JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal by the plaintiff against the judgement and decree of the Additional Civil Judge, Alwar, dated March 22, 1974, whereby he affirmed the decree of the Munsiff, Kishangarh (Alwar), dismissing the suit. 2. It is not necessary to narrate the facts in detail. In 1947, one Gurdatta, son of Sonu Ram, was allotted 16 Bighas of land in village Khanpur Mewan as a rehabilitation measure. One Phulluram made a complaint to the Collector that the appellant, who alleges himself to be Gurdatta, son of Sonu Ram, is not the real Gurdatta to whom the land was allotted. The appellant's name, in fact, is Saidas son of Ram Chander. Phulluram further complained that the real allottee Gurdatta son of Sonu Ramhad gone to Uttar Pradesh, where he died leaving behind his widow Premibai and his son Shiv Dayal. This complaint of Phulluram was enquired into by the Magistrate First Class, Tijara and thereafter by the police. The Collector ultimately forwarded the papers to the Managing Officer for disposal. The Managing Officer conducted the enquiry and by his order dated April 18, 1960 (Ex.5) told that the present appellant was a real allottee.Dissatisfied with the said order, Phulluram went in appeal to the Assistant Settlement Commissioner (Reh), Rajasthan, who vide his order dated August 20, 1960, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Managing Officer. The learned Assistant Settlement Commissioner found that the present appellant was not the real the allottee and that he was an imposter for another Gurdatta son of Sonu Ram, the real allottee. He also ordered that Shiv Dayal, the minor son of Gurdatta, be restored to the possession of the land provided he deposits certain amount within a certain period. This order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner was challenged by Ram Chander before the Settlement Commissioner. The latter, vide order dated November 21, 1961, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the finding arrived at by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner. This order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner was challenged by Ram Chander before the Settlement Commissioner. The latter, vide order dated November 21, 1961, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the finding arrived at by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner. The appellant thereupon filed the present suit against (1) Assistant Settlement Commissioner, (2) Chief Settlement Commissioner, (3) Managing Officer and (4) Phulluram, and asked for the following reliefs:- (1) It be declared that the plaintiff is Gurdatta son of Sonu Ram and and not Saidas son of Ram Chander; (2) It be declared that Gurbachan alias Gurdatta son of Sonu Ram, who according to Phullu Ram, defendant No. 4 is said to have expired, is still alive and is residing at Naswari instead of Khanpur-Mewan; (3) It be declared that the orders passed by the Settlement Officers dated August 20, 1960 & November 16, 1961 are without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. (4) That a permanent injunction be issued against Assistant Settlement Commissioner not to execute their orders dated August 20, 1960 and November 21, 1961 respectively. 3. It appears that during the pendency of the suit, the name of Phulluram was struck off from the array of defendants and Shiv Dayal was impleaded as one of the defendants. The suit was contested by Managing Officer, Phulluram and Shiv Dayal on various grounds. The learned Munsiff, who tried the suit, framed as many as 10 issues in the suit. He held that the present appellant was not Gurdatta son of Sonu Ram, the actual allottee of the land. He further held that the present appellant's name is Saidas alias Sudhi, son of Ram Chandra. He also upheld the validity of the impugned orders dated August 20, 1960 and November 21, 1961. On the above findings, he dismissed the suit. These findings were affirmed by the lower appellate court and hence this second appeal. 4. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, certain developments took place in the case. On October 7, 1974, the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for respondent No. 4 Shiv Dayal filed compromise petition with the prayer that the suit be decreed in accordance with the terms of the compromise. 4. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, certain developments took place in the case. On October 7, 1974, the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for respondent No. 4 Shiv Dayal filed compromise petition with the prayer that the suit be decreed in accordance with the terms of the compromise. The compromise arrived at between the aforesaid parties runs as under:- jkthukek Jh eku] mijksDr muokuh eqdnes esa vihykUV o jsLiksMsUV uEcj 4 esa vykVesUV ds flyflys esa ruktk gSA ge Qjhdsu us vkil esa tkudkjh djds ;g rlYyh dj yh gS fd vihykUV xqjnRrk gh vlyh vyksVh gS vkSj og gh vykV 'kqnk tehu ij dkfcy gS vkSj jsLiksMsUV uEcj 4 dk firk tehu eqruktk ij vkckn ugha gqvk cfYd ;w0ih0 eas y[kheiqjk [kksjks esa vkckn gks x;k FkkA eqnbZ vihykUV gh xqjnRrk iq= lksuwjke gS vkSj bls gh xzke [kkuiqj esa vkjktk 16 cksok okdS xzke [kkuiqj rglhy fd'kux<+ ftyk vyoj esa vykV gqbZ Fkh vkSj oksg gh ml ij dkfct gS vkSj jsLiksMsUV ua0 4 dk vkjkth eqruktk ls dksbZ ljksdkj ugh gS vkSj oksg eqnbZ ds dCtk esa fdlh izdkj dh nLrnkth ugha djsxkA vr% jkthukek is'k dj izkFkZuk gS fd vihy vihykUV o eqftc jkthukek eUtj QjekbZ tkos vkSj vnkyr ekngr dh fMxzh fujLr dh tkos vkSj nkok eqnbZ fMxzh Qjek;k tkosA [kpkZ Qjksdsu viuk&viuk cnkZlr djsxsaA The appellant and Shiv Dayal got this compromise duly verified by the Deputy Registrar of this Court. The compromise bears the thumb impressions of the appellant and Shiv Dayal and also signatures of their respective advocates. On October 8, 1964, this Court ordered that the compromise, which has been duly verified by the Deputy Registrar, be kept on record. On the same day, i.e. on October 8, 1974, an application was filed on behalf of Badri Prasad and Nawala praying that they may be impleaded as respondents to contest the appeal, as respondent No. 4 Shiv Dayal had agreed to sell the disputed land to them for Rs. 25,000/- on May 20, 1974, and the entire sale price had been paid to Shiv Dayal. This application was opposed by Shiv Dayal, who filed his affidavit, wherein he completely denied having sold the land to Badri Prasad and Nawala. 25,000/- on May 20, 1974, and the entire sale price had been paid to Shiv Dayal. This application was opposed by Shiv Dayal, who filed his affidavit, wherein he completely denied having sold the land to Badri Prasad and Nawala. The affidavit of Shiv Dayal runs as under:- " eS f'kon;ky iq= xq'>RRk mez djhc 27 lky tkfr jktiwr oklh [kkuiqj esoku rglht fd'kux<+ ftyk vyoj dk gwWa vkSj l/keZ fuEu fyf[kr c;ku djrk gwWa & 1- ;g gS fd vkjkth equuktk ij esjs firk o esjk dCtk u dHkh Fkk vkSj u vc gSA vkjkth eqruktk ij vihykUV xq'>Rrk dk dCtk 'kq# ls gh pyk vk jgk gSA 2- ;g gSa fd eSaus cnzh izlkn o uoyk dks fnukad 20-5-74 dh vkjkt eqruktk dks 25000 #i;s esa cspus dk dksbZ eqnk;nk ugha fd;kA vkSj u gh 2500 #- muls izkIr fd, vkSj u gh vkjkth eqruktk ij mudk dCtk fn;k vkSj blh izdkj vxLr 74 esa eSaus cnzhizlkn o uoyk ls dksbZ 25000 #0 izkIr ugha fd;sA 3- ;g gS fd vkjkth eqruktk ij tc esjk gh dHkh dCtk ugha jgkA vkSj bl gkykr esa fnukad 20&5&74 dks vkjkth eqruktk ij cnzhizlkn o uoyk dh dCtk nsus dk iz'u gh ughA ;g lc dk;kZokgh eux<+Ur gSA 4- ;g gS fd eSaus tks jkthukek ekuuh; vnktr esa is'k fd;k gS mlesa lkQ rkSj ls fy[k fn;k gS fd eqdnek thrus ds i'pkr eq>s ;g rlyh vPNh rjg ls gks xbZ fd vkjkth eqruktk esjs firk dk ,yksV ugha gqbZ] cfYd vihykUV xq'>Rrk dks gqbZA 5- ;g gS fd cnzhizlkn uoyk dk ;g dguk fcYdqy xyr gS fd eSaus vihykUV ls feydj jkthukek is'k fd;k gS vkSj vihy esa rckyr iSnk djnh gSA vlyh ckr ;g gS fd lc dqN rckyr cnzhizlkn uoyk gh dj jgs gSA igys mUgksaus QthZ vxqaBk yxkdj Jh gfj'kpUnz jLrksxh ,MoksdsV dh esjh vksj ls odhy fu;qDr fd;k gS vkSj tc eSa vly #i ls ;gka vk;k rks vc bUgksus ml QthZ dk;Zokgh dks fNikus gsrq ;g ,d ubZ nj[okLr is'k dj nh gSA 6- ;g gS fd eSa lPpkbZ ij pyuk pkgrk gwa] vkSj ;gh dkj.k gS fd eSaus jkthukek is'k dj fn;kA vkjkth eqrukth ds cspuk dk eqgk;nk ;k #i;s izkIr djus dh tks ckr gS oks euxMUr gS] vkSj loZFkk feFkk gSA " 5. The court, after hearing the parties, did not consider it proper to impleaded Badri Prasad and Nawal as respondent in the appeal, but permitted them to intervene, i.e. to act as interveners. This order was passed on November 8, 1974. On August 14, 1975, the learned counsel for the appellant moved an application to withdraw his suit as well as the appeal against all the respondent's except respondent No. 4 Shiv Dayal. This Court, vide its order dated January 8, 1976, allowed the application and permitted the suit and the appeal to be withdrawn against respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3, subject to all just exceptions. It was also ordered that the remaining respondent No. 4 Shiv Dayal will be free to raise an objection regarding non-joinder of the parties. In the mean while, on August 20, 1975, an application was moved on behalf of respondent No. 4 Shiv Dayal with the prayer that he may be allowed to withdraw the compromise petition filed by him on October 7, 1974. That application runs as under:- "The humble respondent No.4 begs to submit as below:- 1. That the appellant and humble respondent No. 4 submitted the compromise petition before this Hon'ble Court on 7th October, 1974 on wrong and unfounded grounds. 