Judgment Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha, J. This application is directed against the order dated the 22nd February, 1973 refusing to consider an application filed on behalf of the petitioners for quashing the cognizance taken against them. The cognizance of the offence has been taken on the 30th March 1971 against thirty five persons, including the petitioners who have been summoned in the case. 2. Some facts will be necessary to be stated for the purpose of disposal of this application. A first information report (Annexure-3 to the application) was lodged on the 7th September 1970 at Chanpatia police station alleging that when about three hundred persons entered into a Farm known as "Lalgarh Farm" in support of the land liberation movement launched by the Socialist Party, they were assaulted by lathis and farsas etc. resulting in injury to several persons including Pandit Ramanand Tiwary who was leading the land liberation movement. Several persons were named in the first information report as accused. The petitioners names did not figure in it. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet on the 10th February 1971 for various offences including offences under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code against the persons named as accused in the said charge sheet. The names of the five petitioners before this Court are mentioned in it at serial nos. 5, 14, 15, 18 and 28. As stated earlier cognizance of the offences was taken on the 30th March 1971 against the persons named in the said charge sheet. After taking cognizance the case was transferred to Shri Janki Sharan Singh. Judicial Magistrate First Class for conducting the inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Reference of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the instant case is to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898). It appears from the order-sheet of the commitment inquiry that the accused persons appeared before the learned Magistrate on the 16th April 1971 on which date some of the accused persons demanded copies of documents filed under section 173 of the Code while going through the order sheet of the case have found that three of the persons who were also summoned in the case, namely, V.K. Jhunjhunwala, S.K. Singh and K.S. Surena filed an application for quashing of the cognizance taken against them. This matter was heard by the said learned Magistrate Shri Janki Sharan Sinha. This matter was heard by the said learned Magistrate Shri Janki Sharan Sinha. One of the arguments made on behalf of the prosecution was that the petition was not maintainable. According to the prosecution, in an inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate conducting the inquiry has no option but to follow the procedure as laid down under section 207A of the Code. No accused could be discharged at any stage prior to the stage as provided under the said provision of the Code. The learned Magistrate, rejecting this argument, observed that notwithstanding there being specific procedure as laid down under section 207A of the Code for dealing with cases initiated on police report it did not stop the court from quashing the proceeding against a person which, if permitted to proceed, would result in abuse of the process of the court. The exact words in which the learned Magistrate has expressed himself deserves to be quoted. It reads like this :- "10. To me it appears that after the introduction of section 207A by the Amending Act, of 1955 into the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is no doubt true that a specific procedure has now been laid down for dealing with cases initiated on police reports, but before this procedure gets attracted, there must be a proper and valid order initiating the proceeding, in other words, if the very foundation of the proceedings commenced either on a private complaint or on a police report, can be said to be vitiated in law, the question of applying the procedure laid down U/s 207A, does not and cannot arise. There can be no doubt that all criminal proceedings including an inquiry U/s 207A postulates the existence of facts prima facie constituting an offence punishable under the law, and if that is so, I see no reason why the existence of section 207A by itself, can stand in the way of determining the question whether on the relevant facts and allegations accepting them on their face value, any offence at all was made or not. I, accordingly, reject the contention of the learned A.P.P. that the applications are: not maintainable and that this court is not competent to examine the validity of the order initiating the proceedings.” It may be stated that this order was challenged by the State in revision before the Sessions Judge, but the revision failed and the order was confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge On the 30th March, 1972 passed in Criminal revision no, 120 of 1971. 3. The petitioners and the other accused had in the meanwhile filed an application on the 19th August, 1971 for quashing of the cognizance taken against them on the ground inter alia that the facts stated in the first information report and in the charge-sheet, even if taken on their face value did not implicate the 'petitioners in the offences for which cognizance has been taken. It appears that this application remained un-disposed of for a pretty long time and in the mean while the inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code was transferred from the file of said Sri Janki Sharan Singh to the file of Sri Rejeshwar Prasad, Judicial Magistrate, who has passed the impugned order. By the impugned order the learned Magistrate has observed that the petition for quashing the cognizance was not maintainable. The reasons which he has given are twofold; (i) A Committing court is not entitled to quash and terminate a criminal proceeding while conducting an inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code, and (ii) that in an inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code if the case is instituted on a police report, the only occasion for discharging an accused would be the one as laid under Section 207A (6) of the Code. The learned Magistrate has observed that, "the question of discharge will be considered at the appropriate time that is, when the proceeding of this case enters into the stage envisaged in clause (6) of Section 207A of the Code." 4. Mr. Ghose appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that the learned Magistrate was wrong in taking the view that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. It has been further submitted that on the facts stated in the first information report and the charge-sheet, there was no case for putting the petitioners to undergo the harassment of the inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code. 5. Mr. It has been further submitted that on the facts stated in the first information report and the charge-sheet, there was no case for putting the petitioners to undergo the harassment of the inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code. 5. Mr. Choudhary appearing on behalf of the State has submitted that since the Magistrate is inquiring into the matter it would not be proper for this Court to ask him to terminate the criminal proceeding against the petitioners at this interlocutory stage. 6. I do appreciate Mr. Choudhary's argument that this Court should be reluctant to exercise its inherent powers to quash a criminal proceeding at an interl ocutory stage but there may be cases where, if the criminal proceedings is permitted to go on against a person, it may not only amount to harassing the person, but would be an abuse of the process of the Court; for example, where the accused validly asserts that even if all the facts stated in the police documents or in the first information report be taken at their face value, they do not at all implicate him in the offence. Should the criminal proceedings against such a person be not quashed even at an interlocutory stage? It is, no doubt, true that section 207A of the Code prescribes the procedure in proceedings instituted on police reports and in terms of - Section 207 it is enjoined upon the Magistrate to follow the procedure specified under Section 207A of the Code. But I think, this does not mean and cannot mean that even after looking into the facts and all the documents filed by the Police, if no case is made out for proceeding against an accused, he must necessarily be made to undergo all the harassment until the stage of Section 207A (6) of the Code is reached, just because it is the police which has initiated the case. I do not think that the law envisages such unnecessary harassment of a person against whom no case is made out. It cannot be gainsaid that it is one of the primary functions of a court of justice to see that no person is uselessly harassed by an abuse of the process of the Court the learned Magistrate has, therefore wrongly approached the petitioner's petition, 7. It cannot be gainsaid that it is one of the primary functions of a court of justice to see that no person is uselessly harassed by an abuse of the process of the Court the learned Magistrate has, therefore wrongly approached the petitioner's petition, 7. I, therefore, direct the learned Magistrate to go into the merits of the petition filed by these petitioners and if he finds that there are no facts inculpating them must be quashed. 8. I, accordingly, allow the application, set aside the impugned order dated the 22nd February, 1973 and remand the case to the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bettiah for disposing it afresh in accordance with law after considering the petition in so far as it concerns these five petitioners on its merits in the light of the observations made above. Application allowed.