ORDER K.N. Singh, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against the order of the Labour Court II, Kanpur, refusing to frame certain preliminary issues in the dispute pending before it between the parties. 2. Messrs Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd. carry on business of manufacture of cotton bales and textiles at Kanpur, In 1952 it dismissed five workmen from service. The workmen raised industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication. On 17-4-1953 the .adjudicator submitted his award, he held that the employers had wrongfully dismissed the workmen. The petitioner company preferred appeal against that award before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench. The appeal was allowed on 3-9-1953 on the ground that the award had been declared after expiry of the prescribed period. The State Government filed appeal before the Supreme Court against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 20-11-1957 and upheld the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. 3. Thereafter the Deputy Labour Commissioner, U. P. referred the dispute to the Labour Court, Gorakhpur, under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Later on the matter was transferred to the file of the Labour Court at Kanpur. But before the dispute could be decided on merits the petitioner company filed Writ Petition No. 3209 of 1958 before this Court challenging validity of the order of reference as well as the proceedings before the Labour Court, Kanpur, on a number of grounds. The writ petition was dismissed on 29-4-1965, Special Appeal preferred by the petitioner company was dismissed on 11-4-1972 and the judgment of the learned single Judge became final. 4. When proceedings commenced before the Labour Court after the decision of the Special Appeal, the employers raised preliminary objections on a number of grounds challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The petitioner company made an application proposing framing of eight different issues, preliminary in nature, which were in the following words: 1. Whether any prior demand was made by the workmen to the management. If not, is the present reference bad in law? 2. Whether the Textile Labour Association was qualified to represent the workmen and whether the workmen had given any authority to the said Association to represent them? 3. Whether any prior demand was made by the workmen to the management. If not, is the present reference bad in law? 2. Whether the Textile Labour Association was qualified to represent the workmen and whether the workmen had given any authority to the said Association to represent them? 3. Whether the reference is bad as no conclusion proceedings between the workmen and the petitioner under Section 4-F read with Rr. 4 and 5-A of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and Rules took place. If not, whether the reference under Section 4-K is bad as such and no Industrial Dispute exists? 4. Whether the present reference is barred by res judicata in view of the previous reference and decision of Sri S. N. Saxena under G. O. No. 4925 (TD)/XXVIII-LA-15 (TD) 52, dated 19th August, 1952? 5. Whether the present adjudication is barred by res judicata in view of the agreement in 1952 between Kanpur Mill Mazdoor Union and the petitioner? 6. Whether the present dispute ceased to be an industrial dispute when the Kanpur Mill Mazdoor Union became defunct on 5th November, 1954? 7. Whether the Kanpur Textile Labour Association was authorised to espouse the present dispute? 8. Whether Sri J. Prasad, Deputy Labour Commissioner, had no jurisdiction under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act to refer the dispute for adjudication? The respondent-workman contested the petitioner's application mainly on the ground that all the aforesaid questions raised by the petitioners were raised by the petitioner in the earlier writ petition filed before this Court and since the petitioner did not press those issues before this Court, the issues stood decided against the petitioners. Therefore it was not open to the petitioner to raise the same issues again before the Labour Court. The Labour Court accepted the workmen's contention and it refused to frame preliminary issues as proposed by the petitioner on the ground that the questions raised by the petitioner in the form of preliminary issues were barred by principles of res judicata, It, however, framed only one preliminary issue as to whether the dispute referred to it was an industrial dispute and the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. 5. Before considering the questions raised by the petitioner it is necessary to consider the grounds raised by the petitioner in the earlier petition No. 3209 of 1958. 5. Before considering the questions raised by the petitioner it is necessary to consider the grounds raised by the petitioner in the earlier petition No. 3209 of 1958. As already noted that writ petition was filed by the employers against the order of reference in pursuance of which the present proceedings are being taken before the Labour Court. The employers challenged the validity of the order of reference on a number of grounds as well as the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to hear and decide the dispute on the ground that it was not an industrial dispute and a number of other grounds. The employers claimed relief for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order of reference as well as the proceedings before the Labour Court. Validity of the order of reference and jurisdiction of the Labour Court was challenged on 22 different grounds raised in the earlier petition. The parties have produced a copy of the earlier writ petition filed before this Court. On a perusal of the grounds raised in the earlier writ petition I find that all the eight grounds raised by way of preliminary objection were substantially raised before this Court in the earlier writ petition. The proposed issue No. 1 was covered by ground Nos. 6 and 7 of the earlier writ petition, similarly issue No, 2 was covered by grounds Nos. 4 and 5, issue No. 3 was substantially covered by grounds Nos. 6, 7 and 8 issue No. 4 is squarely covered by grounds Nos. 6, 7 and 8, issue No. 5 raised substantially the same question which was raised under ground No. 12 of the writ petition. Similarly, issue No. 6 was covered by ground No. 3, issue No. 7 was covered by ground No. 5 and the proposed 8th issue related to the question of jurisdiction of the Deputy Labour Commissioner to refer the dispute for adjudication raised in the earlier writ petition under grounds Nos. 17, 18, 19 and 20. I sent for the original file from the office of this Court and examined the grounds raised in the earlier writ petition and the preliminary issues proposed by the petitioner company before the Labour Court. 17, 18, 19 and 20. I sent for the original file from the office of this Court and examined the grounds raised in the earlier writ petition and the preliminary issues proposed by the petitioner company before the Labour Court. On a careful examination of the same I find that all possible grounds which could be raised to challenge the validity of the order of reference as well as the existence of the industrial dispute and jurisdiction of the Labour Court to continue with the proceedings were raised in the earlier writ petition. No doubt the construction of sentences and use of words in the grounds raised in the earlier writ petition and in the proposed preliminary issues are different but the substance of the grounds of challenge is the same. There is no scope for any doubt that in the earlier writ petition the petitioner had raised all questions which it tried to raise before the Labour Court later on. 6. At the time of the hearing of the earlier writ petition all the points raised by the petitioner company were not pressed or canvassed before the court, instead only one point was canvassed to challenge the validity of the transfer of proceedings from Gorakhpur to Kanpur. Satish Chandra, J. repelled the contention and dismissed the writ petition. While doing that the learned Judge made an observation that no other ground was pressed by the employers. The petitioner company filed special appeal against the judgment of Satish Chandra, J. hut even in appeal it did not press any other ground, instead it confined its attack on the validity of the transfer of proceedings from Gorakhpur to Kanpur. It is thus clear that even though the petitioner company had raised a number of grounds to challenge the validity of the order of reference as well as the validity of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court on the ground that the dispute referred was not an industrial dispute it did not press those grounds before this Court for undisclosed reasons. It appears that the points raised by it had no merit. Therefore, the petitioner company did not raise the same before this Court. It appears that the points raised by it had no merit. Therefore, the petitioner company did not raise the same before this Court. If there was any merit in the other grounds raised by the petitioner, the petitioner company would have made a statement before the Court reserving its right to raise the question before the Labour Court on the continuance of proceedings. Since the petitioner company did not adopt any such course before this Court, it would be presumed that the other points raised by it had no merit, therefore, it did not press the same, 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Labour Court committed patent error of law in holding that the preliminary issues raised by the petitioner company before it challenging its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute stood decided by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3209 of 1958. He further urged that technical rules of res judicata as laid down by Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code do not apply to proceedings before the Labour Court. Before the question as to whether the issue raised by the petitioner company could not he raised on account of any previous judgment or adjudication between the parties is considered it is necessary to consider the extent to which the principles of res judicata are applicable to proceedings before the Labour Court. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure enacts the principle that a decision once rendered by a competent authority on a matter in issue between the parties should not be permitted to be re-agitated. The principle is based on public policy to attach finality to the judgments or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction between the parties with a view to prevent a new decision or new investigation into the same subject-matter so that same person or party cannot be harassed again and again in various proceedings upon the same questions. Explanation IV to S, 11 lays down that any matter which might or ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such | suit. The Explanation embodies the rule of [constructive res judicata. Explanation IV to S, 11 lays down that any matter which might or ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such | suit. The Explanation embodies the rule of [constructive res judicata. If the subject-matter of the earlier suit was the same and the parties are the same and issues raised in that suit have finally been determined by the competent Court of jurisdiction, it is not open to the parties of the former suit to raise the dispute subsequently in respect of the same subject-matter on some different questions of fact or law. The principle of res judicata contemplates that an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but also to all grounds of defence or attack which could be raised. 8. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in its term does not apply to proceedings before the Labour Court, but the general principles of res judicata have been applied to such proceedings. There has been divergence of opinion on the question as to whether the principles of res judicata are strictly applicable to the industrial disputes. Now it is settled that the principles of res judicata cannot be invoked to curtail the power of the State Government or the Central Government to refer industrial disputes for adjudication on the ground that on an earlier stage it had refused to make reference. See Western India Watch Co. v. Western Indian Watch Co. Workers Union (1970-2 Lab LJ 256) : (1970 Lab IC 1033) (SC). Similarly, in matters relating to revision of wages or allowance the Supreme Court in U. P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Chatterji, ( AIR 1972 SC 1201 ) : (1972 Lab IC 644), held that merely because the award had been declared in the past in respect of revision of wages, any subsequent dispute raised for revision of wages cannot be held to be barred by the principles of res judicata on the ground of change of circumstances and price index. The principle is now well settled that even though Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the proceedings before the Labour Court the principles underlying the section are applicable to proceedings before the Labour Court to subserve the binding character of awards and judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction. 9. In Management of the Bangalore Woollen and Silk Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, ( AIR 1968 SC 585 ) applying the principles of res judicata, it was held that in a case where an award existed between the parties binding them it was not open to the Labour Court in a fresh reference to re-consider the points settled in the earlier award, In Workmen of Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., ( AIR 1974 SC 1132 ) : (1974 Lab IC 730), the Supreme Court clearly laid down that principles of res judicata as contained in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to industrial adjudication wherever possible subject to the principle of substantial justice. The Court observed: "It is now well settled that although the entire Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to industrial adjudication, principles of res judicata laid down under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, are applicable wherever possible for very good reasons. This is so since multiplicity of litigation and agitation and re-agitation of the same dispute on issue between the same employer and its employees will not be conducive to industrial peace which is principal object of all labour legislation bearing on industrial adjudication. But whether a matter in dispute in a subsequent case had earlier been directly and substantially in issue between the same parties and the same had been heard and finally decided by the Tribunal will be of pertinent consideration and will have to be determined before holding in a particular case that the principles of res judicata are attracted." After making the aforesaid observations the Court struck a note of warning in the following words: "Some distinction of whatever shade or magnitude may have to be borne in mind in application of the principles of res judicata in industrial adjudication in contradistinction of civil proceeding. The extraordinary technical considerations, usually invoked in civil proceedings may not be allowed to outweigh the substantial justice to the parties in an industrial adjudication." The above observations of the Supreme Court leave no room for any doubt that the principles underlying Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the industrial adjudication and proceedings before the Labour Court. While applying these principles the extreme technical considerations should not outweigh the substantial justice to the parties. 10. There is no dispute that in writ petition No. 3209 of 1958 filed by the petitioner company a large number of grounds were raised challenging jurisdiction of the Labour Court at Kanpur to continue with the proceedings and to adjudicate the dispute. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court was challenged on three different classes of grounds. The first class of grounds raised objection to the adjudication of dispute on the ground that the dispute was not an industrial dispute. In raising that ground all possible questions were raised. The second class of grounds raised the question of lack of jurisdiction of the Deputy Labour Commissioner in referring the dispute for adjudication on the principles of res judicata. The third category of grounds included the grounds raising objection to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to hear and decide the dispute as it was not properly constituted. As already noted at the time of the hearing the petitioner company pressed only one category of grounds challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, Kanpur, in hearing and adjudicating the dispute as it was not properly constituted and the dispute had not been referred to it for adjudication. This contention failed but the company did not press other questions raised by it. In Special Appeal a Division Bench of this Court upheld the judgment of the Single Judge. The petitioner company did not file any appeal before the Supreme Court and the judgment of this Court became final between the parties with the result that the finding that the Labour Court, Kanpur, was competent to adjudicate upon the dispute became final between the parties. 11. The petitioner company has now again raised those questions before the Labour Court challenging its jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute referred to it on the same grounds which it had raised before this Court in earlier writ petition, although it had not pressed the same. 11. The petitioner company has now again raised those questions before the Labour Court challenging its jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute referred to it on the same grounds which it had raised before this Court in earlier writ petition, although it had not pressed the same. Applying the principles of constructive res judicata, it is clear that the petitioner company raised all the questions which it could have raised before this Court in earlier proceedings but it did not press them because the points raised by it had no merits. Since the petitioner company did not press those points it must be deemed that those points stood decided against the petitioner company, now it is not open to it to re-agitate the same in subsequent proceedings. If this principle is not applied serious result will follow. The petitioner company may go on selecting only one or two grounds each time challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and then approach this Court against the order of the Labour Court disposing of the preliminary objections and thereafter when the proceedings are resumed before the Labour Court the company may raise fresh preliminary objections to challenge the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and it may again come to this Court against the order passed by the Labour Court. If this is permitted, the object underlying the principle of res judicata would be defeated and the public policy of attaching finality to the judgments and adjudications would be frustrated, This would certainly not be conducive to industrial peace and harmony and would cause grave injustice to the workmen. Further this process will enable the employers to block proceedings before the Labour Court for an indefinite period of time and thereby tire out the patience of the workmen who have been out of employment since long. The preliminary objections are no doubt permissible under the law and if objections relating to lack of jurisdiction are substantiated the adjudication proceedings would be rendered null and void but the public policy and interest of justice require that employers should not be permitted to pick up one ground at a time and multiply proceedings by raising the same matter again and again at different stages. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case I am of the opinion that it is not open to the employers to raise these questions again before the Labour Court. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case I am of the opinion that it is not open to the employers to raise these questions again before the Labour Court. The impugned order of the Labour Court does not suffer from any patent error of law. 12. But even assuming that the technical rules of constructive res judicata as embodied in Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to proceedings before the Labour Court and further even if it is held that the questions raised by the petitioner company were not pressed at the earlier proceedings, therefore it cannot be deemed to have been raised and decided, the petitioner is not entitled to discretionary relief under Ait. 226 of the Constitution, Even if it is assumed that the Labour Court misdirected itself in refusing to frame preliminary issues raised by the petitioner company, it is again not entitled to any relief before this Court on the principles of res judicata. It is well settled that principles of res judicata are applicable in proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution. If a writ petition filed by a party under Art. 226 of the Constitution is considered on merits and is decided and the decision so pronounced would bind the parties if the decision is not modified In appeal. In Daryao v. State of U.P., ( AIR 1961 SC 1457 ) the Supreme Court held that if a petition filed in the High Court is dismissed on merits, a subsequent petition under Art, 36 before the Supreme Court would be barred. Applying the principles it is clear that in the earlier petition before this Court parties and the subject-matter of the dispute was the same and after a fair opportunity to the parties this Court decided the dispute against the petitioner company. In such a situation it is not open to the petitioner to re-agitate the same questions again. In tho circumstances it must be deemed that the grounds raised by the petitioner company and not pressed in the earlier proceedings before this Court stood decided against it. That decision is binding between the parties and it is not open to the petitioner company to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court again to challenge the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. That decision is binding between the parties and it is not open to the petitioner company to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court again to challenge the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. If a party files a writ petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of a statutory authority or legality of the proceedings before a quasi-judicial authority on a number of grounds and if the writ petition is dismissed on merits after hearing the parties, subsequently it is not open to the petitioner to file another writ petition challenging the order or jurisdiction of the statutory authority on the grounds which were raised in the earlier Writ petition though not pressed. In such a case the principles of res judicata as laid down by the Supreme Court in Daryao Singh's case will be fully applicable to a subsequent writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 13. In Ramesh v. Genda Lal, ( AIR 1966 SC 1445 ), the nature of proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution was considered and the Court observed: "......... under Art. 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not hear an appeal or revision. The High Court is moved to intervene and to bring before itself the record of a case decided by or pending before a Court or Tribunal or any authority within the High Court's jurisdiction. A petition to the High Court invoking this jurisdiction is a proceeding quite independent of the original controversy. The controversy in the High Court in proceedings arising under Art. 226 ordinarily is whether a decision of or a proceeding before a Court or Tribunal or authority, should be allowed to stand or should he quashed for want of jurisdiction or on account of errors of law apparent on the face of the record. The controversy in the High Court in proceedings arising under Art. 226 ordinarily is whether a decision of or a proceeding before a Court or Tribunal or authority, should be allowed to stand or should he quashed for want of jurisdiction or on account of errors of law apparent on the face of the record. A decision in the exercise of this jurisdiction, whether interfering with the proceedings impugned or declining to do so, is a final decision in so far as the High Court is concerned because it terminates finally the special proceedings before it." In view of the above observations it is clear that the grounds raised by the petitioner challenging jurisdiction of the Labour Court in continuing with the proceedings or adjudicating the dispute referred to it stood finally decided by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and since no appeal was filed the decision of this Court became final and binding between the parties. In the circumstances the petitioner cannot raise the same questions in this petition. 14. In Management of Northern Rly. Cooperative Credit Society v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, ( AIR 1967 SC 1182 ), the employers raised preliminary objection before the Industrial Tribunal challenging its competence on the ground that the dispute referred to it was not an industrial dispute, instead it was an individual dispute as the dispute was not espoused by the workmen. The Industrial Tribunal rejected the objection. Thereupon the employers filed a petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Rajasthan challenging the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the petition holding that the reference was competent and the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute referred to it. The employers did not file any appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court and the judgment of the High Court became final. Thereafter the Industrial Tribunal gave its award. The employers thereupon filed appeal before the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution challenging the award, and one of the grounds raised by the employers was that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute was not an industrial dispute. Thereafter the Industrial Tribunal gave its award. The employers thereupon filed appeal before the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution challenging the award, and one of the grounds raised by the employers was that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute was not an industrial dispute. The Supreme Court applying the principles of res judicata held that since the judgment of the High Court had become final and binding between the parties, it was not open to the employers to challenge the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal as the plea had been rejected by the High Court in writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and since no appeal was filed before the Supreme Court, the High Court judgment was binding between the parties. 15. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that the principles of res judicata are applicable to the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The grounds raised by the petitioner company challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court stood decided in the earlier writ petition between the same parties, it is not open to the petitioner company to raise those questions again in the present proceedings or to raise the same before the Labour Court. The petitioner company is therefore not entitled to any relief. 16. The dispute in the present case has been pending since long. The respondent-workmen were dismissed from service in 1952 but till now the industrial dispute raised by them could not be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal due to various legal proceedings taken from time to time. Social justice and industrial harmony require that the industrial dispute should be decided as early as possible. I hope the Labour Court will take immediate steps to adjudicate the dispute as early as possible. 17. In the result the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.