JUDGMENT-Applicant Mohanlal who is the landlord of the suit house, obtained the requisite permission from the Rent Controller for serving a notice of ejectment upon the non-applicant-tenant under clause 13 (3) (i) and (ii) of the C. P. & Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 referred to hereinafter as the Rent Control Order. It appears from the record that the Rent Controller granted such a permission vide his order dated 26th December 1972. So far as the case of the landlord under clause 13 (3) (i) of the Rent Control Order was concerned, the Rent Controller held that the tenant was in arrears of rent of Rs. 2468 and, therefore, granted him 90 days time from the date of his order to pay the said amount, failing which the permission shall be deemed to have been granted to the applicant to determine the tenancy of the tenant under clause 13 (3) (i). By the same order he held that the tenant is habitually in arrears of rent and, therefore, he also granted permission to the landlord under clause 13 (3) (i) of the Rent Control Order to determine the tenancy of the non-applicant-tenant. It is not disputed before me that the tenant did not pay the arrears of rent as directed by the Rent Controller, but it appears that he filed an appeal under clause 21 of the Rent Control Order. 2. After such permission was granted by the Rent Controller, the landlord served a notice of termination under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 27th December 1972. Thereafter he filed the present suit on 28th February 1973 claiming a decree for ejectment and for mesne profits. 3. From the written statement filed by the defendant it appears that he resisted the suit filed by the plaintiff and contended that the permission granted by the Rent Controller is modified by the appellate Court and, therefore, the notice issued by the landlord is illegal and ultra vires and also invalid in law. Evidence of the parties was also recorded before the Small Causes Court. The learned Judge of the Small Causes Court vide his judgment dated 5-11-1973 came to the conclusion that the notice issued was premature, as, according t-o him, the Rent Controller bad no authority to grant permission under clause 13 (3) (i) of the Rent Control Order before expiry of 90 days. The learned Judge of the Small Causes Court vide his judgment dated 5-11-1973 came to the conclusion that the notice issued was premature, as, according t-o him, the Rent Controller bad no authority to grant permission under clause 13 (3) (i) of the Rent Control Order before expiry of 90 days. According to the learned Judge, the permission could be granted after the said period of 90 days is over and, therefore, the notice issued and the suit filed before the expiry of period of 90 days were premature and bad in law. In this view of the matter, he dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff· landlord. It is this order which is challenged in this Civil Revision Application. 4. Shri Asghar Ali, the learned counsel for the applicant, contended before me that the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court committed an error in going behind the permission granted by the Rent Controller and thereby holding that the notice issued and the suit filed were bad in law. He further contended that the permission was granted by the Rent Control1er under clauses 13 (3) (i) and (ii) of the Rent Control Order. So far as the permission granted under clause 13 (3) (ii) is concerned, as per the order of the Rent Controller the same is deemed to be granted if the tenant failed to deposit the amount within a period of 90 days from the date of his order. It is an admitted position that the tenant has failed to deposit this amount. Therefore, on the date when the notice of ejectment was issued, the landlord was armed with a valid permission which is the only condition precedent contemplated by the Rent Control Order. He further contended that even if in appeal the permission granted under clause 13 (3) (ii) of the Rent Control Order is set aside, the permission granted by the Rent Controller under clause 13 (3) (i) is confirmed and that too for the obvious reason that the tenant failed to deposit the amount as directed by the Rent Controller, though he was in arrears of rent. 5. In this view of the matter, according to the learned counsel, it cannot be said that the notice issued under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not based on the valid permission granted by the Rent Controller. 5. In this view of the matter, according to the learned counsel, it cannot be said that the notice issued under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not based on the valid permission granted by the Rent Controller. Hence the finding recorded by the learned Judge of the trial Court that the notice is bad in law is illegal and liable to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, it is contended by Shri Oke, the learned counsel appearing for the non-applicant-tenant that the permission granted by the Rent Controller under clause 13 (3) (i) of the Rent Control Order itself is illegal, as on the date when the permission was granted the period of 90 days was not over, within which period the tenant could have deposited the arrears of rent. He further contended that under clause 13 (3) (i) the permission to give notice to terminate the tenancy could be granted if the tenant fails to deposit the amount. In the present case 90 days' time was granted to the tenant to deposit the said amount and, therefore, before the expiry of the said period, it was not open for the Rent Controller to have granted such a permission. In substance, therefore, it is the contention of Shri Oke that the permission granted by the Rent Controller is itself illegal. In support of this contention, Shri Oke has relied upon two decisions of this Court in Chandanmal v. A. D. C. Akola1 and Vithalrao v. Hirasao2. In this view of the matter, according to Mr.Oke, the order passed by the trial Court is perfectly legal and valid. 7. For properly understanding the contentions raised before me, it will be useful to make a reference to the relevant provisions of the Rent Control Order. Clause 13 (1) of the Rent Control Order lays down that no landlord shall, except with the previous written permission of the Controller give a notice to the tenant to determine the lease. The sub-clause (2) of clause 13 further contemplates filing of an application by the landlord seeking permission in that behalf. After such an application is filed, the Rent Controller has to pass a written order granting such a permission or refusing to grant such a permission. The sub-clause (2) of clause 13 further contemplates filing of an application by the landlord seeking permission in that behalf. After such an application is filed, the Rent Controller has to pass a written order granting such a permission or refusing to grant such a permission. In case the permission is granted by the Rent Controller, his order is final subject to clause 21 of the Rent Control Order. Clause 21 (3) lays down that the decision of the Collector in appeal and subject only to such a decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and no further appeal, revision or application for review shall lie against the order of said authority whatsoever. The Rent Control Order only deals with granting of permission for issuing of a notice to terminate the tenancy. Once such a permission is granted, then obviously the further proceedings for ejectment of the tenant and possession of the house are governed by the Transfer of Property Act as well as the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. This Court had an occasion to consider the scope of the Rent Control Order in this behalf in R. P. Ghosh v. 8mt. Pramilabai3. After making a reference to the relevant provisions of the Rent Control Order, this Court observed as under: "From the bar. reading of clause 13, it is obvious that a prohibition is imposed upon a landlord to give notice to determine the lease of the tenant unless he obtains a previous written permission of the Rent Controller. The order passed by the Rent Controller, subject to the provisions of an appeal and review, is final. The Rent Control Order confers an exclusive jurisdiction upon the authorities constituted under the Rent Control Order to decide the issues arising out of the said Order. It is obvious from the provisions of clause 13 that the permission sought by the landlord for giving a notice to the tenant determining the lease on the grounds enumerated therein can be granted by the Rent Controller alone. Unless the Rent Controller is satisfied that conditions laid down in clause 13 are fulfilled, it is not open to him to grant such a permission. Once such permission is granted by the Rent Controller, then the landlord is at liberty to serve a notice upon the tenant terminating his tenancy as per the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Once such permission is granted by the Rent Controller, then the landlord is at liberty to serve a notice upon the tenant terminating his tenancy as per the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is the Transfer of Property Act, which then applies. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not require that a reason for determining the tenancy should be specifically stated in the notice itself. It is not necessary under the law 10 set out the grounds for termination in a notice to quit. The contents of notice to quit and its service etc. are wholly governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The provisions of the Rent Control Order do not come into play nor they can affect the question of notice to quit, its requirement or its service, etc. once a valid permission from the Rent Controller is obtained. The provisions of the Rent Control Order are in addition to those of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, before a tenant can be evicted by the landlord, he must comply with the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Rent Control Order does not any way abrogate Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act which deals with leases. The notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is essential for bringing to an end the relationship of a landlord and a tenant. Unless the relationship is validly terminated, the landlord does not get right to obtain possession of premises by evicting the tenant. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not provide for the satisfaction of any additional condition. The Rent Control Order only provides that such a notice cannot be given unless a written permission of Rent Controller is obtained. It does not lay down any further condition so far as the quit notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned. The filing of a suit for ejectment is an independent action. The Rent Control Order only provides that such a notice cannot be given unless a written permission of Rent Controller is obtained. It does not lay down any further condition so far as the quit notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned. The filing of a suit for ejectment is an independent action. The combined effect of this is that it contemplated two distinct proceedings, one relating to granting of a written permission by the Rent Controller to give notice to determine the lease under the provisions of the Rent Control Order and thereafter filing of a suit for ejectment before a competent Civil Court after giving necessary notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Rent Controller or the authority constituted under the Rent Control Order has no authority or jurisdiction to eject a tenant or deliver possession of the property to the landlord. This is the province of a Civil Court The filing of the ejectment suit after giving a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not the continuation of the proceedings instituted before the Rent Controller, but it is an independent and distinct proceeding which is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Transfer of Property Act." Once it is held that the decision of the Rent Controller so far it relates to the matter within his exclusive