( 1 ) THE petitioner was a tenant of a premises which belongs to respon- dent-3-SLN. Charities. The said tenancy was terminated and by a decree made in a suit instituted by the 3rd respondent, the petitioner was directed to hand over possession to the 3rd respondent. Accordingly, the petitioner delivered possession of the premises to the 3rd respondent. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent leased out the premises in favour of res- pondent-2. Respondent-2 applied to the District Magistrate, Bangalore, for permission to effect certain additions to and alterations in the said building for the purpose of making the premises fit for exhibiting cinema shows. ( 2 ) THE District Magistrate, Bangalore, made an order on 23-10-74 granting permission to the 2nd respondent to effect additions to and" alterations in the building subject to the conditions mentioned therein. Against that order, the petitioner preferred a revision petition under S. 18 of the Karnataka Cinemas Regulation Act, 1964. That revision petition was dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the State Govt, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. ( 3 ) WHEN the learned Counsel for the petitioner was asked by the court to state the facts which entitled the peitioner to maintain this writ petition, he stated that apart from the petitioner being a member of the public interested in due and proper administration of law governing the cinemas in Bangalore, he had no other interest in the case. ( 4 ) THE question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the petitioner can maintain this writ petition. Dealing with a similar question in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir ahined (Civ App. 2035/71 dt. 19-12-1975), the Supreme Court has observed as follows :". . . . . Courts can intervene only ,where legal rights are invaded. 'legal wrong' requires a judicially enforceable right and the touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse effect on the interest or right of a person has been held to be insufficient to give him the standing 'to sue' for judicial review of administrative action. Again the 'adverse effect' requisite for 'standing to sue' must be an illegal effect. Thus, in the under mentioned cases, it was held that injury resulting from lawful competition not being a legal wrong, cannot furnish a 'standing to sue' for judicial relief. Again the 'adverse effect' requisite for 'standing to sue' must be an illegal effect. Thus, in the under mentioned cases, it was held that injury resulting from lawful competition not being a legal wrong, cannot furnish a 'standing to sue' for judicial relief. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last, category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. . They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the part-time of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicant in this category, may be no more than 'spoking' the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold. 'proceeding further, the Supreme Court observed as follows : ," The Act and the Rules do not confer any substantive justiciable right on a rival in cinema trade apart from the option in common with the rest of the public, to lodge an objection in response to the notice published under Rule 4. The appellant did not avail of this option. He did not lodge any objection in response to the notice, the due publication of which was not denied. No explanation has been given as to why he did not prefer any objection to the grant of the No-objection Certificate before the Dist Magistrate, or the Govt. Even if he had objected before the Dist Magistrate, and failed, the act would not give him a right of appeal. S. 8a of the Act confers a right of appealto the State Govt, only on any person aggrieved by an order of a licensing authority refusing to grant a license or revoking or suspending any licence under S. 8. Obviously, the appellant was not a 'person aggrieved' within the contemplation of Sec. 8a. S. 8a of the Act confers a right of appealto the State Govt, only on any person aggrieved by an order of a licensing authority refusing to grant a license or revoking or suspending any licence under S. 8. Obviously, the appellant was not a 'person aggrieved' within the contemplation of Sec. 8a. Sec. 8b of the Act provides that the State Govt may either of its own motion, or upon an application made by 'an aggrieved person', call for and examine the record of any order made by a licensing authority under this Act, and pass such order thereon as it thinks just and proper. Assuming that the scope of the words 'aggrieved. person' in S. 8b is wider than the ambit of the same words as used in S. 8a then also the appellant cannot, in the circumstances of this case, be regarded as a 'person aggrieved' having the requisite legal capacity to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. The Act and the Rules recognise a special, interest of persons residing, or concerned with any institution such as a school, temple mosque etc. located within a distance of 200 yards of the site on which a cinema house is proposed to be constructed. The appellant does not fall within the category of such persons having a special interest in the locality. It is not his case that his cinema house is situated anywhere near the site in question, or that he has any peculiar interest in his personal, fiduciary or representative capacity in any school, temple etc situated in the vicinity of the said site. It cannot therefore be said that the appellant is 'a person aggrieved' on account of his having a particular and substantial interest of his own in the subject matter of the litigation, beyond the general interest of the public. The instant case falls well-nigh within the ratio of this Court's decision in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. IV. Teekappa Gowda and bros ( (1970) 3 SCR. 846 . For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the appellant had no locws standi to invoke this special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. " ( 5 ) THE position of the petitioner in this case is no better than the position of the appellant before the Supreme Court. The petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .