JUDGMENT : Acting on probable cause to believe that a narcotics offense had been committed, police officers attempted a warrantless arrest of the defendant while she was standing in the doorway of her residence, but the defendant retreated into the vestibule of her house, where the police officers caught her and seized marked money that she had in her possession, as well as heroin which fell from a paper bag that the defendant was carrying. An indictment charging the defendant and others with federal narcotics offenses was filed in the United States District Court. for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress the evidence seized at the time of the defendant's arrest, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed without opinion. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion of Rehnquist, J., expressing the view of seven members of the court, it was held that (1) the defendant, being in the threshold of her home, was in a public place when the police, acting on probable cause, first sought to arrest her, and such a warrantless arrest would not violate the Fourth Amendment, (2) the defendant could not thwart the otherwise proper arrest by retreating into her house, a private place, since sufficient "hot pursuit" existed to justify a warrantless entry into her house., there being a realistic expectation that delay would result in the destruction of evidence, and (3) since the search conducted incident to the arrest was justified, the District Court erred in granting the defendants' motion to suppress the evidence derived therefrom. 1. An officer Strohm testified that he recognised Santana, whom he had seen before. He also indicated that she was standing directly in the doorway -one step forward would have put her outside, one step backward would have put her in the vestibule of her residence. 2. It is not apparent on what grounds respondent Alejandro had standing to protest the seizures. However, the Government did not raise this issue below and consequently we do not reach it. White, J., concurring, emphasised that since probable cause existed to arrest the defendant and to believe that she was in the house, there was no need for a warrant to enter the house to make the arrest, atleast where force was not required. However, the Government did not raise this issue below and consequently we do not reach it. White, J., concurring, emphasised that since probable cause existed to arrest the defendant and to believe that she was in the house, there was no need for a warrant to enter the house to make the arrest, atleast where force was not required. Stevens, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring, expressed the view that the failure of the police to obtain an arrest warrant when they had sufficient information to do so was either (1) a police decision justifiable in light of the risk that the marked money would no longer be in the defendant's possession after a warrant was obtained, or (2) harmless, since the defendant's residence could have been kept under surveillance while a warrant was being obtained, and a justifiable warrantless arrest could have been made when she ventured into plain view prior to procurement of the warrant. Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissented on the ground that (1) police could not arrest a suspect without a warrant, absent exigent circumstances, and (2) while exigent circumstances existed in this case, they were the product of police conduct, and the case should be remanded for consideration of whether such conduct was for the sole purpose of creating an exigency to circumvent the warrant requirement, rendering the subsequent arrest and search unlawful. OPINION OF THE COURT Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. I. On August 16, 1974, Michael Gilletti, an undercover officer with the Philadelphia Narcotics Squad arranged a heroin "buy" with one Patricia McCafferty (from whom he had purchased narcotics before). McCafferty told him it would cost $115 "and we will go down to Mom Santana's for the dope." 2. Gilletti notified his superiors of the impending transaction, recorded the serial numbers of $110 (sic) in marked bills, and went to meet McCafferty at a prearranged location. She got in his car and directed him to drive to 2311 North Fifth Street, which as she had previously informed him was respondent Santana's residence. 3. McCafferty took the money and went inside the house, stopping briefly to speak to respondent Alejandro who was sitting on the front steps. She came out shortly afterwards and got into the car. She got in his car and directed him to drive to 2311 North Fifth Street, which as she had previously informed him was respondent Santana's residence. 