jurisdiction is concerned, is final and could not be challenged in a suit or in any collateral proceedings, then, in our opinion, the same matter cannot be reopened in a Civil Suit instituted by the landlord after obtaining a permission from the Rent Controller. So far as a suit for ejectment is concerned, the cause of action is not the ground on which the permission is granted by the Rent Controller, but the termination of the tenancy of the tenant under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The same gives an occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. So far as the ejectment suit is concerned, the grounds of ejectment are irrelevant. The same gives an occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. So far as the ejectment suit is concerned, the grounds of ejectment are irrelevant. To such a suit the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and Transfer of Property Act will apply and not the provisions of the Rent Control Order." In the case before me, it is no doubt true that the Rent Controller has granted 90 days' time to the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent from the date of his order. However, by the same order he has clarified the position by saying that if such amount is not deposited within the said period, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted to the applicant to determine the tenancy of the tenant under clause 13 (3) (i). Therefore, this is not a case where the permission is granted to the landlord before the expiry of a period of 90 days so far as clause 13 (3) (i) is concerned. So far as the said clause is concerned, the permission becomes operative after the expiry of 90 days. Therefore in my opinion, it is not correct to say that the permission granted is premature. Instead of passing a further order after expiry of 90 days, in view of the fact that a consolidated application was filed by the landlord under clause 13 (3) (i) and (ii) of the Rent Control Order and the permission was sought on both the counts, the Rent Controller passed a consolidated order because the application filed by the landlord was allowed in toto. By the same order permission was also granted under clause 13 (3) (ii) of the Rent Control Order which becomes operative forthwith. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the order passed is without jurisdiction. Having regard to the fact that the permission granted under clause 13 (3) (ii) became operative forthwith, it cannot also be said that notice issued or suit filed was premature. 9. The cases to which reference is made by Shri Oke are obviously distinguishable on facts. In the case of Vithalrao v. Hirasao (cit. supra) permission was sought and granted only under clause 13 (3) (i) of the Rent Control Order. 9. The cases to which reference is made by Shri Oke are obviously distinguishable on facts. In the case of Vithalrao v. Hirasao (cit. supra) permission was sought and granted only under clause 13 (3) (i) of the Rent Control Order. So far as that case is concerned, it appears that no time was granted to the tenant to deposit the amount and, therefore, this Court came to the conclusion that as time was not granted as contemplated by clause 13 (3) (i) of the Rent Control Order, the order passed in that behalf was illegal. Such is not the position in the present case. In this case 90 days' time was granted to the tenant to deposit the amount and on his failure to do so the permission was deemed to have been granted to the applicant. In Chandanmal v. A. D. C. Akola (cit. supra) it appears that the order granting permission was passed even before the expiry of period and, therefore, this Court held that the order passed was obviously illegal. Therefore, both these cases on which reliance is placed by Shri Oke are distinguishable on facts. 10. In the case before me it is quite obvious from the order passed by the Rent Controller that he has granted permission under clause 13 (3) (i) and (ii) of the Rent Control Order. So far as permission granted under clause 13 (3) (i) is concerned, he passed a conditional order. So far as permission granted under clause 13 (3) (ii) is concerned, it became operative immediately. Therefore, on the date when the notice to quit was issued by the landlord, he was armed with the written permission of the Rent Controller and, therefore, it cannot be said that on the date on which the notice was issued, it was illegal. Subsequently in appeal though the permission granted under clause 13 (3) (ii) was set aside, the permission granted under clause 13 (3) (i) was confirmed. Therefore, this is not a case where the permission granted by the Rent Controller was set aside as a whole. The permission granted by the Rent Controller on the count was set aside, whereas it was confirmed on another count. Therefore, this is not a case where the permission granted by the Rent Controller was set aside as a whole. The permission granted by the Rent Controller on the count was set aside, whereas it was confirmed on another count. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the appeal was partly allowed by the Collector, ultimately he has confirmed the order passed by the Rent Controller on one count, namely, clause 13 (3) (i) of the Rent Control Order. Therefore, in this case the permission granted by the Rent Controller was merely modified and was not set aside as a whole, nor it was revoked. Only because the permission on one count granted under clause 13 (3) (ii) was set aside, it cannot be said that the notice which was issued by the landlord became inoperative. As observed by this Court in R. P. Ghosh v. Smt. Pramilabai, section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not require that a reason for terminating the tenancy should be specifically stated in the notice itself. It is also not necessary under law to set out the grounds for termination of tenancy in the notice to quit. If this is so, then, in my opinion, only because the part of the order passed by the Rent Controller is set aside, it cannot be said that the landlord was not armed with the permission to issue