JUDGMENT This Rule is directed against the order of termination of petitioner’s M.R. Dealership passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Jalpaiguri, dated 15th September, 1975. On November 13, 1972 the petitioner, against the order of suspension of his dealership, moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained a Rule, being C.R. 7677(W) of 1972 and also obtained an ad-interim order of injunction against the Sub-divisional Controller, Food & Supplies, Jalpaiguri from settling the shop with any person or authority for a period of five weeks after the long vacation with liberty to apply for extension and/or further interim order with notice to the other side before the appropriate Bench. Pursuant to the liberty given to the petitioner, an application for the extension of the interim order with notice to the respondents was moved before Mr. Justice P. K. Banerjee. The learned Judge by his order dated 22nd December, 1972 extended the interim order in terms of prayer till the disposal of the said application. The application was adjourned till four weeks after Christmas vacation. Thereafter the petitioner moved an application for contempt on the ground of alleged non-compliance of the orders passed by Mr. Justice Banerjee. A Rule for contempt upon Sub-divisional Controller Food & Supplies, Jalpaiguri was issued. Subsequently the contempt Rule was discharged. The main Rule was ultimately withdrawn by the petitioner on the verbal assurance given to him by the Sub-divisional Controller Food & Supplies, Jalpaiguri that the said Sub-divisional Controller would withdraw the suspension order if the case pending in court be withdrawn by the petitioner. On 18th Of May, 1975 the learned Advocate for the petitioner wrote a letter to the Sub-divisional Controller, Food & Supplies, Jalpaiguri that on an oral prayer made to the Hon'ble Court the application under Art. 226 of the Constitution was withdrawn by the petitioner, Mahabir Prasad Bansal. The purported order of suspension was therefore no longer subjudice before the Hon'ble High Court and the entire matter was left open for the authorities for proper consideration. The allegations centering round the purported order of suspension were wholly nonest and the authority concerned would be pleased to consider the entire matter in its correct perspective. Thereafter, on 6th of June, 1975 the petitioner made representation to the Sub-divisional Controller, Food & Supplies, Jalpaiguri for withdrawal of the said suspension order on the aforesaid assurance. The allegations centering round the purported order of suspension were wholly nonest and the authority concerned would be pleased to consider the entire matter in its correct perspective. Thereafter, on 6th of June, 1975 the petitioner made representation to the Sub-divisional Controller, Food & Supplies, Jalpaiguri for withdrawal of the said suspension order on the aforesaid assurance. The petitioner being aggrieved by the refusal of the Respondents in withdrawing the order of suspension, moved the present application under Art. 226 of the Constitution and obtained the present Rule. Subsequently the petition has been amended and the order of termination of his dealership has been challenged. 2. On 7th of July, 1970 the petitioner made an application for M.R. Dealership at Binnaguri within Dhupguri Police Station in the district of Jalpaiguri. On 3rd August, 1970 the Sub-divisional Controller, Food & Supplies, Jalpaiguri wrote a letter to the petitioner informing him about his appointment as a M.R. dealer. In the said letter the petitioner was further informed that for the purpose of his appointment, he was required to obtain a licence under the West Bengal Kerosene Oil Control Order, 1965 and a licence under the West Bengal Foodgrains (Licencing & Control) Order, 1967. He was also required to execute an agreement in the prescribed Model Form and to furnish security deposit of Rs. 250/- by 5th of September, 1970. The petitioner complied with the terms of the said letter. An agreement was executed on the 1st of September, 1970 between the Governor of the State of West Bengal and the petitioner. The relevant clauses of the agreement are set out hereunder. Clause-17: The District Magistrate or the Controller with the approval of District Magistrate without assigning any reason and without prejudice to the rights and remedies of the Government against the Retailer may suspend supply of food stuffs to the Retailer forthwith and cancel this agreement in the opinion of the Controller, which shall be final if the Retailer has failed to observe, fulfil or perform any of the terms and conditions on the part of the Retailer herein contained or to carry out or observe any directions given to the Retailer under the provisions of this Agreement. Clause-18:–Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the District Magistrate or the Controller, as the case may be, shall at any time be at liberty in his uncontrolled discretion and without assigning any reason to terminate this agreement on giving one month's notice in writing of his intention to terminate the agreement and the Retailer shall have no claim for loss or damage on that account against the Government and the Retailer shall also be at liberty to terminate the agreement after giving similar aforesaid notice. 3. It is stated by the petitioner that by order dated 8th of February 1972, Sub-Inspector, Food & Supplies, Gayerkata directed the petitioner to keep his ration shop fully closed on Saturdays and closed for half day on Sundays. On 8th of July, 1972 which was a Saturday, the Sub-divisional Officer, Sadar, Jalpaiguri went to the petitioner's shop at about 2-30 P. M. when the petitioner's shop remained closed. The petitioner's man informed the Sub-divisional Officer accordingly. Thereafter, on 28th of July, 1972 the petitioner was served with an order dated 27th July, 1972 passed by the Sub-divisional Controller, suspending the petitioner's M. R. dealership of Karbala Tea Estate on the allegations that Fulchand Agarwala, an employee of the petitioner, refused to make available Registers and documents to the Sub-divisional Officer Sadar Jalpaiguri during his inspection of the M.R. Shop on the 8th July, 1972 and thereby prevented him from verifying the allegations of maladministration and holding of spurious ration cards. The conduct of the employee of the M.R. dealer was considered not upto the condition of the agreement entered into by the M. R. dealer. Thereupon on 5th of September, 1972 a show-cause notice was issued upon the petitioner calling upon him to show-cause why his M.R. dealership should not be cancelled or any other disciplinary action should not be taken against the petitioner. In the said show-cause notice three charges were mentioned. Petitioner was asked to submit his explanation on the above charges within seven days from the date of receipt of the said notice. The charges against the petitioner were as follows :– (a) His employee refused to produce register and accounts etc. to S.D.O., Sadar for verification on 8.7.72 on demand by the said S.D.O. (b) Petitioner served M.R. commodity on 18.5.72 and 20.5.72 against some ration cards which had already been cancelled by the Area Sub-Inspector. The charges against the petitioner were as follows :– (a) His employee refused to produce register and accounts etc. to S.D.O., Sadar for verification on 8.7.72 on demand by the said S.D.O. (b) Petitioner served M.R. commodity on 18.5.72 and 20.5.72 against some ration cards which had already been cancelled by the Area Sub-Inspector. (c) Petitioner maintained fictitious accounts as sales, noted in cash memos which in some cases did not tally with those noted in the sale register. The petitioner replied to the said charges. But in view of the interim order passed in previous C.R. 7677 (W) of 1972, no further action was taken in the matter. 4. An affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the respondents has been filed and affirmed by Pradip Kumar Chakraborty, the Chief Inspector, Food & Supplies Department, wherein, it is stated that after the petitioner intimated the withdrawal of the Rule, being C.R. No. 7677 (W) of 1972 the entire case records of the petitioner was forwarded to the Dy. Commissioner, Jalpaiguri being the final authority for dealing with the said order of suspension and/or charges against the petitioner, as forwarded by his memo No. 3992 dated 26.6.75 and the respondent No. 4 the Deputy Commissioner of Jalpaiguri after scrutinising the records relating to the charges and after considering the reply to the show-cause notice as submitted by the petitioner, duly approved the termination of the dealership of the petitioner in terms of Clause 18 of the Agreement. 5. On 4th of February, 1676 the petitioner filed an application to amend the prayer portion of the writ petition by adding the order of termination of MR dealership of the petitioner dated 15th September, 1975 as passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Jalpaiguri. It is stated in the said petition that the petitioner for the first time came to know about the order of termination of his MR dealership which was disclosed in the said affidavit-in opposition filed on behalf of the respondents. 6. Mr. Bose, appearing on behalf of the respondents has raised a preliminary objection. It is however contended that the appointment of the petitioner as a "dealer" in a modified rationing area is not regulated by any statutory Rationing Orders framed under the Essential Commodities Act, 1950 but by an Agreement executed by the Dealer and the Controller of Food & Supplies on behalf of the Governor of West Bengal. It is however contended that the appointment of the petitioner as a "dealer" in a modified rationing area is not regulated by any statutory Rationing Orders framed under the Essential Commodities Act, 1950 but by an Agreement executed by the Dealer and the Controller of Food & Supplies on behalf of the Governor of West Bengal. In terms of Clause 18 of the said Agreement petitioner's dealership can be terminated. In the present case under that clause petitioner's dealership has been terminated. The Agreement is a self-contained contract. According to Mr. Bose, the petitioner cannot enforce contractual right in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 7. Mr. Moitra, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contends that in the present case the Deputy Commissioner, Jalpaiguri did not actually terminate the petitioner's