JUDGMENT In this application, the petitioner Kali Prasad Poddar challenges an order of requisition of a plot of land in Mouza Kamranga in the district of Howrah. The order has been passed under sub-section (1A) of Section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), The impugned order was passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Howrah, requisitioning the land mentioned above for the establishment of a Maternity-cum-Child Welfare Centre with indoor beds. The petitioner obtained the present Rule principally on the allegation that, though he is the owner of the land in question, no notice under Section 3(2) of the Act was served on him. He alleges that he came to know from his brother Debi Prosad Poddar on whom notice was served that the order of requisition has been passed. 2. Mr. Sanjoy Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner strenuously contended before me that there has been no service of notice under Section 3(2) of the Act on the petitioner and consequently the order of requisition would not be validly enforced in respect of the land in question. 3. In order to appreciate the contention it is necessary to set out Section 3(2) of the Act which is as follows :– "An order under sub-section (1) shall be served in the prescribed manner on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land in occupation of an occupier, not being the owner of the land, also on such occupier". 4. In the instant case, since the petitioner is admittedly the owner of the land, the order of requisition has to be served on him "in the prescribed manner". 5. 4. In the instant case, since the petitioner is admittedly the owner of the land, the order of requisition has to be served on him "in the prescribed manner". 5. The manner of service is prescribed by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Rules 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules", Rule 3 whereof provides as follows :– "Manner of Service of Orders,–An order under sub-section (1) of section 3 shall be served on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land in occupation of an occupier not being the owner of the land, also on such occupier– (a) by delivering or tendering a copy thereof, endorsed either by the person authorised by the Act to make the order or by the Collector, to the person on whom the order is to be served or his agent, or (b) by fixing a copy thereof on the outer door of some conspicuous part of the house in which the person on whom the order is to be served ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, or (c) by sending the same to the person on whom the order is to be served by registered post with acknowledgment due or, (d) by fixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous part of the land to which the order relates and also in some conspicuous place of the office of the Collector." 6. Before I deal with the legal contentions advanced by Mr. Bhattacharjee, it will be useful to note the factual aspect with regard to the service of the impugned order in the present case. These facts appear from a supplementary affidavit of Bimal Chandra De to the affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the respondents. Shri De is a process server in the Land Acquisition Collector's Office at Howrah. According to the affidavit which is affirmed on the 7th June 1976, the deponent first went to Calcutta Jute Mill to serve the notice of requisition. He however did not find the persons concerned. He ascertained that one of the persons on whom he was to serve the notice viz., Dayaram Poddar was dead. Thereafter he returned the notice in respect of Dayaram Poddar to the office. He however did not find the persons concerned. He ascertained that one of the persons on whom he was to serve the notice viz., Dayaram Poddar was dead. Thereafter he returned the notice in respect of Dayaram Poddar to the office. Then he hung the notices in the name of Kali Prosad Poddar, the petitioner herein, and Debi Prosad Poddar on the main gate of the Jute Mill in the presence of witnesses. On the following day, i. e. on the 29th April, he went to 5, Taracband Dutta Street which is the residence of the petitioner and Debi Prosad Poddar. He was informed by the inmates of the house that those persons were not in the house. As no one was willing to accept the notices, he hung them on the front door of 5, Tara Chand Dutta Street in the presence of three witnesses who put their signatures on the reverse of the return copies of the notices. I may mention here that, at the time of the hearing, these return copies of the notices were produced before me and I have directed a copy of one of them to be kept on record. 7. The principal contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee was that there was no valid service of the notice of the impugned order of requisition in the facts and circumstances of the present case. With regard to the manner of service as laid down in Rule 3 of the Rules Mr. Bhattacharjee at first sought to contend that the expression 'or' occuring between Sub-rule (a) and (b), (b) and (c) and (d) should be read as 'and'. If this contention is to be accepted it would mean that in serving every order of requisition the authorities will have to take recourse to all the four different modes of service provided for in Sub-rule (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Rule 3 in every case. Realising the sheer absardity of this argument Mr. Bhattacharjee slightly shifted his ground. He sought to argue that although four different modes of service in Rule 3 may be in the alternative, in order to save Rule 3 from being struck down as void and to make it reasonable, it should be construed in the same manner and according the same scheme as is laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. He sought to argue that although four different modes of service in Rule 3 may be in the alternative, in order to save Rule 3 from being struck down as void and to make it reasonable, it should be construed in the same manner and according the same scheme as is laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. In other words, attempts must always to be made in the first instance, to effect personal services as laid down in Rule 3 (a). It is only when such personal service is not possible that it is permissible to resort to the other modes of services in Rule 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d) of the Rules which Mr. Bhattacharjee characterised as 'substituted service". 