JUDGMENT Shiveshwar Pd. Sinha, J. This matter has been referred to Division Bench. 2. With regard to an occurrence which took place in village Rupaspur Chandwa, Police Station Dhamdaha, District Purnea on the 22nd November, 1971, quite a large number of persons have been put on trial. However, owing to the fact that all the accused persons did not surrender together, separate trials have been started in respect of some of the accused persons. In respect of 55 persons, there was commitment proceeding in terms of Chapter XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and on being committed to be tried by the court of Sessions, the case number of that trial in the Sessions court is Sessions Trial No. 47 of 1973. In respect of the persons who subsequently surrendered, the cases against them were instituted in the year, 1975 and regarding one in the year 1976. There are four sessions trial cases pertaining to the year 1975 and one pertaining to the year 1976. Criminal procedure Code 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) having come into force from the 1st, April, 1974, the procedure adopted in the different trials came to be governed by the two Codes of Criminal Procedure, namely, one being the old Code, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and other being the new Code, Criminal Procedure Code ] 973. Sessions Trial No. 47 of 1973 is proceeding under the Old Code and the rest of the trials under the new Code. A question arose as to whether all the Sessions trials which arise out of the same occurrence, should be held in accordance with the provisions of the old Code or in accordance with the provisions of the new Code. 3. It may be added that all these sessions trials were transferred to the same Sessions court for trial. Practically all the accused persons in all the trials filed a petition that all the cases under both the Codes should be consolidated for trial to obviate the hardships and the financial difficulties which the accused may face in defending themselves separately. A further ground for such a prayer was that it would also obviate prejudice being caused to them in their defence. The learned sessions Judge, by order dated the 2nd September, 1976, has rejected the prayer. A further ground for such a prayer was that it would also obviate prejudice being caused to them in their defence. The learned sessions Judge, by order dated the 2nd September, 1976, has rejected the prayer. According to him the provisions under the two Codes of Criminal Procedure, which were mandatory in nature, would get transgressed if consolidation of cases governed by the Old Code and New Code is made. 4. Since that was the view expressed by the learned Sessions Judge and the argument initially before that Court being that all the cases will be governed by the procedure under one Code, the matter has been referred to a Division Bench. 5. Mr. Gorakh Nath Singh, appearing for the petitioners did not dispute the position that so far as the Sessions Trial No. 47 of 1973 is concerned it will be governed by the procedure laid under the Old Code, namely, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the other five Sessions trials, namely, Sessions Trial Nos. 36 of 1975, 68 of 1975, 112 of 1975, 130 of 1975 and 149 of 1976 shall be governed by the procedure under the New Code, namely, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. His only submission is that since the same persons would be witnesses in all the trial cases it would be proper to record their evidence at one place for use in all the separate trials. That is all that he wants. 6. Mr. Jaiswal appearing for the State raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of this petition on the ground that it was against an interlocutory order. He submitted that though it was a criminal miscellaneous application, involving the inherent powers of this Court, but since in effect it was for up-setting an interlocutory order, the petition should not be entertained. According to Mr. Jaiswal section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 specifically prohibits interference through revision of interlocutory orders by any court. 7. It is difficult for me to appreciate Mr. Jaiswal's objection. This objection could be appreciated only if there was some specific definition of "interlocutory orders". To me it appears that the word "interlocutory'' is a relative expression; the order may have been passed at an intermediate stage of the case and yet it may be final in nature. 7. It is difficult for me to appreciate Mr. Jaiswal's objection. This objection could be appreciated only if there was some specific definition of "interlocutory orders". To me it appears that the word "interlocutory'' is a relative expression; the order may have been passed at an intermediate stage of the case and yet it may be final in nature. Broadly speaking, however, by interlocutory order one understands a type of order which does not finally decide the rights of the parties. This is a negative way of understanding as what is as interlocutory order, but that is one way of describing it. Now, therefore, if we look at the impugned order whether it can be called an interlocutory order, seems doubtful to me. After all, this order finally decides the question, on an interpretation of law, that there can be no consolidation of the trials. It is not an order on appraisement of facts which could be reopened for reappraisal. It is basically a decision of legal principles involved in the cases. Necessarily it is final, in so far as it concerns the Court passing the order, and also finally decides the position relating to the manner in which the evidence would be recorded in the case. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the persons who will appear as witnesses may be the same in each trial their evidence will be recorded separately in each trial. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned the impugned order is final. In my opinion, therefore, it would be wrong to call such orders interlocutory orders. Besides, the inherent powers of this court to do justice can not be circumscribed by the provisions of Section 397 (2) of the New Code. The preliminary objection is accordingly rejected. 8. Coming now to the question as to whether the evidence of all the witnesses should be recorded at one place I do not think there can be any valid objection to this. So I far as the procedure for recording evidence is concerned it is substantially the same in both the Codes. The preliminary objection is accordingly rejected. 8. Coming now to the question as to whether the evidence of all the witnesses should be recorded at one place I do not think there can be any valid objection to this. So I far as the procedure for recording evidence is concerned it is substantially the same in both the Codes. Section 286 (2) of Old Code says that "the prosecutor shall then examine his witnesses." Section 231 (1) of the New Code also says virtually the same thing that "on the date so fixed the Judge should proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution." Sub-section (2) of section 484 does not bar the recording of evidence for trial under the Old Code and New Code together. 9. In the instant case it is not disputed by either party that the same persons would be witnesses in all the trials. The same offences are subject matter of all the trials. In fact all the cases arise out of the same occurrence. Such being the position, I think, the circumstances require that the evidence of all the witnesses be recorded at once place for being used in the separate trials separately. 10. In the result the application is disposed of protanto. The records may be sent down immediately. M. P. Singh, J. I agree. Order accordingly.