dealership in terms of the contract although reference has been made in the impugned order to the said Clause 18 of the Agreement. The Deputy Commissioner terminated petitioner's dealership on the basis of a perverse report made by the Controller of Food & Supplies without holding any enquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner. Further, the petitioner had not been given any reasonable opportunity either of being heard before such decision was made by the authorities or allowed to make any representation. It appears from the Annexures to the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents that the Controller took into consideration some extraneous matters which had neither any relevancy to nor any bearing on the charges made against the petitioner. It is urged that when the rights of the petitioner to carryon business under the licences issued under the statutory order were prejudicially affected by an administrative decision made objectively, and not in terms of the Contract, in that case the petitioner's remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not barred. 8. Normally contractual obligations cannot be enforced in a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution. The word "contract" has a technical meaning, namely, "A mutual agreement between two or more parties that something shall be done or foreborne by both, also a writing in which the terms of the bargain are included ; law ; : an agreement enforceable at law". 9. The word "contract" has a technical meaning, namely, "A mutual agreement between two or more parties that something shall be done or foreborne by both, also a writing in which the terms of the bargain are included ; law ; : an agreement enforceable at law". 9. In (1) Har Shankar v. The Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner & ors., AIR 1975 SC 1121 , the appellants were unable to meet their obligations to deposit the entire amount of bid money in an auction for granting the right to sell country liquor at the "Town hall vend" and "Kailash Chowk Vend'', Ludhiana. Under the conditions of the auction the said amount fell in arrears. They filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and prayed for a direction for quashing the auction and that the respondents be restrained from enforcing the obligations arising tender the terms and conditions of the auction. The Supreme Court held that a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching the validity of contractual obligations. 10. In (2) Srinath Singh v. S. K. Bhattacharji & Ors., AIR 1973 Cal. 28 , a similar preliminary objection was raised by the petitioner in a similar proceeding. In that case the Court found that the Agreement was not complete in itself in all respects though it provided under clause 17 of the Agreement for its automatic termination but for its other terms and conditions reference had to be mace to the Rationing Order. Accordingly, it was held that when a public authority arbitrarily in exercise of its statutory powers abridged the right of a person which had its source in a contract, the aggrieved party was competent to enforce such contractual right in a writ petition. 11. In (3) Jagdish Gupta v. The Director of Rationing & Ors., AIR 1975 Cal. 471 , this court held that the power of suspension under para 3(5) proviso of the West Bengal Rationing Orders, 1964 could be exercised without hearing the party concerned but the final order could not be passed without giving an opportunity to the party to show-cause against the proposed order. A petition under Art.226 is available even though the aggrieved person's appointment as a dealer was under a contract. 12. Mr. A petition under Art.226 is available even though the aggrieved person's appointment as a dealer was under a contract. 12. Mr. Bose, sought to distinguish the above two cases on the ground that in both the cases the petitioner's appointment though under a contract was regulated or governed by West Bengal Rationing Orders which were statutory. So, when there was non-compliance or violation of the said statutory provisions, in that case, a remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution was not barred. 13. In (4) D.F.O., South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi Singh, AIR 1973 SC 205 , the Supreme Court held that where the right to relief, though arising from a breach of contract is claimed against arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority entrusted with statutory powers, a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution is maintainable. 14. In (5) K.N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 , the Supreme Court held that a writ petition was maintainable as the appellant was interested in those contracts and had the right under the laws of the State to receive the same treatment and being given the same chances as anybody else. 15. In (6) Daya Swarup v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 Punjab 533, it is held that where a right though initially found on a contract is protected and regulated by statutory provisions, their violation by a statutory body can be enforced by an aggrieved party by a petition under Art. 226, particularly when approach to the Civil Courts, assuming such approach to be permissible cannot afford an equally efficacious and speedy remedy. 