A. N. SURTI, J. ( 1 ) THE question involved in the present appeal is whether the Pujari occupying the suit premises by virtue of his service as a Pujari can be held to be a tenant either under the Transfer of Property Act or can he claim any protection under the Bombay Rents Hotel Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 ( 2 ) THE original defendant the licensee of the suit premises has filed the present appeal against the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge Jamnagar in Regular Civil Appeal No. 178 of 1971 which arose out of the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Khambhalia in Regular Civil Suit No. 12 of 1970 whereby the learned trial Judge dismissed the respondents-plaintiffs suit with costs. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge an appeal was filed by the respondents- plaintiffs and that appeal was allowed by the learned District Judge with costs. ( 3 ) IT is under these circumstances that the present second appeal is filed in this Court. ( 4 ) A few facts giving rise to the present appeal may be shortly stated. ( 5 ) IT was the plaintiffs case that the defendant was a licensee of the suit premises and that his licence was terminated by Ex. 59. It was further alleged that under the circumstances the defendant was a trespasser of the suit premises and that he should be removed from the suit premises. It may be mentioned that the plaintiffs are the trustees of a religious and charitable institution and the defendant was discharging the duties of a Pujari. In the premises of the trust there are deities of Lord Shiv and of Lord Rama. It was further alleged that the defendant was entrusted the work of a Pujari and had to discharge his duties as such from March 8 1962 on a monthly salary of Rs 12/ -. It was also alleged that in order that the defendant could offer his services to the said deities the suit premises were given to him for his use as a licensee. It was alleged that the defendant was not discharging his duties in a satisfactory manner as a Pujari (servant employed by the trustees to offer religious worship to the aforesaid deities) a notice Ex. It was alleged that the defendant was not discharging his duties in a satisfactory manner as a Pujari (servant employed by the trustees to offer religious worship to the aforesaid deities) a notice Ex. 59 dated December 8 1969 was served on him and he was called upon by the sole trustee to handover the possession of the suit premises. It seems that there were also proceedings between the parties under sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the circumstances the plaintiffs-trustees prayed that a declaration should be granted in their favour declaring that the defendant is a tres- of the suit premises and that he has no right to occupy the same. By way of one of the consequential reliefs it was also prayed that the defendant should be removed from the suit premises and should not be permitted to enter the suit premises and in that behalf the usual consequential injunction was also prayed for. It may be mentioned at this stage that in substance the relief was for obtaining the possession of the suit premises though it was urged on behalf of the defendant that the trustees had not filed a suit for getting the possession of the suit premises. ( 6 ) THE suit was resisted by the defendant by his written statement Ex. 14; and it was contended inter alia that he was the tenant of the suit premises and that the suit was not legally maintainable. He also urged that the court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. It was also urged that the suit should not have been filed without the sanction of the Charity Commissioner. It was also urged that since the value of the suit property is more than Rs. 10 0 the trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit ( 7 ) THE learned trial Judge raised the various issues as mentioned in. 35 and the same are set out in para 4 of the trial Courts judgment. The trial Court took the view that the suit as framed was not maintainable. He took the view that the defendant is a servant of the premises He also took the view that the defendant did not prove that he has acquired the right of holding the post of a Pujari by hereditary. The trial Court took the view that the suit as framed was not maintainable. He took the view that the defendant is a servant of the premises He also took the view that the defendant did not prove that he has acquired the right of holding the post of a Pujari by hereditary. The trial Court also held that it had the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned trial Judge held that the issue regarding the sanction of the Charity Commissioner did not arise for his decision. He also held that the defendant is the lessee of the suit premises under sec. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act As a result of his said findings the learned trial Judge dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs. ( 8 ) AS stated above the plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 178 of 1971 in the Court of the learned District Judge Jamnagar. Before the learned District Judge four points were raised for his determination as mentioned in para 4 of his judgment. The learned District Judge held that the suit a framed was maintainable in spite of the fact that there was no proper affirmation by the trustees. He also held that the plaintiffs did prove that the defendant is a licensee of the trust as alleged. He also held that the value of the suit property is less than Rs. 10 0 He also held that the suit is not bad as there was no player for possession of the suit premises. As a result of his said findings the learned District judge allowed the plaintiffs appeal with costs and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. He also District that the defendant should handover the actual physical and vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs on or before August 1 1973 He also directed the defendant to pay the costs to the plaintiffs all throughout. ( 9 ) IT is under these circumstances that the present second appeal is filed in this Court. ( 10 ) MR. J. R. Nanavati the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant raised the following contentions only. (1) That the defendant is a tenant of the suit premises. ( 9 ) IT is under these circumstances that the present second appeal is filed in this Court. ( 10 ) MR. J. R. Nanavati the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant raised the following contentions only. (1) That the defendant is a tenant of the suit premises. He urged that the defendant was rendering service as a Pujari by offering his worship to the aforesaid deities and as such there was a lease granted in his favour by the plaintiffs and hence he is a tenant of the suit premises. He also urged that the suit premises were let out to the defendant for use as a residence by reason of his being in service as a Pujari and as such the only court competent to decide the dispute was the Court constituted under the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (2) That in the instant case the relief clause in the plaint does not show that the plaintiffs had filed a suit to recover possession of the suit premises and that being so the learned District Judge was in error in ranting the relief as to possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs. (3) That in the instant case the license granted in favour of the defendant to use the suit premises was terminated or cancelled by only one of the trustees and as the other trustees did not terminate the said licence no relief should have been given to the plaintiffs in the present suit. These were the only contentions raised by Mr. Nanavati in course of the hearing of this appeal. ( 11 ) IT is an admitted fact that the defendant was discharging his duties as a Pujari and but for the fact that he had to discharge his duties or services as a Pujari the suit premises would not have been given to him for the purpose of his residence or occupation. It is also an admitted fact that unless the defendant-Pujari lived in the suit premises it was not possible for him to perform or discharge his obligations by worshiping the deities of the temple. ( 12 ) I am to appreciate the first contention raised by Mr. Nanavati in the light of the aforesaid facts. Mr. Nanavati invited my attention to sec. ( 12 ) I am to appreciate the first contention raised by Mr. Nanavati in the light of the aforesaid facts. Mr. Nanavati invited my attention to sec. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 which provides as follows :- 105 A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time express or implied or in perpetuity in consideration of a price paid or promised or of money a share of crops service or any other thing of value to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee who accepts the transfer on such terms. The transferor is called the lessor the transferee is called the lessee the price is called the premium and the money share service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. ( 13 ) MR. Nanavati also invited my attention to the reported decision in QUDRAT ULLAH V. MUNICIPAL BOARD 1974 1 SUPREME COURT CASES 202 Mr. Nanavati drew my pointed attention to the contents of paragraph ? Of the said judgment which is in the following terms. 7 There is no simple litmus test to distinguish a lease ass defined in sec. 105 Transfer of Property Act from a licence as defined in sec. 52 Easements Act but the character of the transaction turns on the operative intent of the parties. To put it. pithily if an interest in immovable property entitling the transferers to enjoyment is created it is a lease; if permission to use and without right to exclusive possession is alone. granted a licence is the legal result. Marginal variations to this broad statement are possible. . . . . . . . . . . . The law on the point has been stated by this Court in the Associated Hotels case vide A. I. R. 1959 Supreme Court 1261 In Halsburys Laws of England Volume 21 the distinctive flavour the deceptive labels and the crucial considerations in a lease versus licence situation have been stated and excerpts therefrom may serve as guidelines. 1022 PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AGREEMENT CREATES LEASE OR LICENCE. In determining whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant or merely that of licenser and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties. 1022 PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AGREEMENT CREATES LEASE OR LICENCE. In determining whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant or merely that of licenser and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties. The parties to an agreement cannot however turn a lease into a licence merely by stating that the document is to be deemed a licence or describing it as such the relationship of the parties is determined by law on a consideration of all relevant provisions of the agreement nor will the employment of words appropriate to a lease prevent the agreement from conferring a licence only if from the whole document it appears that it was intended merely to confer a licence. In the absence of any formal document the intention of the parties must be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties. 1023 NATURE OF GRANT OF EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION. The fact that the agreement grants a right of exclusive possession is not in itself conclusive evidence of the existence of a tenancy but it is a consideration of the first importance. In deciding whether a grantee is entitled to exclusive possession regard must be had to the substance of the agreement. To give exclusive possession there need not be express words to that effect it is sufficient if the nature of the acts to be done by the grantee requires that he should have exclusive possession the grant of an exclusive right to a benefit can however be inferred only from language which is clear and explicit. If an exclusive right of possession is subject to certain reservations or to a restriction of the purposes for which the premises may be used the reservations or restriction will not necessarily prevent the grant operating as a lease. 