JUDGMENT - The question involved in this Revision Application is whether a tenant is entitled to file a flesh application for fixation of standard rent under the provisions of section 11 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) even though in an earlier proceedings between the tenant and the landlord under section 11 of the Act standard rent was fixed by consent of parties at a particular amount. Three plots of land situate at Sangli were let out by the Petitioner-landlord to the respondent-tenant Plot No. I was leased on January 2, 1946, at a rent of Rs. 250 per month, plot No.1/1 was leased on April 6, 1948, at a rent of Rs. 70 per month and plot No. 199 was leased on December 14, 1952, at a rent of Rs 31 per month. The aggregate rent of three plots came to Rs. 351-9-0 per month. The lease in respect of all the three plots was to continue upto October 30, 1970. In the year 1953, the lessee filed Miscellaneous Application No. 90 of 1953 under section 1 I of the Act against the father of the Petitioner in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Sangli, for fixation of standard rent of the three pieces of land. The trial Court by its order dated August 30, 1955, fixed the standard rent of the three plots at Rs. 120-11-4 per month. The father of the Petitioner (Landlord) preferred an appeal being Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1955 in the Court of the District Judge, South Satara, Sangli. Cross-objections were filed by the tenants. In that appeal, by consent of the parties on April 15, 1958, standard rent was fixed by the appellate Court at the rate of Rs. 240 per month and a consent order to that effect fixing the standard rent was passed by the appellate Court in the appeal filed by the petitioner's father. Cross-objections filed by the tenants were withdrawn. It is the case of the tenant that notwithstanding such fixation of standard rent for the years 1964 to 1970, the landlord used to recover in aggregate a sum of Rs. 323-33 per month by way of rent. Cross-objections filed by the tenants were withdrawn. It is the case of the tenant that notwithstanding such fixation of standard rent for the years 1964 to 1970, the landlord used to recover in aggregate a sum of Rs. 323-33 per month by way of rent. Thereafter it is his case that rent at the rate of half the above figure was sent by money ordyr by the tenant to the landlord but the same was refused by the landlord on the ground that the lease had expired by efflux of time. It may be stated that in the original lease in respect of three pieces of lands, it is the case of the landlord that he is given an option to purchase the structures erected by the tenants on these pieces of lands on payment of 3/4th of the market value, while it is the case of the tenant that upon the expiry of the lease he has option to renew the lease of the three pieces of land for a further period of 26 years on payment of I! times the contractual rent. In view of these contentions, the landlord filed a suit being suit No. 44 of 1972 for specific performance. The trial Court passed a decree for specific performance in favour of the landlord. The tenant has preferred an appeal being First Appeal No. 483 of 1976 in the High Court and the same is pending before this Court. 3. The landlord gave a notice to the tenant on January 3, 1974, calling upon him to pay all the arrears of rent falling due since November 1, 1970. It was further stated in the said notice that in default of payment of the arrears of rent such legal proceedings as may be permissible under the law would be taken. A reply to this notice was sent by the tenant on January 10, 1974, whereby he called for a clarification from the landlord as regards the rate etc. at which the rent was demanded and was asked for. Along with this letter, a sum of Rs. 4820 was sent by way of provisional rent and it was stated therein that the balance of the amount would be sent upon receiving clarification. at which the rent was demanded and was asked for. Along with this letter, a sum of Rs. 4820 was sent by way of provisional rent and it was stated therein that the balance of the amount would be sent upon receiving clarification. On February 7, 1974, the landlord filed a suit against the tenant being Civil Suit No. 50 of 1974 claiming ejectment of tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent in view of the provisions of section 12 of the Act and for arrears of standard rent at the rate of Rs. 240 per month. After the suit was instituted, on February 28, 1974, the tenant filed an application being Miscellaneous Application No. 20 of 1974 under section 11 of the Act for fixation of standard rent of all the three pieces of lands In question. The controversy in this Revision Application arises out of this application made by the tenant for fixation of standard rent. 4. The trial Court framed a preliminary issue in this application to the effect "Is the application not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 11 A of the Rent Act?" It took the view that it was maintainable. In a Revision Application preferred by the landlord, the learned Extra Assistant Judge, Sangli, took the view that no case was made out by the landlord for interfering with the order passed by the trial Court on the question of maintainability of the application and he accordingly dismissed the Revision Application. It is against this Revision Application that the present Revision Application is filed by the landlord. 