16. The legal position emerges from the ratio of the aforesaid decisions seems to be that ; (a) to enforce or avoid a contractual obligation no writ of mandamus is available, (b) such writ is also oat available if any action is taken within the terms of a contract, (c) where licence of a dealer in a modified rationing area is terminated in terms of Clause 18 of the Agreement or supply of "food stuff" is suspended or the Agreement is cancelled in terms of Clause 17 of the Agreement without stating any reason or without taking recourse to any quasi-judicial proceeding, in such a case the dealer has no right to move this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 17. 17. On the other hand, (a) where the dealership itself is "suspended", (b) the ration cards are de-linked, (c) the dealership is terminated or cancelled upon a finding that the dealer is guilty of the charges framed against him, in those cases, the aggrieved person is competent to invoke the Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 or the Constitution on the allegation of violation of the principles of natural justice or on a challenge to the decision of the authorities as malafide, perverse or as being based on no material or as such that no reasonable person would arrive at on the basis of the material which was before the authority concerned. 18. Admittedly the dealer of a modified rationing area is not governed by any statutory Rationing Orders and his dealership may be cancelled or terminated in terms of Clauses 17 and 18 of the Agreement. The point for determination in this Rule is, whether the dealership of the petitioner had been terminated in terms of the contract or outside the contract ; or, in other words, whether such termination was the result of an objective decision taken by the public authority adopting a quasi-judicial proceeding against the dealer. 19. The framing of charges, issue of show cause, notice consideration of the reply to the show-cause, holding of an enquiry and arriving at a decision upon the report of the Controller do not partake to any of the terms of the contract. Clauses 17 and 18 of the Agreement do not contemplate any quasi-judicial proceedings to be initiated against the dealer to find out the violation of any term of the Contract. It is abundantly clear that in the instant case the authority concerned followed a quasi-judicial procedure. But at the same time it did not hold any enquiry and afford any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner before he was found guilty of the charges. Suspension of "supply of food stuffs" to the dealer in terms of Clause 17 of the Agreement and "suspension of dealership" is not the same thing. Order of suspension of dealership affects the petitioner's other rights, viz., his right to carryon business under other statutory Orders viz. the Kerosene Licence Order. But such rights are not affected if the supply of "food stuff" is only suspended as provided in Clause 17 of the Agreement. 20. Order of suspension of dealership affects the petitioner's other rights, viz., his right to carryon business under other statutory Orders viz. the Kerosene Licence Order. But such rights are not affected if the supply of "food stuff" is only suspended as provided in Clause 17 of the Agreement. 20. In (2) Srinath Singh's case ( AIR 1973 Cal. 28 ) it was contended on behalf of the respondents that de-linking of the Ration Cards could be made under the rules. In the Agreement there is no provision for de-linking. It has been held by the Supreme Court in (7) K. P. Choudhury v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 203 , that in view of Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution there can be no implied contract because if implied contracts between the Govt. and other person were allowed, they would, in fact make Art. 299 (1) useless. So, there could not be any implied condition of de-linking of Ration Cards within the "suspension of food stuff" as provided in clause 17 of the Agreement. 21. In (8) M/s. Erusion Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 266 , the Supreme Court held that black listing has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful rationshop with the Govt. for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of black listing indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the black list. 22. Where the Government instead of taking recourse to the contract, chooses to hold a departmental enquiry to prove the guilt of the dealer and after being satisfied objectively that the dealer is guilty of malpractices, thereafter cannot fall back upon the contract and terminate the licence in terms of Clause 18 of the Agreement. Such termination may create a disability upon the petitioner to earn his livelihood and pursue his business. Such a decision casts a slur, an aspertion on the conduct of the petitioner as a business man. Be that as it may, he should be given an opportunity to defend his case before such decision is taken. 23. It is urged by Mr. Such a decision casts a slur, an aspertion on the conduct of the petitioner as a business man. Be that as it may, he should be given an opportunity to defend his case before such decision is taken. 