Judgment :- 1. The short question raised in the revision is whether the four documents executed by the petitioner in favour of his four sons on 27121969, purporting to be sale deeds could in law be allowed to be treated as deeds of gift and whether on the materials on record they could be so treated. The documents conveyed 3.691/2 acres, 2.581/2 acres, 2 971/2 acres and 3.66 acres and although the extent of the properties conveyed was different, the amount of consideration recited in them was the same sum of Rs 3,000/-which was stated to have been paid previously. They recited that the parcels of property were already in the possession of the alienees under oral sales and that the deeds were being executed owing to their insistence. In the proceedings initiated on the return filed by him, the petitioner raised an objection that the deeds were sales without receipt of consideration and were in the nature of gifts and should not therefore be invalidated. The Taluk Land Board did not accept this contention and proceeded to determine the petitioner's holding on the basis that they were sales and invalid sales at that. The petitioner challenges the decision of the Taluk Land Board that they are sales and not gifts. 2. The first question at issue is whether in view of the recitals in the deeds as to the acknowledgment of consideration, it is open to the petitioner to contend otherwise counsel for the petitioner arguing that he can while the learned Government Pleader maintaining the contrary. In Ismail Mussajee Mookerdam v. Hafiz Boo, ILR. 33 Calcutta 773 (PC.), a son (the appellant) brought a suit to set aside certain transactions entered into by his mother, in favour of his sister (the respondent) by which the latter acquired most of the mother's properties. The trial court and appellate court agreed in rejecting the plaintiff's allegation that at the time of the transactions the mother was of unsound mind but while the trial court accepted the other allegation of undue influence, the appellate court rejected it and dismissed the suit. On appeal the Privy Council upheld the latter finding (which alone was challenged before it). The appellant however contended that there was no valid transfer to the daughter and that she was a benamidar for her mother and that the whole property formed part of her estate. On appeal the Privy Council upheld the latter finding (which alone was challenged before it). The appellant however contended that there was no valid transfer to the daughter and that she was a benamidar for her mother and that the whole property formed part of her estate. After noting that the mother was prompted by hostility to the appellant and the desire to exclude him from inheritance, the Privy Council observed that one of the transactions under which some property was purchased in the name of the daughter with the funds emanating from the mother's estate could not be treated as benami, considering the mother's object which could not have been attained by any benami transaction. As to another item of property it was the subject of a sale direct to the daughter for Rs. 10,000/- recited to be a prior receipt. After repeating the motive that actuated the mother and finding that the payment of price recited in the sale deed is not true, the Privy Council observed: "The fact that the sum of Rs. 10,000 is mentioned as the price, a sum which, according to the evidence, was far short of the actual value of the property, and the fact that that sum is stated to have been paid in advance, whereas in fact it was not paid at all, are strong to show that the transaction was not a sale, but a gift, with an imaginary consideration inserted, in a manner common in such transactions in India." 3. It is obvious from this case that their Lordships did not go by the consideration stated in the transaction as true or conclusive, but on the evidence rejected that statement and the evidence of the respondent-daughter, and held that it was not a sale but a gift with an imaginary consideration, 4. In Hanif-Un-Nissa and another v. Fais-Un-Nissa and another ILR 33 Allahabad 340 (P.C.), the only questions were whether a sale deed executed by the respondent-plaintiff to the appellants and another embodied a genuine transaction or was merely a fictitious deed and whether the appellants should be allowed to give parole evidence for the purpose of showing that the executant did not take the purchase money specified in the deed, which purported to be. and was a deed of sale on the face of it. and was a deed of sale on the face of it. The High Court had held that the defendants were estopped from giving oral evidence to show that the deed of sale was in reality intended by the executant to be a deed of gift and gave the plaintiffs a decree for money with interest charged on the property. On appeal the Privy Council held that the decree could not be sustained and that the proper course will be to remit the case to the High Court to be dealt with on the evidence. The decision is brief and does not lay down in terms any principle; but it would nevertheless appear that their Lordships did not approve the opinion of the High Court about the denial of the defendants' right to give oral evidence. To that extent the decision is in line with the earlier Privy Council case in ILR 33 Calcutta 773. 5. Nagaratnamba v. Ramayya, AIR. 1963 Andhra Pradesh 177, was concerned with the validity of two sale deeds executed by the Kartha (father) of a joint Hindu family in favour of his concubine, who was the appellant. The recitals in the deeds were that they were executed for cash consideration. In the suits it was found that the appellant's evidence that she paid cash consideration for the deeds was unacceptable and that the consideration was past cohabitation. It was accordingly held: (page 181) "It (the consideration of past cohabitation) cannot therefore be deemed to be a price within the meaning of S.54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus the documents though ostensible sale deeds are in reality deeds of gift within the meaning of S.122 of the Transfer of Property Act, past cohabitation being the motive for making these gifts. As gift deeds, they are not open to question so far as the formalities are concerned. These conveyances having been effected by registered instruments duly signed by the donor and attested by at least two witnesses, the formalities prescribed by S.123 of the Transfer of Property Act are duly complied with. That a document which is ostensibly a sale deed may, having regard to the evidence produced with regard to consideration, be treated as gift deed admits of little difficulty." 6. That a document which is ostensibly a sale deed may, having regard to the evidence produced with regard to consideration, be treated as gift deed admits of little difficulty." 6. The position thus is clear that evidence of nonpayment of consideration under a deed which is ostensibly a sale deed is not prohibited and it is not evidence of any oral agreement for the purpose of contradicting, varying or subtracting from its terms such as is tabooed by S.92, Evidence Act (assuming recital of consideration is a term of the contract or disposition of property). And where there is no proof of payment of price it will not operate as a sale deed; but if the requisites of S.122 and 123, Transfer of Property Act are established, it will take effect as a deed of gift. The petitioner's contention cannot therefore be excluded on the theory that he is disentitled to establish the nonpayment of consideration and to prove that what are in terms sale deeds are in effect only deeds of gift. 7. Despite thus being the law, the petitioner must fail as there is no evidence that the deeds lack consideration or that the recitals of consideration which they acknowledge are false or imaginary. That means that the contention of the petitioners that the deeds should be upheld as gifts must fail. 8. The decision of the Taluk Land Board is confirmed and the revision is dismissed but without costs. Dismissed.