J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE original plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge by confirming the trial Courts decree has come in this appeal. ( 2 ) THERE is no dispute that the deceased contractual tenant Rana Chhotabhai Nanabhai though his tenancy was duly terminated before his death on March 9 1960 he was at the date of his death continuing in the suit premises as a statutory tenant. There is also no dispute that the deceased was doing grocery business in the suit shop and that he had left his widow Haribai and his daughter Punjiben as his heirs and all these persons-widow Haribai daughter Punjiben and daughters husband Manilal Chhaganlal were all residing with the deceased at the time of his death. The case of the plaintiff was that after the death of the tenant Chhotalal Naranbhai statutory tenancy was continued only by widow Haribai. Haribai died on February 11 1964 The plaintiff gave notice Ex. 27 on August 18 1964 The defendant daughter and the daughters husband in their reply Ex. 30 dated September 1 1954 claimed protection as statutory tenant. The plaintiffs suit was on the basis of title for evicting the defendants as being in unauthorised possession. The learned Single Judge having held that they were not in unauthorised possession but under sec. 5 (11) (c) in their own rights on the death of the statutory tenant Chhotalal the suit for eviction must fail. That is why the plaintiff has come in this appeal. ( 3 ) THE legal position is now well settled as to the true interpretation of sec. 5 (11) (c) which was in force at the relevant time. Sec. 5 (11) (c) provides that a tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes (c) (i) in relation to premises let for residence any member of the tenant s family residing with the tenant at the time of or within three months immediately prece- ding the death of the tenant as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court and. . . . . . . . . In Heirs of deceased MOHANLAL V. MUKTABAI 12 G. L. R. 272 at page 276 a Division Bench consisting of A. D. Desai J. and my learned Brother interpreted this relevant clause in sec. . . . . . . . . In Heirs of deceased MOHANLAL V. MUKTABAI 12 G. L. R. 272 at page 276 a Division Bench consisting of A. D. Desai J. and my learned Brother interpreted this relevant clause in sec. 5 (11) (c) in this inclusive definition of the term tenant. It was pointed out that all the various clauses of sec. 5 (11) make no reference whatever to the nature of the premises but only to the classes of the persons who are entitled to become tenants. Clause (c) of sec. 5 (11) provides that any member of the tenants family residing with him at the time or within three months immediately preced- ing his death as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court is a tenant. The words residing with him control the expression any member of the tenants family and the said words did not refer to the nature of the leased premises. Because in this relevant definition as it stood before 1965 there were no words of limitation such as in respect of premises let for residence so as to restrict this benevolent clause only to residential premises and as various sub-clauses (a) (aa) (b) clearly indicated that they applied to all the premises in absence of any words of limitation in this relevant sub-clause (c) it could not be held that the benefit of this provision was to accrue only in respect of residential premises. It was pointed out that the legislature elected sec. 5 (11) (c) for the purpose of protecting members of the tenants family residing at the time of or within three months immediately preceding his death. The protection is not to any and every member of his family hut only to such member of the tenants family who was residing with him at the time of or within three months immediately preceding his death. It was therefore held that this provision laid down the manner of devolution of statutory tenancy and it devolved on the death of the statutory tenant on any member of the tenants family residing with hill at the time of or within three months immediately preceding his death. It was therefore held that this provision laid down the manner of devolution of statutory tenancy and it devolved on the death of the statutory tenant on any member of the tenants family residing with hill at the time of or within three months immediately preceding his death. It was also pointed out that in many cases maintenance of members of tenants family residing with him depended on the income derived from the business and in order that such members of the tenants family might not be thrown on the street but continued to maintain themselves by carrying business in the premises the legislature appeared to have enacted the provisions of sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Act. Therefore it was in terms held that the true const- ruction of sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Act is that any member of the tenants family residing with him at the time of or within three months immedia- tely preceding his death was a tenant within the meaning of the said provisions irrespective of the purpose for which the premises were let. The ratio was categorical that on the death of the statutory tenant any member of his family residing with him at the time of or within three months immediately preceding his death was entitled to become a tenant. In SUDALAIMUTHU V. PALANIYANDAVAN A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 469 in similar context of such tenancy legislation where the benefit was to accrue to the members of the family it was in terms held relying on Websters New World Dictionary that family would include a group of people related by blood or marriage relatives. A person can therefore be regarded as being the member of his wifes family and not merely of his fathers family. The term family was not to be construed in the narrow sense to mean only a member of a Hindu Joint Family but even to include a son-in-law as member of the family keeping in mind the salutary principle that the definition of the tenant in such tenancy legislation was applicable irrespective of the personal laws governing the parties. A similar wider interpretation must be given even to the present definition as is pointed out by the Division Bench because the legislature has enacted sec. A similar wider interpretation must be given even to the present definition as is pointed out by the Division Bench because the legislature has enacted sec. 5 (11) (c) for the purpose of protecting members of the tenants family residing with him at the time of or within 3 months immediately preced- ing his death. The tenants definition is also applicable to all persons not only to the widow and the daughter but also to daughters husband or the son-in-law as held by their Lordships in the aforesaid decision. ( 4 ) MR. Shah however canvassed a narrow construction of sec. 5 (11) (c) by relying on the decision of the Court of Appeal in SUMMERS V. DONOHUE 1945 (1) K. B. 376. The Court of Appeal had to construe a totally different definition of the term tenant in the definitive part of sec. 12 (1) (g) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 which in both places where it occurred only referred to the original contractual or statutory tenant on whose death his widow or other members of his family may continue in possession as a statutory tenant. It was because of the relevant words therein which occurred twice over in the definition part of the section which had referred to the same person and only to one person that is to say to the original contractual or statutory tenant who had died that that the Court of Appeal was inclined to interpret this language in restricted manner by holding that it could not cover widow or other member of the tenants family so as to give them right to continue tenancy on the death of such widow or other member of the family. The Court of Appeal took this narrow interpretation on the basis that a succession of descendants was not contemplated under the second part of the definition so that the tenant may include one who had become an artificial tenant by inheritance of the right of original tenant under the earlier part of the definition. There is no such difficulty in the present sec. 5 (11) (c) which the Division Bench had in terms interpreted as laying down that on the death of the statutory tenant any member of his family residing with him at the time of or within three months immediately preceding his death is entitled to become a tenant. There is no such difficulty in the present sec. 5 (11) (c) which the Division Bench had in terms interpreted as laying down that on the death of the statutory tenant any member of his family residing with him at the time of or within three months immediately preceding his death is entitled to become a tenant. In MULIDHAR V. STATE OF U. P. A. I R. 1974 S. C. 1924 a similar definition of sec. 3 of the U. P. Rent Control Act defining tenant had been interpreted. Their Lordships laid emphasis on the fact that such rent restriction statute protecting tenants were measures based on public policy. They were intended to pro- tect weaker sections of the community with view to ultimately protecting the interest of the community in general by creating equality of bargaining power. Although the section. was primarily intended for the protection of tenants only that protection was based on public policy and such a right could not even be waived. When therefore the legislature in the context of such measure based on public policy widens protection by such inclusive definition to include on death of statutory tenant members of the family residing with him at the time of or within three months immediately preceding his death by giving them statutory right of becoming a tenant wide amplitude of provision could not be curtailed on any assumption that the benefit must have been contemplated not to enure for successive descendants but for only one person alone. That would be totally frustra- ting the whole object of this amendment. Some persons may be so unfor- tunate as to lose this protection on this narrow construction by successive deaths in the family. That is not the sound construction of a measure based on public policy especially when there are no such restrictive words in the context of this statute. The legislature was really recognising the juridical possession of the members of the family who were residing with the tenant at the time of or within 3 months of his death and devolving statutory tenancy on those persons. If the statutory right has devolved even on the death of the statutory tenant the said right would further devolve on the death of that statutory tenant in his turn to one in whom the legislature recognises juridical possession in such a measure to protect the community. If the statutory right has devolved even on the death of the statutory tenant the said right would further devolve on the death of that statutory tenant in his turn to one in whom the legislature recognises juridical possession in such a measure to protect the community. Therefore there is no basis for the narrow construction canvassed for by Mr. Shah. In that view of the matter there was no foundation for the present suit on the basis that the defendants were in unauthorised possession as they were in possession in their own right under sec. 5 (11) (c) when the tenancy of the deceased had devolved on them. In the present case even on the narrower footing the defendants were entitled to be protected because both the defendants were residing admittedly with him at the time of the death of the statutory tenant Chhotalal and so the devolution of the statutory tenancy under sec. 5 (11) (c) was on these persons including widow Haribai and the defendants. Therefore on the death of Haribai both the defendants were continuing under the original devolution of statutory tenancy and not under a fresh devolution on the death of Haribai which even is really intended by our legislature as earlier pointed out by us. ( 5 ) IN that view of the matter this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed .