Madhusudan Rao, J. -This appeal by the State is directed against the order of acquittal passed by the learned II Additional Munsif Magistrate, Kakinada, in G. G. No. 908 of 1972 on the file of his Court. The facts leading to this appeal are as follows: — 2. A-1 carries on business in a Kirana shop, known as Price & Co., in Raja Ram Mohan Roy Road at Kakinada. 3. On 30th May, 1972 at about 12-15 the Ford Inspector, Kakinada (P.W. 1) visited the shop. P.W. 2 who wanted to purchase nut powder was also at the shop then. P.W.1 inspected the various articles kept for sale at the shop and suspected the quality of the redgram dhal which was in a gunny bag in the midst of several other articles kept for sale at the shop. In the presence of P.W. 2 he offered to purchase a sample of the redgram dhal. A-1 stated that the redgram dhal was not being sold as food for human consumption and that it was being sold only as fodder for cattle. Even so P.W. 1 purchased a sample of the redgram dhal after paying the cost quoted by A-1 and carried out all the necess;.ry formalities in purchasing a sample, with P.W. 2 as the mediator. He divided the sample of redgram dhal into three equal parts and filled the three parts into three separate bottles. Giving one bottle to the accused he sent one bottle to the Public Analyst and the other bottle to the Court. After due analysis, the Public Analyst reported under Exhibit P-5 that the sample of redgram dhal was misbranded in so far as it was found to contain, “an artificial water soluble yellow colouring matter derived from coal-tar”. After receipt of the report of the Public Analyst, the Food Inspector filed a complaint against A-1. as the person who kept for sale the misbranded redgram dhal and also against A-2 as the owner of the shop on whose behalf A-1 was carrying on business. Except the allegation that A-2 is the owner of the shop, there was nothing more. The Magistrate discharged A-2 and tried A-1 alone for an offence punishable under sections 16 (1) and 7 read with section 2 (ix) (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and rule 29 of the Prevention of the Food Adulteration Rules. Except the allegation that A-2 is the owner of the shop, there was nothing more. The Magistrate discharged A-2 and tried A-1 alone for an offence punishable under sections 16 (1) and 7 read with section 2 (ix) (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and rule 29 of the Prevention of the Food Adulteration Rules. It was not disputed before the trial Court that A-1 was in possession of the misbranded redgram dhal for sale. Though A-1 disputed having received any price from P.W. 1 tor the sample taken by P.W. 1 the trial Court held in the light of the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and the receipt (Exhibit P-2) passed by A-1 that A-1 sold the sample of misbranded redgram dhal to P.W. 1 for Rs. 1-20 Ps. Relying on a decision of our learned brother Lakshmiah, J., in V. S. Chengalrayudu Chetty v. State of A.P.1, wherein it was held that a person commits no offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, if he sells adulterated food declaring to the purchaser that the food was not intended for human consumption, the learned Magistrate acquitted A-1 observing that from the beginning it was the case of accused that redgram dhal was not intended for human consmuption, but was being sold as cattle foder. 4. The State having preferred an appeal against the order of acquittal of A-1 and the same having come up for hearing before one of us (Muktadar, J.), it was felt that when a particular article which could be used for human consumption is kept for sale in a Kirana shop, the mere statement of the vendor that it is not meant for hurt an consumption, cannot absolve him of the liability under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The appeal has therefore been referred to a Bench of two Judges for decision and it is how this appeal is before us now. 5. The only question for decision in this appeal therefore, is, whether in a trial for selling or for being in possession for sale of, adulterated or misbranded food can the accused succeed by merely asserting before the Food Inspector that though the food is ordinarily intended for hun;an consumption he is selling the same not for human consumption but for consumption by animals or for other purposes. 6. 6. To resolve the question, it may be necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which will hereinafter be referred to as "the Act". "Preamble. — An Act to make provision for the prevention of adulteration of food. Be it enacted by Parliament in the Fifth year of the Republic of India as follows: Section 1. Short title, extent and commencement. — (1) This Act may be called the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. (2) * * * * (3) * * * * Section 2. Definitions — In this Act unless the context otherwise requires, — * * * * (v) ‘food’ means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water includes — (a) any article which ordinarily enters into, or used in the composition or preparation of human food; and (b) any flavouring matter or condiments: * * * * (xiii) ‘sale’ with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means the sale of any article of food, whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption or use, or for analysis, any includes an agreement for sale, an offer for sale, the exposing for sale, or having in possession for sale of any such article and includes also an attempt to sell any such article; Section 5. Prohibition of import of certain articles of food. — No person shall import into India- (i) any adulterated food; (ii) any misbranded food; (iii) any article of food for the import of which a licence is prescribed, except in accordance with the conditions of the licence; and (iv) any article of food in contravention of any other previsions of this Act or of any Rule made thereunder. — No person shall import into India- (i) any adulterated food; (ii) any misbranded food; (iii) any article of food for the import of which a licence is prescribed, except in accordance with the conditions of the licence; and (iv) any article of food in contravention of any other previsions of this Act or of any Rule made thereunder. Section 7.-Prohibition of manufacture, sale etc., of certain articles of food.- ‘No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute- (i) any adulterated food; (ii) any misbranded food; (iii) any article of food, the sale of which a licence is prescribed, except in accordance with the conditions of the licence; (iv) any article of food, for the sale of which is for the time being prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interests of public health; or (v) any article of food in contravention of any other provisions of this Act on of any rules made thereunder. Section 16.-Penalties. -(1) If any person- (a) Whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf imports into India for manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food- (i) Which is adulterated or misbranded or the sale of which is prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of Public health; * * * he shall, in addition to penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six; months but which may extend to six years, and with a fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees Provided that- * * * * Section 19.-Defences which may or may not be allowed in prosecution under this Act — (1) It shall be no defence in a prosecution for an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food to allege merely that the vendor was ignorant of the nature, substance or quality of the food sold by him or that the purchaser having purchased any article for analysis was not prejudiced by the sale. (2) A vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any aculterated or misbranded article of food if he proves.- (a) that he purchased the article of food- (i) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a duly licenced manufacturer, distributor or dealer; (ii) in any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer with a written warranty, in the prescribed form, and (b) that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it. (c) any person by whom a warranty as is referred to in section 14 is alleged to have been given shall be entitled to appear at the hearing and give evidence." 7. Sections 5 and 7 which contain absolute words of prohibition against the importing into India and the manufacturing or storing for sale or selling or distributing any adulterated food or misbranded food in India. make it abundantly clear that the intendment of the Act is to protect the public against injurious consequences of the availability of adulterated or misbranded food. The purpose of the Act as the Preamble and its very Title indicate, is the prevention of adulteration or misbranding of any article which is generally used for human consumption, or any substance which ordinarily enters into or is used in the con position or preparation of human food including flavouring matter and condiments. The Act seeks to secure the general health of the society. A large section of the people of our country is poor, illiterate and ignorant of the consequences of consuming adulterated or misbranded food. The innocent members of such section may easily be tempted to purchase adulterated or misbranded fordstuffs, at rates lower than the ordinary rates of the foodstuffs in. their unadulterated form if such adulterated or misbranded foodstuffs are made available for purchase by them. The prohibition in section 7 against the manufacture for sale or storage or selling or distribution of adulterated or misbranded food is unqualified and the section does not postulate the purpose of the sale for which the prohibited food is manufactured or stored or sold or distributed, provided the manufacture, storage or distribution is for sale. The prohibition in section 7 against the manufacture for sale or storage or selling or distribution of adulterated or misbranded food is unqualified and the section does not postulate the purpose of the sale for which the prohibited food is manufactured or stored or sold or distributed, provided the manufacture, storage or distribution is for sale. An article which is normally food for human consumption does not become any the less food merely because it is also used for some other purpose else than human consumption. Bread and milk which are usually foods for human consumption do not lose their essential character as human food merely because they are also used as food for cats and dogs. If milk is adulterated and kept for sale, the person keeping it for sale commits the offence under the Act and will not be protected by a mere assertion that he stored the adulterated milk for sale only as food for cats and dogs. If such an assertion is treated as a valid defence, the very purpose of the Act would be defeated and an unscrupulous businessman can. keep in his shop huge quantities of adulterated or misbranded food stuff’s and when questioned by a Food Inspector he can conveniently and easily say that he kept the food stuff’s no doubt for sale but not for human consumption. Setting up such a plea before the Food Inspectors, the businessman car. be going on selling adulterated or misbranded foodstuffs to the innocent public as articles of food only. Sugar is sometimes used for application bleeding wounds to prevent bleeding. It would not be difficult for a dealer in sugar to adulterate all the stock of sugar in his shed and inform the Food Inspector when questioned, that the sugar in his shop is adulterated and is being used only for external application to wounds but not for human consumption. The Act aims at rendering unavailable for sale of human food which is adulterated or misbranded or prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of public health. If an article which is ordinarilly used as food for human consumption, is adulterated or misbranded and such adulterated or misbranded article of food is sold within the meaning of the word "sale" as defined in the Act, the offence is complete. 8. The definition of "sale" in the Act consists of two parts. If an article which is ordinarilly used as food for human consumption, is adulterated or misbranded and such adulterated or misbranded article of food is sold within the meaning of the word "sale" as defined in the Act, the offence is complete. 8. The definition of "sale" in the Act consists of two parts. The first part is an explanatory true definition of the word "sale". The latter part is an artificial inclusion, of transactions which are not normally sales. The Legislature evidently wanted to make the definition sufficiently comprehensive so as to include all possible and conceivable modes and purposes of sale. Even sale for analysis though admittedly not for consumption is a sale. A mere agreement for sale is a sale under the Act. Even the exposing for sale or merely being in possession for a sale of an article of food is considered as sale under the Act. An. attempt to sell any article of food is also a sale within the meaning of the Act. The definition is indeed extraordinary and is obviously calculated to see that the principle involved in the prohibition of any sale is not foiled or frustrated by an ingenious vendor. 9. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has held in Dhirajilal v.Ramachandra1 that the definition, of "sale" in the Act comprised of three modes of sale and four purposes of sale. Speaking for the Full Bench Kotval, C.J., observed as follows " Therefore the definition includes any and every article of Food. We shall presently refer to the definition of Food. In prescribing the manner of sale, the draftsman has also enumerated every mode in which a sale is possible by referring the three categories, (i) whether for cash, or (ii) on credit, or (iii) by way of exchange. We cannot conceive of a sale which is not included in one of these three categories. Lastly, in dealing with the purpose of the sale or the use of the article the draftsman has used four expressions: (i) by wholesale or retail that is to say to a dealer dealing in any article of food, (ii) for human consumption that is to say to a consumer, (iii) for other uses (we will presently advert to this category) and lastly, (iv) for analysis.“ 10. Sri Narasimhachari, the learned Counsel for the accused contends that the words ‘‘whether by wholesale or retail” indicate only a mode of sale and they cannot be construed as indicative of any purpose of a sale. Laying stress on the proposition ‘for’ before the words ‘human consumption’ it is contended that the sale of an article of food under the Act can be only for the purpose of human consumption and not for any other purpose. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided the Full Bench case of Dhirajlal v. RamaChandar1though we are in complete agreement with the main decision in the case, we are unable to interpret the words “whether by wholesale or retail” in the definition as indicate of any purpose of a sale. We are inclined to accept the contention of Sri Narasimhachari that the words do not refer to any purpose of sale but envisage only a mode of sale and that purpose of sale is indicated only by the word ‘for’ preceding the words ‘human consumption’. The argument of Sri Narasimhachari, however, ignores the other words following the words ‘human consumption’. The phrase as a whole reads ‘for human consumption or use, on for analysis’. As there is no comma after the word ‘consumption’ but only after the word ‘use’ Sri Narasimhachari, submits that the word ‘use’ is ejusdem generis with ‘hunt an consumption’ and therefore the word ‘use’ must necessarily be understood as human ‘use’ i.e. use for human consumption. In Dhirajlal’s case1the Full Bench held that the word ‘use’ in the definition of sale points to a distinct purpose of the sale and was intended to imply the sale of any article for any use whatsoever including use by human beings for any purpose whatever. It was held there in that the word ‘use’ is not controlled by the word ‘human’. We are inclined to accept the contention that ‘use’ is ejusdem generis with human comsumption and that the purpose of the sale should be for human consumption or for human use or for analysis It is not open to us nor is there any such contention that the Legislature has been guilty of tautology in defining ‘sale’. ‘Human consumption’, and human use’ should therefore be held to be two distinct concepts and ‘human use’ would only mean, any other kind of human use, not being human consumption. ‘Human consumption’, and human use’ should therefore be held to be two distinct concepts and ‘human use’ would only mean, any other kind of human use, not being human consumption. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary ‘use’ means ‘using employment application to a purpose availability utility.‘An article of food may be used by human beings either for consumption by themselves or for feeding their domestic animals or for some other purpose. It is the use for some other purpose by the human beings, not being the use for human consumption that is contemplated by the word ‘use’ contained in the definition. Thus the definition of ‘sale’ in the Act is of very wide amplitude and takes in its sweep all modes and purposes of sale of articles which an; ordinarily used for human consumption. Sale of an article which is commonly used as human food is a sale within the meaning of the Act even if the purpose of the sale is not for ‘human consumption’ but for ‘human use’ as material for some other purpose, including the purpose of analysis. Under the circumstances we are of the view that if an article sold by a person or stored by him for sale, is ordinarily an article of food for human consumption and if such article is either adulterated or misbranded such person commits the offence punishable under section 7 of the Act and he cannot escape liability under the Act by merely declaring before the Food Inspector that he was selling the adulterated or misbranded article of food for purposes other than human consumption. We are fortified in this view of ours by a large number of authorities of several High Courts, including a Division Bench case of our own High Court and the Full Bench case of the Bombay High Court already referred to. 