JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated November 23, 1967 passed by Sri S.A. Muqtadir, Addl. Commissioner, Jhansi dismissing the first appeal against the judgment dated July 21, 1966 passed by the J.O., Hamirpur in suit No. 28 of 1965-66 under Section 176 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have and have gone though the record. 3. Sunder Lal respondent No. 1 had filed a suit for division of his ?th share in certain plots. The suit was contested by Smt. Rukia who denied ?th share of the plaintiff and claimed that she herself had acquired ?rd share in the land though a sale deed. The trial court decreed the plaintiffs suit. The first appellate dismissed the first appeal fired by Smt. Rukia. She haw now come up in second appeal before this court. 4. During the pendency of the second appeal respondent No. 1 Sunder Lal died on October 1, 1973. an application for substitution of his heirs and legal representative has been made by the counsel for the appellant on March 4, 1975 along with a prayer for condonation of delay. The counsel for the respondents has on the other hand contended that the appeal may be abated on the ground that the substitution application has been moved beyond time and sufficient cause for condonation of delay has not been shown. This question has been argued at length by the counsels of both sides. 5. It is not in doubt that the substitution application is time-barred as it has been moved more than 16 months after the death of the respondent No. 1. The learned counsel for the appellant has however, taken the plea that he came to know of the death of respondent No. 1 only on February 10, 1975 in court as the appeal was fixed for hearing on that date and that the appellant who was a lady of about 90 years of age came to know of the death of the respondent No. 1 only through his counsel on February 17, 1976. An affidavit has been on the other hand sworn in by Vinod Chandra Saxena who claims to be the uncle of the deceased that Babu Singh s/o appellant who has been appellant's Pairokar in this case came to know of the death of Sunder Lal on October 1, 1973 as he also had his cultivation in village Surha which is an adjoining village of Poora and that in the disputed plot both the appellant and the respondent No. 1 had ?th share and both cultivated the same plot together. A fortnight after the death of Sunder Lal the deponent met Babu Singh and on the latter's query about the shaving of his head he told the latter that his brother Sunder Lal had died on October 1, 1973. He has also stated in his affidavit that Babu Singh permanently resides in village Poora. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited a number of decisions of various courts in support of his contention that the condonation of delay should be made in favour of this client. The first decision he has referred to is Durga Devi v. Sheoram, A.I.R. 1932 Lah. 148 in which the court has observed as follows :- "The appellant is the widow of Mr. Jagat Ram Khosla Barrister-at-law, who had been practising at Lyallpur and who died son-less in May 1921. It is not denied that she is a Pardanashin lady and it appears that she had given up residence at Lyallpur and had been living at Lahore for some years. Shiv Ram, respondent, was a reader in a Magistrate's Court at Lyallpur but, for some reason or other, he had gone to Karachi where he died in October, 1929. There is no reliable evidence to show that the death of Shiv Ram was known at Lahore or to Mt. Durga Devi personally. The affidavits filed by Mt. Lachhmi and Mt. Thakar Devi are not in proper form and cannot be received in evidence. It is established to our satisfaction that the first intimation which the appellant received of the death of Mr. Shiv Ram was from a letter from her counsel, Mr. Kishan Dayal, who had been informed by the High Court office that notice sent to the respondent had been received back with the report that he had died. It is established to our satisfaction that the first intimation which the appellant received of the death of Mr. Shiv Ram was from a letter from her counsel, Mr. Kishan Dayal, who had been informed by the High Court office that notice sent to the respondent had been received back with the report that he had died. Having regard to the facts, that the appellant is a Pardanashin lady, that she had cut off all connections with Lyallpur, and that the respondent died in a different province, we are of opinion that sufficient cause has been shown for not making the application within time. We therefore overrule the preliminary objection." 7. The second decision he has referred to is Parasnath Rai v. Tilesra Kr., 1965 A.L.J. 1081 in which the court has observed as below :- "If, therefore, it is proved that a woman, although she is not a Pardahnashin lady, suffers from the disabilities to which a Pardahnashin lady is presumed to be subject, the validity and the binding nature of a deed executed by her have to be judged in the light of those very principles which are applied to a deed by a Pardahnashin lady. Where the plaintiff was illiterate and when she executed the deed in question she was not only more than sixty years only but was also hard of hearing and she was described by the defendants themselves as a foolish and rustic woman completely devoid of intelligence, and according to the finding of the lower appellate court she was correctly described as such, and besides the defendants stood in relation to her in a position of active confidence held that there could be no doubt that she was as much entitled to the protection of the law as a Pardahnashin lady." 8. The 3rd decision he has referred to is Wajid Ali v. Fagoo Mandal, A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 125 in which the Court has observed as follows :- "When the appellant has already succeeded in serving the notice of the appeal on the respondent, he has done all that is expected of him to do in connection with the appeal. He is not thereafter bound to inquire from day to day as to the state of the health of the respondent or whether he is dead or alive." 9. The 4th decision he has referred to is Mohd. He is not thereafter bound to inquire from day to day as to the state of the health of the respondent or whether he is dead or alive." 9. The 4th decision he has referred to is Mohd. Mohsin v. Muhammad Abid, 91 I.C. 1925 p. 560 in which the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court has held as below :- "In an application to set aside an abatement of a suit, the question of sufficient cause is to be determined with reference to the facts of the particular case. A plaintiff who did not substitute on the record the legal representatives of the defendant, who died, within time, applied to set aside the abatement on the ground of his ignorance of the death of defendant. It appeared that the plaintiff was in service at a place about a hundred miles away from the place of the defendant and, also that owing to temporary arrangements at the Court where the suit was pending there was no Judge for many months by whom the plaintiffs' case could be taken up. Held, that the facts of the case, some attitude may be allowed and the abatement set aside (p. 561 Col. 2)." 