1024 WHEN GRANT CONFERRING EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OPERATES MERELY AS LICENCE. A grant which confers the right to exclusive possession may operate as a licence in the following circumstances which negative the intention to create a lease. 1025 INSTANCES OF AGREEMENTS CREATING LICENCES. A licence is normally created where a person is granted the right to use premises without becoming entitled to exclusive possession thereof. or the circumstances and conduct of the parties show that all that was intendeds was that the grantee should be granted a personal privilege with no interest in the land. 1025 INSTANCES OF AGREEMENTS CREATING LICENCES. A licence is normally created where a person is granted the right to use premises without becoming entitled to exclusive possession thereof. or the circumstances and conduct of the parties show that all that was intendeds was that the grantee should be granted a personal privilege with no interest in the land. If the agreement is merely for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms while the property remains in the possession and control of the owner the agreement will operate as a licence even though the agreement may employ words appropriate to a lease ( 14 ) IN the instant case I must take into consideration the obvious and glaring intent of the parties when the possession of the suit premises was handed over to the appellant-defendant as a Pujari to perform the religious worship to the deities. In the instant case but for the fact that the possession of the premises was handed over to the defendant it was impossible for the trustees to see that proper religious worship was offered by the defendant to the deities. Under the circumstances it cannot be said that the respondents had even any remote or possible intent of transferring any interest in the suit premises in favour of the defendant entitling the defendant to enjoy the possession of the suit premises by reason of his having any legal right or interest in the suit premises. Thus in the instant case taking into consideration the intention of the parties it is clear to my mind that the relation between the parties was not that of a landlord and a tenant but the relationship was that of a licenser and a licensee. The circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties clearly indicate that the clear intention on the pert of the respondents-trustees was that as the defendant had to perform or discharge the services properly to the aforesaid deities and purely with a view to achieve that object only the possession of the suit premises was handed over to the defendant-Pujari. As a matter of fact that was the crux of the agree. ment between the parties and the necessary licence in that behalf was 8 to the Pujari without transferring any interest in the suit premises in favour of the defendant. As a matter of fact that was the crux of the agree. ment between the parties and the necessary licence in that behalf was 8 to the Pujari without transferring any interest in the suit premises in favour of the defendant. Under the circumstances I am convinced that the defendant is not a tenant of the suit premises and that being so the trustees had filed a suit in the court of competent jurisdiction and that it was not necessary for them to file a suit before the Court constituted under the Bombay Rents Hotel Lodging and House Rates Control Act 1947 In this view of the matter there is no substance or merit in the first contention raised by Mr. Nanavati. ( 15 ) THE second contention raised by Mr. Nanavati was that the plaintiffs did not pray for possession of the suit premises in the relief clause of the plaint. In this behalf Mr. Nanavati submitted that when the defendant is in possession of. the suit premises and if the plaintiff did not seek possession of the suit premises but merely claim a declaration that they are the owners of the suit premises such a suit is not maintainable (vide RAM SARAN V. GANGA DEVI A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2685 ). I am in entire agreement with the statement of law to which my attention was invited by Mr. Nanavati. I have carefully seen the relief clause as set out in the plaint. The relief clause is in the following terms. to translate into English: (A) It may be declared that the defendant is a trespasser in the suit premises and is not entitled to be in continuous occupation of the suit premises and that he has no right in the suit premises. (b) The defendant may be removed from the suit premises and that he should be restrained from having an entry in the suit premises and in that behalf an order of injunction be issued against him. (c) All costs should be given to the plaintiffs from the properties of the defendant. (b) The defendant may be removed from the suit premises and that he should be restrained from having an entry in the suit premises and in that behalf an order of injunction be issued against him. (c) All costs should be given to the plaintiffs from the properties of the defendant. ( 16 ) IN order to understand the contents of the relief clause completely I have also carefully perused all the averments set out in the plaint and I am convinced that the trustees were keen to see that they get the possession of the suit premises in order that the defendant who was discharging his duties as a Pujari was removed from the suit premises and unless that was done it was impossible for the trustees to carry out the obvious purpose and the object of the trust viz. to see that proper worship was offered to the aforesaid two deities. No doubt the relief clause in the plaint is not properly worded but at the same time I am conscious of the facts that the plaint was drafted by a lawyer practicing in the moffusil Courts and therefore one has got to see the essence and substance of the relief clause rather than to focus the attention on the technical words or the exact words employed in the relief clause. Reading the plaint as a whole and having anxiously considered all the averments set out in the plaint I am convinced that in essence and substance this is a suit for declaration that the defendant is a trespasser in the suit premises and that he has no right to be in the suit premises and further it was prayed that he should be removed from the suit premises. Thus the said reliefs to my mind clearly indicate that in essence and substance the suit was for possession of the suit premises. ( 17 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion I do not see any substance or merit in the second contention raised by Mr. Nanavati. ( 18 ) THE last contention which was raised by Mr. Nanavati was that the licence which was granted in favour of the defendant should have been terminated by all the trustees and not one of the trustees. Now it may be stated in this behalf that the notice terminating the licence (Ex. 59 was given by Ratanbai Haridas. Nanavati. ( 18 ) THE last contention which was raised by Mr. Nanavati was that the licence which was granted in favour of the defendant should have been terminated by all the trustees and not one of the trustees. Now it may be stated in this behalf that the notice terminating the licence (Ex. 59 was given by Ratanbai Haridas. In Ex. 59 it is clearly alleged that the defendant was misbehaving when he was discharging his duties towards the aforesaid deities. It was also alleged that in a place of religious worship the defendant was behaving in such a manner that the religious sanctity of the temple was already affected by the misconduct of the defendant and that she did terminate the licence which was granted in favour of the defendant. In this behalf it may be stated that by Ex. 30 an application was filed before the trial Court for bringing all the other trustees on the record of the case. Moreover when the trust was originally registered Ratanbai the signatory to Ex. 59 the notice terminating the licence was shown as a sole trustee and that as she was old and infirm she did take the assistance of other trustees. All the other trustees did ratify and accept the action of the original trustee the signatory at the foot of Ex. 59 and were also joined as plaintiffs in the present suit as can be seen from the order passed by the learned trial Judge on an application given by the sole trustee for joining the other trustees as plaintiffs to the suit. Under the circumstances and more particularly when the defendant was merely a Pujari offering services to the aforesaid deities without having any interest in the suit premises cannot claim by way of a right to receive any notice terminating the licence terminating the grant it cannot lie in the mouth of the defendant that all the trustees should have terminated the licence. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case I am of the opinion that the licence which was granted in favour of the defendant was properly and legally terminated by Ratanbai Haridas who was the sole trustee managing the affairs of the temple. Mr. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case I am of the opinion that the licence which was granted in favour of the defendant was properly and legally terminated by Ratanbai Haridas who was the sole trustee managing the affairs of the temple. Mr. Nanavati could not show to me any authority or any decided case satisfying me that even in cases of licensees all the grantors of any licence must necessarily cancel or terminate the licence 8ranted in favour of any licensee. Mr. Nanavati could not point out to me any authority to show that the licensee as in the case of a tenant can claim by way of a legal right a notice in writing signed by all the grantors terminating the licence. ( 19 ) IN this behalf Mr. Nanavati invited my attention to the reported decision of this Court in ATMARAM V. GULAMHUSEIN XIII G. L. R. P. 828. Mr. Nanavati read out before me the following relevant head note :it is therefore clear that one cotrustee cannot give notice to quit determining the tenancy. The decision to terminate the tenancy must be taken by all the cotrustees. The formal act of giving notice to quit pursuant to the decision taken by all the cotrustees may be performed by one cotrustee on behalf of the rest. The notice to quit given in such a case would be a notice given with the sanction and approval of all the co-trustees and would be clearly a notice given by all co-trustees. ( 20 ) IN the instant case the aforesaid authority does not assist the defendant in any manner whatsoever. The present case is a case of a grant of a licence and not a case where the defendant is having any tenancy rights. This is a case where all the trustees did ratify and approve the act of the original trustee particularly when they are joined as plaintiffs in the suit. It is equally clear that all the other trustees did ratify and approve the action of the original trustee. As a matter of fact there were proceedings under sec. This is a case where all the trustees did ratify and approve the act of the original trustee particularly when they are joined as plaintiffs in the suit. It is equally clear that all the other trustees did ratify and approve the action of the original trustee. As a matter of fact there were proceedings under sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure between the parties and there is no tittle of material in the case to warrant a conclusion that the other trustees did not approve or ratify the action of the sole trustee terminating the licence granted in favour of the defendant. In this view of the matter I do not see any substance or merit in the last contention raised by Mr. Nanavati. These were the only contentions raised by Mr. Nanavati and as I do not see any substance or merit in any of the contentions raised by Mr. Nanavati the appeal fails. . ( 21 ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. .