JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. Chandra Sen was adjudged insolvent on April 29, 1960. His properties were sold in two lots on August 16, 1967. The sale was confirmed on July 23, 1968. The debtorinsolvent was discharged on January 23, 1970. sorne of the creditors applied for the setting aside of the sale by an application dated July, 3 1970. The learned insolvency Judge dismissed the application on the findings that it was barred by limitation and also because it was not maintainable as the insolvent had been discharged. The creditors went up in appeal. The lower appellate court held that the mere discharge of the insolvent was not sufficient to throw out the creditors' application challenging the sale. It further held that the application of the creditors was maintainable under Section 4(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act even though the prescribed period of limitation for making an application under Section 68 of the Act had expired. On this view he allowed the appeal and sent the case back to the Insolvency Judge for disposal in accordance with law. He directed the Insolvency Judge to decide the question of limitation for an application under Section 4 of the Act. Aggrieved, the auctionpurchasers have come up to this Court. Section 68 of the Act provides for an appeal to Court against any act or decision of the Receiver. Such an appeal can be tiled by the insolvent or any of the creditors or any other person aggrieved. The proviso says 'that no application under this section shall be entertained after the expiration of twentydays from the date of the act or decision complained of.' In the present case the act complained of was the sale and its confirmation by the Receiver. These acts could well be challenged by the respondents, who are creditors, under Section 68 of the Act. They did not do so. The right to appeal to Court under Section 68 of the Act became barred. Section 4 of the Insolvency Act occurs in part of the Act which is entitled as 'Constitution and Powers of Courts'. Section 3 confines insolvency jurisdiction on district courts. Section 4 is entitled as 'Power ox Court to decide all questions arising in insolvency'. Section 5 gives a general power to Courts in regard to the proceedings under the Act. Section 4 of the Insolvency Act occurs in part of the Act which is entitled as 'Constitution and Powers of Courts'. Section 3 confines insolvency jurisdiction on district courts. Section 4 is entitled as 'Power ox Court to decide all questions arising in insolvency'. Section 5 gives a general power to Courts in regard to the proceedings under the Act. Section 4(1) says: 4(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full powers to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact which may arise in any case of involvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case." (Emphasis applied) This provision confers powers on the court which may be exercised 'in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the court'. In such a case which has come within cognizance of the court, it can decide all questions of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law of fact, or which it may deem expedient to decide. But any such question should arise 'in any such case', namely a case which has come within the cognizance of the court. Section 4 does not deal with the entertainment of a case or lay down the conditions under which a case may be taken cognizance of by a Court. It confers powers exercisable by the courts in a case vandly taken cognizance of. For instance, Section 68 provides an appeal to the Court against an act or decision of the Receiver. If and when such an appeal is filed validly, then in deciding that appeal, the court can exercise the various powers mentioned in Section 4. In other words Section 4 does not provide a remedy to the debtor or creditors or any other aggrieved person independently of the other provisions of the Act which create or confer jurisdiction on court to take cognizance of appeal against the acts or decision of the Receiver. The lower appellate court was, in my opinion, in error in treating Section 4 as a substitute or an alternative remedy to Section 68. The lower appellate court was, in my opinion, in error in treating Section 4 as a substitute or an alternative remedy to Section 68. It is settled rule of interpretation that if a provision expressly confers jurisdiction on a court by way of appeal, a general provision cannot be so interpreted so as to nullify its effect. If Section 4 is interpreted as conferring jurisdiction of appeals against the acts or decisions of the Receiver it will amount to nullifying the effect of the proviso to Section 68 which expressly prohibits an appeal under Section 68 after expiration of twentyone days from the date of act or decision complained of. The respondents who had some grievance against the sale, could have applied under Section 68 and if the period mentioned in the proviso thereof had expired they could have utilised Section 78 which makes the provisions of Sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act to appeals and applications under the Act. But no such effort was made by them. In the rsult, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the lower court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored with costs.