3. McCafferty took the money and went inside the house, stopping briefly to speak to respondent Alejandro who was sitting on the front steps. She came out shortly afterwards and got into the car. Gilletti asked for the heroin; she thereupon extracted from her bra several glassine envelopes containing a brownishwhite powder and gave them to him. 4. Gilletti then stopped the car, displayed his badge and placed McCafferty under arrest. He told her that the police were going back to 2311 North Fifth Street and wanted to know where the money was. She said, "Mom has the money", At this point Sergeant Pruitt and other officers came up to the car. Gilletti showed them the envelope and said "Mom Santana has the money". Gilletti then took McCafferty to the police station. 5. Pruitt and the others then drove approximately two blocks back to 2311 North Fifth Street. They saw Santana standing in the doorway of the house with a brown paper bag in her hand. They pulled up to within 15 feet of Santana and got out of their van, shouting "police", and displaying their identification. As the officers approached, Santana retreated into the vestibule of her house. 1. An officer Strohm testified that he recognised Santana, whom he had seen before. He also indicated that she was standing directly in the doorway -one step forward would have put her outside, one step backward would have put her in the vestibule of her residence. 6. The officers followed through the open door, catching her in the vestibule. As she tried to pull away, the bag tilted and "two bundles of glazed paper packets with 11 white powder "'fell to the floor". Respondent Alejandro tried to make off with the dropped envelopes but was forcibly restrained. When Santalla was told to empty her pockets she produced $135 $70 of which could be identified as Giilettifs marked money. The white powder in the bag was later determined to be heroin. 7. Respondent Alejandro tried to make off with the dropped envelopes but was forcibly restrained. When Santalla was told to empty her pockets she produced $135 $70 of which could be identified as Giilettifs marked money. The white powder in the bag was later determined to be heroin. 7. An indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charging McCafferty with distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 USC ?841 (21 USCS ?841), and respondent is with possession of heroin with interest to distribute in violation of the same section. McCafferty pleaded guilty. Santana and Alejandro moved to suppress the heroin and money found during and after their arrests. 8. The Districts Court granted respondents' motion.2In an oral opinion the court found that "(t)here was strong probable cause that Defendant Santana had participated in the transaction with Defendant McCafferty." However the court continued: 2. It is not apparent on what grounds respondent Alejandro had standing to protest the seizures. However, the Government did not raise this issue below and consequently we do not reach it. "One of the police officers. . . . . . . . . . . testified that the mission was to arrest Defendant Santana. Another police officer testified that the mission was to recover the bait money. Either one would require a warrant, one a warrant of arrest under ordinary circumstances and one a search warrant." 9. The court further held that Santanafs "reentry from the doorway into the house" was not grounds for allowing the police to make a warrantless entry; into the house on the grounds of "hot pursuit" because it took "hot pursuit" to mean "a chase on and about public streets", The court did find, however, that the police acted under "extreme emergency" conditions. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision without opinion. II 10. In United States v. Watson, -US -= (46 L Ed 2d 598 = 96 S Ct 820) (1976), we held that the warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place upon probable cause did not violate the Fourth Amendment.Thus the first question we must decide is whether when the police first sought to arrest Santana, she was in a public place. 11. 11. While it may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of one's dwelling is "private", as is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that under the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment Santana was in a "public" place.She was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection". Katz v. United States, (1967) 389 US 347. 351 = (19 L Ed 2d 576 = 88 S Ct 507). She was not merely visible to the public but as exposed to public view, speech, hearing and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house. Hester v. United States, (1924) 265 US 57,59 = 68 L Ed 898 = 44 S Ct 445. Thus, when the police, who concededly had probable cause to do so, sought to arrest her. they merely intended to perform a function which we have approved in Watson. 