Judgment :- 1. It is rather very unfortunate that the petitioner has to come to this Court for the third time to vindicate his rights as the Director of Research, Rubber Board, Kottayam. The present petition is for taking action for contempt against the Chairman, Rubber Board, on the averment that he has shown disrespect to the orders of this Court and thereby committed contempt of this Court. 2. To understand the background of the case it is necessary to briefly refer to the previous proceedings between the patties. The petitioner is a Master of Science (First Class) in Soil Science of the University of Travancore. He has taken Doctorate in Agronomy Major, Plant Physiology and Biochemistry Minors from Cornell University. New York. He is also the holder of Diploma in Radioisotope Procedure from the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. He started his service as Senior Scientific Officer in the National Chemical Laboratory of India in 1950. On 9-9-1959 he was appointed Professor of Agronomy in the Agricultural College, Vellayani, on selection by the Kerala Public Service Commission. In 1962 he was promoted as Vice-Principal and in 1963 as Principal of the Agricultural College. In 1964 he was posted as Additional Director of, Agriculture (Research) and his post was re-designated as Principal and Additional Director of Agriculture (Research). In December 1967 he was appointed as Special Officer for establishment of the Kerala Agricultural University, and on his report the Kerala Agricultural University was subsequently constituted. In 1970 he was posted temporarily as Director of the Small Farmers' Development Agency. In September, 1971, the Kerala Agricultural University Act was published in the Gazette. By See. 58 of the said Act the Agricultural College and Research Institute Vellayani, was disaffiliated from the Kerala University and made a constituent college and Research Institute of the Agricultural University. Every person employed in any of the colleges specified in sub-section (1) or in any of the Institutions referred to in sub-section (3) of S.58 of the said Act immediately before a specified date was statutorily transferred to become an employe of the Kerala Agricultural University. The petitioner's claim that he became a permanent employee of the Agricultural University was not recognised and the Government did not allow him to take up his post in the Agricultural College as Principal of the College. The petitioner's claim that he became a permanent employee of the Agricultural University was not recognised and the Government did not allow him to take up his post in the Agricultural College as Principal of the College. He was not relieved from his post of Director, Small Farmers' Development Agency which itself was a time limited post. This led to the petitioner filing O.P. 1359 of 1972 for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to relieve him from the post of Director, Small Farmers' Development Agency in order to enable him to take up his duty as the Principal of the Agricultural College as provided in S.58 (4) of the Act. This Court granted a declaration prayed for by the petitioner that he was entitled to the post of the Principal of the College. The Government was also directed to take immediate steps for relieving him from the temporary post so as to enable him to take up his duties as the Principal of the Agricultural College. The contention of the Government and the University that he had not become an employee of the University with effect from 1 219'2 and that there was no provision in the Act for a post of Principal of the Agricultural College were overruled by the Court. Possibly the Government was ill-disposed towards him and without giving effect to the direction of the learned Single Judge who disposed of O. P. No. 1359 of 1972 an appeal was filed before a Division Bench. Pending the appeal the Rubber Board which is under the control of the Central Government advertised for the post of Director of Research and the petitioner was an applicant far the post. The Government permitted the petitioner to appear for the interview and in the interview the petitioner was selected by the Board and the appointment was offered to him. The Government of Kerala permitted the petitioner to accept the appointment and relieved him from the post of Director of Small Farmers' Development Agency by its order dated 4101972 and he took charge as Director on 9 -101972. Thereafter, when the writ appeal against the decision in O. P. No. 1359/72 came up for argument he submitted that he is not interested in taking up his duties as Principal of the College as he was holding a higher and a more remunerative post in the Board. Thereafter, when the writ appeal against the decision in O. P. No. 1359/72 came up for argument he submitted that he is not interested in taking up his duties as Principal of the College as he was holding a higher and a more remunerative post in the Board. The Government Pleader also submitted that the appeal was not pressed. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 3. In 1969 the State Government had initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner a memo of charges had been served on him and the matter was being enquired into by the Enquiry Commissioner when the above proceedings in the O.P were going on. It was pending the disciplinary proceedings that the took charge as Director of Research of the Rubber Board. Subsequently on the basis of the enquiry report finding him guilty of violation of Government Servants' Conduct R.3 and 60 in making certain remarks against the Minister and some senior officers of the Government the Government of Kerala passed an order on 23 111974 to recall and suspend him pending finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings against him. In that order it was also stated that the Government had provisionally decided to dismiss him from service in view of the serious nature of the charges proved against him in the enquiry. Consequent on this order the Chairman of the Rubber Board directed the petitioner to hand over charge to the Chairman or to the Dy. Director, Botany. This was challenged by the petitioner in O. P. No. 5270/74. According to the petitioner, the order of the Government and the consequential orders passed by the Chairman directing him to hand over charge were passed without jurisdiction as the petitioner had ceased to be a Government servant with effect from 121972 and as such he was beyond the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Government. It was pointed that the Government has no power to recall the petitioner to Government service when he had totally ceased to be in the service of the Government by the automatic operation of S.58(4) of the Agricultural University Act with effect from 121972. It was also alleged that even the University which could have had jurisdiction over him if he had been allowed to take up the service in the University had ceased to have any jurisdiction over him with his appointment to the Board. It was also alleged that even the University which could have had jurisdiction over him if he had been allowed to take up the service in the University had ceased to have any jurisdiction over him with his appointment to the Board. The suspension after the enquiry was also attacked on the same grounds and also on the ground that the same is ordered without application of the mind to the existence of the conditions precedent or to any factors which would have a relevance to the fact of public interest being served by the suspension of the petitioner. This writ petition was opposed by the Government and the Rubber Board. Their main contention was that the petitioner is estopped as against the Rubber Board from contending that he was not a Government servant and that as against the Government he had waived his right to claim that he had ceased to be a Government servant. The writ petition was decided by Chandrasekhara Menon J. on 511976. He allowed the original petition and quashed the order of recall and suspension made by the Government and also the order of the Rubber Board relieving him from the post or Director of Research. It was also declared that he is entitled to all the consequential reliefs on the basis of the decision that Government has no authority to recall him or suspend him from service. By way of clarification a declaration that he continues to hold the post of the Director of Research in the Rubber Board was also made inasmuch as such a prayer had been asked for in the original petition by way of amendment. This clarification was in the following terms: "3. I had quashed Ex P-7, P8 and H. I had also declared that the Government of Kerala is not entitled in the circumstances and facts of the case to ask the Board to relieve the petitioner from the service of the Board. It has also been stated in the judgment that the petitioner will naturally be entitled to all the consequential reliefs on the basis of the decision. In view of the fact that Ext. H has been quashed the petitioner certainly has to be considered to be continuing in the service of the Rubber Board inspite of the order Ex H. No doubt the quashing of Ex. In view of the fact that Ext. H has been quashed the petitioner certainly has to be considered to be continuing in the service of the Rubber Board inspite of the order Ex H. No doubt the quashing of Ex. H and the declaration that the petitioner continues to hold the post of Director of Research in the Rubber Board will certainly not disentitle the appointing authority under the Rubber Act and [he Rules framed thereunder from taking any steps, if it is deemed necessary, for the legal termination of the petitioner's service strictly in accordance with law, the service Rules and the order of appointment of the petitioner. It is not for this court to decide in this O.P. whether subsequent to the filing of the O. P. there had been any such termination What I have stated in the judgment, viz. that the petitioner will be entitled to all consequential reliefs will certainly include the relief that inspite of Ex. H, the petitioner continues to hold the post of Director of Research in the Rubber Board." The reference to Exts. P7, P8 and H relates to the order of the Government recalling and suspending him and the order of the Rubber Board relieving him from the post of Director of Research. 4. Unfortunately this did not give a quietus to the controversy between the parties. On the same day the petitioner requested the Chairman to permit him to carry on the duties as Director of Research. But on the ground that the copy of the judgment had not been received by him to decide on the steps to be taken by him he did not permit the petitioner to function as Director of the Rubber Board. After about two weeks the petitioner moved this Court by O. P. No. 410 of 1976 (Contempt) to take action against the Chairman of the Rubber Board for his failure to respect the declaration passed by this Court That was on 191 1976. That petition came up for hearing on 22 11976. The Court wanted to know the attitude of the Rubber Board on the matter and so asked the counsel for the respondent who was present in Court to find out whether the judgment of this Court in O. P. No. 5270 of 1974 was being given effect to by the Rubber Board. The Court wanted to know the attitude of the Rubber Board on the matter and so asked the counsel for the respondent who was present in Court to find out whether the judgment of this Court in O. P. No. 5270 of 1974 was being given effect to by the Rubber Board. For that matter the case was adjourned to 231-1976 and from there to 2711976.On that day at the request of the Advocate General who appeared for the Board the case was adjourned to 29 11976. In the meanwhile, on 271-1976 itself the respondent issued what is called "proceedings". It is necessary to quote the proceedings in lull for a proper appreciation of the controversy now before the Court, THE RUBBER BOARD Kottayam 9 :: Kerala Stale No. 23/72/ EST. 27th January, 1976 PROCEEDINGS Sub: Dr. C. K. N. Nair Ref: 1. Letter dated 28-4-1972 sent by Dr. C. K. N. Nair, offering himself for appointment as Director of Research in the Rubber Board. 2 Letter dated 6-11976 of Dr. C. K. N. Nair. Pursuant to the letter cited Ist of Dr. C. K. N Nair, Director, Small Farmers Development Agencies, Kerala and compliance of certain formalities in this regard, approval of the Central Government was sought for his appointment as Director of Research under the Board, as per DO letter of even number dated 118--1972 addressed by the undersigned to Shri Y.T. Shah, Additional Secretary. Government of India, Ministry of Foreign Trade. Accordingly the Under secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Foreign Trade, by his letter No 21 (5) Plant (B) 721 dated 16th September, 1972 conveyed to the undersigned the approval of the Government to the appointment of Dr. C K N. Nair as Director of Research in the Board. The information was duly intimated to Dr. C K N Nair by the undersigned through letter No. 23/DR/72/EST dared 18 91972, and he was requested, if agreeable to accept the post, to report for duty with certain documents Dr. Nair reported for duty under the Board accordingly on 910 1972 2. While functioning in the Board as above, the Government of Kerala issued an order G O RT 257/74/Vig dated 23 111974 by which Dr. CKN Nair was recalled from the Board and pursuant thereto, he was relieved from the post of Director of Research on 27 111974 (AN). Nair reported for duty under the Board accordingly on 910 1972 2. While functioning in the Board as above, the Government of Kerala issued an order G O RT 257/74/Vig dated 23 111974 by which Dr. CKN Nair was recalled from the Board and pursuant thereto, he was relieved from the post of Director of Research on 27 111974 (AN). However, by the judgment in O.P 5270/74 and the order in CMP 831/76 in the O.P the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala has held that as the Government of Kerala was not competent to recall him as they did, relieving of Dr. Nair from the Board pursuant to the recall was not effective, that therefore in spite of that order, Dr. Nair continued to hold the post, that it is not for the Hon'ble Court to decide in the O. P. whether subsequent to its filing there had been any legal termination of his appointment etc. In compliance with the orders of the Hon'ble Court, Dr. CKN. Nair is deemed not to have been relieved from the post of Director of Research on 2711 1974 3. The maximum period for which Dr. CKN. Nair offered himself for appointment as Director of Research in the Board vide his application Ist cited, expired with 20th March, 1975 (during pendency of the OP). Accordingly his term of appointment expired and he stands relieved from the post of Director of Research with effect from 20- 31975 (AN). In view of the order passed on 12121974 by the Hon'ble High Courts in CMP 16338/74 in the said O.P 5270/74. the automatic termination of his appointment as stated above could not be recorded earlier As Dr. Nair was not functioning as Director of Research on the said date no formalities in this regard had to be complied with. 4. The Board shall not be precluded hereby from exercising its right of appeal against the judgment in O.P. 5270/74. Rights for any action if found required in respect of the acts of omission and/or commission of Dr. CKN. Nair relating to the past of Director of Research in the Board shall not be prejudiced by these proceedings. However, in order to facilitate expeditious settling of claims of salary and allowances, licence fees of accommodation etc., it is decided that for these purposes Dr. CKN. Nair relating to the past of Director of Research in the Board shall not be prejudiced by these proceedings. However, in order to facilitate expeditious settling of claims of salary and allowances, licence fees of accommodation etc., it is decided that for these purposes Dr. Nair shall be deemed to have held the post till 20 31975(AN) subject to orders of the Hon'ble Court in Appeal and related petitions. 5. Expiry of the term of his appointment as stated above need not necessarily be a ground against any re-employment of Dr. Nair. 6. It is open to Dr. C.K.N. Nair to prefer an appeal to the Central Government against these Proceedings, under provisions of R.18 etc. of the Rubber Board Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1961 within three months from the date of receipt by him of a copy hereof. Sd/-CHAIRMAN cc. 1. Dr. C.K.N. Nair (By Regd. Post) Reference is invited to his letter dt. 6-1-76 and the Proceedings of even number dt. 81 76, copy endorsed to him. 5. On the same day an appeal against the judgment in O.P. No. 5270 of 1974 passed by the learned Single judge was also filed by the Board. In the appeal memorandum a ground had been taken as ground No. L which reads as follows: "L. It is submitted that this Court erred in not dismissing the Original Petition as infructuous as against the Rubber Board since in any view of the matter the petitioner could not claim to be in the service of the Board after 20 31975 the date upto which alone he had sought appointment in Exhibit A." That appeal came up for admission and was admitted on the 29th. An application, C.M.P. No. 1849 of 1976, moved for stay of the operation of the judgment was ordered on 16-21976 by a Division Bench of this Court by which a conditional stay of operation of the judgment was granted the condition being that the petitioner will be entitled to receive the salary due to him from February, 1976 onwards till the disposal of the appeal. Following this the petitioner withdrew the contempt petition. There was also a writ appeal by the Government. Both were heard and disposed of by a common judgment dated 6th July, 1976. Following this the petitioner withdrew the contempt petition. There was also a writ appeal by the Government. Both were heard and disposed of by a common judgment dated 6th July, 1976. The decision of the learned Single Judge to the effect, that the Government has no jurisdiction to take disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and that the petitioner has not waived his right as against the Government nor is estopped against the Rubber Board to contend that he has ceased to be a Government Servant was confirmed. It was also held that the petitioner is not appointed on deputation so long as it has not been so ordered by the appointing authority, namely the Government of India. 6. Immediately thereafter on 7 71976 the petitioner submitted a request to the respondent informing him of the judgment and requesting its implementation. A reminder was also sent on 10 71976.On receipt of these letters a reply (Ext. P7) was sent by the Board on 13 7 -1976 which is in the following terms: "Dr. C.K.N. Nair, VI/2, Rubber Board Staff Quarters, Kottayam-9. Sir, I am in receipt of your letters dated 7th and 10th July 1976. The Board has not yet received copy of the judgment delivered on 6 7 -76 in the Writ Appeal No 43/ 76. But I understand from the Board's Counsel in the Writ Appeal that my proceedings of even number dated 27-11976 (recording termination of your appointment under the Board on 20 3 75) has not been referred to in the judgment of the Division Bench pronounced on 6 7 76 and that there are no directions or findings regarding the same. Certificated copy of the judgment has been applied for on 6 7 76 itself. As soon as the same is received I shall issue further orders, if such orders are necessary pursuant to the judgment. Yours faithfully, Sd/-Chairman." Following this nothing was done and after one month the present petition for contempt was filed by the petitioner on 16 81976. 7. The charges framed against the respondent under Art.215 of the Constitution of India read with S.2 (b) and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, are: "THAT you, Sri. K.M. Chandy, being the Chairman of the Rubber Board. 7. The charges framed against the respondent under Art.215 of the Constitution of India read with S.2 (b) and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, are: "THAT you, Sri. K.M. Chandy, being the Chairman of the Rubber Board. Kottayam-9, which was the 2nd respondent in O.P. No. 5270 of 1974 and represented in the Court by you as its Chairman, and the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 43 of 1976 and represented in Court by you as its Chairman, have wilfully disobeyed without any lawful excuse to carry out the directions and orders contained in the judgment of this Hon'ble Court in O.P. No. 5270 of 1974 pronounced on 511976 and the clarification incorporated therein by which the petitioner has been granted a declaration that he continues to hold the post of Director of Research in the Rubber Board and in the judgment of this Hon'ble Court in Writ Appeal No. 43 of 1976 pronounced on 6 71976 confirming the judgment in O.P. No. 5270 of 1974; THAT notwithstanding the said judgments granting the aforesaid directions and declarations and the confirmation thereof by the judgment in Writ Appeal No. 43 of 1976 and notwithstanding the fact that you are fully aware of the judgments and the declarations and directions you wilfully refused to allow the petitioner to resume his active duties as Director of Research in spite of his written requests to that effect; AND THAT notwithstanding the said judgments granting the aforesaid reliefs you have failed, deliberately and wilfully, to implement the said judgments by withholding the arrears of salary and allowances legitimately due to the petitioner and that by reason of your wilful disobedience and deliberate refusal to carry out and implement the decisions this Hon'ble Court in O.P. No. 5270 of 1974 and Writ Appeal No 43 of 1970 you are guilty of contempt of this Hon'ble Court." The respondent has filed a counter affidavit denying charges. According to him, the declaration given by this Court is only based on the rights of the petitioner as on the date of the filing of the original petition on the cause of action existing then against the order of the Government recalling and suspending the petitioner and also the order of the respondent relieving the petitioner. According to him, the declaration given by this Court is only based on the rights of the petitioner as on the date of the filing of the original petition on the cause of action existing then against the order of the Government recalling and suspending the petitioner and also the order of the respondent relieving the petitioner. It is further submitted that the judgment of the learned Single Judge confirmed in appeal can be understood only as declaring the petitioner to continue to hold the post of Director of Research in the Rubber Board in spite of the relieving order. The Court has not pronounced up in the right of the appointing authority to terminate the petitioner's service. The further question whether in the light of the petitioner's specific request for appointment for a specified period upto 20th of March, 1975, or for a shorter period the petitioner's services would automatically terminate on 20-3-1975 was never considered by the Court nor has the Court given any direction on this point. It was further submitted that the Court did not give any finding or direction to the effect that the petitioner was in the whole time services of the Rubber Board and liable to retire only on attaining the age of superannuation applicable to Rubber Board employees although the petitioner had raised such a claim in the pleadings. Neither the Rubber Board nor the Government of India ever contemplated any such regular appointment of the petitioner since the petitioner never offered himself for such appointment nor is it possible or proper for the Rubber Board or the Government of India to appoint a person in the service of the Board when such person appeared to the Board and the Government of India to be an employee of the Kerala Government without regard to that status of the petitioner. The question whether in view of the application for appointment, the selection and the approval of the Central Government, the petitioner could continue in the Board after 20-3-1975 was never pronounced upon by this Court. The respondent's bonafide view is that the petitioner's service with the Rubber Board automatically terminated on 20-3-1973. The question whether in view of the application for appointment, the selection and the approval of the Central Government, the petitioner could continue in the Board after 20-3-1975 was never pronounced upon by this Court. The respondent's bonafide view is that the petitioner's service with the Rubber Board automatically terminated on 20-3-1973. In the circumstances, the respondent contends that it became necessary for him consequent to the judgment to decide such questions as were left open and he has done so bonafide and to the best of his understanding of the records and judgments. The conditional stay was not granted in appeal on the footing that the petitioner continued in the Rubber Board's service even after 20-3-1975. Payments were made by the Rubber Board to the petitioner during the pendency if the writ appeal without prejudice to the Board's contention that in any view of the matter is service automatically terminated on 20-31975. The interlocutory order cannot have the effect as canvassed by the petitioner. It does not decide the rights of the parties finally. The further allegation of the petitioner that in the writ appeal it has been found that the petitioner has not been appointed on deputation so long as it has not been so ordered by the appointing authority is incorrect. The statement by the Court that there is no mention of the deputation in the letter of the Central Government does not amount to a finding that the petitioner is an employe of the Board otherwise than on deputation, nor does it involve a finding that the term of appointment of the petitioner does not expire on 20-31975. The charge against the respondent, it was submitted, is vague. It is not stated specifically which direction or order of this Court has not been obeyed by the respondent. Consequent to this Court's declaration that the petitioner continues in the Board's service in spite of the order dated 27 111974 relieving him, the respondent has paid all amounts due to him upto 20-3-1975, the date upto which only the petitioner sought employment in the Board. The counter-affidavit concludes with a submission that in case this Court is of the view that the respondent has in any way disobeyed the judgment of this Court in passing the proceedings dated 27-1-1976 hi unreservedly and unconditionally tenders his apologies and the same may be accepted. 8. The counter-affidavit concludes with a submission that in case this Court is of the view that the respondent has in any way disobeyed the judgment of this Court in passing the proceedings dated 27-1-1976 hi unreservedly and unconditionally tenders his apologies and the same may be accepted. 8. In the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner the stand taken by the respondent is not admitted. The appointing authority to the post of Director of Research is the Central Government and the appointment of the petitioner to that post was made by the Central Government. The attempt of the respondent to interpret the appointment order of the Central Government as an appointment only upto 20-3-1975 is only a vain and futile attempt to defeat the petitioner. The application submitted by him for appointment never sought an appointment terminating with 20-3-1975 or the date when if in Government service he would retire by superannuation. All that was sought by the application was that until the said date he should have the benefit of deputation arrangement as by that only the benefits of his prior service before joining the Rubber Board would be available to him. The respondent was fully aware of the correct meaning of the application, and that is clear from the forwarding letter sent by him after the selection. It is alleged that the application is now deliberately misread in order to point out some handle by which he could try to defeat the rights conferred on the petitioner by the declaration made by this Court. In the declaration granted by this Court the right of the appointing authority alone is reserved and saved and so only a legally valid action taken by the appointing authority, namely, the Central Government could be honestly put forward by the respondent as satisfying the condition incorporated in the judgment as enabling him to excuse himself from not implementing the declaration granted Such a decision of the Government of India has never been made and considering the persistent conduct of the respondent in denying the just and legal rights of the petitioner it must be assumed that he must have made every attempt to get some approval of the Government of India to the stand now put forward by him and the absence of any communication from Government of India is proof of the mala fides of the respondent. The apology tendered by the respondent is alleged as insincere and does not in fact and in truth purge him of the guilt of contempt of which he has been guilty throughout the course of these proceedings. 9. In the light of these the first question that arises for determination is whether there is any scope for the stand of the respondent that the petitioner's appointment ceased with 20 3-1975 and incidentally a subsidiary question also arises whether it is open to the respondent to take a decision on this question when the appointing authority, namely, the Government of India has not held so. The records of the previous original petition and the appeal have been incorporated in this case by consent. 10. It is not disputed that the appointing authority to the post of the Director of Research in the Rubber Board is the Government of India. Any disciplinary proceedings, if required to be taken, can be only by the Government of India except in the matter of censure. The rules framed under the Rubber Act are clear on this point. The records relating to the appointment of the petitioner as Director of Research are filed in the case by the parties. Ext. RI is the application made by the petitioner for appointment. Since much is sought to be made of the language used in the application it will be useful to quote the application in full. That reals as follows: "C. K. N. Nair, M. Sc., Ph. D. A-22, Jawahar Nagar (Cornell) Trivandrum, Director Dated April 28, Small Farmers Development 1972 Agencies. Registered Acknowledgment Due To The Chairman Rubber Board Puthupally Kottayam. Sir, Sub. Recruitment of a Director of Research for the Rubber Board. Ref: Advertisement inviting applications for the post of Director of Research. Referring to the advertisement inviting applications for the post of Director of Research, I wish to place my service at your disposal subject to the following conditions: 1. I am willing to be appointed as Director of Research Rubber Board, on deputation terms of leave salary and pension contribution by the Board to the State Government, or any period up to 20th March, 1975 (date of my retirement) or any period shorter than this, depending on the tenure of appointment, 2. Initial salary on appointment to the post shall not be lower than the maximum of the grade, namely Rs. 1600/-. 3. Initial salary on appointment to the post shall not be lower than the maximum of the grade, namely Rs. 1600/-. 3. Leave/Surrender of Leave, Travelling allowance and medical benefit rules applicable to me up to 20th March 1975 shall be according to the Kerala Service Rules or any special rules made by the State Government from time to time. 4. Family pension benefits of the State Government shall apply up to the date of retirement from State service. I need be considered for appointment only if all the above conditions are acceptable If the post is offered to me, I shall obtain the necessary Government sanction to accept the appointment on the above conditions. My up-to-date bio data are enclosed. There shall be no other formal application from me. This may be treated as my application. I have no objection in appearing before any Selection Committee for interview, if so desired. Yours faithfully, Sd/ C. K. N. Nair Director, SFDAS. Encl: Bio-data, 8 pages." A selection committee consisting of the Director, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Chairman Rubber Board and Deputy Director-General, I C. A. R. interviewed the candidates for the post and on the basis of the interview two candidates were found suitable for the post and in the order of merit the petitioner was the first. He was recommended for appointment In the letter recommending his appointment reference was also made to the initial salary claimed by the petitioner and also selection committee's recommendation. The Government of India by their communication dated 16th September, 1972, accepted the selection but did not accept the recommendation for the initial pay to be given to the petitioner. That letter reads as follows: "No. 21(5) Plant (B)/72-I Government of India Ministry of Foreign Trade. New Delhi, the 16th September, 1972. To The Chairman, Rubber Board, Kottayam-9: Kerala State) Sub: Appointment of Dr. C. N. K. Nair, as Director of Research, in the Rubber Board, Kottayam: Sir. With reference to your D. O: letter No. 23/72/EST. dated the 11th August, 1972, on the above subject. I am directed to convey the approval of the Central Government to the appointment of Dr. C. K N. Nair, as Director of Research in the Rubber Board, Kottayam, in the pay scale of Rs. 1300-60-1600, with such other allowances as are admissible under the Rubber Board. On his appointment he will draw Rs. I am directed to convey the approval of the Central Government to the appointment of Dr. C. K N. Nair, as Director of Research in the Rubber Board, Kottayam, in the pay scale of Rs. 1300-60-1600, with such other allowances as are admissible under the Rubber Board. On his appointment he will draw Rs. 1309/- P. M., the minimum of the pay scale of Rs. 1300-60-1600. Yours faithfully, Sd/-(M. L.Gupta) Under Secretary to the Government of India" On receipt of this letter the Rubber Board sent a communication to the petitioner on 18th September, 1972, which reads as follows: "THE RUBBER BOARD No. 23/ D.R/ 72/ EST. 18th September '72. Dr. C. K. N. Nair, M. Sc. Ph. D (Cornell), Director, Small Farmers Development Agencies, E. 2, Jawahar Nagar, TRIVANDRUM SUB: Appointment to the post of Director of Research in Rubber Board, Kottayam Ministry of Foreign Trade letter No. 21(5) Plant (B)72-I dated 16th September, 1972. Sir. The Government of India, Ministry of Foreign Trade in their letter cited as reference have conveyed the approval of the Central Government to your appointment as Director of Research in the Rubber Board in the pay scale of Rs. 1300-60-1600 with such other allowances as are admissible under the Board. The initial pay will be Rs. 1300/- per mensum. As regards your request for deputation terms, and fixation of pay, the matter is under the active consideration of the Government of India. In case you are agreeable to the above you are requested to communicate your acceptance and report to duty at this office, with the following documents/ declarations. 1. Relieving order from the Kerala Government. 2. Oath of allegiance to the constitution of India. 3. Marriage Declaration. Yours faithfully, Sd/ CHAIRMAN Copy to: Accounts Section." In compliance with this letter the petitioner joined duty after complying with all the formalities. His appointment is not for any term and it is difficult to understand the application of the petitioner to mean that he applied for appointment till 20-3-1975. In that application he had asked for certain favourable terms, one of which was that he must he treated as on deputation till 20-3-1975, the superannuation date if he had continued under the Kerala Government. In that application he had asked for certain favourable terms, one of which was that he must he treated as on deputation till 20-3-1975, the superannuation date if he had continued under the Kerala Government. That does not mean that he applied only for a term It is clear that the Rubber Board and the Government of India did not also understand his application in the way now interpreted by the respondent. That is clear from the forwarding letter selecting the petitioner for appointment and also the appointment order quoted above. Further, if the respondent has any doubt in the matter, the proper course for him was to refer the question to the appointing authority, namely the Government of India, and to act according to their decision in the light of this Court's declaration. Unfortunately, this was never asked for or their reply received before the proceedings dated 27-1-1976 was issued by the respondent. So, the respondent has no right to either terminate the appointment or to interpret the nature or period of the appointment of the petitioner under the Rubber Act and the Rules. So, his proceedings dated 27-1-1976 is void. 11. The further question is whether there is any bona fides in his issuing the proceedings dated 27-1-1976. For that it is necessary to state the terms of the decision of the learned Single Judge and the events that transpired thereafter till the date of the 'proceedings'. In the judgment of the learned Single Judge a declaration is made that the petitioner has ceased to be a Kerala Government servant under the provisions of S.58 (4) of the Agricultural University Act, that he ceased to be in Government service even on a de facto basis from 9101972 when he joined the Rubber Board as Director. It was also declared that the Government of Kerala is not entitled in the circumstances and facts of the case to ask the Board to relieve the petitioner from the service of the Board. It was also further mentioned that the petitioner is entitled to consequential reliefs (the consequential reliefs are the reliefs which he had asked for in the petition). It was also further mentioned that the petitioner is entitled to consequential reliefs (the consequential reliefs are the reliefs which he had asked for in the petition). To make matters clear in the clarification made on 6-1-1976 it was stated that the petitioner has to be considered to be continuing in the service of the Rubber Board subject to one stipulation namely that this "will not disentitle the appointing authority under the Rubber Act and the Rules framed thereunder from taking any steps, if it is deemed necessary, for the legal termination of the petitioner's service strictly in accordance with law, the service rules and the order of appointment of the petitioner". In the light of this declaration which is only a restatement of the jural relationship between the petitioner and the Rubber Board the respondent cannot be said to be unaware of his limitations in the matter of either terminating the service of the petitioner or to take a decision that the petitioner has ceased to be in the service of the Rubber Board. Further, to the letter (Ext P-8) dated 6th January 1976 of the petitioner to the respondent requesting him to permit the petitioner to resume active duties the reply, Ext. P-9, given by the respondent was that efforts are being made to obtain copy of the judgment at the earliest after examining which alone the undersigned could take necessary decision in this regard and make appropriate orders. Apparently the respondent did not want the petitioner to resume duties. He is aware that this court has issued the consequential declaration that the petitioner continues in service of the Rubber Board subject to only one limitation that the competent authority can terminate his service. This proceeds on the basis that on the date of the declaration the petitioner is in service. In the supplementary affidavit filed by the respondent on 24th June, 1975, in O. P. 5270 of 1974 his contention was that the petitioner was a Kerala Government servant on deputation and that on his attaining the age of superannuation he cannot claim to continue in the employment of the Rubber Board on deputation. This was not accepted by this Court. Following this the respondent wanted to find out a new reason to prevent the petitioner from resuming his duties. This was not accepted by this Court. Following this the respondent wanted to find out a new reason to prevent the petitioner from resuming his duties. As no steps were taken by the respondent for another 10 days, the petitioner filed O. P. No. 410/ 76 M (Contempt) to take action against the Chairman for his failure to respect the declaration passed by this Court That was on 19-1-1976 That petition cam; up for hearing on 22-1-1976, 23-1-1976 and on 27-1-1976. It was being adjourned to find out whether the respondent was implementing the orders of this Court. On 27-1-1976 the Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondent asked for adjournment and it was adjourned to 29 11976. On that day itself the respondent issued the proceedings referred to above. It looks as though it is only an excuse to keep the petitioner out. Now the application is misconstrued as one asking for appointment only for a period till 20 31975. No reasonable man in the position of the respondent can understand the application this way. There is no bona fides in this. 12. That the respondent did not himself very much feel confident to urge this 'proceeding' in the writ appeal filed by him is clear from the events that followed the tiling of the writ appeal. The Writ appeal came up for admission on 29-1-1976. The application for stay of the operation of the decision of the learned Single Judge came up for orders on 16-2-1976 and the following order was passed: "Heard the Advocate-General and Sri. S. Narayanan Poti. There will be a stay of operation of the judgment, but the 1st respondent (writ petitioner) will be entitled to receive the salary due to him from the month of February 1976 onwards, till the disposal of the appeal." No submission was apparently seen made to the court that the petitioner has ceased to be a Director subsequently. The salary from February, 1976 was ordered to be paid and was being paid to the petitioner until the disposal of the writ appeal. If the respondent had brought to the notice of the Court his proceedings dated 27-1-1976 it was likely that the Court would have considered and expressed an opinion on it. Apparently the respondent was not confident of the view that the Court may take. If the respondent had brought to the notice of the Court his proceedings dated 27-1-1976 it was likely that the Court would have considered and expressed an opinion on it. Apparently the respondent was not confident of the view that the Court may take. So he did not mention the proceedings before the Bench which heard the appeal and seek a clarification That indicates that he was only trying to keep behind an excuse to prevent the petitioner from resuming his duties. The whole attitude of the respondent is not quite consistent with the dignity of the position he holds in the Rubber Board. It looks as though he stands by his determination to keep the petitioner out on some pretext or another even if it amounts to a disrespect of the decision of this Court. 13. The next aspect is to see whether the respondent has committed any contempt. 'Civil contempt' is defined in S.2(b) to mean 'wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court' Can it be said that there was any wilful disobedience to the judgment of this Court? This will depend upon the nature of a declaratory judgment and the duty of administrative bodies like the Rubber Board to respect it A declaratory judgment is an order of the court which declares what the legal rights of the parties to the action are. Amnon Rubinstein in his book 'Jurisdiction and Illegality', page 116, states the principle thus: " In the present context, a distinction ought to be made between declarations seeking to prevent future action (prospective declarations) and those impugning past decisions (retrospective declarations). Prospective declarations do not raise any question as to the validity of decisions or determinations; the court is merely asked to declare that a certain course of action which is being contemplated is illegal. The courts, in this case, exercise a preventive supervision akin to that administered through injunctions and prohibitions." It is very often said that such a judgment has no coercive force and therefore a disobedience of it will be no contempt. But, it must be remembered that the respondent represents a public body. A public body cannot say that it is not prepared to observe the law. But, it must be remembered that the respondent represents a public body. A public body cannot say that it is not prepared to observe the law. In a country wedded to Rule of Law, obedience to decisions of the Court by public bodies is implied by its set up. It is rarely that a question is raised that a public body is not prepared to observe the law or the decision of a competent court. The effectiveness of a declaration rests on the foundation that any public body will always observe the law and the question of disobeying the declaration will never arise. So a coercive direction is unnecessary in the judgment. Foulkes in his 'Introduction to Administrative Law', Third Edition, page 183, states the principle thus: "But in many cases in administrative law (and elsewhere) there is no question of the defendant, often a public body, not being prepared to observe the law: the problem is discovering what the law is, rather than securing its observance. But though a declaration has no coercive force it may effectively undermine the enforceability of an administrative act." Garner in his 'Administrative Law', Second Edition, page 162, states the principle thus: "A declaration is subject to the defect that it is not enforceable; in private law this is of course serious, but in public law the defect is insignificant, as no administrative agency can afford to be so irresponsible as to ignore an adverse decision of a High Court Judge." Again, in B. Mishra v. B. Dixit (AIR. 1972 S.C. 2466) at page 2469 the principle is stated thus: "Just as the disobedience to a specific order of the Court undermines the authority and dignity of the court in a particular case, similarly any deliberate and mala fide conduct of not following the law laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court generally, but is also likely to subvert the Rule of Law and engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law." In the light of these principles it is clear that there is no great difference in substance between the positive form of a declaration and the negative form of an injunction so far as public bodies are concerned and the Rubber Board can ill-afford to disregard the legal effect of the declaration granted by this Court in O. P. No. 5270 of 1974 that the petitioner is declared to be continuing in the service of the Rubber Board and that the legal termination of service can be only as stated therein. The conduct of the respondent is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority of this Court but is also likely to subvert the rule of law. 14. The learned Advocate General submitted that in order to constitute a civil contempt there must be proof of a clear contumacious conduct which cannot be explained otherwise. He also submitted that wilful culpability should be established and if two views are possible on the matter reasonably the benefit of doubt be given to the person alleged to have committed contempt and that all these are absent in this case. In support of this he referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dahabrata v. State (AIR. 1969 SC. 189), S.S. Roy v. State of Orissa (AIR. 1960 SC 190), Aligarh Municipality v. E.T. Mazdoor Union (AIR. 1970 SC. 1767) and Banna Prasad v. State of U. P. (AIR. 1968 SC. 1348). The expression "wilful" in the definition of the word "civil contempt" is intended only to exclude such causal or accidental or unintentional act. The facts stated previously clearly make out that the conduct of the respondent was such that no reasonable man in his position would have thought that the order of appointment of the petitioner ceased with 20-3-1975. Moreover, this court clearly stated the method by v,hi:h petitioner's service can be declared as terminated. All these are deliberately ignored. The facts stated previously clearly make out that the conduct of the respondent was such that no reasonable man in his position would have thought that the order of appointment of the petitioner ceased with 20-3-1975. Moreover, this court clearly stated the method by v,hi:h petitioner's service can be declared as terminated. All these are deliberately ignored. Therefor, we are satisfied that action of the respondent in not permitting the petitioner to resume his duties and in issuing the proceedings dated 2711976 is clearly a disrespect shown to the constitutional authority of this Court and thereby the respondent has committed contempt. 15. One more point remains to be considered. A contention is mildly raised that the Rubber Board is not a party to this proceeding and therefore the petition is defective for wait "f proper parties. A public body has to function through a human agency and if the human agency fails to conform to the declaration of the jural relationship between the parties contempt is committed by that human agency and it is enough if that human agency is made a party. Moreover, when a public body or a Corporation is involved in a contempt proceeding only the executive head of that institution need be made a party. That is done in this case. Therefore, that technical plea raised by the respondent fails. 16. The next question is what is the nature of the sentence to be passed in this case. To a large extent action for civil contempt has two aspects. It is remedical as well as punitive. The law is stated thus by the Supreme Court in Aligarh Municipality v. E. T. Mazdoor Union (AIR. 1970 SC. 1767 at page 1770): "Contempt proceeding against a person who has failed to comply with the Court's order serves a dual purpose: (1) vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct and (2) coercion to compel the contemner to do what the law requires of him. The sentence imposed should effectuate both these purposes. 1970 SC. 1767 at page 1770): "Contempt proceeding against a person who has failed to comply with the Court's order serves a dual purpose: (1) vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct and (2) coercion to compel the contemner to do what the law requires of him. The sentence imposed should effectuate both these purposes. It must also be clearly understood in this connection that to employ a subterfuge to avoid compliance of a Court's order about which there could be no reasonable doubt may in certain circumstances aggravate the contempt." In this connection the unconditional apology tendered in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent and mention of it at the outset of his arguments by the Advocate General appearing for the respondent deserve notice. At the same time the respondent must purge his contempt by obeying the declaration of this Court hereafter atleast. Taking a lenient course instead of issuing an order of committal, the apology is accepted for the past period and an injunction is issued prohibiting the respondent from preventing the petitioner in resuming his duties as a Director of Research in the Rubber Board except in the way indicated by the declaration granted by this Court in U.P. 5270 of 1974. The question has arisen whether it is competent for the Court where contempt has been threatened or has been committed to take this kind of lenient course Oswald in his book on "Contempt of Court" at page 16 states the principle thus: "It is competent for the Court where a contempt is threatened or has been committed and on an application to commit, to take the lenient course of granting an injunction instead of making an order for committal or sequestration whether the offender is a party to the proceeding or not." No doubt, this is not a relief specifically asked for by the petitioner. But that is unnecessary. The Court can on its own initiative mould the relief. In Elliot v. Klinear (1967) 3 All. But that is unnecessary. The Court can on its own initiative mould the relief. In Elliot v. Klinear (1967) 3 All. E R.141 at p. 144) Stamp J. quoting the above passage from "Oswald on Contempt" stated the principle thus: "I do not for a moment quarrel with that statement of the law, but in my experience the lenient course mentioned in the passage which I have read is taken by this court on its own initiative and not at the instance of a plaintiff whose proper remedy, where an injunction has been disobeyed or where there has been aiding and abetting by a third party of a breach of an injunction, is to move either to commit, or to apply, in the case of a company for a writ of sequestration. It does not in the least follow that because the court may take the lenient course that the plaintiff is entitled to come to the court and ask the court to take that course without asking for committal " Borrie in his book on "The Law of Contempt" has also stated the principle thus at page 357: "A further power open to the courts is to take the more lenient course of granting an in junction to restrain either a threatened contempt or a repetition of the contempt. The court can grant an injunction in lieu of either sequestration or committal: It has been emphasised, however, that power to grant an injunction does not lie at the instance of a litigant, but is a discretion vested in the court, acting upon its own initiative." Therefore, we direct that the respondent shall not, in future, interfere with the petitioner resuming his duties as Director of Rubber Board, till his appointment is terminated as stated in the judgment of this Court in O.P. 5270 of 1974. The apology is accept d for what has been done by the respondent till now but without in any way prejudicing the rights of the petitioner to ask for relief as Director during that period. 17. In the result, this Original Petition is disposed of in the above terms. The petitioner is entitled to his costs from the respondent. Allowed.