Judgment 1. The defendant preferred the Second Appeal before this Court. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed the suit for eviction of the defendant-tenant. The plaintiff claimed title on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 29-5-1965 (Exhibit 2). The sale deed was executed by Sarjug Sah, father of the defendant. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the ground that he is the owner of the house. 3. The courts below held: (i) that the plaintiff failed to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant; (ii) that the defendant was in permissible possession of the house in suit. (iii) that the plaintiff had title to the suit house by virtue of the sale deed dated 29-5-1965, which was executed by Sarjug Sah in favour of the plaintiff. 4. It is on the basis of this finding that the lower appellate court has held that the plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief for ejectment under Order 7, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the courts below erred in passing the equitable relief for ejectment. In this connection learned Counsel for the respondent relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Kasturi Devi V/s. Shripal Singh, AIR 1954 Pat 128 . In that case the Division Bench of this Court held that where the court has held the defendant a licensee and not a tenant the court can give a decree for ejectment on the basis of the title. The Division Bench also held that the court should not drive the plaintiff to file another suit for ejectment on the ground that the defendant was a licensee. Relying on the Division Bench decision of this Court I hold that the courts below were justified in granting the equitable relief for ejectment against the defendant. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the trial court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try this case. Relying on the Division Bench decision of this Court I hold that the courts below were justified in granting the equitable relief for ejectment against the defendant. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the trial court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try this case. In this connection teamed Counsel refers to Sec.11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 , which runs as follows: "(1) Notwithstanding anything in Sec. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that by reason of the over-valuation or under-valuation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an Appellate Court unless- (a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower Appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that court, or (b) the Appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was overvalued or under-valued, and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits. (2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1), but the Appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in clause (b) of that sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall dispose of the appeal as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court. (3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the Appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suit or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal. (4) The provisions of this section with respect to an Appellate Court shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure or other enactment for the time being in force. (5) This section shall come into force on the first day of July 1887." 7. On a perusal of Sec.11 of the Suits Valuation Act 1887, it is clear that it was the duty of the defendant to press its case in respect of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court at the first instance before the trial court or before the lower appellate court. On a perusal of the judgment of the courts below it is clear that the issue about the pecuniary jurisdiction was not taken by the defendant either before the trial court or before the lower appellate court. The defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court and allowed the suit being proceeded in the trial court without raising the issue of pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court. In view of Sec.11 (1) (a) of the Suits Valuation Act read with Sec. 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure the defendant is not allowed to raise the question of pecuniary jurisdiction for the first time in the second appeal before this Court. In this circumstance I hold that the defendant cannot be allowed to raise the question of pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court first time before this Court. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the quantum of compensation to be paid by the appellant is excessive. In this circumstance, I reduce the quantum of compensation to Rs. 25.00 per month and the appellant is directed to pay Rs. 625.00 as compensation to the plaintiff-respondent. I also direct that the defendant-appellant shall be allowed to remain in the house in question for six months from today. 9. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to the modification in the judgment of the courts below as indicated above. The parties will bear their own costs throughout.