2. That the appellant is not the real son of Sonuram. In fact the land in dispute was allotted to my father Gurudatta and after his demise the land vested in me. The decision of the courts below in this regard is correct. 3. That prior to the alleged compromise I had agreed to sell this land to Shri Badri Prasad and Shri Nawala residents of Khanpur and also realised the sale price from them. The appellant misguided me and induced me to sign the alleged compromise dated 7th October, 1974. I am an illiterate man and could not realise the implications of the compromise petition. Now on the reconsideration of the whole matter I realise that the alleged compromise will be against my own interest as well as the third parties namely Badri Prasad and Shri Nawala. I am an illiterate man and could not realise the implications of the compromise petition. Now on the reconsideration of the whole matter I realise that the alleged compromise will be against my own interest as well as the third parties namely Badri Prasad and Shri Nawala. It is, therefore, prayed that humble respondent No. 4 may permitted to withdraw the alleged compromise dated 7.10.1974 on the same may not be recorded." In support of the applicant Shiv Dayal also filed his affidavit dated October 9, 1974, which runs as under:- " eSa f'kon;ky iq= xq'>Rrk mez 28 lky tkfr jktiwr fuoklh [kkuiqj esokuh rglhy fd'kux<+ ftyk vyoj] gl# ls fuEu lc lPp c;ku djrk gwWa fd %& 1- fd eSa mijksDr eqdnes esa jsLiksMsUV ua0 4 gqa vkSj ofdvkr eqdnek ls okfdQ gqaA eSa i<+k fy[kk ugha gqa vkSj jkthukek dh 'krsZ xyr gSA vkSj u gh jkthukek fn0 7-10-74 ls ikcUn gqaA 2- fd eSaus lyXu nj[okLr tks esjs odhy us rS;kj dh gS dh i<+dj le> fy;k gS mlesa ntZ isjk u0 1 ls 3 esa ntZ okfd;kr esjs futh Kku ls lR; gSA " 6. The first question that arises for determination is whether the compromise petition dated October 7, 1974 can be permitted to be withdrawn by Shiv Dayal. A perusal of the application dated August 20, 1975 would reveal that Shiv Dayal sought withdrawal of the compromise dated October 7, 1974 on the ground that the compromise petition dated October 7, 1974 was wrong and based on unfounded grounds. He further added that the appellant was not the real son of Sonu Ram and in fact the land was allotted to his father Gurudatta. He further added that the appellant misguided him and induced him to sign the compromise dated October 7, 1974. In my opinion, none of these grounds is sufficient to permit the withdrawal of the compromise dated October 7, 194, or to set it aside. A Division Bench of this Court in Putto Lal v. His Highness Maharaj Dhiraj Sumer Singhji of Kishengarh, AIR 1963 Raj 63 interpreted the word "lawful" in the phrase "any lawful agreement or compromise", occurring in Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was observed that the compromise, that the court would not act on the agreement or compromise which is unlawful. It was observed that the compromise, that the court would not act on the agreement or compromise which is unlawful. Their Lordships observed that the compromise would be unlawful if the consideration or the object of the compromise is forbidden by law or is of such a nature that if permitted, it would defeat the provision of any law or is fraudulent or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or the court regards it immoral or opposed to public policy, as provided by section 23 of the Contract Act. It was further held that the compromise would be unlawful if it is void on the very face of it at law such as where it may be by way of wager or in restraint of the marriage of any person or for any other similar reason. Their Lordships then considered that where the contention is not that the object or the consideration of the agreement was unlawful in the sense indicated above, or that it was void on the face of it, but that it was brought about by undue influence or fraud or coercion, then such an agreement provided of course it is proved to have been made, should not be condemned as unlawful within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code for it is only voidable and not void. It is well settled that where an agreement is voidable it could be avoided and displaced only after proper investigation and adjudication in a proceeding appropriate for the purpose, that is a suit, and until that is done, such agreement should be accepted to be lawful for the limited purposes of Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code. In the instant case, the compromise was filed as far back as on October 7, 1974 and it was later on reaffirmed by an affidavit dated October 9, 1974. In view of the above facts, I see no good ground to permit Shiv Dayal to withdraw the compromise entered into by him on October 7, 1974. I would, however, make it clear that it would be perfectly open to Shiv Dayal or to any other person affected by the compromise to seek his remedy for having the compromise set aside in separate suit, if he so chooses. 