JUDGMENT : Madan Mohan Pd., J. This is a reference made under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code) for quashing an ORDER :passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, cancelling the jurisdiction of the Gram' Cut cherry and transferring the case to another magistrate for disposal. 2. It appears that on the 18th of November; 1971 the opposite party filed a complaint alleging that on the 17th of November, 1971 the accused persons had assaulted him and his malik with lathi. Further it was stated that he was not hopeful of getting justice from the Gram Panchayat due to a quarrel with the Sarpanch and hence he was filing the petition of complaint before the Sub-divisional Magistrate. 3. The Sub-divisional Magistrate then passed the following ORDER ::- "Examined the complainant on S.A. Heard. Jurisdiction of the Panchayat concerned is cancelled. Perused the injury report Cognizance taken under Section 323 I.P.C. and the case is transferred to the court of Sri V.S.P. Thakur. J.M. 1st class, for favour of disposal." 4. In support of his recommendation, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has stated that the present case is fully covered by the ruling report in (1) Motilal Yadav V. Rambilas Yadav (1969 P.L.J.R. 494) and further that the present case is worse inasmuch as no reason has been given for the ORDER :of cancellation of the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry whereas reasons had, been given in the case reported in (1) 1969 P.L.J.R. 494 (supra). In view of the aforesaid decision of this court, the learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the ORDER :passed in the present case is illegal and should be 'set aside. 5. Before I enter into a discussion of the question as to whether the ORDER :of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is right, I would do well to indicate the guidelines laid down by this court for District Magistrates and Sessions Judges 'in respect of references under Section 438 of the Code. 5. Before I enter into a discussion of the question as to whether the ORDER :of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is right, I would do well to indicate the guidelines laid down by this court for District Magistrates and Sessions Judges 'in respect of references under Section 438 of the Code. In (2) Abdul Manir V. Kadir Khan (A.I.R. 1937 Patna 110) it was held that courts should be slow to make a reference to this court unless there is a manifest error of law or the case involves a matter of principle and unless there has been a serious failure of justice, unless in short, the court is of opinion that public interest demands that there should be intervention by the High Court. It was pointed out that High Court has ample powers for revision and the widest possible discretion and the party in such circumstances ought to be left to his remedy before this court in revision. The District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is 'thus under no obligation to make a reference to this court under Section 438 even if he may suspect an error of law to exist in the ORDER :recommended to be quashed. I have drawn attention to this decision, for from experience I find that the Sessions Judges are quick in making references in matters which involve a determination by this court of question of fact as well as law for the purpose of deciding as to whether the ORDER :is illegal and ought to be quashed. 6. Coming to the present case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, does not seem to have taken the trouble of referring to any other decisions of this court except the one by a learned single Judge in the case of (1) Motilal Yadav '(Supra)., If he had tried to look into the other decisions of this court which lay down principles contrary to the one relied upon by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on the basis of the decision in the case of (1) Motilal Yadav. Before I proceed to examine the other decisions, I will first take up the case relied upon by the learned Judge. 7. In the case aforesaid, a second complaint had been filed under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code for having committed theft of materials worth Rs.70. Before I proceed to examine the other decisions, I will first take up the case relied upon by the learned Judge. 7. In the case aforesaid, a second complaint had been filed under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code for having committed theft of materials worth Rs.70. Thus, the offence was one triable by the Gram Cutcherry under Section 62 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). The complainant bad pleaded that the mukhiya and the sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat were in collusion with the accused. In his statement of solemn affirmation, it was stated by him that the Gram Panchayat was in league with the accused. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, therefore, cancelled the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry and transferred the case to a munsif-magistrate for disposal. The ORDER :aforesaid was quashed by Kanhaiyaji, J., sitting singly on the following grounds. Firstly, the learned Judge observed, "before taking cognizance the Magistrate had to pass a contrary ORDER :that the case shall not be tried by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry." Secondly, the reasons given by the Magistrate in the case before the learned single judge for cancelling the jurisdiction were 'utterly inadequate and against the law.' In this connection, it was pointed out:- "Since the allegation was that the Sarpanch was interested, the learned Magistrate should not have cancelled the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry, but should have sent this case to the Gram Cutcherry with the direction that either the Up-Sarpanch of the Panel of the Panches should elect its Panch from its own number and the Up-Sarpanch or the Panch so elected may discharge all the functions of the Sarpanch for the purposes of the case. Reference was made in support of the aforesaid decision to the provisions of Section 56 of the Act which provides that no Sarpanch or Upsarpanch or Panch shall take part in any proceeding in which he is personally interested and to Section 57 of the Act laying down that every case instituted under the Act shall be instituted before the Sarpanch or where the services of the Sarpanch are not available, before the Upsarpanch and shall be heard and determined by 'the Bench of the Gram Cutcherry consisting of the Sarpanch and two Panches from the panel to be named by the respective parties to the case and two other Panches selected by the Sarpanch in such manner as may be prescribed. Reference was made to proviso (ii) to Section 57 of the Act laying down that where the Sarpanch is precluded from taking part in the proceeding, the Upsarpanch or, if he is also so disqualified in the opinion of the Sarpanch another Panch shall be elected by the Panel of Panches from its own number and the Upsarpanch or the Panch so elected, as the case may be, shall discharge all the functions of the Sarpanch for the purposes of that case." 8. There can be no two opinions now that the law stands well settled on the question of exclusive jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry to exercise jurisdiction in respect of offences mentioned in Section 62 of the Act except the offences mentioned in the provisos to that section. There is also no dispute on the point that no criminal court can take cognizance of a case which is cognizable by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry in view of Section 68 of the Act. It is, however, equally well settled that the bar provided by Section 68 is removed when, as provided in Section 68 (1), "an ORDER :to the contrary has been passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate.... under the provisions of the Act or any other law for the time being in force." It will be found that Sub-section (4) of Section 68, 69, 70 and 73 of the Act provide for cases of such ORDER :s to the contrary. under the provisions of the Act or any other law for the time being in force." It will be found that Sub-section (4) of Section 68, 69, 70 and 73 of the Act provide for cases of such ORDER :s to the contrary. Sub-section (4) of Section 68 is as follows :- "When a case relating to any offence triable by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry is pending before such bench and a charge-sheet is submitted by a police officer, or complaint is made to any Magistrate in respect of the same offence such police officer or the complainant shall mention in the charge-sheet or the complaint petition, as the case may be, that such a case is so pending and in such circumstances the Sub-divisional Magistrate shall ordinarily direct the bench of the Gram Cutcherry to proceed with the trial of the case, unless, for reasons to be, recorded in writing, he considers it necessary to try the case himself or to transfer it to another competent Magistrate-for disposal." It will appear thus therefrom that it relates to a situation' when a case is pending before the Gam Cutcherry and on the same facts a charge sheet is submitted or a complaint is filed. I want to draw pointed attention to the requirements of this sub-section, namely that if the Magistrate considers it necessary to try the case himself or to transfer it to another competent Magistrate for disposal, he must record the reasons in writing. Section 69 of the Act is as follows :- “If at any stage of proceedings in a case or suit pending before a Magistrate or Munsif it appears that the case or suit is one triable by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, the Sub-divisional Magistrate or the Munsif, as the case may be, shall, if he is satisfied that the case or suit is not of such nature or of such difficulty that it ought to be tried by a regular court at once transfer the case or suit to the bench having jurisdiction.” This, as will appear, relates to a proceeding pending before a Magistrate which appears to be a case triable by a Gram Cutcherry. Before I discuss the other provisions referred to earlier, I may mention that when a complaint is filed before a Magistrate, there is a proceeding pending before him and the provisions of this section seem to govern a complaint filed before a Magistrate which ought to have been filed before the Gram Cutcherry. I may indicate at this stage that there is no other provision in the whole of the Act which directly deals with a complaint filed before a Magistrate even though the offences are cognizable by a Bench of the Gam Cutcherry. I will rest content by stating only that much at the present juncture and discuss this point at some length hereinafter. Then Section 70is as follows:- "The Sub-divisional Magistrate or the Munsif may, of his own motion or on information received, withdraw any case or suit pending before a Bench of the Gram Cutcberry if for reasons to be recorded by him in writing he is of opinion that such case or suit ought not to be tried or heard by such Bench and may try or hear the cast; or suit either himself or transfer it to another competent Magistrate or Munsif or any other bench of the Gram Cutcherry within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Regional Gram Panchayat Advisory Committee of the areas for disposal." This obviously rolates to withdrawal of the case pending before a Gram Cutcherry. Again, it may be noted here that the Legislature specifically dictates that it may be done elf or reasons to be recorded by the Magistrate in writing." Lastly, we have Section 73 which is as follows :- 73(1) If there has been a miscarriage of justice or if there is an apprehension of miscarriage' of justice, in any case or suit, the Sub-divisional Magistrate in respect of any case and the Munsif in respect of any suit may, on the application of any part or of his own motion at any time during the pendency of the suit or case and within sixty days from the date of a decree or ORDER :, call for the record from a bench of the Gram Cutcherry and may for reasons to be recorded in writing- (a) cancel the jurisdictions of the bench with regard to the suit or case and transfer the same to another bench of the Gram Cutcherry within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Regional Gram Panchayat Advisory Committee of the area; or (b) quash any proceedings of the bench at any stage or cancel any ORDER :or decree passed by such bench and either remand the suit or case to the same bench for retrial on direct the complainant or plaintiff, as the case may be, to institute the case or suit afresh before any other bench of the Gram Cutcherry within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Regional Gram Panchayat Advisory Committee of the area: Provided that before passing any ORDER :under this sub-section the Sub-divisional Magistrate or the Munsif, as the case may be, shall call for a report from the bench of the Gram Cutcherry and give an opportunity to the parties to be heard. "Explanation-For the purpose of Sub-section (1), the word 'bench' includes a "full Bench." (2) The Sub-divisional Magistrate may at any time, before passing final ORDER :s in any case under Subsection (1), grant an ad interim bail to any accused in such case. (3) When an ORDER :has been passed by a Munsif or the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Sub-section (1) in respect of any suit or case, as the case may be, the complainant or plaintiff as the case may be, may institute the case or suit afresh in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate or a Munsif of competent jurisdiction. (3) When an ORDER :has been passed by a Munsif or the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Sub-section (1) in respect of any suit or case, as the case may be, the complainant or plaintiff as the case may be, may institute the case or suit afresh in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate or a Munsif of competent jurisdiction. (4) Any suit or case transferred under Clause (1) of Sub-section (1) shall be disposed of as if such suit or case had been instituted before the bench to which it had been so transferred" . It will appear from this section that this relates to any case pending before the Gram Cutcherry or any case decided by the Gram Cutcherry. In the circumstances mentioned therein the Sub-divisional Magistrate may cancel the jurisdiction of the Bench or quash the proceeding as provided under Subsection (1). Sub-section (3) of Section 73, however, is more relevant to the present discussion, because it relates to the case instituted afresh in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate. 9. It need hardly be repeated that this enactment is badly drafted and leaves several lacunae. This court had earlier drawn pointed attention of the Legislature to the fact in the case of (3) Bimal Singh V. State of Bihar (1965 B.L.J.R. 661) and even earlier in the case of (4) Md. Obais V. The State (1959 B.L.J.R. 61). It is a pity that the Legislature bas not considered it necessary yet to amend this legislation in respect of matters pointed out. Be that as it may, it is a well-settled canon of interpretation of statutes that it should be so interpreted as to make the legislation effective and different parts thereof harmonious with each other. Now, the point which has promoted me to make the aforesaid observations is that Section 62 of the Act, as stated earlier, gives jurisdiction to the Gram Cutcherry to try the offences mentioned therein. Section 68 therefore, lays down that no court shall take cognizance of such offences cognizable by the Gram Cutcherry. It further says that the court can take cognizance if an ORDER :to the contrary has been passed under the provisions of the Act or any other law for the time being in force. Section 68 therefore, lays down that no court shall take cognizance of such offences cognizable by the Gram Cutcherry. It further says that the court can take cognizance if an ORDER :to the contrary has been passed under the provisions of the Act or any other law for the time being in force. As I have pointed out earlier, Subsection (4) of Section 68, 70 and 73 do not relate to a case where a complaint has been filed before a Sub-divisional Magistrate in respect of offences which are cognizable by the Gram Cutcherry. The only provision we are left" with is Section 69 which also, after giving a liberal interpretation, would' cover the case of a complaint filed before the Magistrate in respect of offences cognizable by the Gram Cutcherry. The Legislature could have very well removed the lacuna by laying down precisely in what circumstances such a complaint could be taken cognizance of by a Sub-divisional Magistrate instead of saying "unless an ORDER :to the contrary has been passed.... under the provisions of the Act on any other law for the time being in force." No provisions of any other law in existence has been pointed out to show that it is directly concerned with a power on the part of the Sub-divisional Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence cognizable by a Gram Cutcherry nor am I aware of any such provisions directly covering the matter under discussion. Be that as it may, it will not be doing violence to the wording of Section 69 to hold that if a complaint is filed before the Magistrate, he may at that stage consider the case to one of such nature that it ought to be tried by a regular court. No other provisions being there in respect of such a situation, it would, in my view, be proper to give Section 69 a liberal and, wider interpretation to cover such a case. The result is that it must be held that if the Magistrate is satisfied that the case before him, if triable by a Bench of the Gram Cut cherry is of such a nature or of such difficulty that it ought to be tried by a regular court, he may proceed with it in the manner provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, he may try the case himself or transfer it to any other Magistrate for disposal after taking cognizance thereof. In this view I am supported by the observation of another learned Judge (as he then was) of this court, namely, Untwalia, J. in the case of (3) Bimal Singh (supra), who though not called upon to decide the very question, while examining the scheme of the Act, expressed his view in the following words :- "On a careful examination of the provision of law contained in Section 69, however, it would be noticed that this is the section which in my opinion, embraces within its ambit an ORDER :envisaged to be passed under the latter part of Sub-section (1) of Section 68 at the time of taking cognizance of a case by the Sub-divisional Magistrate. If at that time, either upon a complaint or upon a police report, the Sub-divisional Magistrate finds that the case is one which is triable by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry under Section 62 of the Act but yet is of such nature or of such difficulty that it ought to be tried by a regular court, he has got to make an ORDER :to this effect and then take cognizance of the case." 10. The question that arises is as to what is the manner in which this ORDER :is to be passed and what is the stage at which it is to be passed. To answer the second part of the question first, it is obvious that a criminal court cannot take cognizance unless there is an ORDER :to the contrary. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Gram Panchayat has to be removed before the Magistrate' takes cognizance. It is not necessary for me to state that, although the words 'taking cognizance' have not been defined under the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is well-settled that, when a Magistrate applies his mind to the facts in a petition of complaint with a view to take action under Chapter XVI or XVII of the Code, he is taking cognizance of the offence. Thus, it would follow that before the Magistrate proposes to take action under subsequent sections of Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Code, he must pass an ORDER :ousting the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry which can take cognizance of the offence complained of. 11. Thus, it would follow that before the Magistrate proposes to take action under subsequent sections of Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Code, he must pass an ORDER :ousting the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry which can take cognizance of the offence complained of. 11. A further question, however, arises whether the ORDER :must be separately passed prior to the ORDER :by which cognizance has been taken or may be simultaneously passed. In this connection, I would refer to an observation in the case of (5) Ramlakhan Singh V. Thakur Mahton (1954 B.L.J.R. 588). In this case a complaint was being challenged on the ground that the Sub-divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under Section 379 which was cognizable by a bench of the Guam Cutcherry. There was no ORDER :as envisaged in Section 68 passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate ousting the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. The argument was that the ORDER :by which he had taken cognizance may, by implication, be taken to have the effect of a combined ORDER :, i.e. that the Magistrate passed a contrary ORDER :and then took cognizance. The learned Judges rejected the contention and in this connection said that if the Sub-divisional Magistrate intended to pass a contrary ORDER :, he should have done so in express terms and mentioned whether the contrary ORDER :was passed under this Act or under any other law and further that the ORDER :taking cognizance could not be impliedly read as including an ORDER :to the contrary within the meaning of Section 68 of the Act. All that we get from this observation is that the ORDER :must be in express terms and not one to be supposed to be implied. In my view, there is no room for the argument that the ORDER :is to the contrary as required by Section 68 (1) should be passed either separately or long before the taking of cognizance. If, by the same ORDER :the Magistrate removed the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry and takes cognizance of the offences and proceeds in accordance with the Code it would be justified in law. All that Section 68 requires is a contrary ORDER :before the Magistrate can be allowed to take cognizance and proceed thereupon. No appreciable gap of time, in my opinion, is required by the wording of Section 68. All that Section 68 requires is a contrary ORDER :before the Magistrate can be allowed to take cognizance and proceed thereupon. No appreciable gap of time, in my opinion, is required by the wording of Section 68. This reasoning is supported by the language of Section 68 which provides that if at any stage of the proceeding it appears that the case is triable by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry, the Magistrate has to transfer it to the former unless be is satisfied that the case is of such nature or of such difficulty that it ought to be tried by a regular court thus, as soon as it appears to him that the case is triable by a Gram Cutcherry, he is called upon to exercise his discretion and, therefore, as soon as he takes up a complaint petition filed before him and finds that it is of such nature that it ought to be tried by a regular court, he may take cognizance thereafter. In my view, therefore, a composite ORDER :containing both the ORDER :to the contrary' and the lone 'taking cognizance' in the case i would not be illegal. 12. I now turn to the decision of Kanhaiyaji, J. in (1) Motilal Yadav's case (supra). I am in complete agreement with the learned Judge in so far as it has been held that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance unless an ORDER :to the contrary has been 'passed, but, with profound respect, I must point out that I cannot persuade myself to accept the other reasoning given by the learned Judge in support of his conclusion. In the case before him reason had been given' but the learned Judge had found that reason to be utterly inadequate and against the law. In my opinion, it is the Magistrate who has to be satisfied as to whether the case is of such a nature or of such difficulty that it should be decided by a regular court and not by the Bench of the Gram Cutcherry. When an allegation is made by the complainant regarding the Sarpanch and. the entire Gram Panchayat to be in collusion with the accused, I am unable to persuade myself to accept the view that such a ground would be inadequate. Reliance on Sections 56 and 57 of the Act, in my view, was not relevant to the reason. When an allegation is made by the complainant regarding the Sarpanch and. the entire Gram Panchayat to be in collusion with the accused, I am unable to persuade myself to accept the view that such a ground would be inadequate. Reliance on Sections 56 and 57 of the Act, in my view, was not relevant to the reason. I must again express my great regret in having to say this because the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the present case has not only completely followed the observations of Kanhaiyaji, J., for the purpose of decision of the present case but also by the same reasoning held that the present case was worse, and I am constrained therefore, to consider as to whether the reason given by the learned Judge is acceptable to me. Section 56 of the Act, in my view, relates only to a case where a Sarpanch is personally interested in a case. It does not include a case where even though he is not personally interested he is inteleague with another person who is personally interested in denying justice to the complainant. Section 57 of the Act refers to a case where the services of the Sarpanch are not available". It is, therefore, not necessary to say in a case, where an allegation is that the Gram Panchayat would not be able to give justice to the complainant, that if the allegation is against one person, the Sarpanch, the Upsarpanch or, if there be allegation against him too, then any Panch elected in accordance with Section 57 proviso (ii) should discharge the duties. In the case before his Lordship, the allegation was not against an individual alone namely the Sarpanch, but in the statement 'on solemn affirmation, the Gram Panchayat itself was said to be in league with the accused. Perhaps this appears to have escaped the notice of his Lordship. 13. I am unable to follow the aforesaid decision of the learned Judge in its entirety for several other reasons. Firstly, it appears that no other decision of this court was placed before his Lordships..... I have been able to lay my bands on two decisions of this court which go to show that even if reasons are not mentioned in the ORDER :, it would amount to a mere irregularity. Firstly, it appears that no other decision of this court was placed before his Lordships..... I have been able to lay my bands on two decisions of this court which go to show that even if reasons are not mentioned in the ORDER :, it would amount to a mere irregularity. Secondly while discussing the relevant provisions of this Act, I have shown earlier that the Legislature dictates reasons to be recorded in writing in respect of Sections 68 (4) and 70 but there is no provision contained in Section 69 for recording of the reason. Thirdly even though it has been laid down as a salutary principle that every judicial pronouncement must contain reason, the absence of reason may not be held by itself to vitiate the ORDER :. 14. With regard to the first point, it seems that two decisions of learned single Judges of this court in the case of (6) Ramakant Bajpai V. Banbari Sahu (1957 B.L.J.R. 41) and (7) Doman Sahni V. State of Bihar (1974 B.L.J.R. 729) were not placed before his Lordships. In the first case of Ramakant Bajpai the ORDER :passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate was, one under Section 70 of the Act withdrawing the case from the Gram Cutcherry and transferring it to another Magistrate without recording reasons. The question was whether the absence of reasons made the ORDER :illegal. Kamla Sahai, J. held that the failure to give reasons did not amount to an illegality, and it was observed that it merely amounted to an irregularity. In support of the decision, reference was, made to decisions given in respect of Section 528 of the Code in the cases of (8) Mohammad Sharif V. Hari Prasad Lal (27 Cr. L.J. 1214) and (9) Jokhiram Mahesika V. Bhagalpur Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1947 Patna 339). In the other decision in the case of Doman Sahni, J. Naram, J. also held on similar reasoning that the absence of reasons does not amount to an illegality' but merely an irregularity curable by Section 537 of the Code. It has to be borne in mind that Section 70 of the Act in so many words directs reasons to be recorded and yet it was held that the provision is not mandatory. It has to be borne in mind that Section 70 of the Act in so many words directs reasons to be recorded and yet it was held that the provision is not mandatory. Even in the latter case, J. Narain, J., interfered with the ORDER :of the Magistrate because the petitioner had come up at the earliest stage while, holding that the ORDER :could not be said to be illegal in the absence of reasons. The decisions aforesaid I would thus go to show that even though there be a complete absence of reasons the ORDER :would not be illegal on that ground alone. I have already pointed out and I say so at the risk of repetition, that Section 69 of the Act does not require specifically reasons to be recorded. I am in respectful agreement with the decisions of the two learned Judges to the effect that the absence of reasons would not by itself make the ORDER :illegal. In the instant case before me, the Magistrate has cancelled the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry without giving reasons. The latter fact would not, in my view make the ORDER :illegal. 