JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. These two writ petitions are directed against the selection and appointments of 22 Section Officers in the general office of this High Court. Writ Petition No. 7 of 1976 has been filed by three Upper Division Assistants who were considered but were not selected for the posts. This petition is based mainly on the ground that the selection and appointments were not made by the Registrar, as required by the Allahabad High Court (Conditions of Service of Staff) Rules, 1946. Writ petition No. 213 of 1976 has been filed by 40 Bench Secretaries mainly on the ground that they were eligible for the selection and appointments but were not even considered. There were 13 posts of Superintendents and 5 posts of Assistant Superintendents in the office of the High Court. In October, 1971 these posts were redesignated as those of Section Officers Grade 1 and Section Officers Grade II respectively. In May, 1975, the High Court wrote to the Government, pointing out that, on account of the increase in the work, at least 45 Section Officers were needed and re quested that additional posts of 27 more Section Officers be sanctioned By letter dated October 22, 1975, the Government sanctioned 22 more posts of Section Officers. By the same letter the posts of Section Officers Grade I and Section Officers Grade II were merged into one grade of Section Officers. These 22 posts were required to be filled by promotion. Rule 8 of the Allahabad High Court (Conditions of Service of Staff) Rules 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) deals with promotion to certain posts and reads thus: "8. Promotion shall ordinarily be confined to members of the respective departments of the office and shall ordinarily be made according to seniority. An official may receive special promotion for recognised merit irrespective of the grade to which he may belong or of his seniority within the grade." Rule 9 deals with promotion to posts of responsibility etc. It enumerates 31 posts, including posts of Superintendents in the various departments, and provides that promotion to these posts of responsibility or trust or which require special qualifications shall be made by selection irrespective of seniority. Rule 10, which is also relevant for the purposes of these cases, reads thus: "10. It enumerates 31 posts, including posts of Superintendents in the various departments, and provides that promotion to these posts of responsibility or trust or which require special qualifications shall be made by selection irrespective of seniority. Rule 10, which is also relevant for the purposes of these cases, reads thus: "10. Promotion to the posts of Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar shall be made by the Chief Justice in his discretion, promotion to posts mentioned in Rule 9 shall be made by the Registrar by selection and promotion to all other posts shall be made by the Registrar by transfer from one department of the office to another in accordance with these rules subject to any general or special orders passed by the Chief Justice. Provided that the post of Deputy Registrar and the post of Assistant Registrar at Allahabad shall ordinarily be filled in by promotion from amongst persons serving on the staff attached to the Court." In anticipation of the sanction of the Government for additional posts of Section Officers, steps were taken for making the selection. A note was put up before the Chief Justice by the Deputy Registrar (Establishment) on September 29, 1975, proposing that a committee of Officers be nominated to assist the Registrar in making the selection for the posts of Section Officers. On this, the Chief Justice, on October 1, 1975, passed two orders: By the first order the Chief Justice nominated a committee of the following persons for the selection of Section Officers: 1. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. N. Singh. 2. The Registrar. 3. The Additional Registrar. The second order passed by the Chief Justice on the same day was as follows: "In making the selection, the field of eligibility will be confined to the personnel working in the general office." The Committee nominated by the Chief Justice considered, in view of the second order of the Chief Justice, only the Upper Division Assistants working in the general office for the selection. It selected 22 persons and submitted their name to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice approved the selection of these 22 persons and thereupon the Registrar issued an order, appointing these persons to the posts of Section Officers in the General Office. It selected 22 persons and submitted their name to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice approved the selection of these 22 persons and thereupon the Registrar issued an order, appointing these persons to the posts of Section Officers in the General Office. Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 7 of 1976, challenged the selection and appointments to the 22 posts of Section Officers on the following grounds: 1. That the promotion to the posts of Section Officers was governed by Rule 8 and should have been made ordinarily according to seniority, bit the selection was not made on this basis. 2. That the power of selection and appointment vested exclusively in the Registrar and, therefore, the selection by the Selection Committee nominated by the Chief Justice and the appointments made by the Chief Justice were against the rules and were illegal. 3. That the three petitioners in this writ petition were better qualified than many of the persons selected and, therefore, the selection was arbitrary. Sri S.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners in writ petition No. 213 of 1976, challenged the selection and appointments on the following grounds: 1. That the Bench Secretaries, who held posts next below the grade of Section Officers, were alone eligible for promotion to the posts of Section Officers; 2. That the Chief Justice had no power to pass the second order on October 1, 1975, confining the selection to the personnel working in the General Office, thereby excluding the Bench Secretaries from consideration altogether; 3. That Rules 9 and 10, which were framed under the Goveminent of India Act and were continued under the present Constitution, will prevail over the orders of the Chief Justice; 4. That the order of the Chief Justice excluding the Bench Secretaries, who were eligible for promotion to the posts of Section Officers, from consideration for promotion to these posts violates Article 16 of the Constitution; and 5. That the order of the Chief Justice does not relate to the filling up of the 22nd posts which were sanctioned on October 22, 1975, after the Chief Justice had passed these orders. I will first deal with Writ Petition No. 7 of 1976 filed by the Upper Division Assistants. That the order of the Chief Justice does not relate to the filling up of the 22nd posts which were sanctioned on October 22, 1975, after the Chief Justice had passed these orders. I will first deal with Writ Petition No. 7 of 1976 filed by the Upper Division Assistants. Their first contention is that Rule 8 applied to the promotion to the posts of Section Officers and that the promotions were not made in accordance with the principles laid down in Rule 8. There is no doubt that the promotions have not been made on the basis of seniority as contemplated in Rule 8 but have been made by selection on merit. But, in my opinion, the promotion to the posts of Section Officers is not governed by Rule 8 as it is covered squarely by Rule 9. Rule 9 provides for promotion, inter alia, to posts of Superintendents in the various departments. The superintendents were redesignated as Section Officers. It was faintly urged by Sri Bhatnagar that Rule 9 applies only to those posts of Superintendents which are posts of responsibility or trust or which require special qualifications. The language of Rule 9 does not justify this interpretation. It enumerates 31 posts and calls them posts of responsibility or trust or posts which require special qualifications. The expression 'posts of responsibility or trust or which require special qualifications' in Rule 9 merely describes the posts enumerated in that rule. Ultimately, Sri Bhatnagar gave up this contention. The third contention of Sri Bhatnagar is that the three petitioners in this writ petition were better qualified for selection than some of those who have been selected. It is not for me, exercising powers under Articles 226 of the Constitution, to reweigh the qualifications of the various persons eligible for promotion to the posts of Section Officers and to hold that the appraisal and selection by the Selection committee was not correct. Learned counsel referred to paragraph 36 of the counteraffidavit filed by the Registrar which states that the Selection Committee, in considering the suitability of the candidates, took into consideration the following matters: 1. Merit. 2. Standing in service. 3. Experience of work in office in different sections. 4. Overall performance in service. 5. Suitability. He urged that the Committee had failed to take into consideration the educational qualifications of the candidates. Merit. 2. Standing in service. 3. Experience of work in office in different sections. 4. Overall performance in service. 5. Suitability. He urged that the Committee had failed to take into consideration the educational qualifications of the candidates. It is stated in paragraph 37 of the counteraffidavit that educational qualifications of the candidates were not considered relevant factors by the Committee in judging the suitability of the candidates. There can be no doubt that the selection was made by the Committee on relevant considerations. It was open to it to take the view that educational qualifications of the candidates were irrelevant in view of the fact that all the candidates were Upper Division Assistants who had been working in the office and from amongst whom it had to select the 22 best candidates. In these circumstances, I am unable to accept Sri Bhatnagar's contention that the Selection Committee acted arbitrarily in making the selection. It now remains to deal with the second and the main contention of Sri Bhatnagar. This contention is that the Registrar alone was empowered by Rule 10 to appoint Section Officers and the appointments made in the present case by the Chief Justice are in violation of Rule 10 and are invalid. It may be mentioned that Counsel for all the respondents have accepted that the appointments have been made by the Chief Justice on the recommendations of the Committee set up by him. Rule 10 provides that promotion to the posts mentioned in Rule 9 shall be made by the Registrar by selection. Therefore, under Rule 10 it is the Registrar who has to make promotions to these posts by selection. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of K.B. Asthana, J. (as he then was) and S.N. Katju, J. in Special Ram Singh Jouhari v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice and others decided at Lucknow on January 2|24, 1969. There the question was i elating to the appointment of a Bench Reader (now redesignated as Bench Secretary), which is also a post covered by Rule 9. The appointment had been made by the Chief Justice. The Division Bench held that the power of the Chief Justice under Article 229(1) of the Constitution to appoint officers and servants of the High Court had been delegated by Rule 10 to the Registrar. The appointment had been made by the Chief Justice. The Division Bench held that the power of the Chief Justice under Article 229(1) of the Constitution to appoint officers and servants of the High Court had been delegated by Rule 10 to the Registrar. It then observed: "Once such a power is delegated to the Registrar by the Rules made by the Chief Justice and no reservation is made in that behalf it is the Registrar who will exercise the power of appointment in accordance with rules and not the Chief Justice." The appointment of the Bench Reader made by the Chief Justice was quashed by the Division Bench. The decision of the Division Bench fully covers the point raised before me in favour of the petitioners. It was argued by learned counsel for respondents that Rule 10 only requires the Registrar to make the promotion and that the appointment has to be made by the Chief Justice in exercise of his powers under Article 229(1). The contention is that the Registrar after making the necessary selection is required to send the list to the Chief Justice and then the Chief Justice makes the appointment. Apart from the fact that this contention runs contrary to the decision of the Division Bench, referred to above, there appears no merit in it. Where Rule 10 speaks of promotion it really means appointment by promotion. The first part of Rule 10 says that promotion to the posts of Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar shall be made by the Chief Justice in his discretion. This clearly means that the appointment to the posts of Deputy Registrars and Assistant Registrars, which are also to be made by promotion, will be made by the Chief Justice in his discretion. Even on the argument of learned Counsel no selection or promotion has been made by the Registrar, but it has been made by the Committee set up by the Chief Justice. Even on that interpretation there is violation of Rule 10. it was then contended by learned counsel for respondents that the power to appoint Section Officers vested in the Chief Justice as well as in the Registrar, and, therefore, the appointments by the Chief Justice are not invalid. Even on that interpretation there is violation of Rule 10. it was then contended by learned counsel for respondents that the power to appoint Section Officers vested in the Chief Justice as well as in the Registrar, and, therefore, the appointments by the Chief Justice are not invalid. Article 229(1) is in these terms: "Appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of the Court as he may direct: Provided that the Governor of the State may by rule require that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court save after consultation with the State Public Service Commission. It will be noticed that the main part of Article 229(1) names three authorities which may make the appointments, namely, the Chief Justice, other Judge of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice and an officer of the Court nominated by the Chief Justice. The power is exercisable either by the Chief Justice himself, or if he nominates another Judge of the High Court or an officer of the High Court in that behalf, then by that other Judge or officer. Article 229 (1) does not contemplate the simultaneous existence of the power of appointment in more than one person. The point raised is covered by the decision of the Division Bench. Lastly, it was urged that the Constitution of the Committee by the Chief Justice amounted to giving of general or special orders by the Chief Justice under Rule 10. The Division Bench referred to above had held that the words 'subject to any general or special order by the Chief Justice' in Rule 10 govern only promotions to posts contemplated by Rule 8 and not to promotions covered by Rule 9. Since the present appointments are covered by Rule 9, no general or special directions could be issued by the Chief Justice. In any case, even if the Chief Justice was empowered to issue any such general or special directions in respect of appointments under Rule 9, they could not take away the power of the Registrar to make the promotion by selection or change the appointing authority. In any case, even if the Chief Justice was empowered to issue any such general or special directions in respect of appointments under Rule 9, they could not take away the power of the Registrar to make the promotion by selection or change the appointing authority. Since in the present case the appointments have, admittedly, been made by the Chief Justice and not by the Registrar, who was the competent authority under the Rules to do so, the appointments must be held to be invalid. Writ Petition No. 7 of 1976 deserves to be allowed and the appointments made by the Chief Justice are liable to be quashed I now come to Writ Petition No. 213 of 1976 filed by the Bench Secretaries. Before Starting consideration of the points raised, it is necessary to determine the position occupied by the Bench Secretaries in the office of the High Court. The appointment to the posts of Bench Secretaries is covered by Rule 9. The appointments have to be made by the Registrar by promotion by selection. The method of selection was laid down in a notice issued by the Deputy Registrar on September 14, 1960, which reads thus: "A written test followed by an interview will be held, on a date to be notified later, for selection of officials for being brought on the list of approved candidates for appointment as Bench Readers. The test will consist of one paper carrying 70 marks and 30 marks will be allotted for the interview, thus making a total of 100 marks. The questions in the written paper will be based on Chapters I, II, IV to XII, XV, XVII, XVIII of the Rules of Court, 1952 Chapter V of General Rules (Civil) and Chapter IV of General Rues (Criminal) Orders XLI to XLVII and XLIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Chapters XXXI, XXXII and of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Upper Division Assistants, junior translators who are permanent, permanent assistants who are graduates or who have put in at least 5 years service and are certified by their superintendents as really efficient and of outstanding merit are eligible for selection. Upper Division Assistants, junior translators who are permanent, permanent assistants who are graduates or who have put in at least 5 years service and are certified by their superintendents as really efficient and of outstanding merit are eligible for selection. Officials who do not possess good knowledge of both the forms of Vernacular and English need not apply........" The position of the Bench Secretaries will appear from the following pay scales, which are applicable to the various grades of officers and servants in the office of the High Court: S. No. Particulars. Pay Scales. 1. 2. 3. 4, 5. 6. (i) (ii) (i) (iii) (i) (ii) Deputy Registrar Principal Private Secretary (Old Private Secretary to Hon. The Chief Justice.) Section Officers.(Old Supdts. and Asstt. Supdts. Including Stamp Reporter and Court Officer). I Assistant Principal Private Secretary. Old Asstt. Private Secretary to Hon. the Chief Justice). Private Secretary. (Old Judgment writers and Personal Assistants). Bench Secretary. (Old Bench Reader) Personal Assistants. (Old Stenographers). Upper Division Assistants (Including old Revisers translators, Reference Grade Assistants, who are now merged with the Upper Division Assistants). Lower Division Assistants Routine Grade Clerks and Typists Rs. 8001350 Rs. 5001000 Rs. 400750 Rs. 350700 Rs. 260450 Rs. 200320 From these facts it will appear that the Bench Secretaries come from the same stock as the Upper Division Assistants etc., that they have been selected out of that stock on the basis of merit and that they occupied a grade a little higher than that of the Upper Division Assistants. There is one Section Officer in the Bench Secretaries branch. Recently, on the recommendation of the High Court, Government has sanctioned higher pay scales for ten Bench Secretaries. This higher scale is equivalent to the scale of Section Officers. A preliminary objection was raised by one of the learned counsel appearing for some of the respondents that since one of the grounds raised in the writ petition related to the enforcement of the fundamental right under Article 16 of the Constitution, its hearing should be postponed on account of the proclamation of emergency by the President under Article 352 and of the suspension of fundamental rights under Article 359. The order of the President under Article S59 in terms suspends the operation of Article 14 and not of Article Id. The order of the President under Article S59 in terms suspends the operation of Article 14 and not of Article Id. Still it is contended that since Article 16 is one of the facts of Article 14, the suspension of Article 14 results in the suspension of Article 16 also. Reliance is placed upon the observations of a Full Bench of the Assam High Court in Shyam Behari Tewari v. Union of India A.I.R. 1963 Assam 94. The question which rose in this case related to the constitutionality of Rule 149 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code Vol. I, which provided for premature termination of the services of railway servants, temporary and permanent. Though the Full Bench observed that it was not necessary to test the validity of Rule 149 on the ground that it infringes Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, it observed: "The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 is a general right of which the right conferred under Article 16 is a species and in our opinion, the petitioners in view of this statement are not entitled to contend that the Rule violates Article 16 of the Constitution." The reasoning for this conclusion that Article 16 embodied the principle of equality contained in Article 14 in the sphere of employment and that a person who sought his remedy under Article 16, in effect, was enforcing the fundamental right enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution and that since Article 14 was suspended, Article 16 could not be invoked. The decision of the Full Bench was specifically over ruled by the Supreme Court in Moti Ram Deka v, N. E. F. Railway A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600. The Supreme Court struck down Rule. 149 on the ground of violation of Article 14. The President was fully aware of the existence of the three Articles dealing with equality, namely, Article 14, 15 and 16 and he chose to suspend the operation of Art. 14 only. He, obviously, did not intend to suspend the prohibition against discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth imposed by Article 15 or the guarantee of equality of opportunity in matters of public employment given by Article 16. He, obviously, did not intend to suspend the prohibition against discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth imposed by Article 15 or the guarantee of equality of opportunity in matters of public employment given by Article 16. It cannot be said that Articles 15 and 16 cannot stand independently of Article 14 and that if the operation of Article 14 is suspended, then necessarily Articles 15 and 16 become inoperative. Even if Article 14 had not been enacted, Articles 15 and 16 would still have been effective. This writ petition which seeks to enforce the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 16 is maintainable and the preliminary objection is rejected. The first contention raised by Sri Gupta is that the Bench Secretaries alone were in the field of eligibility for promotion to the posts of Section Officers. There is a hierarchy of grades of officers and servants of the High Court. The various grades, according to pay scales, have been set out earlier in this judgment. When appointments to certain posts in a particular grade are required by the Rules to be made by promotion, it is necessarily implied that promotions have to be made from the lower grades. The Rules do not specify the fields of eligibility for the various promotion posts. The petitioners' case is that since the grade of Bench Secretaries is immediately below that of the Section Officers, they alone are eligible for promotion to these posts. According to them, promotion has to be made from the next lower grade to the higher grade. It is true that, generally, promotions are made from the next lower grade to the higher grade. As already observed, the Rules do not specifically lay down that promotions to the posts of Section Officers will be made from the grades of Bench Secretaries alone. No authority has been cited before me laying down that promotions are always confined to the grade next below the one to which appointments have to be made. In its ordinary meaning, 'promote' means advance to a higher position or post. The advance can be from any position or post which is lower and not necessarily from the post which is immediately lower. In its ordinary meaning, 'promote' means advance to a higher position or post. The advance can be from any position or post which is lower and not necessarily from the post which is immediately lower. In appointments to the posts of Bench Secretaries themselves, though the Rules are silent on the point, promotions are made not only from the immediately lower grade of Upper Division Assistants but also from the next lower grade of lower Division Assistants. Therefore, if Upper Division Assistants have also been considered eligible for promotion to the posts of Section Officers, it cannot be said that this is either in violation of any or is illegal. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the petitioners' contention that Bench Secretaries alone were eligible for promotion to the posts of Section Officers. But this much is clear that, under the Rules, Bench Secretaries were also eligible for promotion to these posts. The second, third and fifth ground raised by Sri Gupta may be considered together. The substance of these three grounds is that the Chief Justice had no power to issue the order dated October 1. 1975, confining the field or eligibility for promotion to the posts of Section Officers to the personnel working in the General Office, thereby excluding the Bench Secretaries from consideration and that even if he had, the order passed by him does not relate to the filling up of the 22 posts which were sanctioned later. Under the Rules, the Bench Secretaries were in the field of eligibility for these appointments and it is only by this order of the Chief Justice that they have been excluded from consideration. The Rules do not specifically confer any power on the Chief Justice to define or confine the field of eligibility for appointment to any posts in the office of the High Court. Learned counsel for the respondents sought to justify the order of the Chief Justice on the ground that Rule 10 authorises the Chief Justice to issue 'any general or special order' in respect of the appointments by promotion under Rule 9. Learned counsel for the respondents sought to justify the order of the Chief Justice on the ground that Rule 10 authorises the Chief Justice to issue 'any general or special order' in respect of the appointments by promotion under Rule 9. I have already held, while considering 1he identical argument raised in writ petition No. 7 of 1976 regarding the order of the Chief Justice appointing a selection committee, that, in view of the decision of the Division Bench in Ram Singh Jouhary's case, the words 'any general or special order passed by the Chief Justice' do not govern appointments under Rule 9. It was then contended by the respondents that the Rules, which are relateable to clause (2) of Article 229, can only make provision regarding the conditions of service of officers and not regarding their appointments which is covered by clause (1). A reference was made to Article 309 where the power to make rules is conferred for regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the services. It is contended that Article 309 shows that the Constitution contemplates recruitment and conditions of service as two different things, each exclusive of the other. From this is contended that, in spite of the Rules, the Chief Justice was entitled to make appointments under clause (1) of Article 229 and to lay down the field of eligibility for making appointments. This contention cannot be accepted for two reasons: Clause (1) of Article 229 only confers the right of appointment and not the power to make rules for making the appointments. Clause (2) confers a power on the Chief Justice to make the Rules regarding the conditions of service of officers and servants of the High Court. The expression 'conditions of service' in clause (2) includes the power to make the Rules relating to appointments also as there is no other power apart from this for making the Rules relating to appointments If the contention of learned counsel for the respondents were accepted then there would be no power in the Chief Justice to make any rules relating to recruitment and appointments of officers and servants of the High Court. This contentions cannot be accepted. This contentions cannot be accepted. The second reason is that, as pointed out earlier, the Division Bench, in Ram Singh Jouhary's case, has held that the Registrar, to the exclusion of the Chief Justice, has the power to make appointments under Rule 9 and, therefore, even on the contention of learned counsel, the Chief Justice has no power to prescribe the field of eligibility as the appointing authority. Lastly, it was urged by learned counsel for the respondents that the order of the Chief Justice laying down the field of eligibility amounts to an amendment of the Rules and is thus a rule itself under clause (2) of Article 229. There is no substance in this contention either. In passing the order, the Chief Justice neither contemplated nor intended to amend the Rules. The Rules cannot be amended in the manner in which the impugned order was passed. The order was passed on a note put up by the Deputy Registrar, suggesting that the Chief Justice may nominate a committee of office bearers to assist the Registrar in making the selection for the posts of Section Officers. It is true that no particular formalities have been prescribed by the Constitution for making the Rules under clause (2) of Article 229; but this does not mean that every word, oral or written, which falls from the Chief Justice's lips or pen in connection with the appointments or the terms and conditions of service of officers and servants of the High Court, becomes a rule. It will only be a rule if and when the Chief Justice consciously exercises the powers conferred on him by clause (2) of Article 229. One would expect, when a rule is made in exercise of the power, that the Chief Justice would say so. When the original rules were made, they were published in the Government Gazette and it was stated therein that they were made by the Chief Justice in exercise of the power conferred by clause (b) of subsection (2) of Section 241 read with subsection (2) of Section 242 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The impugned order of the Chief Justice was never published in the Gazette and does not appear to have been given any publicity. It appears to be an ad hoc executive order passed in connection with the present selection of Section Officers only. The impugned order of the Chief Justice was never published in the Gazette and does not appear to have been given any publicity. It appears to be an ad hoc executive order passed in connection with the present selection of Section Officers only. It is not possible to treat this order as a rule under clause (2) of Article 229, For the same reasons, it is not possible to treat the order of the Chief Justice dated May 12, 1974, as a rule under clause (2) of Article 229. A copy of this order was not filed by any of the parties but the original order was shown to me at the fag end of the arguments and a copy was handed up to me. The following sentence in this order was relied upon by the respondents: "In respect of the posts of Section Officers and Assistant Registrars and Deputy Registrars, final decision shall be of the Chief Justice, while in respect of the others, of the Registrar." It is not clear from this order as to for what purpose the decision was to be of the Chief Justice or of the Registrar. No reliance upon this order has been placed in the counteraffidavit and, it not being a rule under clause (2) of Article 229, it cannot have the effect of amending the Rules The fifth contention of the petitioners that even if the Chief Justice had the power to issue the impugned order, it could not relate to the filling up of the 22 newly sanctioned posts of Section Officers is not sound. It is true that the order was passed on October 1, 1975, while the posts of Section Officers is not sound. It is true that the order was passed on October 1, 1975, while the posts were sanctioned by the Government on October 22, 1975. But, obviously, the Chief Justice know that the posts had been sanctioned and that the communication would come from Government in due course. It was open to him, in anticipation of the sanction, to take steps for filling up these posts and to pass such orders in this respect as he was entitled to do. There were no other posts of Section Officers vacant to which the impugned order could be said to relate. It was open to him, in anticipation of the sanction, to take steps for filling up these posts and to pass such orders in this respect as he was entitled to do. There were no other posts of Section Officers vacant to which the impugned order could be said to relate. It is clear that the order of the Chief Justice dated October 1, 1975, was in respect of these 22 posts of Section Officers. The last contention of the petitioners is that the order of the Chief Justice dated October 1, 1975, and the selection and appointment of Section Officers on the basis of that order violate Article 16 of the Constitution. Since I have held that the Chief Justice had no power to issue the order of October, 1, 1975, the further question. whether it offends Article 1(J does not really arise. But" since arguments have been addressed to me at length on this point, I would like to deal with it briefly. I have held earlier that the Bench Secretaries as well as the Upper Division Assistants were eligible for promotion or selection to the 22 posts of Section Officers. By the impugned order of the Chief Justice, the Bench Secretaries have been excluded from consideration. Prima facie, the order offends Article 16 of the Constitution. It is not disputed that Art. 16 applies not only to the initial appointments but also to promotions. A number of cases decided by the Supreme Court were cited before me to bring out the principles laid down for the applicability of Article 16. It is not necessary to notice all the decisions. It has been said that equality is for equals and that Article 16 is a charter of equals. In State of Mysore v. Krishna Murthy A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1146, the Supreme Court observed: "In equality of opportunity of promotion, though not unconstitutional per se, must be justified on the strength of rational criteria correlated to the object for which the difference is made. In the case of Government servants, the object of such a difference must be presumed to be a selection of the most competent from amongst those possessing qualifications and backgrounds entitling them to be considered as members of one class. In some cases, quotas may have to be fixed between what are different classes or sources for promotion on grounds of public policy. In some cases, quotas may have to be fixed between what are different classes or sources for promotion on grounds of public policy. If, on the facts of a particular case, the classes to be considered are really different, inequality of opportunity in promotional chances may be justifiable. On the contrary, if the facts of a particular case disclose no such rational distinction between members of what is found to be really a single class, no class distinctions can be made in selecting the best. Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution must be held to be violated when members of one class are not even considered for promotion. The. case before us falls, in our opinion, in the latter type of cases where the difference in promotional opportunities of those who were wrongly divided into two classes for this purpose only could not be justified on any rational grounds." Relying upon an order of the Chief Justice dated November 6, 1973, a copy of which is Annexure 3' to the counteraffidavit filed by the Registrar, it was urged by learned counsel for the respondents that the Bench Secretaries formed a separate cadre different from that of the officers and servants in the general office. On this basis, it was urged that the Bench Secretaries were not entitled to be considered for promotion to the posts of Section Officers which were in a different cadre. The order reads thus: "Order No. 3 of 1973: The conditions of Service Rules of the High Court staff will be finalised shortly, but under Article 229 of the Constitution it is ordered that the High Court staff shall consist of not one cadre but of many cadres, for example; (1) General office from the Deputy Registrar to the Lower Division Assistants and Routine Grade Clerks including Typists. (2) Principal Private Secretary, Assistant Principal Private Secretary, Private Secretaries and Personal Assistants. (3) Senior Bench Secretary and Bench Secretaries. (4) Section Officer, Translation Department and Translators. (5) Chief Librarian and Assistants. This list is not exhaustive. In each cadre, there shall be different Grades, for example, in the General office, there shall be Grades of Deputy Registrars, Assistant Registrars, Section Officers Grades I and II, Upper Division Assistants, Reference Clerks, Lower Division Assistants and Routine Grade Clerks and Typists. (4) Section Officer, Translation Department and Translators. (5) Chief Librarian and Assistants. This list is not exhaustive. In each cadre, there shall be different Grades, for example, in the General office, there shall be Grades of Deputy Registrars, Assistant Registrars, Section Officers Grades I and II, Upper Division Assistants, Reference Clerks, Lower Division Assistants and Routine Grade Clerks and Typists. In the cadre of private Secretaries, there shall be one Grade of Principal Private Secretary, the other grade of Assistant Principal Private Secretary and Private Secretaries and the 3rd of Personal Assistants. There shall be one Grade of Senior Bench Secretary and the other of Bench Secretaries in the cadre of Bench Secretaries. Similarly, in the Library Section, there shall be the grades of Chief Librarian and the other of Assistants. This order has been passed for the information of the High Court staff that the rule about cadres shall be enforced from November 6, 1973. November 6, 1973. Sd| Chief Justice." This order does not appear to have ever been given effect to or to have been considered as an amendment to the Rules. A Division Bench of this Court consisting of K. B. Asthana, C.J. and K.B. Srivastava, J. has, in Madan Mohan Saran v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice Decided in January 20, 1975, held that the staff attaches to the High Court consists of a single cadre. The decision in this case was given on January 20, 1975. long after the order of Chief Justice dated November 6, 1973 was passed but that order was not even relied upon in this case. Secondly, the identical question was raised in Writ Petition No. 1156 of 1975 (Ram Lakhan Srivastava v. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice, High Court, Allahabad). The dispute related to the appointment in the Librarian's Branch and the petitioner in that case alleged that the Librarian's Branch formed a separate and distinct cadre and promotions to the higher posts in this cadre should be confined to the employees of this cadre. A counteraffidavit was filed on behalf of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the Registrar by Nabi Ahmad Siddiqi, a Section Officer. It was stated in paragraph 5 of this counteraffidavit: "There was no specific order whatsoever passed by the State Government for constituting any separate cadre of Library and any separate Library Department in the High Court. A counteraffidavit was filed on behalf of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the Registrar by Nabi Ahmad Siddiqi, a Section Officer. It was stated in paragraph 5 of this counteraffidavit: "There was no specific order whatsoever passed by the State Government for constituting any separate cadre of Library and any separate Library Department in the High Court. The Library was always a part of general administration. The matter came for consideration in Writ Petition No. 693 of 1969Madan Mohan Saran and another v. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice and others, The Division Bench sitting at Lucknow held on January 20, 1975 that the office establishment of our Court is one establishment having a single cadre and it is wrong to say that there are several cadres in that service. It was inter alia found in the said decision that the library is only a part of the general administration and is not a separate department. The matter stands concluded by the Division Bench's decision referred to above." In view of this categorical stand taken by the Chief Justice and the Registrar, it is hardly permissible for them now to urge that there are more cadres then one in the High Court service. Even in the present selections and appointments, the various departments of the High Court have not been treated as separate cadres. Two of the persons selected and appointed as Section Officers, namely, Shakil Ahmad respondent No. 6 and H.N. Tandon respondent No. 16 belonged to the Translation Department which, according to the order of the Chief Justice dated November 6, 1973, would be a separate cadre yet they have been promoted to the posts of Section Officers in the general office. It was stated by learned counsel for the Chief Justice and the Registrar that these two persons were working in the general office. Even if that be so, their cadre would not change if they belonged to a separate and distinct cadre. Again, Jagdish Prasad respondent No. 21 belonged to the Library Department which also, according to the order of November 6, 1973, was constituted a separate and independent cadre but he has also been selected and appointed a Section Officer in the general office. Again, Jagdish Prasad respondent No. 21 belonged to the Library Department which also, according to the order of November 6, 1973, was constituted a separate and independent cadre but he has also been selected and appointed a Section Officer in the general office. These appoints clearly show that the order of the Chief Justice dated November 6, 1973', never became effective and was never treated as a rule under clause (2) of Article 229 either by the Chief Justice or by the High Court. One more instance may be cited in this connection: One N.P. Asthana was a Private Secretary and, according to the order dated November 6, 1973, the Private Secretaries Branch also constituted a separate and independent cadre. He was, however, promoted to the post first of Assistant Registrar and then of Deputy Registrar. This was done by the Chief Justice himself. From all this it appears that the entire staff of the High Court constitutes one cadre and the various departments have been created only for the sake of efficiency of working. Since there is only one cadre and the Bench Secretaries fall in a grade immediately below that of Section Officers, they WPT" clearly eligible for appointment to the posts of Section Officers It was then urged by learned counsel for the respondents that the Bench Secretaries formed a separate case and they could legitimately be treated differently in the matter of promotion from other classes. There can be no doubt that the Bench Secretaries form a distinct class, having a scale of pay different from those of other classes in the High Court office. It may be said that the classification of Bench Secretaries in one class is reasonable. But can it be said that there is any rational relation between the object of making promotions and the different treatment meted out to this class in the matter of promotion. The object admittedly is to ensure efficiency in the working of the High Court and, for that purpose, appointments have to be made by promotion by selection. Can it ever be said that the object of attaining efficiency will be achieved by excluding the class of Bench Secretaries from consideration in making promotions to the posts of Sections Officers? The object admittedly is to ensure efficiency in the working of the High Court and, for that purpose, appointments have to be made by promotion by selection. Can it ever be said that the object of attaining efficiency will be achieved by excluding the class of Bench Secretaries from consideration in making promotions to the posts of Sections Officers? It was urged by learned counsel for the respondents that Section Officers in the general office are required to supervise the work of Upper Division Assistant and, therefore, the Upper Division Assistants, who are familiar with that work, are alone qualified for promotion to these posts. This argument ignores the fact that the Bench Secretaries also come from the same stock as the Upper Division Assistants. In fact, they were found more meritorious in the selection for Bench Secretaries than the ether Upper Division Assistants who failed in the selection. On account of this selection on merit, they are today occupying a slightly higher grade than that of Upper Division Assistants. It is not possible to accept the contention that the Upper Division Assistants are better suited to work as Section Officers in the general office than the Bench Secretaries. In fact, if eligibility for promotion to the posts of Section Officers had been confined to the Bench Secretaries, it would not have offended Article 16. Lastly, it was contended by learned counsel for the respondents that separate avenues of promotion have been provided for the Bench Secretaries and, therefore, they can lay no claim to the avenues of promotion open to the Upper Division Assistants. There is one post of Section Officer in the Bench Secretaries Branch. Recently, the Government has sanctioned a higher scale of pay for ten Bench Secretaries equivalent to the scale of Section Officers. I do not think that the provision of these posts for the Bench Secretaries will entitle the Chief Justice to debar them from consideration for posts of Section Officers in the general office. It is not that the Upper Division Assistants have only one avenue of promotion and that to the posts of Section Officers in the General Office. Their avenue of promotion is also to the posts of Bench Secretaries and there from to the posts of Section Officers. Lastly it remains to consider the consequences which follow from the impugned order of the Chief Justice. Their avenue of promotion is also to the posts of Bench Secretaries and there from to the posts of Section Officers. Lastly it remains to consider the consequences which follow from the impugned order of the Chief Justice. An Upper Division Assistant who was found on selection to be more meritorious and was promoted to the post of Bench Secretaries is, by virtue of the order of the Chief Justice, debarred from promotion to the higher post of Section Officer, while an Upper Division Assistant who was not so found meritorious is eligible for the promotion. If the less meritorious Upper Division Assistant is selected to the post of Section Officer, he will occupy a post higher than that occupied by the more meritorious Upper Division Assistant who was selected to the post of Bench Secretary and to whom the promotion is barred. This unjustified discrimination is clear from the case of H. N. Tandon, respondent No. 16. Tandon was at one time selected for the post of Bench Secretary, but was later reverted to the grade of Upper Division Assistant. He has now been selected and appointed Section Officer. He now occupies a grade higher than that occupied by those Upper Division Assistants who had been selected as Bench Secretaries and who continued to remain as such. It was pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioners that, if a Bench Secretary was punished for inefficient work and was reverted to the grade of Upper Division Assistants, he would become entitled to be considered for selection to the posts of Section Officers but another Bench Secretary, who was found to be efficient and remained a Bench Secretary, was excluded from consideration for these posts. These consequences clearly establish that the order of the Chief Justice dated October 1, 1975, results in an unjustified discrimination and offends Article 16. For the reasons given above, both the writ petitions are allowed, the two orders of the Chief Justice dated October 1, 1975, the recommendations made by the Selection Committee and the appointments made by the Chief Justice to the 22 posts of Section Officers in the general office, notified by the "Registrar by order dated January 27, 1976, are quashed. The petitioners in both the writ petitions are entitled to their costs.