Judgment :- 1. Petitioner instituted an application under S.80B, Land Reforms Act (called hereunder the Act for convenience) for purchase of kudikidappu to which be was then entitled. While his application was pending before the Land Tribunal, be and his wife together purchased on 18 111974, 85 cents of garden land fit enough to erect a homestead. The respondent-landowner thereupon contended that with the acquisition of this land the petitioner had ceased to be a kudikidappukaran and had thereby lost his right to purchase the kudikidappu. This defence was rejected by the Tribunal but prevailed with the Appellate Authority which reversed the order of the Tribunal and dismissed the application. The petitioner challenges the appellate decision. 2. On behalf of the petitioner Mr. Achan contended that the decisive date is 111970 when S.80A which entitled kudikidappukaran to purchase his kudikidappu and S.80B which prescribed the procedure for that purpose, came into force and as the petitioner was a kudikidappukaran at that date, the subsequent acquisition of land by him cannot disqualify him or entail dismissal of his application. It was also contended that the normal rule is 'Once a kudikidappukaran, always a kudikidappukaran' subject to his being evicted under S.75 (1) or to his kudikidappu being shifted under S.75 (2). Counsel argued that the acquisition of land in the present case might entitle the respondent-landowner to evict him by virtue of S.75 (1) (iv) but would not by itself destroy his status as a kudikidappukaran or preclude him from sustaining his application and obtaining an order of purchase. 3. I find myself unable to accept this contention. S.2(25) defines 'kudikidappukaran' and on its terms, the definition excludes from its scope a person who possesses land exceeding the prescribed limit of three, five or ten cents depending upon its location, either as owner or as tenant on which he could erect a homestead. There is no controversy that with the purchase of the land on 18 111974, the petitioner would be outside the definition but what is urged is that as the rights and liabilities had become crystallized on 1 11970, this subsequent acquisition is of no moment as it cannot destroy his character as a kudikidappukaran. It is true that S.80A and 80B came into force on 111970 and that at that date the petitioner was a kudikidappukaran. It is true that S.80A and 80B came into force on 111970 and that at that date the petitioner was a kudikidappukaran. But in order to sustain an application under S.80B and obtain an order of purchase he has to fill the character of kudikidappukaran; for it is only the issue of a certificate of purchase under S.80C (2) that vests the landowner's right, title and interest in him. The Act prescribes no prohibition against the creation of future kudikidappus (as in the case of leases vide S.73) nor again does it prescribe a time limit within which an application for purchase of kudikidappu (even an existing kudikidappu) has to be made (as it does in the case of tenants under S.72B (3)). The result is that if the other element are satisfied, a kudikidappu can come into existence even after 111970 and again by losing his qualifications at any time after the date, a kudikidappukaran will lose bis character as such until of course he becomes cemented as an owner with the issue of the certificate of purchase. There is no warrant in the provisions of the Act, which justifies the inference that irrespective of whatever disqualification he incurs, a person who was a kudikidappukaran on 1 11970 continues to be so. The petitioner's position after 18 111974 was that he ceased or disqualified to be a kudikidappukaran and thereby becomes disentitled to an order of purchase. That this event has occurred in the course of the proceeding before the Tribunal is immaterial, as even an appellate or revisional court can take note of supervening events to mould reliefs. That position has been well settled at least from the time of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, AIR. 1941 F.C. 5, which has been followed in one of the latest cases, Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, AIR. 1975 SC. 1409. In AIR. 1975 SC. 1409 a landlord who bad applied for eviction of a tenant, under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 on the ground that he required the premises for his use, was found, in the course of the revision before the High Court, to have come into possession of another shop. 1409. In AIR. 1975 SC. 1409 a landlord who bad applied for eviction of a tenant, under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 on the ground that he required the premises for his use, was found, in the course of the revision before the High Court, to have come into possession of another shop. This took away the basis on which he had sought eviction viz., that he was not in occupation of a non-residential building for his use in the town Finding that by this acquisition "the prerequisite for entitlement of the petitioner (landlord) to institute and continue a petition has ceased to exist", the High Court held that the petition "is no longer maintainable and must be dismissed". In upholding this decision the Supreme Court, while pointing out (page 1410) that "It is basic to our pro-cessual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding" held: "If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribu-na', it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair-play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances ... We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." In the present case the petitioner having ceased to be a kudikidappukaran, the Appellate Authority was right in taking that into account and dismissing the application. 4. The petitioner's contention that his status as kudikidappukaran and his concomitant right to obtain an order of purchase got crystallized on 1-1-1970 and that no subsequent event could destroy his rights or correspondingly enlarge the rights of the landowner must fail for another reason as well. 4. The petitioner's contention that his status as kudikidappukaran and his concomitant right to obtain an order of purchase got crystallized on 1-1-1970 and that no subsequent event could destroy his rights or correspondingly enlarge the rights of the landowner must fail for another reason as well. I have already noticed the definition in S.2 (25) which postulates the continued possession of the requisite qualification on the part of the kudikidappukaran. S.75 is another Section which is relevant in this context. It confers fixity on kudikidappukaran but permits his eviction on the grounds specified in sub-S (1) clauses (i) to (iv), the ground laid down by clause (iv) being the acquisition of another kudikidappu or land (of the type and extent mentioned in S.2 (25)) within a distance of five kilometres from his kudikidappu -the two provisos which follow prescribe the extent of the land acquired that would attract clause (iv) whether within or without the distance of five kilometres. The type, extent and distance of the land acquired by the petitioner satisfy these tests, which means that he has incurred the liability to eviction. To allow his application and sanction the issue of the consequent certificate of purchase would be to save him from the liability to eviction and its consequences and to defeat the rights of the respondent. Apart from statute, it would be anomalous to permit a person, who is under a liability, to circumvent the liability and to enforce his right which has been subordinated, if not destroyed by that liability, against a person who is entitled to enforce it, irrespective of any time-limit. In this connection I might refer to the helpful observations in Sreedharan v. 2nd Additional Land Tribunal, Pattanakkad, 1974 KLT. 764 (767 para 4): "But it has to be noticed that the very foundation of that right is the existence of the kudikidappu. If the kudikidappukaran is liable to be evicted on any of the grounds mentioned in S.75 (1), or if the kudikidappu is liable to be shifted for any of the purposes mentioned in S.75(2), the question of purchasing the kudikidappu does not arise....They (the rights conferred on a kudikidappukaran) are very valuable rights, but not absolute in character. On the other hand, they are liable to be affected under the contingencies mentioned in the other provisions of the Act. On the other hand, they are liable to be affected under the contingencies mentioned in the other provisions of the Act. The right of fixity for occupation, and the right to purchase the kudikidappu would not even exist under certain circumstances, mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.75." 5. These observations fully support the conclusion on this aspect which I have indicated above. 6. It only remains to notice Eliamma Chacko v. Paul, 1974 KLT. 743, cited by Mr. Achan in aid of his argument. What happened in that case was that a person who was not a kudikidappukaran on 1-1-1970, having land and a building in the name of himself and his wife subsequently sold them and then brought an applicant on under S.80B for purchase of his homestead claiming himself to be a kudikidappukaran and his application was dismissed. On 1-1-1970 when the right of purchase was first conferred he had no right and what he did was to give himself that right by alienating his land and building. In my view hat decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 7. The judgment of the Appellate Authority is confirmed and the revision is dismissed but without costs. Dismissed.