15. It is well known that even though the legislature may direct recording of reasons, it may still be a directory provisions and not a mandatory one. The provision bas to be tested on well laid tests as to whether it is mandatory in character or merely directory, entailing the consequence of its being either illegal or irregular. It is true that all judicial ORDER :s must be backed by reasons so that the superior Court may be able to judge them, but even so, the mere absence of reason would not vitiate the ORDER :in law. 16. In the instant case, it is obvious that the complainant alleged that he would not be able to get justice from the Gram Cutcherry due to a quarrel with the Sarpanch. There are two aspects of the matter which flow from this allegation; firstly, that the Sarpanch was inimical and secondly, that the Gram Cutcherry was likely to be influenced by the Sarpanch with the result that the complainant would not be able to get justice. All that the Magistrate has failed to do is to include this allegation in his ORDER :and say that in that view of the matter he was cancelling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. All that the Magistrate has failed to do is to include this allegation in his ORDER :and say that in that view of the matter he was cancelling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry. It is, thus, merely an omission which amounts to an irregularity and does not go to the root of jurisdiction or does not amount to violation of any mandatory provisions of law. The ORDER :cannot, therefore, be assailed as illegal. 17. I have already referred to the decision in the case of (5) Ramlakhan Singh (Supra) where it has been held that an ORDER :to the contrary must be passed by the Magistrate before taking cognizance in view of Section 68 of the Act in cases cognizable by Gram Cutcherry. The learned Judges have referred to the proposition that case triable by a Gram Cutcherry cannot be tried by the ordinary courts unless the case is covered by the exceptions mentioned in proviso to Section 62 or there is a contrary ORDER :passed under Section 68 or the case has been transferred under Section 70 of the Act. I have, however, added to this list cases where an ORDER :has been passed under Section 69 of the Act and I have already referred to the decision of Untwalia, J. (as he then was) in the case of (3) Bimal Singh (Supra). It may also be pointed out that in the case of (10) Baldeo Singh and others V. State of Bihar and others (A.I.R. 1957 Supreme Court 612) wherein, while discussing the constitutional validity of the provisions of• the Act, it was said as follows:- “The reference to concurrent jurisdiction in Section 62 is explainable by reason of the provisions in Sections 69, 70 and 73, so that on the transfer or withdrawal of a case from the Gram Cutcherry or the cancellation of the jurisdiction or the bench, it may not be said that the ordinary criminal courts also have no jurisdiction to try it". 18. That brings me to another consideration, namely, whether an ORDER :by a Magistrate cancelling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry can be interfered with on the ground of insufficiency of reasons. Kanhaiyaji, J. in the case before him, found the reasons given to be inadequate and also illegal in view of Section 56 and 57 of the Act. 18. That brings me to another consideration, namely, whether an ORDER :by a Magistrate cancelling the jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherry can be interfered with on the ground of insufficiency of reasons. Kanhaiyaji, J. in the case before him, found the reasons given to be inadequate and also illegal in view of Section 56 and 57 of the Act. I have noted earlier my respectful difference with him in the view aforesaid. In view of Section 69 of the Act it is the Sub-divisional Magistrate who has to be satisfied. If on certain facts he is not satisfied that he thinks that the case ought to be tried by the regular Court even though another view may be possible on the same set of facts, this court would not interfere. If both views are possible, it is not open to this court to say that the satisfaction of the Magistrate was not possible. It is well known that "satisfaction" is to a very great extent a subjective process. It is true that facts are the materials which go to satisfy a person but one person may be satisfied on some materials existing whereas another may require I more materials' to satisfy himself. In law however, the yardstick is that of a reasonable man and the test, therefore, is whether a reasonable person in such circumstances would be satisfied or not. If the Magistrate's satisfaction is that of a reasonable man, this court will not interfere with his ORDER :on that account. It is difficult for me to accept the proposition that the allegation against the Sarpanch and the Gram Cutcherry and the apprehension of the complainant about not getting justice therefrom by themselves were not sufficient materials to lead a reasonable man to satisfy himself that the case deserves to be tried by a regular court. From this point of view also the ORDER :of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, when tested, cannot be said to be vitiated in law. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, I think the learned Additional Sessions Judge was ill-advised in making a reference on the basis of one single decision of this court ignoring an earlier decisions which I have pointed out pointing to a contrary direction. The reference is accordingly discharged. Reference discharged