Judgment 1. This is an application u/s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by the defendant against a judgment of the learned Small Cause Court Judge, decreeing the suit of the opposite party against him. 2. The plaintiff is a cloth merchant of Jamalpur from whose shop the defendant-petitioner used to purchase cloth. The plaintiffs case is that the defendant purchased cloth on credit from his shop on different dates under credit memos countersigned by him which were duly entered in his books of accounts maintained in the shop in regular course of business. His further case is that after some payments made by the defendant a sum of Rs. 648.48 inclusive of the interest amounting to Rs. 70.00 remained unpaid and, accordingly, he instituted the suit in the court below for recovery of the same. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant on various grounds, inter alia that the purchases made by him were on cash basis and never on credit. The learned S.C.C. Judge, however, on a consideration of the materials on record decreed the suit and this revision application has, accordingly been filed in this Court. 4. Mr. Ramji Saran appearing for the petitioner raised a number of contentions in this small matter. He, firstly, contended that the suit itself was not cognizable by a Court of Small Causes as it was one of suits excepted from the cognizance of that court under Art. 31 of the Second Schedule. That Article reads as follows: "any other suit for an account, including a suit by a mortgagor, after the mortgage has been satisfied, to recover surplus collections received by the mortgagee, and a suit for the profits of immovable property belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received by the defendant." 5. According to the provisions contained in S.15 of this Act all suits of civil nature of which the value does not exceed 500.00 (now Rs. 1000.00 as amended recently) are to be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes unless it is one of such suits which is specified in the Second Schedule and excepted from the cognizance of that court. It follows from the very section that every suit is of small cause nature except those which are specifically excepted from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes by the Second Schedule. It follows from the very section that every suit is of small cause nature except those which are specifically excepted from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes by the Second Schedule. As a matter of fact where a suit is not excepted and its value is less than 1000.00 rupees, prima facie it would be deemed to be a case cognizable by a Court of Small Causes. The nature of the suit under consideration, in my opinion, is not covered under the mischief of Art. 31 as it cannot be called a suit for account. Simply because some accounts are to be taken in a case that a suit does not necessarily become a suit for accounts. It must appear from the allegations made in the plaint that the defendant is an accounting party and that the plaintiffs claims on the footing that account has to be taken to ascertain sum due to him. A suit for an account envisaged by Art. 31 is a special form of suit and would not include every case in which accounts have to be looked into in order to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the amount claimed by the plaintiff. A suit for an account is that suit where the defendant is under an obligation to render accounts to the plaintiff. There must be something more than the mere relationship of debtor and creditor and the defendant must stand in some other relation to the plaintiff, such that of an agent or bailee or receiver or trustee or partner or mortgagee. I find full support for this view from a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Kanhayalal V/s. Hiralal (AIR 1947 Bom 255). A suit for money which will be found due on taking accounts is instituted against a defendant under a legal obligation to render the accounts which the plaintiff has not been in a position to ascertain and in such cases a preliminary decree under Order 20 R.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure has to be passed. Reference to that rule will be also of some use. Reference to that rule will be also of some use. This rule states that in a suit for account of pecuniary transaction between a principal and an agent, and any other suit not herein before provided for, where it is necessary, in order to ascertain the amount of money due to or from any party that an account should be taken, the Court shall before passing its final decree, pass a preliminary decree directing such accounts to be taken as it thinks fit. Coming back to the facts of this case the plaintiff has clearly stated in the plaint of various credit purchases that were made by the defendant and the specific accounts of part payments as well as the resultant balance after adjusting the same. It is prayed, therefore, that it is not the case where account has been taken. Of course, in that connection reference to the accounts book of the plaintiff might be necessary to ascertain the correctness of the plaintiffs claim but that would not change the nature of the suit from one cognizable by a Court of Small Causes to that cognizable by a regular Civil Court. In other words, it would not make out a case for accounts as contemplated by Article 31 of the second Schedule. 6. Mr. Ramji Saran next contended that the acceptance of the genuineness of the credit memos purported to have been counter-signed by the defendant have not been legally proved in view of the fact that the defendant and his other relations who were acquainted with the handwriting had denied the same and the same having not been subjected to an expert opinion under S.45 of the Evidence Act. The learned S.C.C. Judge has rejected the evidence of the defendants witnesses on this point on the testimony of the plaintiff who stated that the defendant had put the signature in his presence. The argument of Mr. Ramji Saran, however was that even it the defendant might have signed on the credit memos in question in the presence of the plaintiff, that would not have qualified him to be a competent person who might be said to be "acquainted" with the handwriting of the defendant within the meaning of S.47 of the Evidence Act. This part of the argument is again erroneous as the argument is based without taking note of the explanation added to S.47. This part of the argument is again erroneous as the argument is based without taking note of the explanation added to S.47. According to explanation: "A person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when he has seen that person write." The evidence of plaintiff was that he had himself seen the defendant writing the disputed signatures on the credit memos and that so much so those were signed in his very presence. The main part of S.47, in my opinion, is intended to apply to those cases where the disputed signatures or writings are not written in presence of any person, but are sought to be proved by those, who although have not seen the person writing the disputed signatures, are otherwise competent to recognise the writing on account of their familiarity and acquaintance with the character of the writing of the person concerned. Mr. Ramji Saran categorically failed to cite any authority whether the testimony of such a person who had seen a person writing in his presence was ever discarded or disbelieved on the ground that was urged by him that that would not make him a person acquainted with the handwriting in question. 7 The last limb of the argument of Mr. Ramji Saran was a challenge of the grant of interest prior to the institution of the suit. He contended that this part of the decree was not covered by S.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in the absence of any cogent evidence that there was an agreement between the parties for payment of such an interest, the grant of the interest was invalid. There is no force in this contention either, as the facts of this case are fully covered by S.61 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act. According to this provision in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the court may award interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the amount of price to the seller and in a suit by him for the amount of the price that from the date of the tender of the goods or from the date on which the price was payable. The facts in the present case are fully covered by this provision of the Sale of Goods Act and, therefore, the court was competent to grant interest against the defendant for the period prior to the institution of the suit. 8. All the contentions raised by Mr. Ramji Saran having been answered against him, this application must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 55.00 only.