JAHAGIRDAR J-On City Survey No. 2880/6, in city of Sholapur, re was a godown, bearing Municipal No. 749/5, belonging to one Rajkumar Laxminarayan Ratbi. Two-third of this godown was rented to Ramgopal Shrikisan Asawa, petitioner in present petition, on a monthly rent of Rs. 69-64. In 1968 said Rajkumar issued a notice terminating tenancy of petitioner with effect from 31st March 1968 and followed this up by filing a suit on 4th May 1968 in Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, for possession of leased premises on various grounds. This suit, being Regular Civil Suit No. 444 of 1%8,was filed by said Rajkumar, as already mentioned, for possession on ground that petitioner was in arrears of rent for more than six months, that petitioner had sublet a portion of suit premises for parking of a car, that petitioner had made a permanent construction without consent of landlord and lastly that landlord required suit premises bona fide and reasonably for his occupation inasmuch as it was necessary for stocking goods in his expanding cloth business. 2. The suit was dismissed by trial Court and in appeal preferred by landlord, on 30-6-I970 consent terms were arrived at between parties and accordingly a decree was passed. 3. Thereafter, on 27th April 1971, said Rajkumar, who was original decree-holder, sold entire building in which suit premises were situated along with decree obtained by him in proceedings mentioned hereinbefore to respondents in this petition. consideration for this assignment is mentioned as Rs. 16,900 in sale-deed thereafter, on 1st September 1971, respondents filed an execution-application, being Regular Darkhast No. 338 of 1971, for possession of premises which petitioner had agreed to deliver to landlord in terms of consent decree passed on 30th June 1970. 4. petitioner resisted Darkhast by contending that decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as "Rent Act”, could not be executed by a person who has not originally obtained decree in suit. He contended that right to take possession under decree is restricted to person who has obtained decree, same being personal to plaintiff in suit for possession. 5. He contended that right to take possession under decree is restricted to person who has obtained decree, same being personal to plaintiff in suit for possession. 5. learned Joint Civil Judge Junior Division, Sholapur, rejected the contention of petitioner and directed Darkhast be proceed by his judgment and order dated 17th July, 1973 thereafter petitioner preferred and appeal, being Civil-Appeal No. 213 of 1973, which was heard and dismissed by II Extra Assistant Judge, Sholapur, by his judgment and decree dated 18th April 1974. While dismissing appeal of petitioner, learned II Extra Assistant Judge held that it was not apparent on face of decree that decree was passed under section 13 (1) (g) of Rent Act and secondly that decree could be executed even by a transferee notwithstanding provisions in section 17 of Rent Act. 6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decree passed by II Extra Assistant Judge of Sholapur, petitioner first preferred Second Appeal No. 860 of 1974 which was admitted. At time of final hearing of the second appeal Mr. Agarwal, learned Advocate appearing for respondents, took an objection to maintainability of appeal on ground that in execution proceedings relating to a decree passed under the Bombay Rent Act a second appeal does not lie to High Court, inasmuch as, a second appeal does not lie against decree itself passed in suit. This preliminary objection was upheld by us and Mr. Jahagirdar, appearing for petitioner, accepted this position and made an oral application for converting second appeal into a writ petition under Article 227 of Constitution. By an order passed on 17th November 1976 we granted this prayer and Mr. Jahaglrdar undertook to file a memo of petition within the time allowed by us incorporating grounds in petition which were already raised in second appeal. On this term and subject to this undertaking, this matter has been heard as a Special Civil Application under Article 227 of Constitution. 7. Mr. Agarwal, who appears for Respondents, waived notice and agreed that we should proceed to hear petition on merits as if it is a special civil application fixed for final hearing subject, however, to his objection that re is an inordinate delay in conversion of second appeal into special civil application and, therefore, on that ground it should be dismissed. Mr. Agarwal, who appears for Respondents, waived notice and agreed that we should proceed to hear petition on merits as if it is a special civil application fixed for final hearing subject, however, to his objection that re is an inordinate delay in conversion of second appeal into special civil application and, therefore, on that ground it should be dismissed. This objection is baseless inasmuch as second appeal was filed in time and when we were to convert it into a petition under Article 227 of Constitution, date of filing must be date on which original appeal itself was filed. Mr. Agarwal further contended that main judgment does not disclose any error of law apparent on its face and, therefore, petition must be dismissed. This objection will be dealt with when we consider case itself. 8. Mr. Jahagirdar, who appears for petitioner, assailed judgments of two Courts below and contended that reasoning of Courts below in support of execution of decree by assignees of decree is defective and their interpretation of provisions of Rent Act and in particular section 13 (1) (g) and section 17 discloses an error of law which is patent on face of the record. It was Mr. Jahagirdar' s contention that decree under section 13 (I) (g) of Rent Act is obtained on ground that landlord reasonably and bona fled requires suit premises for occupation by himself and if, therefore, after decree is passed it is transferred or assigned to some one else, very basis on which decree was passed disappears and, therefore, that decree cannot be executed by assignees or transferees. A necessary corollary of this argument was that right to take possession in pursuance of a decree passed under section 13 (1) (g), is personal to plaintiff in suit in which a decree was passed and restricted to person who has obtained that decree. If such a person, as a result of certain developments after passing of decree, is unable to take possession in pursuance of decree, no one else can be nominated by him to execute decree and to take possession. Mr. Jahagirdar further contended that interest to enjoy property under decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) is restricted in its enjoyment to owner of decree and by virtue of provisions contained in section 6 (d) of Transfer of Property Act same cannot be transferred. Mr. Jahagirdar further contended that interest to enjoy property under decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) is restricted in its enjoyment to owner of decree and by virtue of provisions contained in section 6 (d) of Transfer of Property Act same cannot be transferred. To put it in another way, learned Counsel for petitioner said that though decree is transferable, right to take possession and enjoy property which is an integral part of the decree is an interest which remains with transferor 'Though the transferor has transferred all other interest in the decree, the interest to enjoy the property by executing the decree obtained under section 13 (1) (g) should be carved out and should be left with the transferor who has otherwise sold all the rights, title and interest under the decree. 9. When Mr. Jahagirdar opened his case by pointing out that the decree under execution is a decree under section 13 (1) (g) of the Rent Act, Mr. Agarwal, appearing for the respondents, pointed out that the decree on the face of it does not show that it is a decree under section 13 (1) (g) and, therefore, all the arguments which may be built up by Mr. Jahagirdar on the ground that It is a decree under section 13 (1) (g) will be without any foundation. It is undoubtedly true, as Mr. Agarwal Contends and as Mr. Jahagirdar without difficulty concedes, that the decree ass it stands does not disclose that it was passed under section 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. In fact it does not disclose at all that it was passed under the Rent Act itself. Mr. Jahagirdar contended that in the execution proceeding he is entitled to take objection on the ground that the decree in inexecutable because it is under section 13 (1) (g) and on the grounds which we have already summarised above and which will be examined later on. If he is entiled to resist the decree on the ground that it is inexecutable, he is also further entiled to show what the nature of the decree is and in what circumstances it was passed. 10.It is now well settled that special court constituted under the Bomba1 Rent Act, as under other Rent Acts cannot pass a decree except on one or the ground mentioned in Rent Act. 10.It is now well settled that special court constituted under the Bomba1 Rent Act, as under other Rent Acts cannot pass a decree except on one or the ground mentioned in Rent Act. As decree under execution does not disclose on what ground it was passed and whether it was passed under the Rent Act at all it was necessary to find out the ground on which it was passed If a Court posses a decree on a ground de hors the Act then that decree would be a nullity. Mr. Jahagirdar however concedes that he is not attacking this decree on the ground that it is a nullity but he says that he is entitled to show that the decree under execution is a consent decree and that it does not bear imprint of the reasoning of the. Court passing that decree that it is a decree passed validly on one ground or the other mentioned in the Rent Act itself and he cannot argue on the inexecutability of decree unless he is allowed to refer to the material on record because of the absence of recitals in the consent decree For this purpose be relied upon a judgment of Supreme Court in Mr. K. K. Chari v. R. M. Sheshadri1. While dealing with question that the Court the Rent Act must pass a decree of eviction on one or the other ground mentioned in the Act and if at same stage the consent decree does not disclose whether it was passed after the satisfaction of the Court of the existance of one or the other ground necessary for passing a decree, it was held, it would be legitimate to refer to the other material on record to be satisfied that there was same material before the Court which passed the decree. 11. The Supreme Court in abovesaid decision aid: ‘… It is no doubt true that the order on the face of it dose not show that the court has expressed its satisfaction that the requirement of the landlord is boan fide. If the court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that will conclude the matter. That the court was so satisfied can also be considered from point of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for court to apply its mind to relevant question. If the court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that will conclude the matter. That the court was so satisfied can also be considered from point of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for court to apply its mind to relevant question. Other materials on record can also be taken into account to find out if court was so satisfied…” If material on record or than decree itself could be referred to for finding out whether decree has been validly passed, Mr. Jahagirdar contends that same material can be referred to for purpose of finding out on what ground decree has been passed, as he says a decree passed by Special Courts under Rent Act cannot be valid unless it is passed on one or the other ground mentioned in statute. If decree itself does not show on what ground it was passed, it will be legitimate to find out from or records as to ground on which it was being passed. 12. The duty of executing Court has been explained by Supreme Court in Bhavan Vaja and others v. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang and another3 in following terms: “It is true that an executing court cannot go behind decree under execution. But that does' not mean that it has no duty to find out true effect of that decree. For construing a decree it can and in appropriate cases, it ought to take into consideration pleadings as well as proceedings leading upto decree. In order to find out meaning of words employed in a decree Court, often has to ascertain the circumstances under which those words came to be used. That is plain duty of executing Court and if that Court fails to discharge that duty it has plainly failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. Evidently the executing court in this case thought that its jurisdiction began and ended with merely looking at decree as it was finally drafted …" 13. We uphold this contention of Mr. Jahagirdar and allow him to refer to or material, if any, on record for purpose of finding out that decree passed is under section 13 (1) (g) and not under any or section. Mr. We uphold this contention of Mr. Jahagirdar and allow him to refer to or material, if any, on record for purpose of finding out that decree passed is under section 13 (1) (g) and not under any or section. Mr. Jahagirdar referred us to what has been described as a judgment by learned District Judge of Sholapur before whom consent terms were arrived at and who passed decree under those consent terms Learned District Judge briefly reviewed evidence which had been recorded before trial Court which had dismissed suit and expressed his opinion that plaintiff had no case for possession of suit premises on grounds that petitioner had erected a permanent structure or that the petitioner had committed default in respect of rent for more than six months or that petitioner had sublet any part of suit premises. He was, however, of view that landlord was entitled to possession and must be granted possession on ground that he bona fide and reasonably required it for using as a godown. Mr. Jahagirdar rightly points out that learned District Judge was satisfied of existence of evidence regarding bona fide and reasonable requirement and of total absence of or three grounds on which landlord had brought suit. After learned District Judge applied his mind as detailed above and gave his views, he stated that parties entered into settlement terms of which are as follows :- “ ORDER The appeal is allowed. A decree in terms as stated below. Both parties have now settled matter and defendant accepts and agrees that he would delver possession of half portion of god own in his possession so that the plaintiff may set up a wall and utilise half of portion in possession of defendants, that is be say approximately 1/3rd of it is in possession of tenant and out of remaining portion in possession of defendant half portion of the godown would be surrendered by defendants in favour of plaintiff as soon as he constructs wall and separates portion for his own use. It is further accepted that rent for such portion as will be continued with defendant would be Rs. It is further accepted that rent for such portion as will be continued with defendant would be Rs. 35 per month and month of tenancy would be according to Gregorian calender from first of each month to last day of each month landlord will have choice to select the portion to be taken by him and defendant will have half portion that will be left out by landlord. It is accepted by both parties that y would devise ways and means of setting up of wall and taking possession, in case y are unable to settle matter, Court executing decree should decide mode of division and get partition wall constructed under supervision of a Court Commissioner, and deliver half portion to plaintiff in execution of decree. In case defendant in any manner non· cooperate, Court executing decree will be entitled to give appropriate direction for costs or damages sufferred by plaintiff on account of non-cooperation of defendant in Ploceeding in execution of this decree. Defendant will be liable to pay rent at rate of Rs. 69-64 for period till which partition will be set up. Order of costs passed by trial Court in suit stands confirmed in respect of suit; but parties shall bear their costs in respect of appeal as incurred. Dated 30th June, 1970." 14. As terms mentioned above stand, y do not disclose, as contended by Mr. Jahagirdar, ground on which decree for possession had been passed by learned District Judge. 15. After having thus satisfied us that decree in execution was a decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) of Rent Act, Mr. Jahagirdar contended that interest which is a part of decree for occupying and enjoying property after decree is executed cannot be transferred in view of provisions contained in section 6 (d) of Transfer of property Act. That provision is as follows:- "An interest in property restricted in its enjoyment to owner personally cannot be transferred by him. " We are not inclined to accept this submission of Mr. Jahagirdar because in first place an interest in decree cannot be carved out separately as suggested by him. If entire decree is transferred, it is not possible to retain part of rights or interests contained in that decree. " We are not inclined to accept this submission of Mr. Jahagirdar because in first place an interest in decree cannot be carved out separately as suggested by him. If entire decree is transferred, it is not possible to retain part of rights or interests contained in that decree. Secondly we are also satisfied that the right to occupy and possess the property in pursuance of the decree is not an Interest in the property restricted in Its enjoyment to the owner person ally. landlord can obtain possession of property in pursuance of any decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) and property can be enjoyed by any person or than landlord. 16. The next argument, which is more elaborate, advanced by Mr. Jahagirdar was that when analysing scheme of Act and in particular provisions of section 13 (1) (g) and section 170f Act, it is implicit that a decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) cannot he transferred especially to strangers and such a transfer, if made, will not enable the stranger to execute the decree. According to him, if execution of such a decree by transferee or assignees is allowed, it would defeat provisions of section 17 of Rent Act and entire decree will lead to contravention of said provisions and if Court comes to conclusion that execution of decree leads to illegal results, Court should not lend assistance to such execution. 17. Sub-section (1) of section 17 of Rent Act provides that where a decree for eviction has been passed by Court on ground specified in clause (g) of sub-section (1) of section 13 and premises are not occupied within a period of one month from date on which landlord recovers possession, erstwhile tenant is entitled to make an application to Court which can order landlord to place tenant in occupation of premises from which he has been evicted tenant is thus entitled to reinstatement in case landlord fails to occupy premises within one month after he obtains premises in execution of a decree passed under section 13 (1) (g). It is now settled by Supreme Court that requirement of occupation of premises within one month after execution of a decree relates to a decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) as also requirement of construction work to be commenced within a period of one month in case of a decree obtained under section 13 (1) (i) (vide Krishanlal Ishwarlal Desai v. Rai Vijkor and ors3). According to Mr. Jahagirdar, landlord mentioned in section 17 (1) is landlord who has obtained a decree; it is same landlord who has authority to execute decree and obtained possession; it is again same landlord who has to occupy premises possession of which he has thus obtained. If section 13 (1) (g) and section 17 are read together, as indeed y ought to be read together, Mr. Jahagirdar says that landlord who figures in latter section must be same landlord who had appeared in earlier section. Decree for self-occupation cannot be obtained by one landlord and executed by another landlord. At first sight argument advanced by Mr. Jahagirdar appears to be attractive as it apparently advances object for which Rent Act was enacted. If a landlord obtains a decree on ground that he requires suit premises for occupation by himself or by members of his family and after obtaining decree he transfers same it will, according to Mr. Jahagirdar, give a handle to persons who have wherewithals to purchase decree and to execute same If we were to rest our judgment only on object of Rent Act and possible abuses to which any or interpretation would lead we would have upheld contention of Mr. Jahagirdar. 