Judgement ORDER:- This Civil Revision under S.115 of the Civil Procedure Code is directed against an order dated 20-5-1974 passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 8 of 1973 arising out of Title Suit No. 15 of 1971. 2. The petitioner company, as plaintiff, filed a suit, being Title Suit No. 15 of 1971, in the court of the Munsiff at Mangaldoi against the opposite party for a declaration of title and for ejectment from the suit land. The opposite party as defendant appeared in court and filed written statement and in due course the matter came up before the learned Munsiff who passed an ex parte decree on 14-11-1972. Thereafter, on 11-1-1973 the opposite party filed an application purported to be under Or. 9 R.13 of the Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the ex parte decree, which was contested by the present petitioner and thereafter several adjournments were taken by the parties from time to time and at long last the matter was posted for hearing on 14-3-1974. But on that date the Presiding Officer of the court, namely, the Munsiff was absent. On that date, on behalf of the petitioner, an application was filed complaining that although the present O. P. was away in Bangladesh, in the Hazira filed in Court his name was shown as present in court on 13-1-1974 and 14-3-1974. On receipt of this application, the Civil Shristadar in charge of the Munsiffs court, who could not fix any date of hearing of the suit passed an order directing that the matter may be put up for orders on 22-4-1974; on 22-4-1974, the learned Munsiff was again absent and accordingly the matter had to be put off for 20-5-1974. The order dated 22-4-1974 as well, was passed by the Civil Shristadar who had no power and jurisdiction to fix a date of hearing of the suit. Accordingly the case came up on 20-5-1974 before the Munsiff. As stated earlier, on that date, apparently the case was not fixed for hearing of any other matter excepting for consideration of the application filed by the petitioner on 14-3-1973. But on that date, namely, 20-5-1974, the present petitioner filed an application stating about the illness of the representative of the plaintiff-company and also stated that the learned counsel of the petitioner was away in Shillong, wherefor a prayer was made for adjournment. But on that date, namely, 20-5-1974, the present petitioner filed an application stating about the illness of the representative of the plaintiff-company and also stated that the learned counsel of the petitioner was away in Shillong, wherefor a prayer was made for adjournment. But the learned Munsiff rejected the said application stating that the applicant namely, one Tarini Misra had no locus standi to file the said application and in the same breach the learned Munsiff restored the suit to file observing as under:- "The original suit is restored to file due to the absence of the plaintiff." 3. This application has been filed under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and is directed against the impugned order dated 20-5-1974. Sri J.N. Sarma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has questioned the validity of the impugned order on the following grounds:- (i) That the learned Munsiff had no jurisdiction vested in him by law to take up the hearing of the case on 20-5-1974 inasmuch as the case was never fixed for hearing on 20-5-1974 and therefore the learned Munsiff was bound to adjourn the case to some other date for hearing. (2) That the application under Or.9 R.13 C.P.C. was apparently barred by limitation and, as such, the learned Munsiff assumed jurisdiction not vested in him by law in taking up and disposing of the matter, when apparently and admittedly the application was barred by limitation. He contended that the decree was passed ex parte on 14-11-1972 and the application under O. 9 rule 13 was made on 11-1-1973 and as such the application was beyond the period of limitation and there is nothing on record to show that there was any application made by the opposite party praying for condonation of the delay under any provision of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. (3) That in any view of the matter, no revival of the nature could be made by any Civil Court in exercise of its power under Or.9 R.13 of the Civil Procedure Code inasmuch as a Civil Court acting under the Code of Civil Procedure can restore a suit to its file only after complying with the mandatory provisions contained in Or.9 Rule 13 of the Code. According to the learned counsel, under the foresaid provision it was incumbent upon the petitioner to satisfy the court either (i) that the summons was not duly served or (ii) that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing in court when the suit was called on for hearing. In the absence of the satisfaction as set forth above, the Court had no jurisdiction to restore the suit under O. 9 R. 13 of the Code. In the instant case, according to the learned counsel, the suit was restored in view of the absence of the plaintiff which is absolutely foreign or extraneous to O.9 R.13 and as such the impugned order must be held to have been made without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction vested in it by law. 4. Having heard the learned counsel and also on perusal of the record, I am of definite opinion that on 20-5-1974, the matter could not have been taken up for hearing by the learned Munsiff. The matter was set down for hearing on 14-3-1974 on which date, the Presiding Officer was absent, but an application was filed by the plaintiff and the Civil Shristadar of the court passed an order directing that the application should be put up for orders on 22-4-1974. On 22-4-1974 the learned Munsiff was absent and therefore the Civil Shristadar directed that the matter may be placed for orders before the learned Munsiff. The Civil Shristadar had no jurisdiction vested in him by law either under the Civil Procedure Code or under the Civil Rules and Orders to make any judicial order like fixing a date of hearing of a suit. This being the admitted position, there is no escape from the conclusion that 20-5-1974 was not the date set down for hearing of the application under O. 9 R. 13 of the Code. Under the circumstances. I am of the opinion that the learned Munsiff acted illegally and without jurisdiction in taking up the matter for hearing on 20-5-1974 and disposing of the same in the absence of the plaintiff and his counsel. Accordingly I hold that the impugned order was made without jurisdiction. 5. Besides I find the second contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has sufficient force. Accordingly I hold that the impugned order was made without jurisdiction. 5. Besides I find the second contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has sufficient force. When an application under O. 9 R. 13 of the Code was filed beyond the prescribed limit, the learned Munsiff ought to have decided the question as to whether in fact he had the jurisdiction vested in him by law to entertain an application filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. S. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 clearly lays down that no matter whether any objection is taken or not, it is the duty of the court to ascertain as to whether the application appeal etc. is filed within the period of limitation. This has not been done in the instant case. There is no application for condonation of the period of limitation. In any view of the matter, when the application was filed beyond the period of limitation, there ought to have been an order of the court condoning the delay for one reason or the other and in the absence of any such finding, I must hold that the learned Munsiff acted beyond his jurisdiction vested in him by law. A question of limitation is undoubtedly a question of jurisdiction of the court. No court can entertain and dispose of an application, appeal etc. when the same is presented beyond the period of limitation. It can assume jurisdiction to dispose of the matter only after condoning the delay. In the instant case, the said order of condonation of delay not having been made by the learned Munsiff, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 6. The next point which has been urged by the learned counsel by itself is enough to hold that the impugned order is without jurisdiction. The learned counsel is absolutely justified in submitting that the power of the court to restore a suit is circumscribed and limited by the express provision contained in O.9 R.13 of the code. On no ground other than those enumerated in O. 9 R. 13 of the Code a court can set aside an ex parte decree. For setting aside the decree, the applicant must satisfy the court that (i) the summons was not served or that (ii) he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing in court when the suit was called on for hearing. For setting aside the decree, the applicant must satisfy the court that (i) the summons was not served or that (ii) he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing in court when the suit was called on for hearing. In the present case, the impugned order was passed not on any of the aforesaid ground. Queerly enough the suit was restored to file "due to the absence of the plaintiff." This is not a ground on which a civil Court can set aside an ex parte decree. Accordingly I am constrained to hold that the impugned order is absolutely without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained. 7. In the result, the application is allowed and the impugned order dated 20-5-1974 is set aside and the matter is sent down to the Munsiff, Mangaldoi for disposal in accordance with law, and in the light of the observations made herein. 8. Before parting with the records, I mast observe that the above conclusion regarding the question of limitation is not my final opinion. When this matter will go down to the learned Munsiff, he should consider as to whether the application was filed within the period of limitation or not and/or as to whether the present opposite party had sufficient ground for not submitting the application within the period of limitation. The learned Munsiff should dispose of this matter first and thereafter, giving opportunities to the parties, proceed to dispose of the matter in terms of O. 9 R. 13 of the Code. 9. In the result, the petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. No order as to Costs. Revision allowed.