10. The 5th decision he has referred to is A.I.R. 1957 Rajasthan 330 in which the Court has made the following observations :- "The Code does not anywhere make it the duty of the appellant to keep himself informed day by day about the health and existence of the adversary. The law allows considerable latitude to the appellant to prosecute his appeal, and what better reason could there be for delay in application than the fact that he had no knowledge of the death of the respondent. Hence the fact that the appellant did not know of the death of the respondent is a good reason for extending limitation on an application under Order 22, Rule 9 of the Code." 11. The 6th decision he has referred to State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 749 in which a learned bench of Supreme court has laid down the following principles :- "26. The legal position when a question arises under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fairly well settled. It is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts of matters would constitute 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The legal position when a question arises under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fairly well settled. It is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts of matters would constitute 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. But it may be safely stated that the delay in filing an appeal should not have been for reasons which indicate the party's negligence in not taking necessary steps, which he could have or should have taken. Here again, what would be such necessary steps will again depend upon the circumstances of a particular case and each case will have to be decided by the courts on the facts and circumstances of the case. Any observation of an illustrative circumstance or fact, will only tend to be a curb on the free exercise of the judicial mind by the Court in determining whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case amount to 'sufficient cause' or not. I is needless to emphasise that courts have to use their judicial discretion in the matter soundly in the interest of justice." "29. It has been pointed out by this Court in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd., (1962) 2 S.C.R. 762 : A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 361 as follows :- In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important consolidations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light-heatedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. The discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattoppan, (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. The discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattoppan, (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 269 Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised upon principles which are well understood ; the word 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bong fide is imputable to the appellant." "30. From the above observations it is clear that the words 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial or want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant." 12. I have considered the effect of the above weighty pronouncements. The Supreme Court's decision referred to above had laid down the broad principles for consideration whether or not the delay should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a particular case. The first requirement is that the delay should not have been for the reasons which indicate the party's negligence in taking necessary steps he should have taken. The second requirement is that the Courts have to use their judicial discretion in the matter soundly in the interest of justice. The 3rd requirement is that the Court should scrutinize the reasons for delay on merits. The fourth criterion is that the legal rights which has accrued to a party by lapse of time should not be disturbed and the 5th criterion is that the word sufficient cause should be liberally constructed so as to advance substantial justice. 13. I find that the appellant has failed to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay and that substantial injustice would be cause if delay is to be condoned in the present case. The contesting parties are co-tenants in the land in dispute which is situated in vill. Surha, Tahsil Mahoba district Hamirpur. The appellant Smt. Rukia has shown herself to the resident of village Surha in Vakalatnama filed by her counsel. In her W.S. she has shown her address to be of village Poora. The respondent No. 1 Sunder Lal was the resident of village Gahrauli. Surha, Tahsil Mahoba district Hamirpur. The appellant Smt. Rukia has shown herself to the resident of village Surha in Vakalatnama filed by her counsel. In her W.S. she has shown her address to be of village Poora. The respondent No. 1 Sunder Lal was the resident of village Gahrauli. It is on record that the village Surha, Poorna and Gahrauli are all neighbouring villages of Tahsil Mahoba situated at small distances from each other. In the case of the Lahore High Court it was found that the parties lived in different provinces. In the case of Rajasthan High Court it was found that the parties lived in different towns. Therefore, it cannot be argued that in the present that case the appellant or her son had sufficient reason for not moving the substitution application in time. Further the affidavit filed on this behalf respondent also proves that the appellant and her son came to know of the death of the respondent No. 1 within a fortnight of the death were obviously negligent in taking steps. As regards the question of substantial justice it may be observed that the trial court had given its verdict in favour of the plaintiff and against the appellant on July 21, 1966, i.e. nearly ten years back. The trial court's verdict has been reaffirmed by the lower appellate court and yet the appellant has obtained a stay order against these concurrent judgments during the pendency of the second appeal. The dragging on the litigation is causing substantial injustice to the other party. It has to be recognized that delay is a factor of injustice rather than justice and the maxim 'justice decided is justice denied' is a sound one. 14. I therefore, hold that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of Section 5 Limitation Act in the interest of justice. The second appeal is hereby dismissed under Section 3 of the Limitation Act.