18. But for purpose of interpreting provisions of section 17 as narrowly as is Suggested by Mr. Jahagirdar it would require more explicit and compelling reasons than ones mentioned by Mr. Jahagirdar. It must be noted that decree is culmination of a suit which has been filed on a cause of action. As soon as a decree is passed, original cause of action is merged in it and has no separate existence decree is property which is capable of being transferred or assigned as any or form of property is capable of being assigned or transferred. As soon as a decree is passed, original cause of action is merged in it and has no separate existence decree is property which is capable of being transferred or assigned as any or form of property is capable of being assigned or transferred. If it is so, to hold that a particular decree is incapable of being transferred or assigned or at any rate incapable of being executed it will be necessary to look for much stronger restrictions than those suggested by interpretation put by learned counsel for petitioner on section 17 property can be transferred under a law; transferee of a property who is owner of that property is entitled to handle it as an owner of any or property. If, therefore, it is being suggested that a particular type of property is subject to limitation and restrictions those limitations and restrictions must be found clearly or by necessary implication in some provision of law. We are unable to accept that provisions of section 17 of Rent Act impose any such restriction by necessary implication; that y do not expressly impose such restriction is obvious. 19. Mr. Jahagirdar in support of his submission referred to a decision of Nagpur High Court, viz., Dwarkanath Jaggannath Gupta v. Amarnath Gopinath Gupta". That was a case under Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order (1949). Clause 13 (3) of said order contemplated a personal need of landlord as a ground for grant of permission to terminate tenancy. Petitioner No.1 in se proceedings was far of petitioner No.2 and was landlord of a house which was in occupation of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 in that petition as tenants. Petitioner No.1 made an application to Controller for permission to terminate tenancy but before this permission was granted, re was a partition in family and suit house was allotted to Petitioner No.2. The question n arose as to whether petitioner No.1 could continue proceedings for obtaining permission under clause 13 (3) of aforesaid order. It was held that since property itself had been transferred to a person or than one on whose behalf permission was being sought proceedings could not be continued on behalf of petitioner No. 1. In that case proceedings were continuing and had not culminated in passing of a decree which is case here We do not, therefore, think that said decision will assist Mr. In that case proceedings were continuing and had not culminated in passing of a decree which is case here We do not, therefore, think that said decision will assist Mr. Jahagirdar in any way. 20. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Jahagirdar on a decision of Madras High Court in Dr. Mohammad Ibrahim v. Rahim Khan5. Madras High Court held that an order of Rent Controller directing tenant to put landlord in possession of his house on ground that landlord desired to occupy house himself is one for personal benefit of landlord and is not capable of execution after death of landlord at instance of his legal representatives. Mr. Jahagirdar with considerable justification contends that if according to said the decision legal representatives of deceased landlord who had obtained decree for possession on ground of bona fide requirement for personal occupation could not execute decree, assignees could do so much less y being total strangers to proceedings which culminated in decree and also to family of landlord. The learned single Judge of the Madras High Court while delivering said judgment held that like a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or like a decree in favour of a widow to reside in a house decree obtained by a landlord for possession of premises on ground of requirement of personal occupation is a personal decree and with death of landlord-decree-holder substratum of decree is demolished with result that decree itself becomes inexecutable. 21. With great respect we are unable to agree with observations in said judgment which compare a decree for possession of suit property on ground of personal requirement of a landlord with a decree for restitutution of conjugal rights or with a decree in favour of a widow to reside in a house. The provisions of Bombay Rent Act do not at any place impose any limitations or fetters on person who obtains a decree to transfer same in favour of any or persons; re is no modification of rule or general Jaw, viz., that a decree can be transferred like any or property can be transferred. There is no reason for us to hold that a decree for possession of suit premises for personal requirement of landlord, like any or decree cannot be transferred. There is no reason for us to hold that a decree for possession of suit premises for personal requirement of landlord, like any or decree cannot be transferred. In any case, observations of single Judge in abovementioned decision are contrary to judgment of Chief Justice Chagla in Kadarbhai Dossaji v. Sugrabai w/0 Mohommadali Esufali6. The facts of case decided by Chief Justice Chagla were that plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 had filed a suit in Small Causes Court at Bombay for possession of certain premises on ground that the required same for use and occupation in order to carryon a business. They succeeded in obtaining a decree but before execution could be concluded, plaintiff No.1, died and in execution proceedings heirs of plaintiff No.1, though not necessary, were brought on record. The executing Court held that execution proceedings were maintainable despite death of plaintiff No. 1. This decision was challenged in a revision petition in High Court and it was contended on behalf of petitioner judgment-debtor that with the death ·of original plaintiff No.1 basis of decree had vanished and, therefore. the decree could not be executed. Rejecting this contention learned Chief Justice pointed out: “…That to me is a very startling proposition of law. I can understand a plaintiff dying pending suit. In that case question always arises whether cause of action which was in him survived to his legal representatives. If cause of action did not survive suit must abate and must fail. But I have never heard this proposition being advanced in relation to a decree. Once a decree is passed cause of action is merged in decree and in law legal representative of deceased decree holder is entitled to execute decree, even though the decree might have been personal to plaintiff. The legal representative does not execute decree in his own right, but in the right of the estate which he represents That to my mind is an elementary proposition and Rent Act does not in any way alter that elementary proposition …” 22. This proposition of law laid down by the learned Chief Justice must be held to be applicable to assignees of decrees also for re is nothing in Rent Act to hold otherwise, viz., assignees of a decree cannot execute a decree. 23. At this stage we may refer to a decision of Gujarat High Court in Budhaji Bakorji v. Desai Shantilal7. 23. At this stage we may refer to a decision of Gujarat High Court in Budhaji Bakorji v. Desai Shantilal7. The facts in that case disclose that opponent had obtained a decree for possession of suit premises on ground mentioned in clause (i) of section 13 (I) and after decree was passed assigned decree to respondents in petition before High Court. It was contended on behalf of tenants that decree passed under clause (i) of sub-section (I) of section 13 was a personal decree and that decree could only be executed by person who was landlord at time when cause of action arose and that it could not be executed by anyone else. Mr. Justice Miabhoy, who heard petition, rejected this contention and while doing so relied upon judgment of Chief Justice Chagla to which we have already referred above. Mr. Agarwal, who appears for respondent points out that there is no distinction, in so far as the executability is concerned, between decree passed under section 13 (1) (i) and section 13 (1) (g) of Rent Act. Mr. Agarwal says that contention of Mr. Jahagirdar that provisions of section 17 by necessary implication exclude possibility of a decree under section 13 (1) (g) being executed by a person or than one the one who obtained decree cannot be accepted in view of decision of Gujarat High Court as well as decision of Chief Justice Chagla of our High Court. 24. For the reasons which we have already indicated above, we are of the opinion that a decree which is a property under general law can be transferred unless re is a specific limitation or restriction placed upon it by any law. Rent Act does not place any such limitation or restriction. We cannot infer such a restriction from provisions of section 17. A restriction on right which is recognised under the law of land must be provided more explicitly. 25. It would not be out of place to mention here that prior to 1953 there was a provision under Rent Act which prohibited a person who purchased a property after 1947 from filing a suit for possession of property on ground mentioned in section 13 (1)(g) of Rent Act. In 1953 this restriction was removed. 