23. It is urged by Mr. Bose that the procedure adopted by the Controller is purely of an exploratory nature. What the Controller has to do is, to find out for his own satisfaction whether the dealer has acted in contravention of conditions enumerated in the Agreement. 24. An investigation when it is conducted for the purpose of informing the mind of the authorities whether on the basis of the materials collected against the dealer his licence could be terminated or cancelled either under Clause 17 or 18 of the Agreement, in that investigation there is no has between the dealer and the Controller. The report of such investigation is neither a decision nor an administrative order which affects prejudicially the rights of the petitioner to carryon his business. The question of violation of the principles of natural justice also does not arise in such an investigation. But where a show-cause notice is issued after framing charges against the dealer calling upon him to show cause why his dealership should not be cancelled or any other disciplinary action as may be deemed necessary should not be taken in that case it is implied that he has a right to adduce evidence to disprove the charges on the basis of which an action against him is proposed to be taken. The expression "show-cause' connotes an opportunity of leading evidence in support of the contentions of the person concerned and in controverting such allegations as are made against him. In the present case since a show-cause notice was issued, rules of natural justice and fair play must be observed. 25. The report along with the orders of the Respondent Nos. 2 and 4 have been disclosed in Annexure to the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents. After the withdrawal of the Civil Rule No. 7677 (W) of 1972, the matter was placed before the Sub-divisional Controller, Food & Supplies, Jalpaiguri. In has note dated 24th of June, 1975 the said Sub-divisional Controller said that the dealer concerned denied to have done anything wrong or had any gross irregularities as charged in the show-cause notice issued to him. In has note dated 24th of June, 1975 the said Sub-divisional Controller said that the dealer concerned denied to have done anything wrong or had any gross irregularities as charged in the show-cause notice issued to him. Moreover, he stated that his shop was closed in full as per departmental instructions and his employee was not authorized to act on his behalf. Defects, irregularities, if any, may be scrutinized by any competent Chief Inspector or the dealer may be allowed a hearing, if deemed necessary. The ration cards of the suspended dealer were tagged with Sri T. K. Barua (but now there is now existence of any ration card in the said shop). It is now to be considered if the dealer concerned should be reinstated after vacating the suspension order, in view of his prayer dated 6.6.75 as he has voluntarily withdrawn the case in the Hon’ble High Court and has already been sufficiently punished for keeping him under suspension for over three years. In case he is reinstated, he shall have to be allowed with some ration cards of other adjacent shops after being de-linked as there is no existence of any ration card in the suspended M.R. dealer’s shop at Binnaguri tagged with T.K. Barua, M. R. dealer. That note was placed before the District Controller who by his order dated 1.7.75 referred the same to D.C., Jalpaiguri. The Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 4.7.75 again sent back the file to the District Controller to have his views in the matter. It appears from the note of the Controller dated July 14, 1975 that he scrutinized the charges o the materials available on record. As regard charge no. 1 the Controller was of opinion that in view of the affirmation of the dealer that it was a Saturday weekly day of closure was not acceptable. He, however, accepted the dealer’s explanation that his employee was not his authorized representative, so he did not leave Registers and accounts to the employee. 26. As regard charge no. 2 he found that the explanation of the dealer that he was aware of the fact that the relevant ratio cards were cancelled was not acceptable in view of the weekly returns for the week from 24.4.72 to 29.4.72 submitted by the dealer himself wherein he admitted cancellation of the cards. 26. As regard charge no. 2 he found that the explanation of the dealer that he was aware of the fact that the relevant ratio cards were cancelled was not acceptable in view of the weekly returns for the week from 24.4.72 to 29.4.72 submitted by the dealer himself wherein he admitted cancellation of the cards. As regard charge no.3 he found that the dealer admitted in his explanation that these were bona fide mistakes. There is no charge against the petitioner that he violated the notice of the area Inspector and did not close the shop on Saturday. The charge against him was that his employee refused to produce registers and accounts etc. to S.D.O. for verification. The Controller accepted the explanation of the petitioner. So, on the face of the records, it appears that the petitioner was found guilty of a charge which had not been framed at all against the petitioner. 