Judgment :- 1. These revisions are against 2 orders of the Taluk Land Board, Parur In CRP. No. 1928 of 1976 challenge is made to an order passed against the petitioner in that revision petition, he being the son of the petitioner in CRP. No. 3105 of 1976 The latter petition is by the father who challenges the order of the Taluk Land Board passed against him. Both orders are passed in proceedings relating to surrender of excess land under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The son as well as the father were found to own excess land. The son has been directed to surrender 1.10 acres of land and the father has been directed to surrender 4.55.819 acres of land. For the sake of convenience I will refer to the petitioners by their names, the son as Rama Iyer and the father as Sahasranama Iyer. 2. Sri. Sahasranama Iyer obtained lands from his joint family for the share of his branch somewhere about the year 1950 In 1957 he had a wife and 3 children (one of them being a daughter) as members of his branch. The ancestral properties obtained by the branch were partitioned under a deed dated 16-8-1957. The minors were represented in this deed by their mother. The father, mother and each of the children took properties of the joint family separately as their respective shares and that is how Rama Ayyar, one of the sons, came to possess separate properties from that date. It is in respect of these lands that he has now been called upon to surrender excess land. He was a minor on the date of the partition deed and is said to have attained majority some time before 1-1-1970 As on 1-1-1970 he was an adult unmarried person. On that day his father was the head of a 'family' (as defined under the Kerala Land Reforms Act) consisting of 2 members namely himself and his wife. 3. Apart from some minor questions to which I will presently refer, in both the cases there is a common question and that is of some importance. On that day his father was the head of a 'family' (as defined under the Kerala Land Reforms Act) consisting of 2 members namely himself and his wife. 3. Apart from some minor questions to which I will presently refer, in both the cases there is a common question and that is of some importance. Allied to the purpose of S.84 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, (in short the Act) which provides for invalidating transfers effected after the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill 1963 in the Government gazette, there is provision in the explanation to S.85 (1) of the Act which deems transfers effected after 18-12-1957 and prior to the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill 1963 in the Government Gazette except in certain specified cases as transfers to be ignored for the purpose of determining the extent of land owned or held by the transferor as on 1-1-1970. S.84 which declares that such offending transfers shall be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act and invalid has been construed by this Court as rendering such transfers invalid only to the extent such transfers deal with excess land. It has been so held by a Full Bench in Kesavan Namboodiri v. State of Kerala and others (1976 KLT. 427). That is because consistent with the purpose for which S.84 has been incorporated in the Act it is only proper to assume that the invalidation is for the specific object of securing that the provisions of the Act are not defeated. Such provisions are defeated only if the person deals with excess land. Therefore if the person who is holding excess land deals with land by way of transfer not only to the extent of excess land but even of land within the ceiling limit there is no purpose served by treating the transfer as invalid to any extent other than that of the excess. That was the reason why the expression in S.84 "shall be invalid" has been read by this Court in the decision adverted to as invalid to the extent of the excess. 4. In these cases before me the father effected certain transfers between 18-12-1957 and 15-9-1963. The total extent of land covered by such transfer is 4.59 acres. That was the reason why the expression in S.84 "shall be invalid" has been read by this Court in the decision adverted to as invalid to the extent of the excess. 4. In these cases before me the father effected certain transfers between 18-12-1957 and 15-9-1963. The total extent of land covered by such transfer is 4.59 acres. According to counsel for the petitioner the excess held by him at that time was only 38 cents and therefore if at all the transfer was to be ignored by reason of Explanation to S.85 (1), that should be with regard to 38 cents only and it is only 38 cents that should be taken as owned or held by the petitioner notwithstanding such transfers. In the case of Rama Iyer, there has been a transfer between the dates contemplated by the Explanation and that transfer was really one by way of exchange of an item of property with the father. 117 acres was transferred by the son to the father and the father transferred 12 cents in exchange for it. The transfer by the son to the father was ignored as transfer by a person in possession of excess land. The transfer by the father to the son was taken into account. 1.17 acres which has been transferred was treated as Ratna Iyer's land. That is objected to, for, according to counsel the excess on that date was only 1.02 acres and therefore the transfer of the entire 1.17 acres could not, at any rate, be ignored This common question calls for consideration in both these cases and that is why I have heard the cases together and disposed them of by a common order. 5. Before I come to the main contention I may advert to certain minor contentions urged by counsel. In Rama Iyer's case it is said that 4.230 cents of land had been compulsorily acquired in 1957 and therefore it is urged that this extent should be exempted. The evidence of notice received in land acquisition proceedings has been produced. That it has been so acquired is not disputed. But what is stated in the order is that a perusal of the notice discloses that the notice was issued to the father Sahasranama Iyer and not to the declarant. The notice is dated 26-3-1957. The declarant obtained the properties only in July, 195. That it has been so acquired is not disputed. But what is stated in the order is that a perusal of the notice discloses that the notice was issued to the father Sahasranama Iyer and not to the declarant. The notice is dated 26-3-1957. The declarant obtained the properties only in July, 195. Therefore it is said that the notice has to be ignored. This is erroneous. During the course of the land acquisition proceedings partition took place and it is only natural that prior to the partition notice was issued to the father who was the manager of the family. Therefore the issue of notice to the father and not to the son is not in any way significant. The son obtained this land as included in his schedule in the partition and since the proceedings for acquisition were continued thereafter the loss of that land was to the son Naturally therefore the exclusion of 4.230 cents was claimed. That has to be allowed. The petitioner in C. R. P. No. 1928 of 1976 succeeds on this point. There is no other point in this case other.than the one which I have already adverted to. 6. In C.R P. No 3105 of 1976, the revision by the father, he claims that an extent of 1.85 acres was transferred by him to a tenant and only 1.70 acres has been found eligible for exemption. But it is agreed that the document of transfer mentions the extent transferred as 1.70 acres. It is not for this court in revision to interfere so as to find that larger extent was transferred. One other contention raised is that certain lands ought to have been treated as commercial sites and exempted because they were lying on the side of a road. Merely because they were situate near a road it is not possible to grant exemption to them as commercial sites. Whether they are commercial sites is a matter for decision on appreciation of several circumstances and that could be done only by a fact finding authority. I see no reason to disturb the finding of the Taluk Land Board in this regard. 7. Whether they are commercial sites is a matter for decision on appreciation of several circumstances and that could be done only by a fact finding authority. I see no reason to disturb the finding of the Taluk Land Board in this regard. 7. Though the petitioner had a complaint that 1.17 acres the transfer of which by the son to the father was treated as invalid in the son's case is included as land of the father in his ceiling case that has not affected the father because it is seen that this land is comprised in the gift executed to the sister the land included in which gift has been excluded. Therefore the contention does not require notice. 8. Now I come to the main controversy in this case. It may be necessary, in this context, to advert to S.84 and 85 of the Act. These sections read. "84. Certain voluntary transfers to be null and void:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, all voluntary transfers effected after the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the Gazette, otherwise than (i) by way of partition; or (ii) xx xx xx xx (iii) in favour of a person who was a tenant of the holding before the 27th July, 1960, and continued to be so so till the date of transfer; (iv) xx xx xx xx by a family or any member thereof or by an adult unmarried person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area, (or otherwise than by way of gift in favour of his son or daughter. or the son or daughter of his predeceased son or daughter by any person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area) shall be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of this Act and shall be invalid: Provided that, without prejudice to any other right of the parties to any such transfer, when any purchase price is payable under S.56 or any compensation is payable under S.72H or S.88 for any land covered by the said transfer it shall be competent for the Land Tribunal to award to the transferee, out of the purchase price or compensation amount in respect of such land, such sum as the Land Tribunal may consider just and proper. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, all voluntary transfers effected by any person (other than a family or any member thereof or by an adult unmarried person) owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area after the 1st July, 1969, otherwise than (i) by way of partition; or (ii) in favour of a person who was a tenant of the holding before the 27th July, 1960, and continued to be so till the date of transfer, (iii) xx xx xx xx Provided that without prejudice to any other right of the parties to any such transfer, when any purchase price is payable under S.56 or any compensation is payable under S.72H or S.88 for any land covered by the said transfer, it shall be competent for the Land Tribunal to award to the transferee, out of the purchase price or compensation amount in respect of such land, such sum as the Land Tribunal may consider just and proper. (3) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the expression "ceiling area" in sub-sections (1) and (2) means the ceiling area specified in sub-section (1) of S.82 as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment Act, 1969 (35 of 1969). 