Judgment :- 1. A shop room was taken on rent by the appellant-plaintiff from the respondent-defendant under Ext. Al, and that room was destroyed by accidental fire sometime in 1968. The appellant vacated the premises and started his business in another building. In due course the defendant landlord put up a new structure in the old premises and inducted his son into the new construction. On 1-61971 the appellant instituted the present suit for directing the defendant to let out the newly constructed premises to the plaintiff on the ground that Ext. Al contract still subsists. The action was resisted by the defendant on various grounds inclusive of the contention that Ext. Al was terminated by the voluntary and unqualified surrender of the premises by the plaintiff to the defendant. The courts below substantially accepted the contentions raised by the defendant and non-suited the plaintiff. 2. The averments in the plaint suggest a sort of agreement between the plaintiff on the one part and the defendant on the other to the effect that the defendant was permitted by the plaintiff to put up a new structure on the understanding that the reconstructed premises will again be let out to the plaintiff. In as much as there is no evidence whatsoever in support of the suggested agreement, the appellant did not canvass before me for the proposition that his claims are based upon any specific subsequent agreement. 3. The only contention urged before me is that Ext. Al contract continues to be in force and that on the strength of that contract the plaintiff is entitled to the occupation of the newly constructed building. In support of his case the appellant relied on S.108 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act (for brevity the Act). The appellant did not seriously dispute the proposition that if Ext. Al has been terminated in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act, S.108 (e) cannot be of any assistance to him. So the main question to be considered is whether Ext Al has been terminated in accordance with S.111 of the Act. In Para.8 of the plaint what is alleged is that the plaintiff surrendered the premises to the 1st defendant only for the purpose of constructing a new building. So the main question to be considered is whether Ext Al has been terminated in accordance with S.111 of the Act. In Para.8 of the plaint what is alleged is that the plaintiff surrendered the premises to the 1st defendant only for the purpose of constructing a new building. In Para.9 of the written statement, in addition to the denial of the understanding referred to in Para.8 of the plaint, it is specifically contended that there was a voluntary and unconditional surrender of the premises by the plaintiff-tenant in favour of the defendant-landlord. There is no written surrender in this case. But certain facts are beyond dispute. The shop room was destroyed. The plaintiff never showed any interest to retain the vacant space. As a matter of fact, what he did was to hire out another building and start his business there. The landlord undoubtedly entered possession and put up a new structure without any demur from the tenant. The sequence of events cannot support the case of a qualified surrender urged by the appellant. That apart, in the plaint though the plaintiff is very vehement in alleging that Ext. Al continues, it is significant to note that there is no whisper regarding the liability of the plaintiff to pay rent from the date of destruction of the premises till the institution of the suit. It would thus appear that according to the plaintiff Ext. Al continues for the limited purpose of conferring a right on the plaintiff to claim the new building and without any liability to pay the rent agreed upon under Ext. Al for the period during which he was not in occupation. I am highlighting this aspect only to show that when once the agreement suggested in the plaint is found against and the subsequent events are taken into consideration it is crystal clear that there was a complete surrender of the premises and that the plaintiff never dreamt of keeping alive Ext. Al to his detriment or to his advantage. I am thus satisfied that this is a case where there has been a determination of Ext. Al lease by surrender. That being so, S.108 (e) of the Act can have no application. 4. Since the scope of S.108 of the Act has been argued at some length, I am tempted to consider the real object of S.108(e) of the Act. Al lease by surrender. That being so, S.108 (e) of the Act can have no application. 4. Since the scope of S.108 of the Act has been argued at some length, I am tempted to consider the real object of S.108(e) of the Act. S.108 provides for the rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee. The provision starts with the following paragraph: "Rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee. In the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, the lessor and the lessee of immovable properly, as against one another, respectively, possess the rights and are subject to the liabilities mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property leased." The succeeding provisions of S.108 are broadly grouped under two different sub-headings as A and B. The clauses grouped under sub-heading A are intended to provide for the rights and liabilities of the lessor. The provisions under the sub-heading B deal with the rights and liabilities of the lessee. Clause (e) of S.108 is grouped under sub-heading B; and it is in the following terms: "if by fire, tempest or flood or violence of any army or of a mob, or other irresistible force, any material part of the property be wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purposes for which it was let, the lease shall, at the option of the lessee, be void: Provided that if the injury be occasioned by the wrongful act or default of the lessee, he shall not be entitled to avail himself of the benefit of this provision." The proviso to this clause has no relevancy in this case because the landlord has no case that the building was destroyed by the wrongful act or default of the lessee. Again, without deciding I may assume that the lessee has not in the instant case exercised the option given to him by this provision. What then is the result? The utmost that could be spelt out is that Ext. Al contract subsists. It may be relevant in this connection to refer to S.111 of the Act, which deals with determination of leases. The destruction of the leasehold property under the circumstances mentioned in S.1080(e) by itself does not amount to a determination of the lease under S.111. The utmost that could be spelt out is that Ext. Al contract subsists. It may be relevant in this connection to refer to S.111 of the Act, which deals with determination of leases. The destruction of the leasehold property under the circumstances mentioned in S.1080(e) by itself does not amount to a determination of the lease under S.111. In other words, even though the leasehold property is destroyed the tenancy is not automatically determined. Despite the destruction of the premises if the lease is to subsist who is the sufferer? Apparently it is the lessee, who is at a disadvantage because without the benefit of enjoying the right to property he is fastened with the liability to pay the contractual rent. It is presumably to avoid such a contingency that the tenant is conferred an option by S 108(e) to treat the contract as void and thereby avoid the liability of paying the rent in future. The learned counsel for the appellant did not rightly bargain for the position that even if the tenant did not exercise his option and the contract continues without determination under S.111 the tenant has got a right to compel the landlord to construct a building in the old premises and give occupation to the tenant. The qualified proposition advanced by the appellant is that even if the landlord has no obligation to construct a building at the old site, when once a structure is put up the tenant automatically gets a right to occupy the newly constructed building in view of the subsistence of the original contract. The proposition is not as easy as it is alleged to be. Suppose the destroyed building was a substantial one and the newly constructed structure is smaller in dimension and value, will the tenant be prepared to occupy the new structure agreeing to pay the old rent? To that question the appellant apparently has no answer. The only way he can get over the situation is by pleading that there is yet another option resting with the tenant either to accept or not to accept the newly constructed premises. I do not think that the express wording of S.108(e) is capable of any such construction Thus S.108(e) of the Act cannot be construed as supporting the appellant's case that he is entitled to the occupation of the new building in view of the subsistence of Ext. I do not think that the express wording of S.108(e) is capable of any such construction Thus S.108(e) of the Act cannot be construed as supporting the appellant's case that he is entitled to the occupation of the new building in view of the subsistence of Ext. Al . The appellant has thus neither a contractual nor a statutory right to compel the respondent to surrender possession of the new building to the appellant. The suit was rightly dismissed, and I find no reason to interfere. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.