5. Mr. Pratap on behalf of the landlord submitted that both the Courts were in error in framing the preliminary issue in the manner in which it was done. The real issue that should have been raised for adjudication between the parties was, according to his submission, whether in view of the consent order dated April 15, 1958, passed by the learned District Judge, South Satara, Sangli, in Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1955 fixing Rs. The real issue that should have been raised for adjudication between the parties was, according to his submission, whether in view of the consent order dated April 15, 1958, passed by the learned District Judge, South Satara, Sangli, in Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1955 fixing Rs. 240 per moth as standard rent of these three pieces of land the tenant was precluded or estopped from making a fresh application for fixation of standard rent of the said three pieces of land either by reason of the provisions of section 11 A of the Act or section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise in law. He submitted that so far as this Court is concerned, uniformly the view has been taken except in one case that once standard rent is fixed even by consent of parties in proceedings adopted under the Act, the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, is precluded from making a fresh application for fixation of standard rent either under section 11 or by raising such an issue in a suit between the landlord and the tenant. His submission is that in view of the fact that in the earlier proceedings in an appeal preferred by the landlord by consent of the parties standard rent was fixed at Rs. 240 per month in respect of these three pieces of land, the tenant is now precluded or estopped from initiating fresh proceedings for fixation of standard rent by making an application under section 11 of the Act. He urged that a consent decree is not merely a contract between the parties but it is something more than a contract. He, therefore, submitted that such being the nature of a consent decree or order, it will not be permissible to the parties to the same litigation or to their representatives in interest to agitate the same question between them by adopting proceedings under section 11 of the Act. In short his submission is that both the Courts were in error in taking the view that the present application made by the tenant was maintainable having regard to the events that had happened between the parties. Mr. In short his submission is that both the Courts were in error in taking the view that the present application made by the tenant was maintainable having regard to the events that had happened between the parties. Mr. Abhyankar on the other hand on behalf of the tenant submitted that when an order is passed by the Court even under section 11 of the Act by consent of the parties, it is not decided on merits and such an order can neither operate a, an estoppel nor can it preclude a party aggrieved thereby to adopt independent proceedings for fixation of standard rent by making a fresh application under section 11 of the Act. In short his submission was that both the Courts were right in taking the view that notwithstanding the consent order passed in the earlier proceedings fixing Rs. 240 per month as standard rent of three pieces of land it was open to the tenant to make a fresh application for fixation of standard rent as in the earlier proceedings the order was passed by consent of the parties and not upon adjudication by the Court on merits of the case. 6. In my opinion, having regard to the matters in controversy between the parties, both the Courts ought to have framed an issue for determination as under:- "Whether in view of the consent order dated April 15, 1958, passed in Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1955 by the District Judge, South Satara, Sangli, fixing Rs. 240 per month as a standard rent of the premises was the tenant estopped or precluded from instituting a fresh application under section 11 of the Act merely on the ground that earlier fixation of standard rent was not by adjudication by the Court by reason of the consent of the parties?" What is the nature of a consent decree or order is not open to much controversy. A consent decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be treated on the same footing as a contract between the parties. To the compromise of the parties a command of the Court has been super-imposed and the makes all the difference. (See Govind Waman Shanbhag v. Murlidhar Shrinivas Shanbhag1. A consent decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be treated on the same footing as a contract between the parties. To the compromise of the parties a command of the Court has been super-imposed and the makes all the difference. (See Govind Waman Shanbhag v. Murlidhar Shrinivas Shanbhag1. It is well settled position in law that a consent decree has to all intents and purposes the same as effect as res judicata as a decree passed in in vitum; it raises an estoppel as it is a decree passed in in vitum. A consent decree, however, is a result of the agreement on which it is founded and it may be set aside on any ground that would invalidate an agreement between the parties. It is not the case of any of the parties in this Revision Application that the earlier order fixing Rs.240 per month as a standard rent is either a nullity or invalid on any of the grounds on which a consent decree or order can be legally set aside. 