12. The only remaining question is whether her act of retreating into her house could thwart on otherwise proper arrest. We hold that it could not. In Warden v. Hayden, (1967) 387 US 294 = (18 L Ed 2d 782 = 87 S Ct 1642), we recognised the right of police who had probable cause to believe that an armed robber had entered a house a few minutes before, to make a warrantless entry to arrest the robber and to search for weapons. This case, involving a true "hot pursuit", is clearly governed by Warden; the need to act quickly here is even greater than in that case while the intrusion is much less. The District Court was correct in concluding that "hot pursuit" means some sort of a chase, but it need not be an extended hue and cry "in and about (the) public streets." The fact that the pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began did not render it any the less a "hot pursuit" sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into Santana's house. Once Santana saw the police, there was likewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence. See Vale v. Louisiana, (1970) 399 US 30, 35 = (26 L Ed 2d 409 = 90 S Ct 1969). Once Santana saw the police, there was likewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence. See Vale v. Louisiana, (1970) 399 US 30, 35 = (26 L Ed 2d 409 = 90 S Ct 1969). Once she had been arrested the search, incident to that arrest, which produced the drugs and money was clearly justified United States v. Robinson, (1973) 414 US 218 = (38 L Ed 2d 427 = 94 S Ct 467 = 66 Ohio Ops 2d 202); Chimel v. California, (1969) 395 US 752, 762-763 = (23 L Ed 2d 685 = 89 S Ct 2034). 3. Warden was based upon the "exigencies of the situation", 387 US at 298 = (18 L Ed 782 = 87 S Ct 1642) and did not Use the term "hot pursuit" or even involve a hot pursuit in the sense that that term would normally be understood. That phrase first appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 US 10, 16 n 7 = (92 L Ed 436 = 68 S Ct 367) (1948), where it was recognised that some element of a chase will usually be involved in a "hot pursuit" case. 13. We thus conclude that a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place, and is therefore proper under Watson, by the expedient of escaping to a private place. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed. SEPARATE OPINIONS Mr. Justice White, concurring, 14. It is not disputed here that the officers had probable cause to arrest Santana and too believe that she was in the house. In these circumstances, a warrant was not required to enter the house to make the arrest, at least where entry by force was not" required. This has been the longstanding statutory or judicial rule in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, see American Law Institute A Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, 306-314, 696-697 (1975), and has been deemed consistent with state constitutions, as well as the Fourth Amendment. It is also the Institute's recommended rule. Id., ?120.6. I agree with the Court that the arrest here did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 15. It is also the Institute's recommended rule. Id., ?120.6. I agree with the Court that the arrest here did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 15. My Brother Marshall, post and United States v. Watson, -US -, -, (1976) 46 L Ed 2d 598 = (96 S Ct 820) (dissenting opinion), would reinterpret the Fourth Amendment to sweep aside this widely held rule and to establish a constitutional standard requiring warrants for arrests except where exigent circumstances clearly exist. The States are, of course, free to limit warrantless arrests, as is Congress; but I would not impose his suggested nation-wide edict, founded as it is on a belief in the superior wisdom of the members of this Court and their power to divine that the country's practice to this date with respect to arrests is after all unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Justice Stevens, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, concurring. 16. When Officer Gilletti placed McCafferty under arrest, the police had sufficient information to obtain a warrant for the arrest of Santana in her home. It is therefore, important to note that their failure to obtain a warrant at that juncture was both (a) a justifiable police decision, and (b) even if not justifiable, harmless. The decision was justified by the significant risk that the marked money would no longer be in Santana's possession if the police waited until a warrant could be obtained. The failure to seek a warrant was harmless because it would have been proper to keep the Santana residence under surveillance while the warrant was being sought; since she ventured into plain view, a warrantless arrest would have been justified before the warrant could have been procured. 17. I therefore, join the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting. . 