11. In Rakhal Chandra v. Purna Chandra1, the Sanitary Inspector went to the shop of the accused and purchased a sample of mustard oil which was found on analysis to be adulterated. The accused pleaded that he could not be convicted under the Bengal Food Adulteration Act for selling the mustard oil even though it was adulterated in so far as he advertised the mustard oil to be a mixed oil, intended for lighting purposes, by exhibiting a sign board at his shop. The accused pleaded that he could not be convicted under the Bengal Food Adulteration Act for selling the mustard oil even though it was adulterated in so far as he advertised the mustard oil to be a mixed oil, intended for lighting purposes, by exhibiting a sign board at his shop. The trial Magistrate, the Appellate Court and the High Court disbelieved the plea of the accused to the effect that he was selling the mustard oil not as an article of food, but only for lighting purposes. Further the High Court observed: “The Food Adulteration Act makes it penal to sell adulterated articles. It does not excuse the offence on the ground that the purchaser knew that what he was purchasing was not purs foodstuffs. The Act was intended to protect the public from using adulterated article and therefore it has made it penal to sell these adulterated articles to persons irrespective of the fact that the purchaser knew the article to be adulterated or otherwise.” 12. In Chairman, Dist. Board v. Artul Chandra2, the accused had stored for sale an oil, the bulk of which was mustard oil but mixed with linseed oil. He choose to call the mixture not as mustard oil but ‘fuel oil’ and alleged that he had not intended that the adulterated oil should be used for human consumption. Quoting with approval, the view in Rakhal Chandra v. Purna Chandra1, Costello, J., observed as follows: “Now it has been argued before me that there can be no offence under the Act of 1919 unless the article in question is sold, exposed for sale or stored for sale for human. consumption and not otherwise. The case of Rakhal Chandra Dutt v. Purna Chandra Ghosh1as also the unreported decision of M.C. Ghose, J., to which I have been referred seem to emphasise the fact that nowhere in this particular Act is there any qualification of that description, it is nowhere made an essential part of the offence that what is done should be done with a view to or for the purpose of human consumption of the oil. It is quite true, as Mr. It is quite true, as Mr. Ganguly has said, that the articles enumerated in section 6 (1) are articles of food; and no doubt the policy of the Act is to prevent either the sale or the exposing for sale of articles of food unless there are up to a certain standard of purity. But it cannot rightly be held in my opinion that it is a sufficient defence for the accused merely to say that it was never intended by him that the things should be used for human consumption. It is quite clear that the mere placing of a label on a connister containing some article, if in fact it can be used is an article of food, will not help him in escaping a conviction.” 13. In Karnidan Sarda v. Emperor3, the question was whether the accused who were manufacturing and offering for sale “Mahabir Brand Mixed Guja Mustard Oil”, were committing an offence under section 3 (2) of the Bihar and Orissa Food Adulteration Act for manufacturing for sale impure mustard oil even though they were advertising that the oil they were selling was not pure mustard oil. Dealing with the contention that the accused did not commit any offence in so far as the very description of the article showed that the oil offered did not purport to be pure mustard oil, there would be no offence, Rowland,J., observed as follows: ‘‘Substantially a similar contention was raised in Rameshwar Chaudhury v. Purulia Municipality4. In that case it was held that the placing of a placard outside the shop to indicate that mixed oil was obtainable, which was not food for human consumption did not affect the case. Apparently the article, in respect of which a conviction was had in Rameshwar Chaudhury v. Purulia Municipality4, was sold as mustard oil. The judgment of James, J., makes it clear that if an article is sold as mustard oil and is not in accordance with the prescribed standard for mustard oil, the offence under section 3 of the Act is committed notwithstanding that there may be a placard or other advertisement enabling the public or the literate portion of the public to ascertain before making their purchases that the oil is some other article than pure mustard oil. In the present case we have in the description of the article the word ‘mustard oil’ as the concluding and substantive portion of the description with some adjectival description preceding the substantive name. This preliminary adjectival description may give the intending purchaser notice that what he is getting is not pure mustard oil, but that is not in my opinion a compliance with the law. What section 2, clause (2) means in my view is that the name mustard oil, with or without prefixes is not to be used for an article which is not mustatd oil of the standard prescribed by rule under the Act.“ 14. The Patna High Court has again held in Jamshedpur N.A. Committee v. Durga Prasad1, that a vendor of turmeric powder, undoubtedly an article of food cannot escape his liability under the Act if the turmeric is found to be adulterated merely by giving out even at the earliest stage to the Food Inspector while selling the sample for analysis that the article was not meant for human consumption. Prasad, J., observed: “In my opinion, such a defence is not available at all to a person who is found to have sold an article of food which on analysis is found to be adulterated”. 15. In Leela Ram v. State2, the accused pleaded that the asafoetida (hing) he was selling at this shop was not for human consumption but was for agricultural purposes. The trial Court and the Appellate Court held that the plea of the accused was false and that the hing was being sold by the accused only for human consumption. In a revision against the conviction considering the definition of ‘food’ in section 2 (v) of the Act, the High Court held as follows: “The definition shows that any article which ordinarily is used in the composition 01 preparation of human food would answer to the description of food. The word ‘ordinarily’ indicates that it is not essential than the article should be exclusively and invariably used in the composition or preparation of human food because such a view would render the word “ordinarily” meaningless. The word ‘ordinarily’ indicates that it is not essential than the article should be exclusively and invariably used in the composition or preparation of human food because such a view would render the word “ordinarily” meaningless. On the contrary, the language used clearly goes to show that it is quite enough if the article in question is ordinarily used in the composition of human food and its occasional use for other purposes would not take it out of the definition of food.” 16. The same High Court again held in Manohar Lal v. State3that it is essential and ordinary nature of the article as an article of food that is relevant for consideration and not the actual purpose for which the article was sold. In that case, when the Food Inspector served a notice on the accused who was Kirana Shop keeper intimating his intention to purchase a sample of the turmeric powder exposed for sale, the accused received the notice and endorsed thereon that he was selling the turmeric powder only for external application to wounds and not for human consumption. Repelling the contention of the accused, the High Court observed as follows: “Turmeric powder as recovered from the shop of the petitioner does fall, within the definition of the word ‘food’ given in sub-clause (a) of clause (v) of section 2 of the Act. It is of no consequence, if the petitioner at the time its sample was purchased by the Food Inspector claimed it to be an article meant not for sale in general to the public for consumption a; human food but as he noted on the notice of intimation. Exhibit P-A.it was meant for application to the wounds. In, the first place, it is very difficult to accept the stand in defence taken by the petitioner that he was not selling the turmeric powder for human consumption as an article of food but was selling it for application to the wounds. The container, which contained four kilograms of turmeric powder did rot bear any lable to the effect that the turmeric powder contained therein was being sold as claimed. Even if the stand taken by the petitioner of its sale being for the extraordinary purpose for external application to the wounds is taken as correct, the turmeric powder will all the same fall within the scope of the word ‘food’ referred to above. Even if the stand taken by the petitioner of its sale being for the extraordinary purpose for external application to the wounds is taken as correct, the turmeric powder will all the same fall within the scope of the word ‘food’ referred to above. Turmeric powder is ordinarily used for human consumption by its use in articles of food prepared for meals or used as snacks. It is from the point of view of the essential purpose of turmeric being used in eatables for human consumption that the Court is to determine whether that article is covered by the definition of the word ‘food’ and not from the point of view of its extraordinary, unusual and occasional purpose to which that article can be put. The defence, which the petitioner has taken, refers to the latter type of purpose and not to the former. Thre is no gainsaying the fact that the turmeric powder sold by a grower for use in eatables may be used by any one for application to wounds. Even if the stand of the petitioner is taken as correct, which is hard to accept, that he was selling turmeric powder for external application to wounds, that article would nonetheless fall within the scope of the word ‘food’ because of its principal purpose for which it is used, namely the purpose of its entering into the composition to preparation of human food. Thus, the point raised has no substance." 17. In Public Prosecutor v. Kondayya1, which was a case under section 5 (1) (d) of the Madras Prevention of Adulteration Act it was pointed out that "it is not justifiable to introduce as a test of liability the purpose for which the adulteration was effected on importing the element of intention to commit fraud". It was further pointed out that "the knowledge and awareness of the purchaser about the adulteration is wholly immaterial as the object and policy of the statute is to protect the public by prohibiting sale of adulterated milk or milk which did not come up to the prescribed standard of purity. " 18.Public Prosecutor v. Palanisami2, is a case decided at the Madras High Court under the Central Act of 1954. In that case, the trial Magistrate convicted the accused for having sold and for being in possession of adulterated asafoetida. " 18.Public Prosecutor v. Palanisami2, is a case decided at the Madras High Court under the Central Act of 1954. In that case, the trial Magistrate convicted the accused for having sold and for being in possession of adulterated asafoetida. The Appellate Court acquitted the accused having found from the evidence of the mediator that at the time when the Food Inspector purchased a sample of the asafoetida, the accused represented that the asafoetdia was being sold by him only for feeding cows and goats and not for human consumption. On appeal filed by the State against the order of acquittal, the High Court observed as follows: ‘What the accused contended and’ which contention was found acceptance at the hands of the learned Sessions Judge is that it would not be an offence under the Act, if an article intended’ for human consumption is sold to a customer on the express understanding that it should be given to cattle and not consumed by human being. The crux of the offence does not lie in the use to which the buyer may put an article, but whether intrinsically the articles sold or exposed for sale is one used for human consumption or not. The plea of the accused seems to be that, because he used to represent to his buyers that this particular asafoetida which he had in stock, should be used only for feeding cattle and not used as human food, he would be exempt front prosecution......As already mentioned, as long as the article sold by him on stored by him. for sale remains an article which ordinarily enters into the preparation of human food, it is irrelevant to consider whether it was sold to a particular customer on the distinct understanding that he should not use it for preparing food, but should give it only to animals." 19. In Vararnasi Municipality v. Sudeshwari Devi1, the defence put forward by the accused was that at the time of sale to the Food Inspector it was declared that the ghee was being sold for the purpose of burning only and that the accused was selling the ghee only as "Akhadya" i.e., non-edible. In Vararnasi Municipality v. Sudeshwari Devi1, the defence put forward by the accused was that at the time of sale to the Food Inspector it was declared that the ghee was being sold for the purpose of burning only and that the accused was selling the ghee only as "Akhadya" i.e., non-edible. Quoting the definition of "sale" as contained in section 2 (xiii) of the Act the Allahabad High Court observed: "The aforesaid definition is of wide amplitude and embraces not only a sale for human consumption or use but also a sale for analysis. It is therefore manifest that the sale of a sample of ghee to the Food Inspector was a sale under the provisions of the Act. A dealer cannot, therefore, escape the clutches of law by merely describing an article of food at the time of its sale as "Akhadya". 20. In Puri Municipality v. R. C. Anjaneyulu2, the accused was selling adulterated ghee unfit for human consumption affixing a label on the tins containing the ghee that the ghee was meant for lighting purposes. Considering the contention of the accused that he committed no offence under the Act in so far as he sold the adulterated ghee not for human consumption but for lighting purposes, the High Court observed as follows: "It is true that a large quantity of ghee is daily required for lighting purposes in the temple of Lord Jagannath and other temples, but does not mean that such ghee must necessarily be adulterated. Undisputedly ghee is a food stuff as it is used in various forms in the preparation of human food and sale of adulterated ghee is prohibited by law. Although the ghee might have an alternative use such as for lighting purposes it cannot lose its importance as a food. It was open to the accused to sell such article for lighting purposes by any other name. But once he sells an article in the name of ghee he is bound to sell it in an unadulterated form and once it is found to be adulterated, the seller becomes liable under section 16 of the Act. It was said that the description on the label that it was meant for lighting purposes was a sufficient notice to the Food Inspector that it is not a food so as to entitle him to exercise jurisdiction under sections 10 and 11. It was said that the description on the label that it was meant for lighting purposes was a sufficient notice to the Food Inspector that it is not a food so as to entitle him to exercise jurisdiction under sections 10 and 11. That the ghee was meant for lighting purposes is no notice to the customers that it is unfit for human consumption. There is no bar for pure ghee being used for lighting purposes and good ghee may be used for both the purposes. It is however not a sufficient defence for the accused to contend that it was never intended by him that the said ghee should be used for human consumption. Once an article is sold as ghee in the market it was perfectly within the jurisdiction of the Food Inspector to act under sections 10 and 11 of the Act." 21. In Subbayyan v. State3, it was contended on behalf of the accused that the prosecution must establish not only the sale of an article of food but that the sale was as an article of food. Dealing with this contention, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court observed as follows; "It was also contended by the learned Counsel for the accused that it was not enough that the article sold is an article of food, but it must have been sold as an article of food. It was submitted that there was evidence in this case that compounded asafoetida can be used as a drug, and that there was no evidence that the sales were made as articles of food. These are all contentions contrary to the clear provisions of the Act. That compounded asafoetida is ‘food’ as defined in section 2(v) of the Act admits of no doubt and it was also not disputed. Then the only question is whether the accused sold it, and if they did, they are guilty under section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act read with section 7.” 22. In Public Prosecutor v. Nagabhushanam1 a Division Bench of this Court expressed its dissent from the view taken by a single Judge in Public Prosecutor v. Satyanarayana2. In the latter case, the learned single Judge held that before an accused car be convicted under section 16 (1) of the Act, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the article in question was sold as an article of food. In the latter case, the learned single Judge held that before an accused car be convicted under section 16 (1) of the Act, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the article in question was sold as an article of food. Speaking for the Division Bench, Basi Reddy J., pointed out as follows in Public Prosectuor v. Nagabhushanam1 ”The learned Judge’s attention does not appear to have been pointedly drawn to the distinction contemplated by the definition itself, between a sale for human consumption or use on the one hand, and a sale for analysis on the other. If however, the learned Judge meant to lay down that even in the case of a purchase for analysis before a conviction can be had under section 16(1)(a) of the Act, it is imcumbent on the prosecution to prove that the article in question was sold as an article of food, in addition to the prosecution proving that what was sold was an article of food and that it was adulterated, we must express our respectful dissent.