quit notice, when, in fact, the notice was issued. On the date on which notice to quit was issued and suit was filed the landlord was armed with the consolidated permission on both the counts, namely, clause 13 (3) (i) and (ii) of the Rent Control Order. The permission granted to the landlord under clause 13 (3) (i) was subsequently confirmed in appeal. If this so, only because the permission granted under clause 13 (3) (ii) is set aside in appeal, it cannot be said that the earlier notice issued has become inoperative. In this view of the matter, it is quite obvious that the order passed by the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court dismissing the suit on the ground the permission granted by the Rent Controller is without jurisdiction cannot be sustained. In this view of the matter, it is quite obvious that the order passed by the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court dismissing the suit on the ground the permission granted by the Rent Controller is without jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The order passed by the Rent Controller directing that if the tenant did not comply with his order, which directed payment by a particular date, the order would become absolute or the permission will be deemed to be granted is neither illegal nor it is without jurisdiction. In this case, on the date notice, was issued, or suit was instituted, the landlord was armed with a valid permission. As in appeal permission granted under clause 13 (3) (i) was confirmed, even during the pendency of the suit he was armed with the necessary permission of the Rent Controller which is the only condition precedent for serving the notice of termination and institution of a suit. Hence the notice was issued and the suit was filed after obtaining necessary permission of the Rent Controller, which continued even during the pendency of the suit. The landlord had a requisite permission throughout. Hence in this case it cannot be said that the notice issued or the suit filed was premature or was not filed after obtaining requisite permission of the Rent Controller. 11. Once it is held that the order passed by the Rent Controller was perfectly legal and was not without jurisdiction, then obviously, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to go behind it. In this context reference could usefully be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Romji Dos v. Trilok Chand4. In paras. 3 and 4 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed as under: "3. The proceeding before the District Magistrate under section 3 (2) and before the Commissioner under section 3 (.3) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act are quasi-judicial in character. By section 3 (4) of the Act the decision of the Commissioner under sub-section (3) of section 3 subject to any order passed by the State Government under section 7-F of the Act, is declared final. The respondent did not prefer any petition before the State Government under section 7-F of the Act and on that account the order passed by the Additional Commissioner exercising powers of the Commissioner under section 3 (3) became final. The respondent did not prefer any petition before the State Government under section 7-F of the Act and on that account the order passed by the Additional Commissioner exercising powers of the Commissioner under section 3 (3) became final. Section 16 of the Act provides that no order made under the Act by the State Government or the District Magistrate shall be called in question in any Court. It is true that the finality of the order declared by section 3 (4) and section 16 will not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue an appropriate writ quashing the order. But subject to interference by the High Court, the decision must be deemed final and is not liable to be challenged in any collateral proceeding. 4. In our view, the High Court was in error in holding that the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was in the suits filed by the appellant, open to the objection that the Officer did not consider the "needs of the tenant". The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. Even if we assume that he committed an error in the exercise of his jurisdiction the error could be corrected only in a proceeding under section 7-P of the Act by approaching the State Government and by way of a writ petition to the High Court, but the order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and confirmed by the Additional Commissioner could not be challenged in the suit." Similar view was taken by this Court in Mohd. Usman v. Bhalida Abdul Karim5. 12. Once it is held that the decision of the Rent Controller so far as it relates to the matter within his exclusive jurisdiction is concerned is final and could not be challenged in a suit or in a collateral proceedings, then in my opinion, the same matter cannot be reopened in a civil suit instituted by the landlord after obtaining permission from the Rent Controller which has become final. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, it was not open to the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court to sit in appeal over the permission granted by the Rent Controller and then holds that the permission granted by him was illegal. 13. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, it was not open to the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court to sit in appeal over the permission granted by the Rent Controller and then holds that the permission granted by him was illegal. 13. In the result, the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court dated 5-11-1973 is set aside. As the matter was decided by the Small Causes Court only on preliminary issue, the suit is remitted back to the Small Causes Court for decision on merits in accordance with law. As the matter is pending since long, the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court is directed to decide the suit as expeditiously as possible. The costs in this Civil Revision Application will be the costs in the cause. Revision allowed.