JUDGMENT 1. - This is an application-in-revision filed by Jodha Ram and Others against the preliminary order and the order of attachment of the land in dispute passed by the District Magistrate, Churu, on 5-1-1976, in a proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P.C. 2. The short facts giving rise to this revision-petition may be stated as followsOn 5-1-1976. the District Magistrate, Churu, initiated proceedings under S. 145, new Criminal Procedure Code upon some information that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists concerning `Johar' and pasture land situated in villages Bachrara and Ghumandi between Jodha Ram and Others on one side and Pabudan Singh and Others on the opposite side. He made an order in writing stating the grounds of his satisfaction and requiring the parties concerned in the dispute to attend his court on a specified date and time and to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. At the time of passing the preliminary order, the District Magistrate considered the case to be one of emergency and, therefore, attached the land in dispute under sub-section (l)of S. 145, new Criminal Procedure Code. Aggrieved by these simultaneous orders, Jodha Ram and Others have come-up in revision to this court. 3. The revision-petition was admitted and notices were issued to Pabudan Singh and Other non-petitioners. Mr. P. N. Datt appeared on behalf of the non-petitioners and contested the revision-petition. I have carefully gone through the record and heard the learned counsel for the parties. Firstly, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that there was no material on record to show that there was existence of dispute relating to `Johar' and pasture land and apprehension breach of the peace because of it and that the District Magistrate, Churu, wrongly assumed jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under S: 145, Cr. P. C. (new) against the petitioners. It was further argued by Mr. Bishnol for the petitioners that the power of attachment in case of emergency under Sub-Section (1) of S. 146, Cr. P.C. is confined to cases in which the danger of breach of the peace is so imminent as to call for prompt action to prevent it. P. C. (new) against the petitioners. It was further argued by Mr. Bishnol for the petitioners that the power of attachment in case of emergency under Sub-Section (1) of S. 146, Cr. P.C. is confined to cases in which the danger of breach of the peace is so imminent as to call for prompt action to prevent it. According to him, the District Magistrate acted without necessary data and his order of attachment does not show any material on which he based his conclusion of imminent danger of breach of the peace necessitating attachment on the ground of emergency. In short, the argument of Mr. Bishnol was that an order of attachment can be passed without issuing notice to the other side, but the attachment should not be ordered as a matter of routine in the absence of necessary data showing imminent danger of breach of the peace. In support of his above contention, Mr Bishnol relied on Mushtaq Ali v. Bulaki Chand, AIR 1956 Bhopal 2 and Birma v. Aidan, X.Y.Y.R.R. 1954 RLW 736 4. Mr. P.N. Datt, appearing on behalf of the other side, on the other hand, urged that the District Magistrate was entitled to act on any information received by him and that he was not required to form his opinion that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists on evidence or on police report and that the High Court will not go in revision into sufficiency of the information which has satisfied the District Magistrate. It was further argued by Mr. P.N. Datt that in this case the District Magistrate, Churu, has relied upon certain applications sent to him by inhabitants of villages Bachrara and Ghumanda, copies of which are on the record and that there were sufficient grounds for apprehending breach of the peace when he issued the preliminary order and the order of attachment. Mr. Bhati appearing on behalf of the State supported the order of the District Magistrate, Churu. 5. I have given my careful consideration to the rival contentions. From a bare reading of the contents of the two applications dated 7-7-1975 and 1-8-1975 filed by Pabudan Singh, it appears that the District Magistrate was satisfied as to likelihood of breach of the peace because of a dispute relating to `Johar' and pasture land situated in two villages Ghumanda and Bachrara. From a bare reading of the contents of the two applications dated 7-7-1975 and 1-8-1975 filed by Pabudan Singh, it appears that the District Magistrate was satisfied as to likelihood of breach of the peace because of a dispute relating to `Johar' and pasture land situated in two villages Ghumanda and Bachrara. Hence, it cannot be safely held that there was no material at all before the District Magistrate on which he could come to any finding as to likelihood of breach of the peace. It was entirely within the District Magistrate's discretion to institute or not to institute proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. upon the referred to above two applications sent to him by Pabudan Singh. This Court is reluctant to interfere with his discretion, unless it is exercised in an arbitrary manner or on caprice or conjecture. In the two applications it is clearly alleged that some of the persons proceeded against are bent upon forcibly taking the `Johar' and pasture land into their possession and that there is likelihood of breach of the peace because of their attempts to grab the land. This Court while exercising its revisional powers will not go into the sufficiency of the information on which the District Magistrate was satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning `Johar' and pasture land under controversy. The preliminary order is obviously not unreasonable and unjustified as it is based on the facts and material before the District Magistrate. Another contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the dispute in this case relates to the right of user of `Johar' and pasture land and that it is not a dispute concerning immovable property itself. According to the learned counsel for ihe petitioners, the District Magistrate committed an error in taking preventive action under S. 145, Cr. P. C. The proper course for the District Magistrate was to take action under S. 147, Cr. P. C. The above contention has no force, because the contents of the two applications dated 7-7-1975 and 1-8-1975 reveal that some of the persons proceeded against had gone to this land with their ploughs and had started ploughing it. P. C. The proper course for the District Magistrate was to take action under S. 147, Cr. P. C. The above contention has no force, because the contents of the two applications dated 7-7-1975 and 1-8-1975 reveal that some of the persons proceeded against had gone to this land with their ploughs and had started ploughing it. In these circumstances, it can be safely held that the subject- matter of the dispute related not only to the right of the user alleged by the villagers but also to the land itself. Consequently, I am unable to hold that any error as committed by the District Magistrate in taking preventive action under S. 145, Cr. P. C. 6. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that there was no material on the record on which the District Magistrate could consider the case to be one of emergency necessitating attachment of the land under controversy. The above contention has some force. The power to attach property under dispute can be exercised in cases in which the likelihood of breach of the peace is so imminent as to call for prompt action to prevent it. Such a power should be exercised with great care and caution. Attachment should not ordinarily be ordered without hearing the affected parties, unless there is such emergency as to justify ex-parte attachment of the land in dispute. In the present case, there is nothing on the record indicating imminent danger of breach of the peace necessitating immediate action to prevent it by way of attachment of the subject of dispute. From a bare perusal of the order of attachment, it appears that the District Magistrate acted on some information which he did not disclose. This court is not in a position to know what was the nature of that information and whether it was sufficient enough to give satisfaction to the District Magistrate as to the existence of imminent danger of breach of the peace necessitating attachment of the disputed land. There are some applications on the record filed by Pabudan Singh before the District Magistrate. Churu, on the basis of which the preliminary order appears to have been passed. The first application bears no date, hence it cannot be said with reasonable certainty whether it was presented before the District Magistrate prior to the passing of the attachment order. There are some applications on the record filed by Pabudan Singh before the District Magistrate. Churu, on the basis of which the preliminary order appears to have been passed. The first application bears no date, hence it cannot be said with reasonable certainty whether it was presented before the District Magistrate prior to the passing of the attachment order. Apart from this, there is nothing in this application which indicates that there was really emergency at the date of passing of the preliminary order. The second application filed by Pabudan Singh is dated 7th July, 1975, and the third application is dated 1st August, 1975, while the order of attachment along With the preliminary order of the land in dispute was passed on 5th January, 1976 after about five months. The order of attachment does not show any material on which the District Magistrate arrived at a conclusion of imminent danger of breach of the peace. It is not mentioned in the order that after the filing of these applications by Pabudan Singh and Others the persons proceeded against were bent upon causing imminent danger of breach of the peace. It is merely stated in the order of attachment that the District Magistrate has come to know that the likelihood of breach of the peace is so imminent as to call for prompt action to prevent it. The source of information has not been disclosed, nor was any report from the local police called for In the absence of any material this Court is unable to hold that there was any cause for the exercise of the extraordinary powers of attachment of the land. It is undoubtedly true that the question as to the existence of imminent danger of breach of the peace was within the discretion of the District Magistrate but the discretion ought to have been exercised in a judicious manner after applying his mind to the facts and the circumstances of the present case. The discretion exercised by the District Magistrate in this case calls for interference by this Court while exercising revisional powers, because it can be sadly held that the District Magistrate acted without necessary data in passing the order of attachment, which should not have been ordered as a matter of routine. Mr. The discretion exercised by the District Magistrate in this case calls for interference by this Court while exercising revisional powers, because it can be sadly held that the District Magistrate acted without necessary data in passing the order of attachment, which should not have been ordered as a matter of routine. Mr. P.N. Datt, appearing on behalf of the non-petitioners, however, urged before me that the case may be sent back to the District Magistrate for proper determination of the question of emergency and until a proper decision is given by the Magistrate on the question of emergency, the attachment of the land in dispute may be ordered to continue as a temporary measure in order to avoid possibility of any untoward happening resulting in breach of the peace. In support of his above contention, he relied on an authority of this Court Mahant Bhagwandas v. Suggan, 1955 R.L.W. 1. In which Hon'ble Chhangani J., while setting aside the order of attachment, passed an order that until proper decision of the question of emergency by the Magistrate the attachment of the property and the arrangement made for its custody and management shall continue. I have carefully gone through this authority. The view taken by Hon'ble Chhangani J. in the referred to above case, which is like the present one, is correct and quite reasonable. 7. I, therefore, partly accept the revision-petition and while maintaining the preliminary order passed by the District Magistrate on 5th January, 1976, set aside the order of attachment of the land in dispute dated January 5, 1976. However, I think it proper to send the case back to the District Magistrate, Churu, with a direction to consider the question of emergency after hearing both the parties and looking into all such materials, as may be produced before him, and then to pass appropriate orders with reasons in accordance with law. However, in order to avoid any possibility of any untoward happening pertaining to the law and order situation. I further direct that the attachment of the land in dispute and the arrangement made, if any, for the custody and management thereof shall remain in operation until the question as to existence or non existence of the emergency is decided by the District Magistrate after hearing the parties. I further direct that the attachment of the land in dispute and the arrangement made, if any, for the custody and management thereof shall remain in operation until the question as to existence or non existence of the emergency is decided by the District Magistrate after hearing the parties. In case the District Magistrate decides not to attach the disputed property, the orders of this Court regarding continuance of attachment as a temporary measure shall stand vacated. The record of the case be sent to the District Magistrate, Churu, without delay. *******