8. In support of this contention, Mr. Bhattacharjee referred to the cases of (1) Dina Nath Pati and others v. Upendra Nandan Das Mahapatra and others, AIR 1924 Calcutta 1004. (2) Kassim Ebrahim Saleji v. Johurmull Khemka 20 CWN 173, (3) Tripura Modern Bank Ltd. v. Bansen and Co., AIR 1952 Calcutta 780, (4) Jhabarmull Dudhwalla v. Bhagatram Serowgif, 51 CWN 189 and (5) Ramendra Nath Ghosh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax and others, 66 ITR 414. Mr. Bhattacharjee however fairly pointed out that all the case mentioned above except the last one relate to Order 5 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The last one relates to service under the Income Tax Act of 1922, Section 63 whereof expressly provided that service was to be effected in accordance with the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 9. In my view, it is not permissible to import the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 with regard to service in interpreting Rule 3 of the Rules in the present case. The Code of Civil Procedure 1908 has its own scheme of service. Broadly speaking, the scheme is that personal services must be attempted in every case and only when such personal service is not practicable that it is permissible to take recourse to service by affixation. 10. Section 3(2) of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Rules in my view contains the entirely different scheme as to the mode of service of orders passed under Section 3(1) or 3(1A) of the Act. 10. Section 3(2) of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Rules in my view contains the entirely different scheme as to the mode of service of orders passed under Section 3(1) or 3(1A) of the Act. In my view, the four modes of service indicated in Rule 3(a), 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d) of the Rules are clearly alternative modes of service. It is for the authorities to decide as to which mode to adopt in a particular case. There is nothing to indicate that the mode of personal service must first be exhausted before recourse could be taken to the other modes of service prescribed in Rule 3. The analogy of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not apply and also the cases mentioned above are clearly distinguishable on that ground. This contention on behalf of the petitioner must therefore fail. 11. Even assuming that this contention has some substance, it was pointed out by Mr. G.N. Roy, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, that in the facts of the present case, as appears from the affidavit of the process server referred to above attempts were made to serve the petitioner personally. Mr. Bhattacharjee vehimently contended that there was no Jute Mill named Calcutta Jute Mill as mentioned in the affidavit of the process server. I was informed by Mr. Roy on instructions that there was a slight error and the real name is Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Company, with which are petitioner is connected. Be that as it may, it was only after an attempt at personal service failed that service was made by affixation. There is no dispute that the petitioner resides at 5, Tarachand Dutta Street. In fact that is the address mentioned in the petition before us. It is also on evidence that his brother, Debi Prosad Poddar got a copy of the impugned order with which the petitioner rushed to this Court. In my view, the contention of Mr. Roy is sound that there has been no failure of justice in the present case. Mr. Roy in this connection referred to me to the decision in the case of (6) A. M. Allision v. B. L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 at 231 where it has been held that the High Court should not interfere in this jurisdiction unless there has been a failure of justice. 12. Mr. Roy in this connection referred to me to the decision in the case of (6) A. M. Allision v. B. L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227 at 231 where it has been held that the High Court should not interfere in this jurisdiction unless there has been a failure of justice. 12. The next contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee was that although the Act does not contain any provision for a representation or a hearing I should read into it such a provision in order to make the act reasonable. In support of this contention reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (7) Government of Mysore and others v. J. V. Bhat reported in AIR 1975 SC 596 . In that case it was held generally that where there are no statutory provision which debar the application of the principles of natural justice, such principles should apply to the statutory provisions so that they may not be struck down as unconstitutional. This decision in my view is of no assistance to the petitioner. This is because in the case of (8) S.M. Nandy and others v. The State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1971 SC 961 and with which we are concerned in the present case was specifically challenged as ultra vires under Article 19 of the Constitution. There were several grounds of challenge. One of the grounds was that the Act does no contain any provision for hearing or representation. This contention was negatived by the Supreme Court which held the Act to be intra vires. It was observed by the Supreme Court that there is no bar to a representation being made, after an order is served under Section 3(2) of the Act. If the representation raises a point which overrides the public purpose it would be favourably considered by the State Government or other authorities as the case may be. 13. In the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case mentioned immediately hereinbefore there is no question of the Act being unconstitutional, in the absence of a provision for hearing. Consequently, the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court in the case relied on by Mr. Bhattacharjee have no application to the present case. 14. 13. In the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case mentioned immediately hereinbefore there is no question of the Act being unconstitutional, in the absence of a provision for hearing. Consequently, the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court in the case relied on by Mr. Bhattacharjee have no application to the present case. 14. Lastly, it was contended that the appropriate authority was not satisfied about the public purpose before the order of requisition under Sec. 3(1) of the Act was made. It was contended that the appropriate authority which in this case is the Additional District Magistrate, Howrah did not apply his mind before making the order of requisition. The entire records of the case have produced before me. I find that all the relevant facts including the purpose for which the proposition was proposed viz., the establishment of a Maternity-cum-Child Welfare Clinic were put up before the Additional District Magistrate, Howrah before he signed the impugned order of requisition. That being so, this point, in my view, is without any substance. 15. In the result, this application fails and is dismissed. The rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to cost.