VENKATACHALIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of and is directed against the order dt. 25-5-1978 made by Venkataswami, J. dismissing the appellant's writ petition No, 6790 of 1975 in which appellant sought to have the proceedings for allotment of certain residential accommodation in the town of Chickmagalur under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, in favour of the third respondent quashed. ( 2 ) THE residential premises in question is stated to belong to the hindu undivided family of the appellant and his deceased brother and after some antecedent correspondence which is at Ext. 'a' to 'd' between the second respondent and the appellant, the latter filed a report, of vacancy respecting the premises which fell vacant upon the previous allottee-tenant having vacated the same. Prior to the submission of the report of vacancy, the appellant had informed the second respondent that the premises were not to be re-let; but were required for the bonafide use of a daughter of his deceased brother and her husband one Krishnachar. The second respondent, however, directed a vacancy report to be submitted and suggested that the said Krishnachar do apply for allotment. Accordingly, the said krishnachar filed an application for allotment. So did the third respondent. ( 3 ) BY his order dated 11-10-1975 (as per Ext. K) in HRC. No. 1/75-78, the second respondent allotted the premises in favour of the third respondent. The appeal against the said order preferred by the appellant befor the first respondent in JHM. RPL. RC. 1/75-76 as per Ext. M) having been unsuccessful, the appellant filed the writ petition, from which this appeal arises, challenging the orders of the first and the second respondents. ( 4 ) BEFORE the learned single Judge who heard the petition two grounds were urged In support of the petition. The first was that the first respondent had not, in the course of the proceedings before him, complied with the requirements of sub-secs (1) and (5) of S. 8 of the Karnataka Rent control Act, 1961 (which we hereafter refer to as the 'act), and secondly, that the application of the third respondent was not eligible for consideration in-asmuch as allegedly, the mandatory provisions of S. 8 (5) of the 'act' requiring a deposit of one month's rent to be made before an order of allotment, had not been complied with. Both the contentions were negatived by the learned single Judge. The first contention was not pressed before us. On the merits of the second contention, the learned single Judge held : ". . . . . . I am inclined to the view that no serious injustice has resulted therefrom thus warrantinng interference with the order in question in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in this court". "8. Moreover on the plain language of S. 8 (5) itself it may be seen that such deposit has not been expressly directed to be made along with an application for allotment. On the other hand, the provisions of the said sub-section merely enjoin that no order of allotment as provided under s. 8 (4) shall be made unless the applicant concerned "has deposited or deposits" one month's rent in advance for the purpose of payment of the same to the landlord. It seems to me that this requirement can be said to be substantially complied with when an allotte deposits such rent before occupying the premises pursuant to such an order of allotment. Hence this contention has no merit". It is the correctness of this order that is challenged before us. ( 5 ) SRI H. R. Venkataramaniah, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the non-deposit of one month's rent by the third respondent in compliance with the mandatory requirement of S. 8 (5) (ii) of the 'act- and it is not disputed that factualy there was no such deposit-would render the third respondent disentitled to an order of allotment. He contended that sub-sec (5) of S. 8 of the 'act' forbade an order of allotment unless the requirements of that sub-sec were satisfied and that deposit of one month's rent was one of those mandatory requirements. ( 6 ) SUB-SEC (5) of S. 8 of the Act reads : "8. (5 ). He contended that sub-sec (5) of S. 8 of the 'act' forbade an order of allotment unless the requirements of that sub-sec were satisfied and that deposit of one month's rent was one of those mandatory requirements. ( 6 ) SUB-SEC (5) of S. 8 of the Act reads : "8. (5 ). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec (4), no order under the said sub-sec shall be made in favour of a person other than a public authority, unless - (i) such person has made an application in the prescribed form to the controller for allotment of a building for his use or occupation, (ii) such person has deposited or deposits with the Controller for payment to the landlord an amount equal to one month's rent of the building as advance, and (iii) the Controller is satisfied that such person is not occupying or for reasonable cause cannot occupv a building, which is his own or the possession of which is suitable for his requirements". The question that arises is whether the provisions of sub-sec (5) of S. 8 are mandatory or merelv directory. Provisions of sub-sec (4) are couched in negative and prohibitive terms, and the rule of construction when legislature employs such negative and prohibitive terms is laid down by the Supreme Court in Lachmi Narain v. Union of India , AIR, 1976 SC. 714, as under: ".----If the legislative intent is expressed clearly and strongly in imperative words, such as the use of 'must' instead of 'shall', that will itself be sufficient to hold that provision to be mandatory, and it will not be necessary to pursue the enquiry further. If the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory (Crawford, the construction of Statutes pp. 523-524 ). . . . . . " sri H. R. Venkatarmaniah also invited our attention to two decisions of learned single Judges of this Court in C. N. Chandraghaigi v. Deputy commr and House Rent and Accommodation Controller, Shimoga , 1961 Myslj. 51: ILR 1961 Mys 925. and in M. Krishna Rao v. H. N. Thimmayya,1962 Myslj. 261: ILR 1961 Mys 1210, where corresponding provisions of the earlier enactment were interpreted to have had a mandatory import. 51: ILR 1961 Mys 925. and in M. Krishna Rao v. H. N. Thimmayya,1962 Myslj. 261: ILR 1961 Mys 1210, where corresponding provisions of the earlier enactment were interpreted to have had a mandatory import. ( 7 ) SRI M. P. Chandrakantharaj Urs, learned Govt Advocate appearing for Respondents-1 and 2, however, contended that the provisions of sec. 8 (5) (ii) of the 'act' do not admit of the construction contended for for the appellant and that in ascertaining whether a provision of a statuts was mandatory or merely directory the real intention of the legislature should t. e gathered regard Le;ng had, inter-alia, to the nature and design of the statute; the consequences which follow from construing it one way or the other; the impact of the provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the serious or the trivial consequences that flew from non-compliance; the fact that non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty and the like. Relying on these guids-lines enunciated by the Supreme Court in state of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya , AIR. 1961 Sc. 751. Sri Chandrakantraj Urs contended that, tested in the light of these norms, the view in favour of the provision being merely directory becomes really inescapable. ( 8 ) THESE principles of interpretation are enunciated by 'the Supreme court. But we find it difficult to accept the further contention that the application of these principles to the present case would lead to the inference suggested by Sri Urs. One of the objects of the provision as to deposit, as a stipulation conditioning the eligibility of the applicant, appears to us to have been built in to keep out speculatve and frivolous applications and to obviate the difficulties and inconveniences caused thereby. When two other clauses of -sub-sec (5) of S. 8, namely clauses (i) and (iii) are mandatory, as clearly they are and indeed Sri Urs agrees they are, there is no reason which can support a different, view as to the import of clause (ii) of the said sub-section. ( 9 ) THERE is yet another important ground which supports the view we take of the matter. It is this. ( 9 ) THERE is yet another important ground which supports the view we take of the matter. It is this. Similar and indeed identical expression in S. 3 (3) (b) (ii) contained in the previous legislation, the Mysore House rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (Act XXX of 1951) came for consideration in Chandraghatgia case (1) and in M. Krishna Rao's case (2) referred to above and clause (ii) of S. 3 (3) (b) thereof read : " (ii) the allottee deposits with the controller an amount equal to one month's rent of the house to be allotted; and. . . . . . " this provision was held to be mandatory, Those decisions were rendered before the present Act came into force. It is a well known principle of construction that where the legislature uses In an Act a legal-term which has received judicial interpretation, it must be assumed that the term is used in the same sense in which it has been judicially interpreted. In barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co, 1933 Ac. 402 lord Buck-master stated the principle thus: "it has long been 'a well-established principle to be applied in the consideration of Acts of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation, the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context, must be construed so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaninng that has previously been assigned to it". This rule finds its clear expression in the following words of Griffith C. J, to D'emden v. Peddar, (1904) 1 CLR. 01. "now when a particular form of legislative enactment which has received authoritative interpretation, whether by judicial decision or by a long course of practice, is adopted in the framing of a later statute, it is a sound rule of construction to hold that the words so adopted were intended by the legislature to bear the meaning which had been so put upon them". ( 10 ) IN Zimmerman v. Grossman, (1971) 1 A11. E. R, 363. ( 10 ) IN Zimmerman v. Grossman, (1971) 1 A11. E. R, 363. Widgery LJ, observed: ; "i have considered this argument and I recognise the weight attached to it but, standing by it ignores another argument which i find of greater force, and that is the well-known principle of construction that, where Parliament has re-enacted specific words which have already been the subject of judicial interpretation, it is presumed that Parliament when re-enacting those woras, intends them to have the meaning which the Courts have put on them in their earner use. '' what emerges from these authorities is that where the language of provision of a statute has been judicially interpreted and that language is reproduced by the legislature in the new Act, on tne same subject, it is to be assumed that the earlier interpretation is accepted. This presumption, is not conclusive; but is an aid to construction, being, of course, subject to a manifest contrary intention. ( 11 ) ON the basis of these settled principles it has to be held that the provisions in S. 8 (5) (ii) of the 'act' calls for the same construction as its counterpart in the earner Act XXX- of 1951 received and that accordingly, the requirement of S. 8 (5) (ii) is mandatory, ( 12 ) WITH respect, we are unable to bring ourselves to agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge on this aspect of the appellant's case. ( 13 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal,, and in reversal of the order of dismissal dated 25-576 made by the learned single Judge in WP. No. 6790 of 1975, we quash the order of the second respondent dated 11-10-1975 as per Ext. . J and that of the first respondent dated 27-11-19/75 as per Ext. M. in the circumstances of. the case, there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .