JUDGMENT This case has arisen on the application filed by the petitioner, Permanand Prasad from the District Jail, Monghyr, through the Jail Superintendent. The application of the petitioner is in Hindi. The relevant portion of the application reads thus:- lfou; fuosnu ;g gS fd eSa fnukad 2 fnlEcj 1975 ls Hkkjr lqj{kk vf/kfu;e ¼Mh- vkbZ- vkj-½ ,oa vkarfjd lqj{kk vf/kfu;e ¼felk½ ds varxZr eqaxsj eaMy dkjk esa utjcan gw¡A Hkkjr lqj{kk vf/kfu;e ¼Mh- vkbZ- vkj-½ esa iVuk mPp U;k;ky; ds ekuuh; U;k;k/kh’k Jh ,e- ,e- izlkn egksn; us eq>s fnukad 11-3-76 dk vkns’k la[;k fdzfeuy felysfu;l ua- 576 ds tfj, tekur ij fjgkbZ dk vkns’k fn;s gSA vc eSa flQZ felk esa gh utjcan gw¡A tsy vf/kdkjh eq>s ‘kq: ls gh lsy esa j[ks gq, gSa rFkk fnukad 14-7-76 dks iqfyl ;k lh- vkbZ- Mh- ds lwpuk ij esjs iSjksa esa fldM+h&csM+h iguk fn;s gSaA iqfyl ;k lh- vkbZ- Mh- ds vuqlkj eSa uDlykbV fopkj/kkjk dh tkudkjh j[krk gw¡ ;k ekurk gw¡A 2. The petitioner was detained under the Defence or India Rules as well as under the provisions contained in Maintenance: of Internal Security Act, 1971. As mentioned in the application, this Court in Criminal Misc. No. 576 of 1976 by order dated the 11th March, 1976 had ordered for release of the petitioner on ball for his detention under the Defence of India Rules. Therefore, the petitioner in his application has mentioned that at present he is detained only under Misa and he has been kept in cell and iron chains have been put on his legs, because according to the C.I.D of Police, the petitioner is nexalite. In the application the petitioner has stated that he is not a nexalite nor he belongs to any party and has prayed that order may be passed to remove the iron chains from his legs. 3. The application of the petitioner was put up before us for disposal under the writ jurisdiction. None has appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. G. P. Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, however has placed all the relevant materials before us and also he has referred to the counter affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the State, as by order dated the 3rd September, 1976. We had directed issuance of notice to the State. Mr. Mr. G. P. Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, however has placed all the relevant materials before us and also he has referred to the counter affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the State, as by order dated the 3rd September, 1976. We had directed issuance of notice to the State. Mr. Narsimrao Mehadeorao Patole, Superintendent District Jail, Monghyr has sworn the counter-affidavit dated the 26th October, 1976 which was filed in the court on the 10th of November, 1976. In paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit it is stated that on the 2nd February, 1976 Sri Brajendra Kumar, Special P.P. (Naxalite), Monghyr wrote to the Superintendent, District Jail, Monghyr that the petitioner was declared as Nexalite and he may be kept under proper security measures. In paragraph 5 it is also stated therein that on the 2nd July, 1976 Sri S. Pd. Assistant Inspector General of Prisons who happened to visit District Jail Monghyr, had ordered the superintendent, District Jail to keep the petitioner in fetters and cell, and on that date the Superintendent, District Jail imposed link fetters on the petitioner. The Superintendent, District Jail informed the Inspector General of Police on the 24th July, 1976. In paragraph 6 it was mentioned that the petitioner was kept in fetters till he was lodged in Monghyr Jail. The petitioner was transferred to Bhagalpur Special Central Jail on the 8th August, 1976. According to the counter affidavit, even in the Central Jail, Bhagalpur the petitioner is under fetters. Therefore, the fact stated by the petitioner that he is not a nexalite, has been denied in the counter affidavit and regarding the fetters it is admitted in the counter affidavit and it is alleged that the petitioner has been kept under fetters on the ground of security. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has raised the following point for consideration by us. (i) The application filed by the petitioner is not maintainable in view of the fact that the provisions contained under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 are suspended by the Presidential Ordinance and there is no other specific provision for grant of habeas corpus, as Section 491 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure has been deleted in the new Code (ii) the relief sought for in present case, can be granted only by the State Government. 5. 5. According to the learned counsel, it is further submitted that in the instant case on the ground of security the petitioner is kept under fetters, as stated in the counter affidavit. He drew our attention to Rule 426 of the Bihar Jail Manual Rules which reads thus:- Prisoners who have escaped from Jail, or while in transit from one Jail to another, Or have attempted or conspired to escape, may be placed in fetters under section 56 of Act, IX of 1894, with the sanction of the Inspector General." Learned Counsel emphasises that whether the petitioner was trying to escape or not, can only be judged by the State or the jail officers. It cannot be considered here. Learned counsel also placed before us a copy of the circular dated the 15th September, 1975 issued by Sri B.B. Lal, Inspector General of Prisons, Bihar, addressed to all superintendents of Central and District Jails. The relevant portion of the said circular runs thus:- fo”k;& uDlyiaFkh cafn;ksa dks MaVk&csM+h esa j[kus ds laca/k esaA egk’k;] dkjk gLrd ds fu;e 426 dh izFke dafMdk dh vksj vkidk /;ku vkd`”V djrs gq;s eq>s dguk gS fd uDlyiaFkh cafn;ksa us jkT; ds dqN dkjkvksa esa tks gjdrs dh gSa muls ;g Li”V :i ls ladsfrr gqvk gS fd os dkjk ls Hkkxus dh ;kstuk;sa lnSo cukrs jgrs gSa vkSj dkjk dks lqj{kkRed detksjh dk lnk Qk;nk mBkrs jgrs gSaA vr% bu cafn;ksa ds laca/k esa vki lnk lrdZ jgsa& 6. It will be convenient to deal with the both points, namely point nos. (i) and (ii) together, raised by the learned counsel for the State. Learned Counsel, in order to find support to his contention, has relied on the case of Additional District Magistrate Vs. It will be convenient to deal with the both points, namely point nos. (i) and (ii) together, raised by the learned counsel for the State. Learned Counsel, in order to find support to his contention, has relied on the case of Additional District Magistrate Vs. Shiva Kant Shukla, and drew our attention to paragraphs 11 and 12 at page 1220, where it is stated that on 27th June, 1975 in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 359 the President declared that the right of any person including a foreigner to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the above mentioned rights would remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation of Emergency made under clause (1) of article 352 of the Constitution on 3rd December, 1971 and on 25th June, 1975 are both in force. The Presidential order of 27th June, 1975 further stated that the same would be in addition to and not in derogation of any order made before the date of the aforesaid order under clause (1) of article 359 of the Constitution. In paragraph 12 of the said Judgment it was stated that it would be noted that on 8th January 1976 there was a notification that in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution the President declared that the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the abovementioned rights may remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation of Emergency made under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on 3rd December, 1971 and on 25th June, 1975 were in force. 7. In paragraph 51 at page 1220 of the aforesaid Judgment it is mentioned that the statutory right under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been deleted from the new Code of the Criminal Procedure, which came into effect on the 1st April 1974. 8. Reference was also made to paragraph 127 at page 1241 of the said decision where conclusions of the observations made in various paragraphs are stated. 8. Reference was also made to paragraph 127 at page 1241 of the said decision where conclusions of the observations made in various paragraphs are stated. It was observed that in view of the Presidential order dated 27th June, 1975 under clause (1) of article 359 of our constitution no person has locus standi to move any writ petition under article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ of order or direction to enforce any right to personal liberty of a person detained under the Act, on the grounds that the order of detention or the continued detention is for any reason not under or in compliance with the Act, or is illegal or malafide. Secondly, it was observed that article 21 is the sole repository of rights to life and personal liberty against the State. Any claim to writ of habeas corpus is enforcement of article 21 and is, therefore, barred by the Presidential order. 9. Learned Counsel for the State then referred to paragraph 492 of the said Judgment at page 1349. It will be relevant to quote the said paragraph in extenso which runs thus:- "And so we go back to 'The Zamore (1916) 2 AC 77 Rex. V. Halliday, 1917 AC 260, 271 Liversidge V. Anderson, 1942 AC. 206, Greene, Vs. Secy. of States, 1942 AC 284. A jurisdiction of suspicion is not a forum for objectivity.' Those who are responsible for national security must be the sole Judges of what the national security requiring, "However precious the personal liberty of the subject may be, there is something for which it may well be, to some extent, sacrificed by legal enactment, namely, national success in the war or escape from national plunder or enslavement." As a result, perhaps, the only argument which the court can entertain is whether the authority which passed the order of detention is duly empowered to pass it, whether the detention is properly identified and whether on the face of the order the stated purpose of detention is within the terms of law. These questions, in almost all cases, will have an obvious answer." In our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the State is well founded and in our opinion also it is for the State Government or the officer to decide that in a particular case whether it would be safe to unfetter the petitioner or not. 10. In the case of Samir Chatterjee Vs. State of West Bengal, while dealing with section 15 of the Maintenance of Internal security Act, in paragraph 13 at page 1172 it was observed :-"...................... to advise the Government as to how they should exercise their functions or powers conferred on them by statute is not one of this courts functions......... 11. In the present case also the relevant rule, namely, Rule 426 of the Jail Manual Rules has been framed under section 56 of the Prisons Act, 1894 (Act, IX of 1898). Section 56 lays down, 'whenever the Superintendent considers it necessary (with reference either to the state of the prison or the character of the prisoners for the safe custody of any prisoners that they should be confined in irons, he may, subject to such rules and instructions as may be laid down by the Inspector General with the sanction of the State Government so confine them.' Therefore, the powers have been conferred on the state by statute. 12. We may also refer in this connection to an unreported Judgment dated the 20th August, 1976 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal writ no. 25 of 1975 where the grievances of various detenus were being considered. 13. On behalf of some of the detenues it was contended that they had been equated with under trial prisoners and that provisions of the Jail Manual applicable to under trial prisoners have been made applicable to them. It was held that the said grievance was wholly without substance. It was within the competence of the Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi to bodily lift some of the provisions of the jail manual and incorporate them in the general order dated the 8th May, 1974 making it a comprehensive one. The detenu Sri Kedar Nath Sachdev had contended that he was allowed to spend only Rs. It was within the competence of the Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi to bodily lift some of the provisions of the jail manual and incorporate them in the general order dated the 8th May, 1974 making it a comprehensive one. The detenu Sri Kedar Nath Sachdev had contended that he was allowed to spend only Rs. 20/-per month but keeping in view the rising prices it was not possible for him to even buy food at his own expense to supplement the food given by the Jail authorities which he alleged was of very poor quality. He further averred that his wife and children had to come from Delhi to Ambala for weekly interviews with him on which heavy expenditure was incurred besides they had to spend many hours for getting permission for weekly interview. All those had resulted in converting the preventive detention into a punitive detention. He, accordingly prayed that he be allowed to spend Rs. 200/- per month during hi, detention, to transfer him to Delhi Central Jail or to make transport arrangement for his family members and relatives every week for interview with him to allow him to move about within Jail premises for a stroll daily for a specified period; to give him proper medical facilities of his choice, to direct the respondents to fix the duration of interviews of at least two hours without the presence of C.I.D. persons and to make liberal arrangements for interviews so that his relatives might be allowed immediate interviews without delay. Their Lordships observed "The grievances noted above partake the facet of personal liberty. In seeking a declaration for regulating the conditions of their detention the petitioners are in fact trying to enforce facet of their personal liberty to which they have no locus standi......”. 14. A reference was also made to an unreported Judgment of this court dated the 18th October, 1976 in Cr. W. J. C. No. 126 of 1976. In that case the first grievance of the petitioner was that he had been placed in Bhagalpur Special Central Jail in class X-1 (b) Division (Symbol C), Class X applies to security prisoners of dangerous type. The petitioner of that case stated in his application that he was a political worker and not a criminal, and, therefore, he should not have been put in the category of Gunda and criminal type prisoners. The petitioner of that case stated in his application that he was a political worker and not a criminal, and, therefore, he should not have been put in the category of Gunda and criminal type prisoners. According to him, he should have been placed in the category of political workers. Uday Sinha and Shivanugrah Narain, JJ, obesrved. 'We regret it is not possible for this Court to grant relief for the simple reason that it is not possible for this Court to embark upon any enquiry as to the antecedents of, and allegations against, the petitioner. The authorities have applied their mind to it and they have considered the petitioner to be of Gunda and criminal Type. . . . ' 15. In our opinion, after the consideration of the application of the petitioner from various aspects of the matter, we do not find any merit in this application which is, accordingly, dismissed. Application dismissed.