27. The petitioner himself admitted that it was bonafide mistake with respect to the charge no. 3. So, only the charge no. 2 was found to be proved against the petitioner. It further appears from the notes that the Controller took into consideration some extraneous matters. He has said in his note that during the dealer’s suspension for such a long period, the ration cards of his shop were tagged with the neighbouring shop of T.K. Barua but there was no existence of the cards of that shop. The District Controller concluded his report in saying "In view of all the facts above and in view of the charges having been established against the suspended dealer, his dealership may be terminated under Clause 18 of the Agreement. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, Jalpaiguri shought the opinion of the Government Pleader whether the action suggested by the District Controller would not in any way interfere with the High Court's order. The Government Pleader on 27th July, 1974 remarked, 'lawyer of the dealer has informed the S.D.O. that the suspension order is no longer subjudice as the application has been withdrawn. It seems that the Department is not in need of appointing a dealer. That is, however, a different issue. In view of the fact that the High Court case has been withdrawn, the department may take such action as may be justified on the facts. It seems that the Department is not in need of appointing a dealer. That is, however, a different issue. In view of the fact that the High Court case has been withdrawn, the department may take such action as may be justified on the facts. Thereafter the opinion was placed before the Deputy Commissioner and by his order dated 15th of November, 1975 the Deputy Commissioner approved the action as suggested by the District Controller, Food & Supplies in his note dated 14th of July, 1974. 28. In the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Pradip Kumar Chakraborty, Chief Inspector of Food & Supplies, reference has been made to the public complaint against the distribution of rationed and controlled commodities by the petitioner to the S.D.O. and also the report of the Sub-divisional Controller, Jalpaiguri against the petitioner dated 10.7.72. The District Controller, however, nowhere in his report made any reference to such public complaints and report of the Sub-divisional officer. It is not disputed that the public complaint and the report of the Sub-divisional officer upon which the charges were framed against the petitioner were not made known to the petitioner before such decision was taken by the authorities. It appears that both the Sub-divisional Controller and the District Controller were of the view that in case the petitioner was reinstated then some allotments have to be made with some ration cards of other adjacent shops after being de-linked. Consideration of those aspects, in my view, have got nothing to do with violation of any term or condition of the Agreement. In paragraph 21 of the affidavit-in-opposition it is stated that the petitioner was found to be guilty for committing gross irregularities in dealing with rationed commodities and acted adversely and prejudicially in the public interest. 29. I have already said that the authorities are competent to cancel or terminate the dealership either under Clause 17 or 18 of the Agreement without stating any reason. It is not necessary for the authorities either to issue a show-cause notice or hold an enquiry. 29. I have already said that the authorities are competent to cancel or terminate the dealership either under Clause 17 or 18 of the Agreement without stating any reason. It is not necessary for the authorities either to issue a show-cause notice or hold an enquiry. But after framing charges against the petitioner, suspending him for the last three years, thereafter, without holding any enquiry into the charges and without giving any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to represent his case before the authorities, the District Controller upon considering some extraneous matters holding the petitioner guilty of charges, could not terminate the petitioner dealership in terms of Clause 18 of the Agreement. In my opinion, the said decision of the District Controller is perverse. It is based upon no evidence and there has been violation of the principles of natural justice. The Deputy Commissioner, Jalpaiguri, did not apply his mind. He simply approved the action suggested by the District Controller, Food & Supplies. Therefore, in my opinion, the impugned order of termination of the petitioner's dealership must be quashed. 30. In the result, this Rule is made absolute. The impugned order of termination of the petitioner's MR dealership passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Jalpaiguri dated 15th September, 1975 is quashed. Let a Writ of Mandamus be issued against the respondents commanding them not to give effect to the said order of termination. There will be no order for costs. 31. This order, however, shall not prevent the respondents to hold an enquiry into the charges already framed against the petitioner. In that case the authorities must give the petitioner opportunity of being heard and allow him to place materials in support of his defence.