25. It would not be out of place to mention here that prior to 1953 there was a provision under Rent Act which prohibited a person who purchased a property after 1947 from filing a suit for possession of property on ground mentioned in section 13 (1)(g) of Rent Act. In 1953 this restriction was removed. At no time neither n or since n a restriction on transferability of a decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) has been included in Rent Act. If re is no restriction on transferability of decree itself re is no reason for us to go further and say that executability of decree transferred can be stopped. 26. We are able to find support to our view from decision of Queen's Bench of High Court in Goldthorne v. Bain8 This was a unanimous judgment of three Judges. In that case landlord's mother had obtained an unconditional order for possession on 8th March 1951 and before order could be executed she died on 30th August 1951. By her will she left house to her daughter. on 5th December 1951 executors under will executed an assent to the devise thereby vesting legal estate in daughter The daughter thereafter claimed that she was entitled to benefit of order of 8th March 1951. trial Court had ordered delivery of possession of house to landlord's daughter. Somervell L. J., who delivered leading judgment said that it was not an order which ceases on death of landlord who obtained order conceding that re could be certain illogicality about it learned Lord Justice said that it could never have been suggested that if a landlord, who had obtained an order, such as present died before he had time to move in, tenant could claim that status quo ought to be re-established conclusion to which Lord Justice came was reinforced by difficulties of applying to circumstances which might arise in or cases principle on which learned (County) Judge based himself Jankins L. J. who gave major judgment concurring with Somervell L. J., said as follows: "…. I think it is impossible to draw a distinction between orders based on a default of tenant, such as non-payment of rent, and orders based on personal circumstances of the landlord. I think it is impossible to draw a distinction between orders based on a default of tenant, such as non-payment of rent, and orders based on personal circumstances of the landlord. In both cases, as it seems to" me the circumstances on the strength of which the landlord is seeking possession, and, indeed, the overriding condition as to reasonableness of making the order, must be considered with reference to the facts as to they stand at date of hearing. The order, once made, is an order which, though subject to the special provisions of section 5 (2) of the Act of 1920 applicable to orders for possession in Rent Act ceases, remains, notwithstanding death of original plaintiff, a valid order for possession and one capable or enforcement by successors in title of the original plaintiff…, 27. We are, therefore, of opining that the respondents who are assignees of a decree passed in favour of their assignor far possession of the suit premises on ground mentioned in clause (g) of section 13 (1) are entitled to' execute to decree for possession. There is no force in Mr. Jahagirdar's contention that subsequent to passing of decree there is a change in the circumstances which change in fact brings about a change in complexion of decree itself and decree becomes inexecutable. For this purpose he relied upon a judgment of the Madras High Court in Chinna Goundan v. Kalyanasundaram lyer9, which lays down that a judgment-debtor is not debarred from raising a plea in execution proceedings that a change in law renders the decree inexecutable though the decree was valid when it was passed. He also relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwalal10, in which it was held by Supreme Court over ruling Phoo' Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwallia11 that despite the death of plaintiff in suit far possession of premises on ground of bona fide personal requirement suit could be continued by his heirs and legal representatives. Supreme Court according to Mr. Jahagirdar further held that if a stranger is brought on record in place of the original plaintiff the suit cannot proceed. We do not think law laid down by the decisions affects our judgment. In fact, we have allowed Mr. Supreme Court according to Mr. Jahagirdar further held that if a stranger is brought on record in place of the original plaintiff the suit cannot proceed. We do not think law laid down by the decisions affects our judgment. In fact, we have allowed Mr. Jahagirdar to contend that the decree is inexecutable but we have rejected his contention on the ground that no restriction which he has suggested could be read into the provisions of the Rent Act. 28. In the result, Special Civil Application is liable to' be dismissed. The point of law involved in petition is not covered directly by any reported decision. The Petitioner had consented to part with the possession of a part of premises in his possession on the ground that it would be occupied by his landlord One cannot, therefore, say that the petitioner was unjustified in resisting the claim for possession made by transferee in decree. In se circumstances we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. 29. Rule discharged. Rule discharged. :'