18. Earlier this Term, I expressed the view that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the police may not arrest a suspect without a warrant. United States v. Watson, -US -, -, (1976) 46 L Ed 2d 598 = 96 S Ct 820 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For this reason, I cannot join either the opinion of the Court or that of Mr. Justice White, each of which disregards whether exigency justified the police decision to approach Santana's home without a warrant for the purpose of arresting her. Nor can I accept Mr. For this reason, I cannot join either the opinion of the Court or that of Mr. Justice White, each of which disregards whether exigency justified the police decision to approach Santana's home without a warrant for the purpose of arresting her. Nor can I accept Mr. Justice Stevens' approach for while acknowledging that some notion of exigency must be asserted to justify the police conduct in this case, Mr. Justice Stevens fails to consider that the exigency present in this case was produced solely by police conduct. I would remand the case to allow the District Court to determine whether that police conduct was justifiable or was solely an attempt to circumvent the warrant requirement. 19. The Court declines today to settle the oft-reserved question of whether and under what circumstances a police officer may enter to home of a suspect in order to make a warrantless arrest. United States v. Watson, -US, at -n 6, (1976) 46 L Ed 2d 598 = 96 S Ct 820; Gerstein v. Pugh, (1975) 420 US 103, 113 n 13 = 43 L Ed 2d 54 = 95 S Ct 854; Collidge v. New Hampshire, (1971) 403 US 443, 480-481 = 29 L Ed 2d 564 = 91 S Ct 2022; Jones v. United States, (1952) 357 US 493, 499-500 = 2 L Ed 2d 1514 = 78 S Ct 1253, Seizing upon the fortuity that Santana was standing in her doorway when the police-approached her home for the purpose of entering and arresting her, the Court ignores Mr. Justice White's repeated advocacy of the common-law rule on warrantless entries, ante, at -, 49 L Ed 2d 306; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, (1971) 403 US at 511-512, n 1. = 29 L Ed 2d 564 = 91 S Ct 2022 (White, J., concurring and dissenting) and treats this case as a simple application of Watson. 1. Mr. Justice White would have us bequeath our duty to interpret the Constitution to the States and Congress. As I said in response to a similar argument in Watson: "(T)he doctrine of deference that the Court invokes is contrary to the principles of constitutional analysis practiced since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, . . .. . .. .. . . (2 L Ed 6) (1803). As I said in response to a similar argument in Watson: "(T)he doctrine of deference that the Court invokes is contrary to the principles of constitutional analysis practiced since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, . . .. . .. .. . . (2 L Ed 6) (1803). (I)t is well settled that the mere existence of statutes or practice, even of long standing, is no defense to an unconstitutional practice. '(N)o one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when the span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it.' Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 US 664, 678 = (25 L Ed 2d 697 = 90 S Ct 1409) (1970), See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 US 266 = (37 L Ed 2d 596 = 93 S Ct 2535) (J973); Roe v, Wade, 410 US 113 = (35 L Ed 2d 147 = 93 S Ct 705) (1973); Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238=(33 L Ed 346 = 92 S Ct 2726) (1972); Reynolds v. Sins, 377 US 533 = (12 L Ed 2d 506 = 84 S Ct 1362) (1964). Our function in constitutional cases is weightier than the Court today suggests; where reasoned analysis shows a practice to be constitutionally deficient, our obligation is to the Constitution, not the Congress." -US, at -= 46 L Ed 2d 598 = 96 S Ct 820 (footnote omitted). 20. It is somewhat more than that, for the Court takes the opportunity to refine the contours of that decision. Thus, if I correctly read the Court's citation to the "open fields" doctrine of Hester v. United States, (1924) 265 US 57, 59 = 68 L Ed 898 = 44 S Ct 445, the Court holds that the police may enter upon private property to make warrant less arrests of persons who are in plain view and outdoors; and the Court applies that doctrine today to persons who are arguably within their homes but who are "as exposed" to the public as if they were outside. But the Court's encroachment upon the reserved question is limited. But the Court's encroachment upon the reserved question is limited. Thus, the Court's citation of Katz v. United States, (1967) 389 US 347, 351 = (19 L Ed 2d 576 = 88 S Ct 507), does not suggest that a plain view of a suspect is alone sufficient to justify warrant-less entry and seizure in the home. Indeed, the Court's rejection of sight alone as a basis for warrant-less entry and arrest is made patent, in Mr. Justice Stewart's phrase, by negative implication from the Court's need to elaborate a hot pursuit justification for the police following Santana into her home. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, (1971) 403 US at 480-481 = (29 L Ed 2d 564 = 91 S Ct 2022). Presumably, if plain view were the touchstone, Santana would have been just as liable to warrant-less arrest as she retreated several feet inside her open door as she was when standing in the doorway. 