by the predecessor-in-title, who is in the best position to know all about the property in his possession, is not only evidence against him, but also an evidence against those who claim through him. The normal rule is that what the party admits to be true is presumed to be true unless the contrary is proved. A heavy burden therefore lay on the defendants to show that the recital made in Ex.2 by Pannalal was wrong. The defendants utterly failed to discharge that burden. The lower appellate court, in the circumstances, rightly held on the basis of Ex.2, that Pannalal was the tenant of Balchand. 9. I now take up the third finding regarding the plea of res judicata. The relevant facts relating to this plea are that Nathulal created a usufructury mortgage in respect of the suit shop in favour of Lal Singh. The latter filed a suit for eviction against Pannalal alleging that Pannalal was the tenant of mortgagor Nathulal who was also impleaded in the suit as co-defendant. The final court of appeal, namely the High Court of the then Tonk State, vide its judgement Ex. A5 dated August 7, 1946, upheld the finding of the lower appellate court that Pannalal was the the tenant of Nathulal, but held that the suit was not maintainable as the mortgage deed, the basis of the suit, was not duly registered. In view of the judgement Ex. A5, no question of suit being barred by res judicata arises in the present case. 10. The next finding of the lower appellate court relates to plea of adverse possession raised by the defendants. It is urged that Pannalal's possession became adverse in 1943 as he asserted his own title to the suit shop and disowned the title of Bal Chand or that of Nathulal in his written statement filed by him in 1943 in the suit for eviction filed by Lal Singh. According to the learned counsel for the defendants, the relationship of landlord and tenant came to an end in the year 1943, on Pannalal's hostile assertion of title against Nathulal. According to the learned counsel for the defendants, the relationship of landlord and tenant came to an end in the year 1943, on Pannalal's hostile assertion of title against Nathulal. It is urged that after this hostile assertion, the position of Pannalal was that of a trespasser, and since the present suit was instituted on October 1, 1965, i.e. long after the expiry of 12 years from 1943, it is barred by time under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In substance, the whole argument of the learned counsel for the defendants is that the defendants perfected their title over the suit shop by adverse possession sometime in the year 1955. The above contention, in my opinion, is wholly devoid of force. Having regard to section 116 of the Evidence Act, the rule is well settled that so long as the relationship of landlord and tenant sub sits, the tenant cannot set up any title by adverse possession, however notoriously he may proclaim title in himself and deny the title of the landlord. The fact that the landlord takes no steps to contest the tenant's hostile assertion, in no way, improves his position. See Tulsiram v. K.L. Pande and others, AIR 1956 Nag 11 , Karimullakhan and another v. Bhanupratap Singh, AIR 1949 Nag 265 , Seshamma Shettai and others v. Chickaya Hegede and others, ILR XXV Mad 507 , Gopal Chandra Das v. Satya Bhanu Ghosal, AIR 1926 Cal 634 , and Krishna Lal Sadhu and another v. Pramila Bala Dassi, XXXII Cal WN 720 . The above view is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Atyam Veerraju and others v. Pechetti Venkamma and others, AIR 1968 SC 629 . The relevant observations of their Lordships are contained in paras Nos. 13 and 14, which read as under:- "(13). Having regard to Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, during the continuance of the tenancy, a tenant will not be permitted to deny the title of the deity at the beginning of the tenancy. In Bailas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh ILR 37 All 557 at Page 567: AIR 1915 PC 96 at p.98 , the Privy Council observed:- 'A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord's title, however, defective he may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord.' (14). In Bailas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh ILR 37 All 557 at Page 567: AIR 1915 PC 96 at p.98 , the Privy Council observed:- 'A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord's title, however, defective he may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord.' (14). It is also well settled that during the continuance of the tenancy, the tenant cannot acquire by prescription a permanent right of occupancy in derogation of the landlord's title by mere assertion of such a right to the knowledge of the landlord See Mohammed Mumtaz Ali Khan v. Mohan Singh, 50 Ind. App.202: AIR 1923 PC 118 , Madhayrao Waman Saundatgekar v. Raghunath Verkatesh Despande, 50 Ind App 255: AIR 1923 PC 205 , 51 Ind App 83: AIR 1924 PC 65 ." In the instant case, Pannalal was a tenant and by asserting his own title in the written statement in 1943, he did not acquire title to the suit shop. I therefore reject the contention that Pannalal and his heirs acquired title to the suit shop by adverse possession. 11. No other point has been pressed before me. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with the costs. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants prays for leave to appeal to a Division Bench, which is refused. *******