7. So far as this Court is concerned, what is the effect of fixation of standard rent by consent of the parties in proceedings adopted under the Act, the matter has come up for consideration for a number of years and barring the observations in one case all along uniformly a view has been taken that standard rent though fixed by consent of parties in proceedings under the Act is binding between them and it is not open to any of the parties or their representatives in interest to initiate fresh proceedings for such fixation of standard rent either by making an application under section 11 or by raising such an issue in a suit between the landlord and the tenant. The matter was first considered by Gajendragadkar J. as he then was in Parbhudas Harjivandas Mehta v. Sheth Trikumdas Chunilal2. After scrutinizing the provisions of the Act he observed that he was unable to see how it could be contended that it was not open to the parties at dispute as to the standard rent of premises to compromise the said dispute under the provisions of the Act. He pointed out that it was undoubtedly true that the policy of the Act was a benevolent policy and the policy was to help the tenants. He pointed out that it was undoubtedly true that the policy of the Act was a benevolent policy and the policy was to help the tenants. But he was unable to accept the argument that the Act either expressly or by necessary implication made it obligatory on the Court to decide the matter. According to the learned Judge, it would be perfectly competent to the parties to settle the dispute in regard to the standard rent and the mere fact that after the tenant had entered into an agreement in respect of this dispute he had begun to feel that he had been persuaded to enter into an agreement to his prejudice would not justify the argument that the compromise agreement itself was a nullity. Upon the question arising whether a consent decree would constitute a bar of res judicata or not, be observed, it was necessary to make a distinction between consent orders Or decrees which might be contrary to law and those which might be prohibited by law. In the Act there was no prohibition preventing the parties from settling the dispute as to the standard rent by agreement. Even if the consent order fixed the standard rent at an amount which might be higher than the amount which might have been fixed by the Controller, that would not make the consent order contrary to law. He summed up his view by saying: "Therefore, in my opinion, the Courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the consent order passed in Application No. 326 of 1948-49 precludes the Court from trying the same issue over again in the present proceedings." To the same effect was the view taken by Shah J. as he then was in Rajaram Balkrishna Awar v. Sardarkhan Amirkhan Pathan3. In that case a consent decree was passed in a previous proceeding between the same parties and under it the standard rent of the premises was- fixed at Rs. 19 per month. The view which was taken by the Courts below in a subsequent proceeding was that the standard rent should be fixed at Rs. 12-8-0 per month. It was contended on behalf of the landlord before the said learned Judge that the view which was taken by the Courts below was erroneons and that the standard rent should be fixed at Rs. 12-8-0 per month. It was contended on behalf of the landlord before the said learned Judge that the view which was taken by the Courts below was erroneons and that the standard rent should be fixed at Rs. 19 per month as the parties had come to an agreement in a prior proceeding, which was the basis of the consent decree in that proceeding, that should be the standard rent of the premises. A contention was advanced on behalf of the tenant before the learned Judge that an agreement to pay rent in excess of the rent which was found by the Courts below to be the proper standard rent could not be regarded as a lawful agreement upon which the Court could pass a decree binding upon the parties. Such a contention was negatived by the learned Judge and he took the same view that was taken by Gajendragadkar J. in the matter referred to above. 8. A similar question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Popatlal Ratansey v. Kalidas Bhavan4. In that case a tenant filed an application under the Act for fixation of standard rent for premises leased to him by his landlord. The landlord filed a cross-suit for possession alleging that the tenant was in arrears of rent and that he had sub-let the premises. The trial Court, in the tenant's application, fixed the standard rent at Rs. 40 per month and decreed the landlord's suit for possession. Appeals against these decisions were filed by the parties. While these proceedings were pending, the parties agreed that the reasonable and standard rent of the premises was Rs. 91 per month and they made a request to the appear Court that the standard rent of the premises be fixed at Rs. 91 per month The landlord gave up his claim to recover possession of the premises and the tenant on the other hand abandoned his contention that the' proper standard rent of the premises was Rs. 40 per month and he accepted the landlord's figure that Rs. 91 per month should be the standard rent. 91 per month The landlord gave up his claim to recover possession of the premises and the tenant on the other hand abandoned his contention that the' proper standard rent of the premises was Rs. 40 per month and he accepted the landlord's figure that Rs. 91 per month should be the standard rent. When this agreement was submitted to the appeal Court, the Court considered that it was a fair and just agreement and it was satisfied that there was nothing unlawful about it, Accordingly it passed a decree in terms of the agreement by which the dispute between the parties was decided and the applicant-tenant was accepted by the landlord as his tenant upon his paying standard rent at the rate of Rs. 91 per month. Thereafter the landlord filed a suit to recover