21. The Court's doctrine, then, appears sui generis, useful only in arresting persons who are "as exposed to public view, speech, hearing and touch", ante, at -, = (49 L Ed 2d 305), as though in the unprotected outdoors. Narrow though it may be, however, the Court's approach does not depend on whether exigency justifies an arrest on private property, and thus I cannot join it. 22. Mr. Justice Stevens focuses on what I believe to be the right question in this case -whether there were exigent circumstances -and reaches an affirmative answer because he finds a "significant risk that the marked money would no longer be in Santana's possession if police waited until a warrant could be obtained'. Ante, at -, = (49 L Ed 2d 306). I agree that there were exigent circumstances in this case. McCafferty was arrested a block and a half down the street from Santana's home. Although the arresting officers did not see anyone in Santana's home watching the arrest, App 16, one officer testified, "We were a block and a half from her home when the arrest was made, I am sure that the word would have been back within a matter of seconds or minutes". Although the arresting officers did not see anyone in Santana's home watching the arrest, App 16, one officer testified, "We were a block and a half from her home when the arrest was made, I am sure that the word would have been back within a matter of seconds or minutes". App 51, That is undoubtedly a reasonable conclusion to draw from the facts of the arrest; and the danger that the evidence would be destroyed and the suspects gone before a warrant could be obtained would ordinarily justify the police's quick return to Santana's home and the Warrantless entry and arrest. If that is the basis of the "significant risk" to which Mr. Justice Stevens refers, I have no difference with him on that score. 2. I assume that Mr. Justice Stevens is not suggesting that exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search or arrest are always present -regardless of whether the suspect is aware the police are on his trail -whenever police have probable cause to believe the suspect is in possession of evidence. Cf. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 US 30 = (26 L Ed 2d 409 90 S Ct 1909) (1970). 23. I do not believe, however, that these exigent circumstances automatically validate Santana's arrest. The exigency that justified the entry and arrest was solely a product of police conduct. Had Officer Gilletti driven McCafferty to a more remote location before arresting her, it appears that no exigency would have been created by the arrest; in such an event a warrant would have been necessary, in my view, before Santana could have been arrested. United States v. Watson, -US, at -, = (46 L Ed 2d 598 = 96 S Ct 820) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is not apparent on this record why Officer Gilletti arrested McCafferty so close to Santana's home when the arresting officers were clearly aware that such a near by arrest would necessitate the prompt arrest of Santana. App 51. While a police decision that the time is right to arrest a suspect should properly be given great deference, cf. Hoffa v, United States, (1966) 385 US 293, 310 = (17 L Ed 2d 374 = 87 S Ct 408), the power to arrest is an awesome one and is subject to abuse. App 51. While a police decision that the time is right to arrest a suspect should properly be given great deference, cf. Hoffa v, United States, (1966) 385 US 293, 310 = (17 L Ed 2d 374 = 87 S Ct 408), the power to arrest is an awesome one and is subject to abuse. An arrest may permit a search of premises incident' to the arrest, a search that otherwise could be carried out only upon probable cause and pursuant to a search warrant, Likewise, an arrest in circumstances such as those presented here may create exigency that may justify a search or another arrest. When an arrest is so timed that it is no more than an attempt to circumvent the warrant requirement, would hold the subsequent arrest or search unlawful. See Coolidge v. United States, (1971) 403 US at 469-471 =(29 LEd 2d 564=91 S Ct 2022); Vale v. Louisiana, (1970) 399 US 30; 35, = (26 L Ed 2d 409, F 90 S Ct 1969), Chimel v. California; (1969) 395 US 752, 767 == (23 L Ed 2d 685 = 89 S Ct 2034); Abel v. United States. (1960) 362 US 217. 226 and 230 = (4 L Ed 2d 668 = 80 ,-S Ct 683), United States v. Rabinowitz, (1950) 339 US 56, 82 = (94 L Ed ti53 = 70:S Ct 430) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting); United States v. Lefkowitz, (1932) 285 US 452, 467 = (76 L Ed 877 = 52 S Ct 420 = 82 ALR 775), Accordingly, I would remand this case for consideration of whether the police decision to arrest McCafferty a block and a half from Santana's home was for the sole purpose of creating the exigent circumstances that otherwise would justify Santana's subsequent arrest. 3. Because, I cannot agree that police may arrest a suspect in a public place solely upon probable cause, I cannot agree with Mr. Justice Stevens that any police error in deciding to return to Santana's home for the purpose of entering and arresting her was harmless.