“ 23. In Dhirajlal v. Ramachandra3, the Full Bench considered the question”Whether the definition of “sale” contained in section 2 (xiii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is confined to the sale of articles of food for human consumptions alone or extends to the sale of an article of food regardless of the use to which it is put?“After examining the question by reference to various authorities, the Full Bench answered the question as follows: ”The definition of ‘sale’ contained in section 2 (xiii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is not confined to the sale of articles of food for human consumption only but extends to the sale of any article of food regardless of the use to which it is put.“ 24. In the light of the provisions of the Act and the views of the various High Courts referred to supra, we are unable to share the view of our learned brother in V. C. Chengalrayudu v. State of A.P.4 , wherein it was held that when an accused makes a declaration before the Food Inspector unequivocally that the sample he was selling was not intended for human consumption but for that of animals, the sale would not constitute the sale of an article of food. In that case, when the Public Prosecutor contended that mere declaration on the part of the accused is not sufficient and that the Court had to examine the correctness or otherwise of the declaration, our learned brother, repelled the contention relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in A. P. Grain and Seed Mfrs. Association v. Union of India5. The observations relied on are as follows: “In any event it is always open to a person selling an article capable of being used as an article of food as well as for other purpose to inform the purchaser by clear notice that the article sold or supplied is not intended to be used as an article of food. What is penalised by section 16 (1) is importation, manufacture for sale, or storage, sale or distribution of any article of food. If what is imported, manufactured or stored, sold or distributed is not an article of food, evidently section 16 can have no application.” above extracted observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court do not support the view taken by him. The Supreme Court has clearly observed in the last two sentences of the above extracted observation that sale of an article of food is penalised by section 16(1) of the Act and that section 16 can have no application if what is sold is not an article of food. The observations were made by their Lordships while considering certain writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, under sections 7, 13, 16 and 19. Dealing with section 16(1) of the Act, their Lordships have pointed out as follows in para. 11 of the Judgment. "We are again unable to accept the argument that under the Act even when an article is purchased not as an article of food, but for use otherwise the vendor will be deemed guilty if the article does not conform to the prescribed standards, or is as an article of food adulterated or misbranded. 11 of the Judgment. "We are again unable to accept the argument that under the Act even when an article is purchased not as an article of food, but for use otherwise the vendor will be deemed guilty if the article does not conform to the prescribed standards, or is as an article of food adulterated or misbranded. Counsel said that coconut oil is used In the State of Kerala as a cooking medium, and sale of adulterated coconut oil may in Kerala be an offence under section 16, but in other parts of the country where coconut oil is not used as a cooking medium and is used as component of hair oil or for other purposes, it amounts to imposing an unreasonable restriction to penalise the vendor who sells coconut oil knowing that the purchaser is not buying it as a cooking medium. But there are no articles which are used as food only in one part, and are not at all used as food in another part of the country. Even coconut oil is used as a cooking medium by certain sections of the people in part’s of India other than Kerala. In any event it is always open to a person selling an article capable of being used as an article of food as well as for other purpose to inform the purchaser by clear notice that the article sold or supplied is not intended to be used as an article of food. What is penalised by section 16(1) is importation, manufacture for sale, or storage, sale or distribution of any article of food. If what is imported, manufactured or stored, sold or distributed is not an article of food, evidently section 16 can have no application." 26. In the above extracted observation, their Lordships did not say that it would of no offence, under section 16 (1) if what is generally find ordinarily, an article of food is sold in an adulterated or misbranded form for a purpose other than human consumption. On the other hand, their Lordships are categoric that section 16 (1) penalises importation, manufacture for sale, or storage, sale or distribution of any adulterated or misbranded article of food. On the other hand, their Lordships are categoric that section 16 (1) penalises importation, manufacture for sale, or storage, sale or distribution of any adulterated or misbranded article of food. The clear notice pointed out by their Lordships is only with reference to articles which are generally no articles of food within the meaning of section 2 (v) of the Act and are, however, useful for human consumption and also for other purposes. If coconut oil is not used as an article of food in any particular area, their Lordships observed that by clear notice of its adulteration to the purchase the businessman can sell it for a purpose other than human consumption in such area. It would be necessary to notice that their Lordships made the observation while considering the plea of hardship in the case of selling adulterated coconut oil at places where coconut oil is not at all used as a cooking medium. In the same case in para 5 of the judgment, their Lordships observed: "In our judgment, the restrictions imposed upon, the conduct of business by traders in foodstuffs cannot be deemed unreasonable. By section 16 (1) provision is made for imposing penalties, among other acts, for storage, sale or distribution of articles of food which are adulterated or misbranded or sale of which is prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the Interest of the public health or in contravention of the Act or the Rules. The Act, it is true, does not make some blame-worthy mental condition constituted by knowledge or intention relating to the nature of article stored, sold or distributed, an ingredient of the offence. Unless the case falls within sub-section (2) of section 19, if sale, storage or distribution is established, intention to sell articles or knowledge that the articles are adulterated, misbranded, or prohibited need not be proved by the prosecutor to bring home the charge." 