85. Surrender of excess land:-(1) Where a person owns or holds land in excess of the ceiling area on the date notified under S.83, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided: Provided that where any person bona fide believes that the ownership or possession of any land owned or held by such person or, where such person is a member of a family, by the members of such family, is liable to be purchased by the cultivating tenant or kudikidappukaran or to be resumed by the land owner or the intermediary under the provisions of this Act, the extent of the land so liable to be purchased or to be resumed shall not be taken into account in calculating the extent of the land to be surrendered under this subsection. Explanation: -Where any land owned of held by a family or adult unmarred person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area was transferred by such family or any member thereof or by such adult unmarried person, as the case may be, after the 18th December, 1957, and on or before the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the Gazette, otherwise than (i) by way of partition; or (ii) on account of natural love and affection; or (iii) in favour of a person who was a tenant of the holding before the 18th December, 1957, and continued to be so till the date of transfer; or (iv) in favour of a religious, charitable or educational institution of a public nature solely for the purposes of the institution, the extent of land owned or held by such family or adult unmarried person shall be calculated for purposes of fixing the extent of land to be surrendered under this section as if such transfer had not taken place, and such family or adult unmarried person shall be bound to surrender an extent of land which would be in excess of the ceiling area on such calculation, or, where such family or person does not own or hold such extent of land, the entire land owned or held by the family or person; but nothing in this Explanation (a) shall affect the rights of the transferee under the transfer; or (b) shall apply in the case of any transfer of land by a family or any member thereof or an adult unmarried person if the extent of land owned or held by such family or adult unmarried person, as the case may be, immediately before the transfer was not in excess of the ceiling area specified in the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960, and applicable to such family or adult unmarried person. It is true that the language of explanation to S.85 is different from the language of S.84 of the Act. S.84 renders all voluntary transfers effected after 15-9-1963 otherwise than those of the specified categories by a family or any member thereof or by an adult unmarried person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area as transfer calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act and as invalid. S.84 renders all voluntary transfers effected after 15-9-1963 otherwise than those of the specified categories by a family or any member thereof or by an adult unmarried person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area as transfer calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act and as invalid. Construing this section this Court said in the Full Bench decision in Kesavan Namboodiry v. State of Kerala and others (1976 KLT. 427): "The question is whether a transfer hit by the section is invalid in toto or is invalid only to the extent it operates to defeat the provisions of the Act. It may be said that the transfer is invalid for all purposes and even as between the transferor and transferee no right would pass by reason of the transfer Another possible view is that the transfer would be invalid only to the extent required to achieve the object of the provision. Such object is indicated in the section itself, namely to see that the provisions of the Act are not defeated If that view be taken the transfer would be bad only to the extent it would be objectionable as a transfer of aland in excess of the ceiling area." Further this Court said: "The circumstances amply justify the construction of the term "shall be invalid" in a restricted sense, viz., that the transfers would be invalid to the extent they would operate to defeat the provisions of the Act." By way of justification for adopting this construction the Full Bench observed "II two alternative constructions are equally possible the one which is consistent with the scheme envisaged by the enactment and which promotes the purposes and abject of the provision is to be preferred. The legislative intent and purpose behind the provision and the result sought to be achieved will have to be considered. The meaning to be attributed must be consistent with the intent and the result sought to be achieved. The adoption of a wider meaning may result in extending the scope of the provision to matters which may not be necessary to be provided for under the scheme of the Act or for the purpose of the Act and to attribute such a wide meaning may lead to undesirable results. In such cases the adoption of a wider meaning ought to be avoided." 9. In such cases the adoption of a wider meaning ought to be avoided." 9. I have quoted the above passages only to enable the examination of the provision in Explanation to S.85 of the Act in the light of the rule of construction adopted by the Full Bench 10. I have already extracted the explanation earlier in this judgment. We are concerned Here with the case of an adult unmarried person owning excess land on 1-1-1970. The Explanation, leaving out the part of the Explanation not necessary for this case, would read thus: "Where any land owned or held by an adult unmarried person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area was transferred by such adult unmarried person after 18-12-1957 and before 15 -9-1963 otherwise than in certain specified cases the extent of the land owned or held by such adult unmarried person shall be calculated for the purpose of fixing the extent of land to be surrendered under S.85 of the Act as if such transfer had not taken place and such adult unmarried person shall be bound to surrender an extent of land which would be in excess of the ceiling area on such calculation, where such adult unmarried person does not own or bold such extent of land, the entire extent owned or held by him." The explanation refers to the adult unmarried person 'owning' or 'holding' land. Therefore the Explanation's application is only to a case where such person owns excess land on 1-1-1970. An adult unmarried person owning such land on 1-1-1970 may not have been an adult unmarried person between 18-12-1957 and 15-9-1963. Therefore it is easier to understand the term 'adult unmarried person' in that context by referring to the person himself. In otherwords if Sri. Rama Iyer was an adult unmarried person on 1-1-1970 and he owns excess land the explanation will have application if Rama Iyer had transferred any land between 18-12-1957 and 15-9-1963. Rama Iyer might not have been an adult unmarried person on the date of transfer. In otherwords if Sri. Rama Iyer was an adult unmarried person on 1-1-1970 and he owns excess land the explanation will have application if Rama Iyer had transferred any land between 18-12-1957 and 15-9-1963. Rama Iyer might not have been an adult unmarried person on the date of transfer. The section cannot be understood in any other sense as it will result in leaving out cases to which the section must properly apply Similarly in the case of a family if the family owns or holds excels land on 1-1-1970 if the family or any particular member of that family had executed any transfer during the specified period the explanation would apply. The family at that time might not have been one constituted by the identical members. In fact family being a unit consisting of father, mother and minor unmarried children, the family, during the period between 18-12-1957 and 15-9-1963 may not in many cases be of the identical members as on 1-1-1970. By the term family is envisaged a family as on 1-1-1970 and the test would be whether that family or any member thereof had effected transfers between the relevant date in order to render the explanation applicable. 11. Coming back to the case of an unmarried person the explanation, ignoring for a moment clauses (a) and (b) which qualify this explanation, applies to a transfer between the dates mentioned irrespective of whether the transferor held excess land on that day or not. That is because the explanation begins with the words 'where any land owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person'. There is no qualification in the main body of the explanation that at the time of the transfer the transferor must be holding excess land or that the transfer must be of excess land. The transfer must be by a person, who, on 1-1-1970, is an adult unmarried person and on 1-1-1970 owns excess land. If such person had transferred any land between the dates specified the explana-nation is attracted. The transfer must be by a person, who, on 1-1-1970, is an adult unmarried person and on 1-1-1970 owns excess land. If such person had transferred any land between the dates specified the explana-nation is attracted. But cases where such transferor did not hold excess land as on the date of the commencement of the Agrarian Relations Act 1960 are excepted by reason of what follows, for, clause (b) which follows provides that nothing in the explanation shall apply in the case of any transfer of land by an adult unmarried person if the extent of land owned or held by him immediately before the transfer was not in excess of the ceiling area specified in the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960, and applicable to him. We must remember that the transfer might have been at any time before the Agrarian Relations Act came into force. It is not the ceiling area on the date of the transfer that is relevant. It is the ceiling area specified in the Agrarian Relations Act that is relevant. It is only if the person held, on the date of transfer, land in excess of the ceiling area as specified in the Agrarian Relations Act 1960 the explanation would be applicable. Otherwise the application of the explanation is ruled out. In the face of the plain language of the explanation read with clause (b) it is not as easy to read down the explanation as S.84 of the Act has been read down by the Full Bench in Kesavan Namboodiri v. State of Kerala and others (1976 KLT. 427), for, in the latter case it was sufficient to add to the words 'shall be invalid' 'so far as the transfer concerns the excess'. It was easy to add these words as indicating the purpose and object of the provision. Here if what counsel pleads for is to be accepted it is not sufficient to add similar words to the explanation or for that matter to clause (b). That is because the explanation calls for ignoring the transfer-"as if such transfer had not taken place"-and adding the extent of land transferred to the land of the transferor as on 1-1-1970. 12. That is because the explanation calls for ignoring the transfer-"as if such transfer had not taken place"-and adding the extent of land transferred to the land of the transferor as on 1-1-1970. 12. We may have to examine whether the object of the provision is to ignore the transfer only to the extent it exceeds the ceiling limit fixed under the Agrarian Relations Act 1960 or to ignore it completely. Difficulty arises because clause (b) provides that nothing in the explanation shall apply in the case of a transfer specified therein. The explanation is not limited to the case of persons holding land in excess of the limit specified in the Agrarian Relations Act. Reading the explanation without clause (b) which acts as a proviso, all transfers between the specified dates would be objectionable irrespective of whether the transferor had excess land (i. e above the limit specified in the Agrarian Relations Act) on the date of transfer. To avoid this result clause (b) restricts the application of the explanation to cases where the transferor has excess land on the date of the transfer. To what extent the transfer by a person who holds excess land has to be ignored for the purpose of the explanation is not in terms stated in clause (b) or in the explanation. The question is: could the section be nevertheless read down to mean that the words "as if such transfer had not taken place" applies only to such extent of land as is in excess of the limit specified in the Agrarian Relations Act, 1960. 13. The oft-quoted celebrated passage in Heydan's case (3 Co. Rep. 7a) deserves to be noticed in this context: "that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: (1st) What was the common law before the making of the Act. (2nd) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide (3rd) what remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. (2nd) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide (3rd) what remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. And (4th) The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico." It is a well settled rule of lav, that when the language of a statute is plain it does not call for construction so as to deviate from the meaning evident from such plain language. But this rule is in a way qualified. Circumstance may necessitate limiting the meaning of the plain language of the statute. Those are cases where otherwise mischief would be caused and injustice would be the result. The intention of the architects of that statute as seen from the scheme of the Act may have relevance and it would be advisable to construe the provision so as to promote the object and purpose of the Act concerned. Even supplying words not there to understand the provisions in any restricted sense or in a larger sense, as the case may be, to promote the construction indicated above would be called for on occasions. I may in this context refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh (AIR 1955 SC 830). There the court had to consider the application of S.99 of the Representation of the People Apt, 1951. That called for issue of notice under the proviso to that section to parties to an election petition before recording the findings under S.99 (1) (a). In the case "before the Supreme Court notice was not issued, but the party was conducting the case and the notice would have been nothing but a formality. There would have been no prejudice to the party by reason of non-issue of notice. In the case "before the Supreme Court notice was not issued, but the party was conducting the case and the notice would have been nothing but a formality. There would have been no prejudice to the party by reason of non-issue of notice. It is in that context that the Supreme Court reiterated the well-known rule of construction in these words "It is argued that if the language of the enactment is interpreted in its literal and grammatical sense, there could be no escape from the conclusion that parties to the petition are also entitled to notice under the proviso. But it is a rule of interpretation well-established that, "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence." The quotation is from a passage of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 229. 14. S.11 of the Opium Act 1878 provided for confiscation of the vessels, packages and coverings in which any opium liable to confiscation under that section was found, and also of the other contents of the vessel or package in which such opium may be concealed, and of the animals and conveyances used in carrying it. The words of the section read "shall be confiscated ". In a case where owner of the vehicle in which opium liable to be confiscated was found was a necessary party and was shown to be not responsible for conveyance of the opium in that vehicle the question was whether the court had discretion not to order such confiscation notwithstanding the language 'shall be liable to confiscation' employed in the section. The Supreme Court found that the words had to be read as enabling a discretion to be exercised. This is what Sikri. J, as he then was, speaking for the Bench, said in that context in State of M. P.v. Azad Bharath Finance Co., 1967 SC. The Supreme Court found that the words had to be read as enabling a discretion to be exercised. This is what Sikri. J, as he then was, speaking for the Bench, said in that context in State of M. P.v. Azad Bharath Finance Co., 1967 SC. 276: "In our opinion, the High Court was correct in reading S. H of the Madhya Bharath Act as permissive and not obligatory It is well settled that the use of the word shall" does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory; it depends upon the context in which the word "shall" occurs and the other circumstances Three considerations are relevant in construing S.11. First, it is not denied by Mr. Shroff that it would be unjust to confiscate the truck of a person if he has no knowledge whatsoever that the truck was being used for transporting opium. Suppose a person steals a truck and then uses it for transporting contraband opium. According to Mr. Shroff the truck would have to be confiscated. It is well recognised that if a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence." 15. The question therefore would be whether it would be necessary in the circumstances of the case to read the explanation qualified by clause (b) following it limited in the manner canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner. The object of Chapter III of the Act is to limit the extent of holdings of persons and families so as to enable excess land to be taken over for the purpose of assignment to those who qualify for such assignment. Avoidance of concentration of land in the hands of a few and distribution to those eligible is one of the objectives of the agrarian reforms envisaged by the State. The proposal to enact a law relating to such agrarian reforms and to put a ceiling limit on possession of holdings was a matter debated in the Legislature of the State, in the Press and in platforms. The proposal to enact a law relating to such agrarian reforms and to put a ceiling limit on possession of holdings was a matter debated in the Legislature of the State, in the Press and in platforms. S.84 was enacted with a view to meet the situation where persons who were aware that a new bill limiting the extent of holding was going to be passed executed transfers that had the effect of defeating such provisions S.85 was also intended to meet a similar situation. The steps taken to introduce agrarian reforms in the State started even prior to the Agrarian Relations Act of 1960 and that is the significance of fixing the date 18-12-1957 as the date subsequent to which the transfers effected by persons holding land in excess of a limit specified were to be treated as liable to be ignored in determining the ceiling area of the transferor. The one essential difference between the legal consequence arising from S.84 and the Explanation to S.85 is. that transferees are not affected in the case of transfers falling within Explanation to S.85. The transfers are not rendered invalid as in the case of those falling under S.84. Transferors alone are to be affected. There is an essential common feature in both the sections and that is that the purpose of these provisions is to see that by reason of a transfer effected by a person owning or holding land in excess of the specified area, the extent of land liable to be surrendered by him is not affected. In other words, it is to secure that such person also surrenders excess land that the Explanation is provided for. The transferee may have taken the transfer in good faith and therefore the statute does not provide that so far as he is concerned he would be under an obligation to surrender that land. If this be the object of the provision as is apparent from the scheme, the setting and context of Explanation to S.85 (1), as it appears in the Act, one sees no reason to ignore a sale of land even to the extent the sale would not be objectionable or the sale would not affect the obligation "f the transferor to surrender any land. If a person permitted to hold 20 acres of land under the Agrarian Relations Act 1960 possessed 21 acres of land transfer of 1 acre of land may be ignored and that too may be treated as belonging to the transferor. But if he transfers 15 acres of land, one fails to see why the entire 15 acres must be treated as belonging to the transferor, notwithstanding such transfer, for, he is free to transfer any area within the specified limit It he is possessed only of land within the limit he is free to transfer 14 acres. Why be should suffer different consequences by transferring the same area of 14 acres when only 1 acre is in excess is not evident. Such a construction does not appear to be consistent with the scheme of the Act. What has been said in this regard in the context of interpreting S.84 in the decision in Kesavan Namboodiri v. State of Kerala and others (1976 KLT. 427) must apply with all force to this situation also. 16. I have already stated that clause (b) of the Explanation which starts with the words "nothing in this Explanation shall apply "could certainly be read to mean that that the explanation would apply in the case of any transfer of land by an adult unmarried person to the extent of land which, immediately before the date of transfer, was not in excess of the ceiling area specified in the Agrarian Relations Act 1960 and applicable to him. That may properly be read with the qualification that the explanation shall apply to the extent of the excess of land as specified in the Agrarian Relations Act, 1960. If so read what has to be ignored for the purpose of the explanation is only the land in excess of the area held by an adult unmarried person on the date of transfer as specified in the Agrarian Relations Act, 1960. To the extent it is not in excess of such limit the transfer need not be ignored or the land covered by the transfer need not be added on to the land held by an adult unmarried person. What has been said about an adult unmarried person would equally well apply to the case of a family. 17. To the extent it is not in excess of such limit the transfer need not be ignored or the land covered by the transfer need not be added on to the land held by an adult unmarried person. What has been said about an adult unmarried person would equally well apply to the case of a family. 17. The result of the above discussion so far as the case before me is concerned is that in the case of transfer by Sahasranama Iyer which is of 4.59 acres between the dates 18-12-1957 and 15-9-1963 such transfer would have to be ignored only to the extent of 38 cents and that alone is to be added on in place of 4.59 acres. In the case of Rama Iyer it will be bad to the extent of the excess which is said to be 1.02 acres. In the light of this decision the Taluk Land Board will go into the question of extent to be surrendered afresh. Only the questions which are re-opened by these revisions call for fresh consideration by the Taluk Land Board. Both the revisions are allowed as above. No costs. A carbon copy of this order will be issued to counsel for the Taluk Land Board free of cost.