Order. - The landlord, who lost before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, in the matter of eviction of the tenant respondent in an application filed under section 10 (3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 on the ground that he needed additional accommodation, has come up; to this Court. The landlord’s case is that the respondent is a tenant under the petitioner occupying two shops in the ground floor of premises No. 75, Harris Road, Madras-2, and is carrying on a nonresidential activity. The landlord is residing in the same premises with his family and the members of his family are running an English Medium School known as Saraswathi Nursery School in the same-premises and the accommodation for running the said school is not sufficient for them and, therefore, he requires the two shops in the occupation of the tenant for the benefit of his family members. The petitioner would say that the respondent has constructed a two storeyed building in the same road and it would not be inconvenient for him to shift his spare parts shops to his new premises. As the tenant respondent failed to vacate in spite of notice, and as the accommodation provided to the school run by the members of the family of the landlord is not sufficient, the present petition was filed for eviction of the tenant. The respondent-tenants denied the landlord’s case and opposed the application. It is brought out in the evidence that the petitioner is not actually running the Nursery School, but it is being run by his wife and daughter. The Rent Controller found that the claim of the landlord was bona fide and that no hardship would be caused to the tenant by his vacating the premises, inasmuch as he could easily shift his business to his own building in the same road. He would not agree with the legal objection raised by the tenant that as the petitioner-landlord was not carrying on a non-residential activity in the premises, he is not entitled to additional accommodation in the same building under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The Rent Controller directed eviction. On appeal, the Appellate Authority reversed the same. He would not agree with the legal objection raised by the tenant that as the petitioner-landlord was not carrying on a non-residential activity in the premises, he is not entitled to additional accommodation in the same building under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The Rent Controller directed eviction. On appeal, the Appellate Authority reversed the same. The appellate Court’s view was that section 10 (3) (c) of the Act cannot enable a landlord to seek for additional accommodation for the purpose of a business which he is not carrying on. Relying upon the clear distinction made in the language used in section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, and section 10 (3) (a) (iii) the Appellate Authority held that the petition for eviction was not maintainable and he allowed the appeal. It is as against this, the present civil revision petition has been filed. 2. Mr. O. K. Nambiar, learned counsel for the landlord relied upon a decision of our Court in Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar1, and would urge that a commercial activity of a dependant of the landlord can also be taken advantage of for the purpose of eviction under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act for securing additional accommodation in the same premises resulting in the eviction of a tenant in charge of such accommodation. But Mr. W. S. Venkataramanjulu, learned counsel for the tenant would distinguish the cited report on the ground that that was a case decided under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act and not under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The question for consideration is, whether in an amplication for eviction under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, the landlord can seek for eviction of’ the tenant in the same premises on the ground he wants additional accommodation of that portion occupied by the tenant for the purpose of expanding the commercial activity indulged in by his dependants. 3. The question for consideration is, whether in an amplication for eviction under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, the landlord can seek for eviction of’ the tenant in the same premises on the ground he wants additional accommodation of that portion occupied by the tenant for the purpose of expanding the commercial activity indulged in by his dependants. 3. Ever since the Act to regulate the letting of residential and non-residential buildings was passed by our State Legislature in order to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom, there was a provision enabling the landlord to apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of" the buildings, if he is occupying only a part of a building whether residential or non-residential and request the Controller to direct the tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be. There was also contemporaneously another provision which would enable a landlord for a similar order for eviction, when he is not in occupation of a residential building of his own or a non-residential building belonging to him. We shall consider these provisions in detail later. But the point is that ever since the special Act to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants was introduced in 1949, a distinction was maintained between the provisions where by , a landlord would ask for additional" accommodation from a tenant in the same premises from the provision whereunder a landlord could ask for a building in the occupation of his tenant, if he is himself not occupying a building of his own whether residential or non-residential in the same city, town or village. This distinction which has been maintained throughout by the Legislature has to be borne in mind, not only to understand the significance of such a definite classification, but also in the matter of the invocation of those sections for directing the eviction of tenants. This distinction which has been maintained throughout by the Legislature has to be borne in mind, not only to understand the significance of such a definite classification, but also in the matter of the invocation of those sections for directing the eviction of tenants. In the 1949 Act (XXV of 1949), section 7 (3) (a) (iii) enabled the landlord to seek for eviction from a nonresidential building of his tenant, if the landlord did not occupy for purposes of a business which he was carrying on, a nonresidential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled. At" some point of time later, the landlord. under a similar provision under Act XVIII of 1960, could seek eviction, if the non-residential building is required by him or by his son. Again, this provision was amended in 1973, which entitled the landlord under such circumstances to ask for the premises for his own occupation or for the benefit of any member of his family, for the purpose of the business which he or any member of his family is carrying on. In the wake of these provisions, a decision rendered by our Court by Veeraswami, J., as he then was, was referred to by Mr. Nambiar before me in Kangu v. Ahmed Unnissa Begum1. The learned Judge was dealing with a case of eviction under section 7 (3) (c) of the 1949 Act. That clause read: "A landlord who is occupying a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be." "Sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Act of 1949, pertained to the ground of requirement of the premises for owner’s occupation under which a tenant in a residential building may be evicted therefrom provided the other conditions of the clause are satisfied. After noting the distinction between the words used in both the above clauses and in particular, interpreting the expression " for his own occupation", the learned Judge observed as follows: "The words ‘if he requires ‘occur-ing in section 7 (3) (c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, should be understood in the same liberal sense-as the words ‘his own occupation ‘in section 7(3) (a) of the Act have been understood. What is meant by the words ‘his own occupation ‘or ‘if he requires ‘is that the requirement is not that of a stranger. It is not necessary to attract those words that the need should be personal to the landlord. The need of close relations who happen to live with the landlord or land-lady may well satisfy the words ‘his own occupation’ or ‘if he requires’. Dependency, social customs and habits, usage, practice of a particular community and like considerations may well be taken into account in determining whether the requirement of those words is satisfied." In fact, he relied upon a similar decision of our Court in Kolandavdu Chettiar v, Koolayana Chettiar2. In Saraswathi v. Vadi-velu Chettiar3, this Court interpreted the word ‘landlord ‘in section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of Act XVIII of 1960, as a word, which cannot be treated as rigid or inelastic. By that time, the 1949 Act, was amended and the provision of section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of Act XVIII of 1960, enabled the landlord or his son to apply for relief and for eviction of the tenant, if either of them was not occupying for purposes of a business which he or his son is carrying on a non-residential building in the city, which is his own. The improvement, if such an expression could be used, is that the Legisla ture added the alternative expression landlord or his son in the Act of 1960, whereas in the Act of 1949, it left the entitlement only to the landlord. The improvement, if such an expression could be used, is that the Legisla ture added the alternative expression landlord or his son in the Act of 1960, whereas in the Act of 1949, it left the entitlement only to the landlord. In Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar3, this Court, having regard to the expansion of the word "landlord " took a liberal view of the matter and said the mere addition of the word " son " after the word " landlord " in the section and the exclusion of the enumeration of other dependants or relatives cannot lead to the conclusion that the Legislature by necessary implication intended to exclude such dependants from obtaining the benefit of that provision. Here again a reference was made to the decisions in Kolandavelu. Chettiar v. Koolayana Chettiar2and Kangu v. Ahmed Unnissa Begum4. After the decision in Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar3, the section was amended in 1973 by Act XXIII of 1973. There, in section 10 (3) (a) (iii) with which we are concerned, for the words, " his son ", the words " any member of his family " were substituted. Apparently, the Legislature was taking note of the interpretation given by the Courts to the expression " landlord " or " landlord or his son " which occurred in the Act of 1949 and in the Act of 1960. By 1973, therefore, in section 10 (3) (a) (iii) we have the provision whereby, in case it is a common non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned, which Is his own, then he can apply for eviction of the tenant in the occupation of his building provided the other conditions in the section are satisfied.Whilst this is the position, the Legislature did not think it fit at all to make such a concurrent and simultaneous amendment to section 7 (3) (a) of the Act, 1949, or section 10 (3) (c) of the Act of 1960, the language of the relevant section enabling ‘the landlord to secure additional accommodation remained practically the same. At this stage, it is convenient to quote it for the purpose of ready reference. At this stage, it is convenient to quote it for the purpose of ready reference. Section 10 (3) (c) which is equal to section 7 (3) (c) of the 1949 Act reads as under: "A landlord, who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be." If, therefore, the Legislature maintained the text of this part of section 10 of the new Act arid section 7 of the old Act without expanding the meaning of the word, landlord, as they did to the same word appearing in section 10 (3) (a) (iii) then it should be assumed that the Legislature deliberately did not want to make the word ‘‘landlord" in section 10 (3) (c) an elastic expression which could take into its fold not only the landlord but also any member of his family. It is no, doubt true that in Kolandavelu Chettiar v. Koolayana Chettiar1 , Kangu v. Ahmed Unnissa Begum2and Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar3the Court, on the basis of the norms and standards of an Indian society, expanded the meaning of the word " landlord " which was afterwards accepted by the Legislature as well. But it cannot be said that when the Legislature did amend section 10 (3) (a) (iii), it was not aware of the need to expand the word " landlord " appearing in section 10 (3) (c) ; the Legislature twice had an opportunity to consider this aspect. They would only amend section 10 (3) (a) (iii), but would not touch upon the language of section 10 (3) (c). This deliberate avoidance on the part of the Legislature appears to be significant and therefore, it would not be within the canons of propriety, if the expression " landlord " appearing in section 10 (3) (c) should be liberally interpreted notwithstanding the deliberateness on the part of the Legislature not to make it elastic or not to expand it at all, though it had two such opportunities to do so. 4. 4. If, therefore, under section 10 (3) (c), the landlord could seek for additional accommodation only for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, then it would be difficult to accept Mr. O. K. Nambiar’s argument that the landlord’s wife’s business or his daughter’s business would also be covered by the expression "his business" in section 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The petitioner-landlord cannot, on the ground that the accommodation with the tenant is required for expanding a Nursery School conducted by his wife and daughter, ask for such accommodation under section 10 (3) (c) of the Act and seek for eviction of the tenant. The order of the appellate Court is right. 5. The civil revision petition is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.