27. What emerges out of the above discussion is that no person can manufacture for sale, or store for sale or sell or distribute any adulterated or misbranded food as defined in section 2 (v) of the Act. What emerges out of the above discussion is that no person can manufacture for sale, or store for sale or sell or distribute any adulterated or misbranded food as defined in section 2 (v) of the Act. Where an article is essentially and substantially an article of food for human consumption, it cannot be sold in an adulterated or misbranded form and the vendor cannot be absolved of his liability by saying that he was intimating his customers that the adulterated food is not for human consumption. 28. If an article, which is generally not used as ‘food for human consumption’ but is used for purposes other than human consumption and the article can also be used for human consumption (like coconut oil in some areas other than Kerala) in the event of such article being adulterated or misbranded, it would be open to the vendor to inform the purchasers by clear notice that the article is not intended for human consumption. 29. In the instant case, the accused stated before: the Food Inspector that he was selling the red-gram dhal, which is undisputably misbranded, as cattle fodder. Red-gram dhal is unquestionably an article of food for human consumption. Apart from the fact that it is not open to the accused to sell mis-branded human food as cattle fodder it is difficult to believe the plea of the accused. In this State, red-gram dhal is never used for feeding cattle. It is used only for human consumption. If it was redly exposed for sale by the accused for use as cattle fodder, it is not understood as to why he should have misbranded it by polishing it with an artificial watersoluble yellow colouring matter derived from coal-tar, as reported by the Public Analyst. We do not think that cattle are so choosy as to prefer attractively coloured red-gram dhal. Admittecly, the accused did not even exhibit any notice board. The plea of the accused that he was selling the red-gram dhal only as cattle fodder is a deliberate false invention and does not command itself to us as true. 30. Sri Narasimhachari, the learned Counsel for the accused contends that the plea of the red-gram dhal being sold as cattle fodder was spontaneous and that the accused raised that plea ever; before the Food Inspector, when the sample was purchased. 30. Sri Narasimhachari, the learned Counsel for the accused contends that the plea of the red-gram dhal being sold as cattle fodder was spontaneous and that the accused raised that plea ever; before the Food Inspector, when the sample was purchased. He says that in view of the spontaneity in the plea, it would be reasonable to accept it as true. A spontaneous plea may generally be true. It does not, however, mean that every plea of an accused mentioned soon after the detection of his offence is necessarily true. The truth or otherwise of a plea is a question of fact in each case and the circumstance of the earliness with which the plea is set up is no doubt a factor for consideration in favour of the truth of the plea. It is, however, not unusual for habitual or consummate offenders to conceive of a plausible plea far before the possible detection of their offence and such offenders can always make their prefabricated pleas appear as if spontaneous. Under the circumstances, we have no hesitation to conclude that the plea of the accused to the effect that he was storing the misbranded red-gram dhal, for sale as cattle fodder is false. In a vain bid to substantiate the plea, the accused has examined one witness or. his behalf. But, that witness (D.W.11) could not have the cheek to say that he ever purchased red-grant dhal from the accused to feed his cattle. What all that witness has stated is, "I got two she-buffaloes and one cow. I will be purchasing cattle fodder and, red-gram dhal and other articles from the accused’s shop." The witness did not say that he ever purchased red-gram dhal as cattle fodder. 31. Moreover, as pointed out already, while setting out the facts that led up to this appeal, the trial Court found that the accused sold a sample of the misbranded red-gram dhal to the Food Inspector (P.W.1) for analysis. The sale to the Food Inspector for analysis is unquestionably a sale, within the meaning of the Act. The order of the Magistrate acquitting the accused, under the circumstances, is erroneous and has to be set aside. 32. The sale to the Food Inspector for analysis is unquestionably a sale, within the meaning of the Act. The order of the Magistrate acquitting the accused, under the circumstances, is erroneous and has to be set aside. 32. For the reasons recorded, we overrule the decision in V. C. Chengalrayudu v. Stale of A.P.1, and convict the accused under sections 16(1) and 7 read with section 2 (ix) (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and rule 29 of the Prevention. of Food Adulteration Rules. The accused is sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for a term of six months and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. In default of payment of the fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for another six months.