7. I would, however, make it clear that it would be perfectly open to Shiv Dayal or to any other person affected by the compromise to seek his remedy for having the compromise set aside in separate suit, if he so chooses. 7. That next question that arises for determination is whether it is a fit case where a declaration should be granted that the appellant is Gurditta son of Ram Chander. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides that any person entitled to any legal character or any right as to any property may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title to such character or right and the court may, in its discretion, pass as decree for declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff, in such suit, need not ask for any further relief. It may be recalled here that when the suit was filed, Shiv Dayal was not made a party to the suit. The allegations as to making of complaint and denial of title were all made against Phulluram. It a later stage of the trial, the plaintiff got impleaded Shiv Dayal as a co-defendant and Phulluram's name was struck off. While impleading Shiv Dayal as co-defendant, no allegation whatsoever was made in the plaint against Shiv Dayal. There is no allegation in the plaint that Shiv Dayal, at any time, denied the title of the plaintiff to the land or that Shiv Dayal denied that the plaintiff was not Guruditta son of Sonu Ram. Now, to entitle the plaintiff to a declaratory decree, it must be shown that his legal character of right to any property was denied by defendant or that at least he was interested in denying it. No cause of action accrues for grant of declaration until there is infringement or threatened infringement of legal character or to any right to any property. Unless hostility on the defendant's part is alleged and proved, no decree for declaration can be passed in favour of the plaintiff. In the instant case, no hostility on the part of Shiv Dayal was alleged in the plaint. During the pendency of the appeal in this court, Shiv Dayal admitted the plaintiff's claim in compromise petition filed by him. Unless hostility on the defendant's part is alleged and proved, no decree for declaration can be passed in favour of the plaintiff. In the instant case, no hostility on the part of Shiv Dayal was alleged in the plaint. During the pendency of the appeal in this court, Shiv Dayal admitted the plaintiff's claim in compromise petition filed by him. In absence of any allegation as to hostility of title on the part of Shiv Dayal, no declaratory decree against Shiv Dayal can be granted. 8. That apart, in the present case, the plaintiff has given up all the reliefs concerning other defendant respondents by withdrawing his suit as well as the appeal against respondents Nos. 1 to 3, namely, Assistant Settlement Commissioner, Chief Settlement Commissioner, and Managing Officer respectively. At the time of institution of the suit, his main grievance was as to the adverse orders passed by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Having withdrawn the suit against these respondents, the adverse orders passed by the said officers against the appellant are not liable to be set aside. 9. The proviso to section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, lays down that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff being able to seek further relief omits to do so. The proviso thus bar a suit for mere declaration where the plaintiff is in a position to claim additional relief by virtue of the title he seeks to establish or be declared. In the present case, the plaintiff was in a position to claim other reliefs. In fact, he led claim those reliefs but subsequently by withdrawing the suit against respondents Nos. 1 to 3, he impleadly withdrew those reliefs. The plaintiff's case is hit by the proviso. From which ever angle the case is looked into, the plaintiff is not entitled to discretionary relief, namely, a declaratory decree that the appellant is Guruditta son of Sonu Ram. 10. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout. *******