possession of the premises from the tenant alleging that the tenant had failed to pay rent and was in arrears of it. The tenant contended that he was not in arrears of rent, as the standard rent for the premises was Rs. 40 per month as previously fixed by the Court and that he had paid rent at that rate. On the question whether the consent decree which was passed in the appeals would operate as a bar to the tenant's contention in this suit that the standard rent for the premises was Rs. 40 per month and not Rs. 91 per month, the Division Bench of this Court held that in the circumstances of the case, between the present parties, who were also parties to the appeals, the determination of the standard rent as embodied in the consent decree 'Passed in the appeals would constitute a bar of res judicata and would estop the tenant from contending that the standard rent should not be Rs. 91 per month as fixed by the consent decree but it should be Rs. 40 Per month. The Division Bench pointed out that there is a fundamental distinction between an agreement which is embodied in a lease and the decision which is embodied in a consent decree. The agreement which is embodied in a lease is purely and simply an agreement as to rent. On the other band, what is embodied in a consent decree is the decision of the Court as to standard rent. The agreement which is embodied in a lease is purely and simply an agreement as to rent. On the other band, what is embodied in a consent decree is the decision of the Court as to standard rent. Such a decision or judgment of the Court would estop the tenant from contending in a subsequent application under the Bombay Rent Act that the standard rent to which he had previously agreed was not the fair rent. 9. It was urged by Mr. Abhyankar that the law laid down by the Division Bench is no longer good law as the provisions of the Act have been amended by Maharashtra Act 14 of 1962 whereby inter alia section 11A was introduced in the Act. The said section reads as under:- "11A. No Court shall upon an application or in any suit or proceeding fix the standard rent of any premises under section 11, or entertain any plea that the rent or increases are excessive, if the standard rent or the permitted increases, in respect of the same premises have been fixed by a competent Court on the merits of the case, without any fraud or collusion or an error of the facts, and there has been no structural alterations or 'Change in the amenities or in respect of any other factors which are relevant to the fixation of the standard rent, or change in such increases thereafter in the premises." After referring to this section, it was urged by Mr. Abhyankar that the provisions of section 11 imply that a tenant will be precluded from making a fresh application for fixation of standard rent under section 11 of the Act only if in the earlier proceedings rent was fixed by a competent Court on the merits of the case. His submission was that such fixation on merits of the case presupposes an adjudication by the Court without the consent of the parties and if in earlier proceedings where the issue directly between the parties as regards the fixation of standard rent is settled by them, by consent notwithstanding the present pronouncement of the Court by putting its imprimatur or command will not preclude a tenant from making a fresh application for fixation of standard rent. In my opinion, the section in a way is not exhaustive of the ground on which a Court has been prevented from fixation of standard rent in a subsequent proceeding, and if an effect of a consent decree is to all intents and purposes the same as res judicata as a decree passed in in virum it raises an estoppel and it is a decree passed in in virum. It is not the plea of the tenant in the present application that the earlier proceedings for fixation of standard rent by consent of Rs. 240 per month was liable to be set aside on any ground on which an agreement between the parties can be legally corrected. In my opinion, there is nothing in section 11A of the Act which will prevent a consent decree or order fixing the standard rent passed in the earlier proceedings between the parties from operating as an estoppel between them or those who obtained title from them. That such is the effect of section 11 A which has been introduced by Maharashtra Act 14 of 1961 becomes quite evident if regard be had to the Statement of Objects and Reasons. The object of introducing section IIA in the Act as stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons is as under:- ·'It is noticed that the fixation of standard rent or permitted increases is canvassed in Courts, years after a tenant takes over, or the increase is made. Consequently it is thought proper that a limitation be laid down for making an application for fixation of standard rent, or permitted increases. A provision is also provided to be made that if standard rent is once duly fixed by the Court, the same shall not be canvassed again and again, unless there are structural changes or change in the amenities, which affect the fixation of standard rent." The objects and reasons for introducing the section rather than supporting the contention of Mr. Abhyankar negative the same. Abhyankar negative the same. It was introduced with a view to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court on the part of the tenant in making repeated applications for fixation of standard rent even though in the earlier applications he got the same fixed in the manner permitted by law It should not be overlooked that having regard to the provisions of Order 23, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure a compromise between the parties has to be accepted by the Court only subject to the condition that it is lawful. In the present case, nothing is stated in the application made by the tenant to indicate that the earlier consent order fixing Rs. 240 per month as standard rent was unlawful or suffered from any infirmity on the basis of which an agreement between the parties can be invalidated. 10. After the introduction of section 11 A, question relating to the right of a tenant to make a fresh application for fixation of standard rent had come up for consideration on two occasions before the single Judge of this Court. Vaidya J., who had the occasion to consider this question in the case of Vasant Ramchandra Sharma v. Narayanibai Mulchand Agrawal5, had taken the view that the mere fact that for some reason the tenant agreed to have a consent decree about standard rent does not preclude him from raising a fresh dispute about it under sections 11 (1) (e) and 11 (2). If really a dispute exists it cannot be said to be a mala fide one. The learned Judge has taken that view upon an erroneous assumption that section 11A of the Act exhaustively enumerates the grounds on which a tenant is precluded from raising a fresh dispute about the fixation of standard rent. There is nothing in the language of section 11 A or any other provisions of the Act to warrant such an approach. The absence of the non· applicability of the clause has been completely overlooked by the Court. The fact that section 11 A is worded in a negative manner would indicate that when the provisions of that section are applicable, the Court shall have no jurisdiction. The absence of the non· applicability of the clause has been completely overlooked by the Court. The fact that section 11 A is worded in a negative manner would indicate that when the provisions of that section are applicable, the Court shall have no jurisdiction. But there is nothing in that section to indicate that it is a comprehensive provision enumerating all the circumstances in which the Court is precluded or estopped from going de novo into the question of fixation of standard rent even though it is fixed by the consent of the parties lawfully in the earlier proceedings between them or those from whom they derived title. 11. The matter came up for consideration again before Sapre J., in Lila Kishanchand JaiJinghani v. Odhavji Popatlal Ahya6. The learned Judge has taken the view that a bar of estoppel can be raised against a petitioner (original applicant) who had filed an earlier application for fixation of standard rent under section 11 of the Act from her conduct of allowing her application to be dismissed in default at a stage where an indication was available that she did not want to go on with that application and impliedly admitted that the rent that was being paid by her was the standard rent. No independent right is available to a tenant under section 11A of the Act to file an application for fixation of standard rent apart from the right which the tenant has under section 11. The intention of the Legislature in inserting section 11A in the Act is not to create a new right in the tenant to file an application which would be barred on the ground of res judicata, estoppel etc. under section 11. In my opinion, the position in law has been correctly laid down by Sapre J. That view bas been taken by him even in a case where the earlier application made by a tenant for fixation of standard rent was dismissed for default of appearance. The principle laid down by him will be more suitably attracted if in the earlier proceedings by consent of parties standard rent has been fixed lawfully by the Court. The principle laid down by him will be more suitably attracted if in the earlier proceedings by consent of parties standard rent has been fixed lawfully by the Court. Once the standard rent has been so fixed by the Court, it will operate as an estoppel and would preclude the tenant from reagitating the same question by making a fresh application for fixation of standard rent under section 11 of the Act. 12. It was urged by Mr. Abhyankar that the tenant was demanding Rs. 323.33 by way of standard rent up to 1970 and an issue will survive between the parties as to that amount in any way. Such a contention is not permissible if regard be had to the clear and unequivocal statement made by the landlord in answer to the application for fixation of standard rent. In paragraph 2 of his reply to the application he has stated that the standard rent is admittedly fixed by the Court at Rs. 240; that the landlord does not claim or demand anything in excess and that, therefore, the application does not lie. In view of these express averments in the reply to the application, question of fixation of standard rent in excess of Rs. 240 per month was not in controversy between the parties and such a question will not arise for consideration before the Court. 13. In the result, the Revision Application is allowed. The rule is made absolute. The order passed by both the subordinate Courts holding that the application of the tenant for fixation of standard rent was maintainable is set aside and it is hereby held that in view of the consent order dated April 15, 1958, passed in Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1955 by the learned District Judge, South Satara, Sangli, fixing Rs. 240 per month as the standard rent of the three pieces of land, the respondent-tenant is precluded from making a fresh application for fixation of standard rent of the said premises over again. The application of the tenant for fixation of standard rent is dismissed with costs throughout. Revision application allowed.